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SUMMARY
This thesis, using a methodology based on ethnomethodology 
or participant comprehension, has studied the role and 
involvement of the medical profession in the decision 
making and management of acute hospitals both within the 
NHS and within similar hospitals in the United States. It 
considers the management changes that have taken place in 
hospitals, and the involvement of doctors in management 
together with the effects on clinical freedom.
The philosophy of involving doctors in management is 
considered from the viewpoint of the medical profession and 
management, considering both the advantages and 
disadvantages, and the factors and influences which affect 
this within the context of existing clinical involvement in 
management.
The struggle for control and power between doctor and 
manager highlights the different characteristics of doctor 
and manager and their different educational, attitudinal 
and career backgrounds. A test of the relationship of two 
groups, both within and to the hospital, is introduced and 
discussed, as well as how that relationship is affected by 
the patient.
The management involvement by doctors and the problems this 
creates for managers and doctors and their future role is
followed by a discussion of the basic principles and 
structures of emerging clinical directorates, and the 
thesis suggests what the future might be for hospital 
organization, and how some integration might be achieved. 
The concepts and skills that are necessary for involving 
doctors in management are listed and finally some 
suggestions made for the direction of further work.
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INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH TOPIC
1.1. Introduction
The reforms of the National Health Service first 
published by the Government in its White Paper "Working 
for Patients" in 1989 had the declared intention of 
increasing involvement of clinicians in the management of 
resources, (HMSO, 1989:11); this document states:
"It is therefore important that consultants are given 
more responsibility for their use of resources."
It also provided a stimulus for a more detailed 
investigation into the role of hospital consultants and 
specialists in the various processes of management, 
decision making and change in acute hospitals and health 
care organizations.
So I began with what at the time, seemed like a simple 
question:
"What is the role of a doctor in managing a hospital"
This does in fact require qualification as to what is 
meant by "managing" a hospital. Although doctors are
1
responsible for most of the daily activity in the wards, 
theatres and outpatients, and therefore considerable 
expenditure, it can mean the running of the hotel and 
other similar day to day facilities and not just the 
purely medical aspect of the hospital. There are also 
some semantic differences in how the term is used, 
generally, and it is used differently in England and in 
America. There are all sorts of ways people run complex 
organizations and it was not long before I realized how 
very naive my original question had been.
An initial year was devoted largely to background reading 
and considering the questions to be raised, much of which 
changed as the learning process evolved, a matter given 
detailed consideration in Part 5 Chapter 19 which details 
the personal lessons learned and my learning curve.
During 1991 when fieldwork commenced there was a rapid 
and extensive change as foreground knowledge increased; 
this change continued and accelerated after interviewing 
more and more clinical directors, consultants involved in 
management, and general managers.
1.2. The method of the study.
It seemed in the early days as if the plan would be very 
simple and I considered several options as tabulated on 
the next page. Firstly I could consider content, the 
situation as it was, and what I felt that the situation
2
should be, in other words how it could be improved and 
which direction it should be going in. Then I could 
describe how it should get from the one position to the 
other. Alternatively I could take pieces of where it 
was, study them individually, see how each should or 
could be changed and then try and fit them all together 
again as a whole. Or, having considered the whole 
problem in depth, I might have to admit that there was no 
simple answer, and that I could find no solution. I 
felt that the answer and conclusions were unlikely to be 
simple. If they were then the thesis would be flawed as 
studies of this nature and depth, from what I had already 
discovered, do not come up with simple answers.
Study of "content" of the change.
(What changes).
HOW IT SHOULD BE NO SOLUTION
CURRENT
SITUATION.
STUDY PARTS SPLIT INTO PARTS STUDY PARTS
REASSEMBLE PARTS
3
Or I could study the process, the "how” and try and 
understand and explain the changes, the actions, 
reactions and the interactions of the various parties, in 
particular the consultants as they moved from its present 
state, to make a study of the doctors7 reaction and 
involvement in the change process rather than the actual 
changes themselves, in order to see how doctors handled 
change.
Study of the "process" of the change.
(The How of Change).
REACTION TO CHANGE 
INVOLVEMENT IN CHANGE 
PROFESSIONAL CHARACTERISTICS AND CHANGE 
MANAGEMENT STYLES WITH CHANGE 
COMMITMENT TO CHANGE 
ENERGY AND ENTHUSIASM FOR CHANGE 
MOTIVES FOR INVOLVEMENT IN CHANGE
Or thirdly I might study the context of the change, the
"why". Pettigrew (1985a, 1985b) and Pettigrew, McKee and
Ferlie (1988) relate all these three areas of context,
process and content, but also point out that analytically
context is divided into an outer and inner context?
"Outer context refers to the national economic, 
political, and social context for a district as well as 
the perception, action, and interpretation of policies 
at national and regional levels in the NHS. Inner 
context refers to the ongoing strategy, structure,
4
culture, management and political process of the 
district which help shape the process through which 
ideas for change proceed."
And the extent to which I have considered this is
referred to later in this chapter (section 1.6.7) under
Other Influences.




They continue by describing how neglect of context and
the role of powerful groups within them has produced a
situation in which myths abound, and they continue;
"Rather changes are also a product of processes which 
recognize historical and continuing struggles for power 
and status".
1.3. The Scope of the Study
In my research I have studied the role and the 
involvement of the medical profession in the decision 
making and management of acute health care organizations 
particularly acute hospitals both within the National
5
Health Service in England and also within similar 
organizations in the United States.
This has involved studying Clinical Directors, General 
Managers and Chief Executive Officers, Chairmen of Trust 
Boards of various hospitals , and also Academics, 
Governmental Medical Officers and Health Economists 
primarily through interviews and discussions. In 
addition I have attended Management Board Meetings and 
Medical Executive Committee Meetings of the various 
institutions to study how the doctors and managers handle 
the decision making and management processes that go on 
within the hospitals. The Academics, Governmental 
Medical Officers and Health Economists have enabled me to 
step outside the immediate environment of a hospital as a 
unit and study the institution as part of a greater 
organization, and to relate the changes that occur within 
a historical, environmental, sociological and political 
context.
Clinical Directorates as a role model are said to have 
originated in Johns Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore, 
(Disken, Dixon, Halper, and Shocket, 1990:3) which is 
often cited as the model for ideas in the White Paper. I 
thought it would be very relevant to this study to 
consider the American experience. In addition America was 
introducing clinical outcomes audit in 1973, a concept
6
also introduced into the U.K. with the White Paper.
(HMSO, 1989).
Years ago America realised that the cost of health care 
11 far exceeded" the "willingness" of the public to provide 
the necessary finance (via in their case the insurance 
companies and employers), (Bailey, 1990) (Friedman, 1991) 
(Holahan, Moon, Welch, and Zuckerman, 1991). This led to 
the introduction of various concepts of limiting costs by 
involving doctors in the decision making processes to 
allocate resources. (Heyssel, Gaintner, Kues, Jones, and 
Lipstein, 1984).
Also until 1990 most of the useful writing on doctors in 
management had been written in American Journals. (Rubin, 
Plovnick and Fry 1974), (Rubin et al, 1977), (Weisbord, 
1976), (Blumberg, 1977), (Kouzes and Mico, 1979). The 
Americans had for instance long realised that management 
methods no matter how valuable in other settings, do not 
work well in medicine, because they feel that medical 
centres have few of the characteristics of industrial 
firms. There also appeared to be a greater willingness 
on the part of American doctors to be involved in 
administration and management in hospitals and 
departments, greater co-operation between managers and 
clinicians and greater incentives to provide a constantly 
improving service for the benefit of all, and a greater 
sense of immediacy in solving problems. As one Executive
7
Vice President and Chief Executive Officer of an American 
Non Profit Hospital put it to me,
111 think it's important for managers to be objective, 
to be open to physician comments, to spend a lot of 
time out in the hospital, because I think that the lack 
of availability sometimes on the part of hospital 
managers and senior managers is what creates that 
scepticism among the medical staff, "these people don't 
know what the hell they're doing, because they don't 
know what we do. So how can they control what we're 
doing from an office that is so far removed from 
hospital activity." Likewise I also wear this, 
beeper, and the reason for that is that I tell my 
secretary that in the event a physician calls my 
office, for whatever reason, if I'm not here, beep me, 
if I am here, interrupt me. So that I think that 
availability is very important for physicians, for as 
you know, physicians work (at least when they're in the 
hospital), in an acute setting, and when things need to 
happen in a very timely fashion, they call. I think 
they sense a lack of interest or desire in really 
resolving their issues. You can resolve many things 
in a two minute telephone conversation that can take a 
month, if you don't address it at that moment."
1.4. The Changing Environment.
One of the issues that caused me some concern initially 
was the speed at which the subject under study was 
changing. The reforms of the White Paper (HMSO, 1989) 
"Working for Patients" are more radical than anything 
that had gone before in the National Health Service. I 
was concerned as to the point at which I should draw a 
line, describe the scene and draw some conclusions, 
rather in the manner of a giant painting a mural 
depicting some great event in history.
8
This is a subject already discussed in section 1.2 and to 
which I return further in Part 5, Chapter 19. Suffice to 
say that in a changing scene, I was studying as much the 
process and context as the event. My first hypothesis 
was quickly overtaken by my new learning, my initial 
overall plan became meaningless, the variables changed 
and the relationship between them also changed. The 
methods of data collection had to be adjusted to 
accommodate this, and even my advance plan for data 
analysis had to be refined to match the quantity and type 
of data I was collecting. My scientific training 
initially proved a hindrance as it was inappropriate to 
the task of social science research. I felt I was 
researching with an emphasis on discovery, rather than 
with an emphasis on proof. I shall return to the actual 
methodology in Chapters 8 and 9. What was certain was 
that my initial learning process and change in attitude 
had to be fairly rapid.
1.5. The Research Process.
The process of the study could be described as iterative 
and enfolded. The process was not a linear one of a 
gradual development or even a conceptual leap into an 
idea, which was then tested and the results reported, in 
the way my training was encouraging me to go. Rather, it 
was periods of exploration alternating with periods of 
theorizing and reading the ideas of others in the
9
literature then trying out and exploring new ideas with 
the interviewees to see how they developed. Then I had to 
return to the literature to follow up loose strands, 
queries and new thoughts that had been thrown up by my 
experience.
Thus the knowledge I have acquired has grown by an 
accumulation of experience and experimentation, as well 
as the views, philosophies and ideas of others, and my 
maturation, of which the writing of this thesis is itself 
a part. The thesis is therefore a guide to how I have 
arrived at the body of knowledge I have acquired as well 
as an attempt to document those findings. There is a 
slight mixture of literature, method and findings 
throughout, which I shall refer to at the beginning of 
appropriate chapters, although I have tried to separate 
these into various sections as appropriate. Part 2 
covers the outline and background of existing knowledge. 
Part 3 is an explanation of the methodology used. Part 4 
concentrates largely on the data and findings with some 
discussion and Part 5 draws it all together with further 
discussion and suggestions for the direction in which the 
work should be continued.
10
1.6.0. General Plan of Work
1.6.1. Historical Background
I have begun by considering the historical background to 
the control of doctors' work in hospital, how hospitals 
were administered, by whom, and how this has changed over 
the years and in particular since the beginning of the 
NHS. At the same time a parallel with the USA experience 
over the last fifty years will be outlined. The 
introduction of professional management into the hospital 
structure will be considered, including whether this was 
the result of apathy for the role by the medical 
profession, an act of deliberate policy by the government 
or a matter of expediency by government and managers.
There has been a considerable volume of literature on the 
doctor's role in the hospital and considerably more on 
Organizational Development, but little on the role of 
doctors in a management capacity in hospitals. There is a 
growing literature (Bennett, 1987) on the "medical 
culture" and the combined effect of medical training and 
socialization on the attitudes and behaviour of doctors 
which has created problems for doctors in relation to 
managers and management.
Sociologists and psychologists have studied the 
institutional role of a number of occupations and
11
professions. And the amount written on management has 
been vast. But doctors and their role in management has 
rarely been the centre of this research, although it 
seems obvious that their role is central to the issues of 
management of a hospital. Fitzgerald and Sturt (1992) 
say,
"There is limited research evidence on clinical 
management roles or their operation in the UK. A 
literature search of current articles yielded only five 
items on clinician managers. Yet the trend towards 
establishing clinical directorates and clinical 
directors as clinician managers has accelerated 
dramatically."
Most observers have suggested that the basic problem in 
researching this field, (which I discuss in the next 
section), is one of entry of "outsiders" into the medical 
"world".
1.6.2. Entry problems.
The medical profession have in the past failed to be 
convinced of the value of the social science research; 
doctors feel defensive about non-medical researchers 
delving into their work and behaviour, and they think 
that it might invade the ethic of confidentiality. One 
doctor put an issue to me thus;
"Now I would have to word that much more delicately to 
non doctors, and I probably would not have said it."
12
They are of course a very conservative group and many 
fear change. Griffiths (1992b) says:
"We also have to remind ourselves continually that the 
medical profession is conservative and does not like 
being assailed with new global theories, particularly 
economic theories, which they generally regard as less 
proven than even alternative medicine."
And Cartwright agrees (1977:184):
"Some would blame the senior doctors holding that they 
are too conservative, unwilling to move with the 
times."
Several Clinical Directors reminded me of consultants' 
fear of a hidden agenda in any research or review of 
their work that might affect their income and prestige, 
by altering the mystique of the present system. As one 
Clinical Director said:
" And those physicians in specialties whose incomes 
have dropped recently, tend to be the most vocal."
It is also traditionally and frequently indicated that 
they are very busy, and time is a valued professional 
commodity. I therefore entered the research with 
something of an advantage, not only as a member of the 
medical profession, but also as a surgeon, which some 
regard as the most prestigious part of the profession. 
The issue of a pecking order within the profession is 
again an issue which will appear from time to time in 
further chapters. I had less trouble therefore in
13
obtaining interviews with consultants in hospital, even 
surgeons! I was able to handle the scepticism, even 
scorn, of some of them at the idea of a social science 
research project using post positivistic methods.
Because of the number of interviews four were conducted 
by a research assistant, herself a trained counsellor who 
therefore has extensive experience of handling 
interviews. Her experience was somewhat different. One 
Clinical Director approached to participate declined to 
be interviewed, one was not available when she arrived, 
and one was mildly hostile although he knew in advance 
what the questions were going to be. This could be 
because, firstly, she is female and even now the medical 
profession is male dominated. They could have been 
uncomfortable because she is not a doctor or because 
since they didn't see the researcher their own status was 
somehow reduced.
1.6.3. Organizational Development Theory
I then considered the theory of Organizational 
Development in Human Service Organisations. A vast 
descriptive literature of health organizations exists. On 
the other hand there was little practical guidance on how 
to use this knowledge effectively (Weisbord, 1976). This 
is surprising when over a decade before, Vinter (1963) 
wrote that extension of organizational analysis into the
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health and welfare field has been extremely limited. He 
suggested that the knowledge, if acquired, would permit 
deliberate redesign of organizational conditions to 
achieve more effective services. Most of the literature 
is found in books and journals from the United States of 
America, so that this does bias the work to that side of 
the Atlantic, but it did make it more important that I 
consider the problem of consultants in management in 
American hospitals as part of the total investigation.
It is a popular notion that there is a common failure of 
hospitals, compared to other service institutions, to 
perform well. Explanations are, that the organization or 
its managers are not business like enough, that hospitals 
need better managers and that the objectives and results 
are intangible. Drucker (1977) feels that this belief 
underlies the management boom in service institutions.
He attributed the explanations to alibis rather than 
explanations. He also believes that business-like in a 
service institution means primarily control of cost, he 
feels that effectiveness and not efficiency are what the 
service institution lacks, so the basic problem is lack 
of effectiveness. He also feels that the objectives of 
the business of a hospital are tangible, that is they 
have to satisfy not only the patient, but also the 
doctors, the nurses, the technicians, the patient's 
family and the taxpayers etc.
15
The cry for better people is something echoed in the 
earliest Chinese texts on government. It is absurd to 
expect the administrator of every hospital will be a 
genius. Indeed Drucker (1990) feels that what matters is 
not the leader's charisma but the mission. The first job 
of the leader is to think through and define the mission 
of the institution. He stated,
"that leadership by itself is not enough, that it's an
end. And that's misleadership".
1.6.4.0. Data collection
Before discussing the details of the data collection it 
might be helpful to give some broad outline of the scope 
and size of the project. I interviewed 60 NHS consultants 
involved in management as clinical directors and 18 
General Managers or Chief Executives. These doctors and 
managers came from 13 NHS hospitals, some Directly 
Managed Units and other independent Trusts which were 
seeking and have since been given independent Trust 
status. They ranged from a major London teaching hospital 
to a small District General Hospital. In addition I 
interviewed 10 health care academics, many of whom had 
been general managers or consultants previously, 7 
Regional Officers and 2 Governmental Officers.
In the United States I interviewed 27 doctors involved in 
management and 13 hospital administrators at 6 hospitals,
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from a major University teaching hospital through a 
Veterans' Administration hospital, a Community Hospital 
and a Private Not for Profit Religious Institution.
The total number of interviews was 118 and the total 
number of hours interviewing in excess of 200 hours. In 
addition I attended over a hundred hours of meetings over 
and above the meetings I attended and studied within my 
own hospital, part of my normal work as a practicing 
clinical director. There were over 300 hours of tapes 
transcribed and the transcriptions of important sections 
of interviews and notes from interviews and meetings has 
come to more than 500,000 words.
In addition I held seminars and workshops for doctors 
involved in management and for managers, with all the 
discussions and feedback sessions recorded? although they 
were not transcribed I did have the opportunity to play 
them back several times and make notes.
While covering statistics it might useful to conclude 
this section by saying that the project involved reading 
124 textbooks and 25 official NHS publications, as well 
as 1,180 published papers and articles, 198 of which I 
found important enough to photocopy, 92 on organizational 




There were many different ways I could have approached 
the problem. I planned a systematic analysis of 
organizational and management literature on this and 
other sectors, as well as a search through the literature 
on the historical, sociological and political 
background, with particular reference to the origins, 
course and future of health services. Because there were 
close links in the recent reorganization of the National 
Health Service with American experiences and expertise, 
some comparisons between the one health system and the 
other were necessary. I considered that epidemiological 
and economic research into the costs and effectiveness of 
different methods of running health care were however, 
outside the scope of the project.
Above all this is an ethnographic study. A variety of 
ethnographic studies of, for instance, the Griffiths 
(1984) reorganization have been undertaken, for the 
technique is now used by many different disciplines and 
in many different ways (Cox, 1990). The method is said 
to stem originally from anthropology (Diesing, 1977:5) 
but has close parallels with some of the methods used by 
social historians. Both sorts of research aim to study 
thought and belief and the way these relate to human 
action. One question remains however: how can this be 
done when some thoughts and beliefs may remain unsaid,
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and some may be deliberately concealed, even if much is 
spoken or written down? This is an issue addressed in 
more detail in Chapters 8 and 9 on Methodology.
Most of this study sets out to capture speech rather than 
the written word. To do this, I have conducted in depth 
informal interviews with people directly involved, 
doctors as Clinical Directors or Medical Directors, Nurse 
Managers, District and Unit General Managers and Chief 
Executives, Presidents, Directors of Finance and 
Personnel, and with the Chairmen of Health Authorities 
and Trusts, governmental doctors, and departmental 
medical officers. The latter was largely the result of my 
trying to interview Ministers from the Department of 
Health who, like their colleagues in the shadow 
departments in opposition, all refused to acknowledge let 
alone reply to my many letters. In addition I interviewed 
and discussed my ideas with health academics and health 
economists.
I have sat in on internal health service management 
meetings and attended conferences of doctors and 
managers. The NHS is a vast organization and ethnography 
is an intensive method. Although I wished to portray the 
whole, the amount of data was enormous. I was therefore 
forced to be somewhat selective. (Though the data on the 
problem was gathered from many different levels). I
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focused my main efforts from time to time on the areas 
which gave me most difficulty at that particular moment.
I have looked across to other districts and hospitals, 
concentrated on individual hospitals and clinicians, but 
I have also been up to the tiers above, to region, and 
beyond, to Whitehall. General Practitioners are not 
forgotten though not much mentioned in the study. Until 
the reforms it would have been hardly necessary to 
consider them in the problem, but since the reforms of 
1989 they have become a factor, particularly those who 
are Fund Holders. It is very much an investigation about 
people trying to cope with, understand and implement 
change.
After the first background chapters, much of the rest of 
the work is in the words of the interviewees. Their 
speech is set inside an analytic framework which I have 
provided but the main evidence for the arguments comes in 
quotations to illustrate a point. Since almost everyone 
spoke so frankly, I have omitted names, and changed what 
identifying details I thought necessary. A similar 
blanket of anonymity covers the hospitals and districts.
1.6.4.2. Details of Data Collection
The data on the project was originally to be collected 
from doctors involved in management decision making and
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change in hospitals and from senior managers. Initially 
the questions were mine and the whole data collection was 
based on using intensive, loosely structured interviews. 
The subjects were all volunteers from an institution, 
approached initially through the Unit General Manager or 
Chief Executive Officer.
In the introductory letter an outline of the research 
project was given together with a request to interview 
not only the Unit General Manager or Chief Executive 
Officer but also another senior manager and at least two 
hospital consultants involved in the management of the 
hospital. Ideally this included the Medical Director and 
a Clinical Director sitting on the Management Board or 
equivalent.
Some hospitals found fourteen such volunteers, at 
Stanford University Hospital I interviewed six senior 
managers including the President and eight senior 
consultants involved in the management of that 
institution. At others I interviewed only the Chief 
Executive, and only one Clinical Director was 
forthcoming. On the whole the North American hospitals 
were far more willing to participate and take the subject 
seriously than were the English hospitals.
In England about a week ahead of the interviews the 
subjects were given a list of topics covering no more
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than half an A4 sheet. This was not possible in the 
United States as all the interviews were arranged by the 
hospital and I did not know until I arrived who I would 
be seeing. The interviews were planned and I requested 
that they last about an hour, the participant being 
allowed to talk freely about the subject in any way they 
chose. The interviewee having being given an estimate of 
the length of the interview in advance, was free to 
continue if they so wished for as long as they needed.
The shortest interview was about twenty minutes and the 
longest four hours.
The technique was to use reflective listening and only 
interfere with the subject's discussion if it should 
drift well away from the topic. All interviews were 
recorded with the permission of the interviewee, who had 
been warned in advance in the original letter to the 
hospital. Only one English Clinical Director felt 
unhappy about the tape recording but in subsequent 
correspondence felt that he had not been inhibited in 
answering the questions. Notes were taken of the main 
points raised and used as a personal aide memoire to 
raise further queries later at the end of the interview. 
They were also useful in drawing out organizational and 
management structures, to which reference might be made 
during the discussion. After the interview a recording 
or further notes were made of my immediate post interview 
impressions and including any remarks made by the
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interviewee after the main recording had been finished. 
The two recordings were transcribed and these, together 
with the notes, were used to construct a summary of the 
main points covering no more than two sides of an A4 
sheet. This was posted to the interviewee who then had 
the opportunity to change anything which had been 
misunderstood, correct anything said in error, or add any 
additional thoughts. This is a technique based loosely on 
a method described by Simendinger and Pasmore (1984) 
which is felt to provide more information regarding 
respondents than other more general interviewing methods.
Factors discussed include the practical aspects of 
managing, and the relationships between doctors and 
managers, including preconceptions and experiences. I 
also explored my subjects7 vision of future developments. 
In general doctors and managers agree about more things 
than they disagree on. Also relationships between them 
tend to improve or deteriorate on stereotype beliefs of 
one another, rather than accurate views of each other.
As stated above the original questions were mine but this 
is a research based on "co-operative inquiry" and this is 
discussed in detail in Chapters 8 and on Methodology. As 
a result the research, and in particular at this stage, 
the questions, changed and adapted to the participants 
feelings and views of what were or were not important. 
Indeed this has been a constantly evolving process.
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1.6.5. External Data Collection.
By this I mean the data introduced by the main players 
and it has four main pillars: Date gathered from doctors
and managers, both from the U.K. and the U.S.A. I then 
introduce the data to initiate a discussion on the 
changes which have taken place in the consultant's role 
and predict where they are going, with some views as to 
how this may change and develop in the future. This has 
been fulfilled largely and has lead to some suggestions 
for changes in the methods of managing hospitals.
1.6.6. Internal Data Collection.
This studies the actual working of the various hospital 
committees on which consultants and managers meet to 
inform, discuss and decide issues, and which are part of 
the management hierarchy and structure of the hospital.
On some committees I sit as chairman, others as a 
participating member and others merely as an observer. 
Other members of those committees have been interviewed 
about their views and actions.
1.6.7. Other Influences
There have been other matters to consider which I 
collectively call ”other influences”. I have tried to
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view the management role of consultants not in a narrow 
sense confined only to the local district hospital, but 
also to study them as a group, with a major influence on 
the actions and activities of the medical profession as a 
whole, whether that be at district, regional or national 
level.
To broaden and raise my vision I also sought the opinions 
of researchers and academics in independent health care 
research organizations such as the Inter Authority 
Comparisons and Consultancy part of the Health Services 
Management Centre at the University of Birmingham, The 
Kings Fund Centre and The King's Fund College.
As a result of one of the interviews with a Fellow of the 
King's Fund College I was given the opportunity to speak 
at a King's Fund course on Resource Management for 
Clinical Directors. The discussion which followed lasted 
long after the planned time to finish, and gave me a 
valuable feedback from a group of nearly twenty 
consultants who had not previously been involved in the 
project.
In the American Hospitals I studied University Hospitals, 
Private Hospitals, Community and County Hospitals, 
Veterans Association Hospitals and Non Profit Religious 
Charity Hospitals. In England all the hospitals were part 
of the National Health Service, and to reveal any
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possible different perspectives I did include interviews 
with two private hospital managers, as well as the 
Medical Director and Managing Director of the British 
United Provident Association.
1.6.8. Human Service Organizations
I had also planned to interview the heads of some other 
HSO's to see whether the similarities and grouping of 
hospitals with HSO's was valid and whether lessons could 
be learned from them for transfer to the hospitals. 
Although I did carry out one interview with the 
headmaster of a large comprehensive school, and I could 
see it was a field where there might be some interesting 
and useful research, I abandoned this aspect as other 
lines of inquiry began to yield such large quantities of 
data that I was in danger of being swamped. In addition 
the work itself led to more suggestions and invitations 
to pursue the interviews at national level, providing 
information directly related to the original theme of my 
inquiry.
1.7. The Contents of the Thesis.
There are several sections to the thesis. In part 1 I 
introduce the work, "the problem", and the purpose of 
study and consider some problems of validity. This is 
followed by a general plan of the work.
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In Part 2, there are five chapters reviewing the 
literature and considering in detail some of the major 
issues. In Chapter 2 the changes in the National Health 
Service and its organization and reorganizations are 
related to the involvement of doctors in management. 
Chapter 3 describes how doctors came to be involved with 
hospitals. Chapters 5 and 6 consider the whole question 
of clinical autonomy or clinical freedom as it is now 
known, and its consequences.
Part 3 consists of three chapters, chapter 7 discussing 
both validity and bias. The following two chapters 
consider the development of the methodology, the theory 
and choice available in chapter 8, and how the decision 
was reached in chapter 9.
Part 4 introduces most of the findings. It is divided 
into seven chapters considering various models of 
clinical management and doctors in management roles.
There is consideration of the management views about this 
issue and the relationship between doctors and managers. 
Then the last two chapters in this section consider the 
issues associated with managing as a Clinical Director 
and how doctors can be introduced into management.
Part 5 is the conclusions with the lessons learned, the 
possible future, a suggested programme of action, some
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personal lessons learned, and finally some unanswered 
questions and suggested ways of taking the research on 
further.
1.8. The Literature or Existing Knowledge.
The process of exploring the literature began with a 
catholic and avid interest in anything that might be 
relevant. At that time, in the autumn of 1988, there was 
little of direct relevance, or so it seemed; my view of 
that has since changed but it is a statement, still 
germane. I can now refer to the literature more 
selectively, as I know which areas are useful and can 
significantly contribute to my investigations. I learnt 
much from the experience and writings of others and 
gathered many useful ideas. I suspect all are not being 
attributed, as sometimes I saw no connection with my work 
until days or weeks later, when an idea would spring to 
mind or a connection would be made, yet the origin would 
be obscured by time.
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CHAPTER 2
CHANGES IN THE NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE
2.0. Introduction
Change in health care provision is not new; although the 
inception of the NHS in 1948 was a major change in the 
provision of health care in this country, it has since 
been in a constant state of evolutionary change. The 
formation of the NHS however was not the end of this 
change process. The DHSS (1972) published a paper for 
reorganisation implemented in 1974. Six years later the 
DHSS (1980) published a further paper and in 1982 another 
reorganization took place. The following year the 
Griffiths Report DHSS (1983) was published and 
implemented the following year. In 1989 the government 
published its White Paper, "Working for Patients" HMSO 
(1989), introduced during 1991.
According to Welborne (1990), all organizations are now 
experiencing very rapid and continuous change and he 
feels that it is important for all senior staff and 
managers to develop skills to manage such changes if they 
are to be effective in their jobs. But this is not a new 
experience; as long ago as 210 BC Petronius Arbiter said:
"We trained hard-but it seemed that every time we were
beginning to form up in teams we would be reorganised.
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I was beginning to learn, later in life that we tend to 
meet any new situation by reorganising; and a wonderful 
method it can be for creating the illusion of progress 
while producing confusion, inefficiency and 
demoralisation."
2.1. Reasons for Change
These changes also beg the question as to their purpose. 
Is it to make the service better, and in what way? To 
treat more patients, or to treat patients quicker, or to 
treat patients for less money? Improvements in priority 
group services are often now financed through cost 
improvement achievements or rationalization within the 
acute sector. The government appear to see change within 
the NHS mostly as a means of cost improvement and cost 
containment. In a sympathetic review of the NHS,
Enthoven (1985) notes the tight limits under which the 
NHS operates and considers that it will find it 
increasingly difficult to meet the demands placed upon 
it, so that it will need to find ways of obtaining even 
greater value for money.
Change has not only been concerned with finance, but also 
with management and control. In spite of talk of 
decentralization, the period from 1982 has been a time 
when central government has tightened its "grip" on the 
NHS through such reforms as annual review systems, the 
application of performance indicators and trial 
management advisory schemes. Petchey (1986) describes an
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increasing disquiet, felt not only in government and the 
DHSS, but also by staff within the NHS, particularly 
doctors, about the failure or shortcomings of consensus 
management which he says,
"were experienced as cumbersome and time-consuming, 
leading to institutional stagnation and creating a lack 
of managerial accountability."
Although the assumption that consensus management may 
lead to institutional stagnation may be difficult to 
justify, he does not elaborate on this aspect.
The early reorganisations recognised that the NHS is a 
loosely coordinated system. During the Royal Commission 
on the NHS, Kogan (1978) echoed the DHSS statements from 
1972:
"it is generally held that decision making cannot be 
undertaken by a Chief Executive of a single authority 
because of the integrative complexity of health care 
provision."
Schulz and Harrison (1983) claimed widespread support for 
the practice of consensus decision making as a means of 
managing the service.
2.2. Rewards and Incentives
The lack of adequate reward does not help. In private 
industry there are cost of living and merit based pay
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increases for employees. During pay restraint, private 
organisations can manipulate the system to non cash 
benefits to reward their employees. Public service 
organisations have none of these advantages and are 
usually made to set examples of government pay policy 
norms. In a review of the incentives and economic 
efficiency of the NHS Enthoven (1985) says:
"-the system contains no serious incentives to guide 
the NHS in the direction of better quality care and 
service at reduced cost. There are not many rewards for 
the manager who takes risks and makes the extra effort, 
and not many rewards for him or her to hand out to 
staff."
Rewards are more than the ability to recruit the right 
calibre of employee or reward effective performance, they 
are also a measure of the value that an organisation 
places on its employees and an expression of the value 
placed on them by society. To maintain, as governments 
do, that vocational reward is compensation enough for low 
pay compared to those in private industry may insult your 
employees. Estimates suggest that up to 10% of medical 
graduates never practice and a similar number drop out in 
the early years. And there is a growing tendency for 
medical consultants to take early retirement. In addition 
large numbers of nurses once trained never work, or, they 
do not return to NHS hospitals. Increasing NHS defections 
highlight a growing gap between the philosophy of the NHS 
and that of the outside world. Companies appreciate that
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staff are an important and increasingly scarce resource, 
so they provide decent facilities to retain them.
For a health service to be effective it has to have some 
inbuilt slack capacity. This may be regarded by some as 
inefficient, but patients do not fall ill or have 
accidents at a steady daily rate. If there is a major 
disaster the local hospital(s) cannot say, we can only 
cope with 25% of the casualties today, the rest we will 
treat next week. When someone has a heart attack you 
cannot say, sorry we have had too many emergencies this 
week, we will admit you another time. Although much of 
this slack is given by staff goodwill, working extra 
hours without reward, their goodwill cannot make other 
resources available. Yet most hospitals make no 
provision for staff holidays, sickness or maternity 
leave, so that when these events take place there is no 
one to do the work. Routine work is not done, or it is 
cancelled even though other members of the team are 
available. The result is a very efficient organisation 
that has become an ineffective one.
2.3. Management Problems
So the NHS management finds itself, unlike private 
industry, without the authority to determine and direct 
all the activities of the organization. It does not have 
what is known as primacy. Management in the NHS is part
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of a coalition, managers and professionals which is 
entirely separate from the other coalition of the 
professionals, doctors, nurses and paramedical 
professions, of which the medical profession for 
historical and also logistical reasons of its 
relationship with the patient, is the most dominant.
Klein (1989) considers that a striking feature of policy 
making in the NHS is the domination of the medical 
profession . He states that out of the NHS total labour 
force of about 750,000, only some 45,000 are doctors, yet 
he states that a review of the literature about policy 
making in the NHS is exclusively preoccupied with the 
medical profession. As Crossman (1972) said the NHS is a 
"consultant dominated service".
2.4. The First Reorganization. [1972] 1974.
The participation of hospital doctors in management and 
their contribution to the efficiency of the hospital 
service was a major theme of the first reorganization and 
stemmed from doctors being able to direct the use of 
costly resources with varying, but often considerable, 
degrees of autonomy. After discussion between the 
Minister of Health and the profession in 1965, the Joint 
Working Party on the Organisation of Medical Work in 
Hospitals was set up to discuss the progress of the NHS, 
and particularly to review the hospital service. It
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produced three reports, (MoH, 1967. DHSS 1972b and DHSS 
1974), known as the Cogwheel reports because of the 
design printed on the covers. The first report 
recommended the creation of divisions of broadly linked 
specialities to include consultants and junior medical 
staff which would constantly appraise their services and 
methods of provision. Such divisions were likely to be 
set up on a faculty or speciality basis, such as surgery, 
medicine, obstetrics, pathology, etc. Representatives 
of each division were to come together in each hospital 
as a Medical Executive Committee which would co-ordinate 
the work and views of the division and provide a link 
with nursing and administration. The sort of problems 
they might consider included bed management and the 
organisation of outpatient and inpatient resources. In 
fact they became a means of disseminating routine 
information, and a discussion forum for problems, in 
addition to being an outlet for airing frustrations.
Most hospital groups gradually implemented this scheme, 
and by 1972 the second report was able to identify the 
essential elements of an effective Cogwheel system and to 
report that particularly in large acute hospitals, the 
system had been helpful in creating improved 
communications, reductions of inpatient waiting lists and 
the progressive control of medical expenditure.
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The third report clarified the role of Cogwheel systems 
in the newly reorganised NHS, because an emphasis of the 
1974 reorganisation was the part played by multi­
disciplinary teams in integrated management, whereas 
Cogwheel had been set up as a doctor dominated hospital 
based arrangement. The third report suggested that 
Cogwheel should continue to deal with issues where the 
agreement and action of hospital doctors was the main 
need, while problems requiring strong collaboration 
between all professional groups, both within the 
hospitals and in community services, should be the 
province of the district management teams and their 
health care planning teams. It would still be 
appropriate for Cogwheel systems to concentrate on 
efficiency issues, and it would be helpful for hospital 
doctors to see their clinical freedom in the context of 
team work and the necessity of sharing resources.
Cogwheel divisions have not flourished everywhere, 
however, but where they have, (Levitt and Wall, 1984) 
many have required a considerable amount of 
administrative support. Support for the Cogwheel concept 
is nevertheless fairly general, and an alternative is 
difficult to find given the clinical autonomy which 
consultants have enjoyed. The Royal Commission noted an 
impatience amongst medical staff with the seemingly 
inevitable delays intrinsic within consensus management 
and they supported an executive team at hospital level
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which they thought would speed things up. The idea of 
unit management teams was endorsed in "Patients First" 
(DHSS, 1979) and in a DHSS (1980) circular on the new 
structure, but the involvement of doctors was somewhat 
ambiguously stated. Many doctors feared that the 
reorganization would be taken as the opportunity to 
deprive them of their clinical autonomy. Clinical 
freedom was however built into the reorganized service.
The intrusion of politics exacerbated discontent. A 
Green Paper and Consultative document in 1972 (DHSS,
1972) appeared to have had as its purpose a closer 
integration of preventative with curative medicine. As 
implemented in April 1974 the only overt effect was to 
make administrative machinery more cumbersome and to 
separate lay administration more widely from the working 
doctor. A hospital consultant now had to penetrate 
several strata of committees before arriving at the 
source of management. The nature of these new committees 
intensified the political aspect.
2.5. The Second Reorganization. [1980] 1982.
Following the 1982 reorganisation, unit management teams 
(UMT) were set up as a quartet of doctor, nurse, 
administrator and treasurer? in some cases they included 
a Consultant and General Practitioner. The planned role 
of these teams is not altogether easy to determine, nor
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is their corporate relationship to the District 
Management Team (DMT), although clear directions were 
given (DHSS, 1982) on how doctors were to be appointed to 
the DMT following the 1982 reorganisation. The 
consultant was to be elected by the consultant body and 
the General Practitioner by all General Practitioners in 
a District to serve for a limited period. This marked a 
change in some places where previously the District 
Medical Committee (DMC), itself a representative body, 
had elected the DMT medical representatives.
2.6.0. The Third Reorganization. [1983] 1984.
The Griffiths Report (1983) proposals recommended 
modification to this type of team decision making. 
Ironically, it was hospital doctors' criticisms of 
consensus management which probably did most to encourage 
the Secretary of State to ask for the Griffiths report in 
the first place. The resulting proposals that there 
should be a general manager at District and Unit level 
led the BMA to state that such a post should be held by a 
doctor, even though many doctors were doubtful that 
filling the role would be practicable given their 
comparative or total lack of management training and 
their prime commitment to patient treatment which would 
allow little time for the managerial role.
38
2.6.1. Some Problems with Doctors
The dilemma cannot be easily resolved. Doctors need to 
be involved closely with the decisions about health care, 
but do not wish to spend too much time away from their 
patients and other commitments like teaching and research 
etc. It was hoped that the Griffiths proposals would be 
an effective improvement on Cogwheel and on consensus 
management, however things changed again with the reforms 
introduced in 1991.
To a certain extent the idea of a top doctor had been 
tried before with the Medical Superintendent in some 
hospitals, and with the Medical Officer of Health in 
local health authorities before the 1974 reorganisation. 
Medical Superintendents' posts atrophied well before 
1974, but the Medical Officer of Health was sometimes a 
highly influential officer in local authorities whose 
work was often widely appreciated, although not usually 
by hospital consultants. The holders of these posts did 
not find it easy to adapt to the different management 
principles following the reorganisation and this has left 
community medicine in a somewhat ambiguous position.
Possibly this is one of the reasons why there were 
relatively few community physicians in the early 80's.
No one appeared to know whether community medicine was 
about the management of medical work or about the
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management of the community's health. Unfortunately 
training in community medicine was not the same thing as 
training in management. Regional Medical Officers and 
District Medical Officers were not trained for management 
and their background was not the best qualification for 
persons expected to give leadership to consultants.
Prestige in medicine has always been associated with 
possession of skills in the application of advanced 
technology. Consultants discount the views of Regional 
Medical Officers and District Medical Officers and 
Community doctors because they have no direct experience 
of the problems of being a consultant. This may of course 
be a phenomenon not unique to medicine. But the 
consequence is that Regional Medical Officers and 
District Medical Officers have little authority over 
consultants. Medical leadership might be strengthened by 
recruitment of leaders from the more powerful medical 
posts, and those with formal training in management, and 
this is an issue which I will be addressing later.
Despite the claims of the Hunter Report (1972) which had 
tried to amalgamate both the managerial and clinical 
responsibilities, the Royal Commission felt that the 
Community Physicians' role in planning, health education, 
epidemiology and environmental control should be 
encouraged. This implied that the more administrative 
tasks should be undertaken by administrators.
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Doctors generally do not perceive the impact of their 
individual decisions on beds, facilities and costs 
(Weisbord, 1976). But factors that destroy administrative 
cooperation are that doctors have little interest in 
management problems. Some managers stated that they felt 
that doctors are closed minded and aloof, and not really 
interested in the problems facing the administrator 
Jacobs (1978). Jynton (1975) agrees that physicians have 
a tendency to establish themselves as role experts in 
health related matters. Their "domain” includes all 
parts of the hospital. According to Hanlon and Gladstein 
(1984), a common perception of departmental heads, many 
of whom were doctors, was that they were at best mediocre 
administrators with little sensitivity to the human side 
of management.
2.6.2. Interpretation of the Griffiths Report
It is now claimed by Griffiths (1991 and 1992) that both 
doctors and managers misunderstood the implications of 
the Griffiths Report (1983):
" Involve the clinicians more closely in the management 
process, consistent with clinical freedom for clinical 
practice. Clinicians must participate fully in 
decisions about priorities in the use of resources."
In the Audit Commission Annual Lecture in 1991 he said: 
(Griffiths 1991):
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"I personally believed and intended it to be liberating 
in the sense that doctors and nurss would have the 
opportunity of having a much greater say in the running 
of the Health Service.”
And again in a speech to the British Association of 
Medical Managers in 1992, (Griffiths, 1992) he re­
emphasizes this:
"From the very outset in 1983 I made it clear that I 
envisaged a strong role for doctors in the management 
of the NHS and my report subsequently confirmed that."
However, of greater interest is his statement on general 
management, in which he says:
”1 did not intend that the result should be yet another 
profession in the National Health Service to work in 
parallel with other professions".
Not only were the Griffiths recommendations 
misunderstood, or perhaps reinterpreted later, but also 
the medical profession, always fearing a loss of clinical 
freedom, felt unable to grasp the opportunity created, 
and the reforms were effectively highjacked by 
management.
Fitzgerald and Sturt (1992) in discussing the Griffith 
Report (1983) said:
"Despite the strong thrust provided by general 
management, limited progress was made on the inclusion 
of clinicians into management decision making."
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Harrison (1988) offering an historical analysis up to the 
late 80s suggested that,
"some change has taken place but that this has more to 
do with the f o r m  of relationships [between doctors and 
managers] than with the substance."
Enthoven (1985), while sympathetic to the thrust of the 
Griffith Report, said that in different circumstances its 
recommendations might make a difference, but only if the 
structure and incentives in the NHS were changed more 
fundamentally.
2.7. The Fourth Reorganization. [1989] 1991.
The National Health Service has now undergone the most 
radical of the many reorganizations in its history.
There was intense discussion about ideas for reform which 
fell largely into two broad views: Either on the theme of 
replacing the tax financed scheme with an insurance based 
scheme, or improving the use of existing resources by 
organizational change. The influence of American ideas on 
the first, being insurance based, is very obvious but the 
second theme less so, but attributed to the influence of 
Enthoven (1985) who advocated an "internal market" within 
the NHS. As Klein pointed out (1989):
"There appeared to be a terminal irony in the fact 
that, after 40 years which had brought a regular 
procession of Americans to Britain to find out the
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secrets of the NHS's success, the process was being 
reversed: the anorexic were seeking a cure from experts 
on obesity".
Ministers failed to convince the majority of health care 
professionals that the reforms would have the desired 
effect. Nor indeed were doctors consulted, a point of 
interest as it was the first time that government had 
failed to consult the medical profession, a theme to be 
developed in a later chapter on the influence and 
clinical autonomy of the medical profession. The service 
continued to work because of inherited good will and 
almost any system can be made to function if all the 
members are willing to work within the organization.
There was also the danger that strategic planning would 
produce plans that did not actually happen.
Implementation failure might occur because planning was 
separated from those that have to work the changes, or 
because of hopeless optimism, or because implementation 
problems are denied so that at best only compliance is 
achieved instead of commitment. At worst this could 
result in conflict.
The consultants had accepted long term contracts with the 
NHS and limits on total expenditure in exchange for job 
security and "clinical freedom". The NHS management has 
very little leverage to make their services responsive to 
patient needs. To change the speciality mix of its
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medical staff, a Region District or hospital had to wait 
for deaths and retirements.
Improvements that do occur are often the result of 
accident rather than design, or because powerful of 
individuals rather than effective management structure. 
This is because major organisational change in the health 
service is often based on assumption and belief rather 
than substantiated theory or observational evidence. One 
of those assumptions is that commercial organizational 
models are directly transferable to public service 
enterprises.
So we came to the position that in 1989 in the face of a 
radical reorganisation the doctors were the ardent 
defenders of a nationalised structure. They had found 
refuge in the doctrine of central control, regional 
appointments for consultants and uniform terms and 
conditions of service to avoid interference from local 
authorities. Not only had the societies gone but now also 
the spectre of municipal control. Clinical freedom had 
been enlarged, and the doctor no longer had to worry 
about the patient's ability to pay before deciding on 
treatment. The profession was enjoying greater freedom 
than at any time since club practice began in the 1820's. 
It is partly the apparently increasing loss of this 
freedom, often called clinical freedom or clinical
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autonomy, which is an important factor in considering the 
main question of this thesis.
Until 1948 every doctor had been trained in a medical 
school which was attached to a voluntary hospital. The 
student was reared in a spirit of the voluntary hospital. 
Voluntary hospitals ran on a shoe string. The hospital 
could only exist if everyone was prepared to help. 
Everything non essential to the patient's welfare had to 
be cut to a minimum. Care without direct payment carries 
on a tradition from the voluntary hospitals that pre 
dated the NHS. Doctors gave their time free of charge in 
those hospitals, hence the name. This charitable 
background may still be affecting many consultants' 
attitudes, as an influential consultant aged 55, training 
young doctors today, would have been trained by 
consultants who entered medicine and had their attitudes 
shaped in the 1920's.
The voluntary hospital spirit was not one to be forgotten 
quickly. One cannot identify a date at which good will 
started to run out, but the process was gradual. New 
doctors qualified who had no experience of the voluntary 
hospitals, and what was more important, they were being 
trained by doctors who also did not have that background. 
The doctor found himself increasingly frustrated. The 
general practitioners were debarred from the hospital.
The hospital consultant became swamped with a type of
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illness that could have been dealt with by a general 
practitioner. Specialized medicine and surgery became 
more complex and time consuming, but had to be fitted 
into the routine work. A highly trained and skilled 
specialist surgeon found himself repairing hernias and 
removing ingrowing toenails. It was very useful and 
necessary but could have been done more economically by 
less skilled staff in Primary Health Centres, had they 
existed, an idea first suggested in a report (Dawson, 
1920) on proposed reorganization of health care in 
Britain in 1920. This emphasised bringing together of 
preventative and curative medicine. Specialist advice 
would be available at a Primary Health Centre, but the 
main working area of the consultants would be in the 
Secondary Health Centres, located in a hospital capable 
of undertaking diagnosis, care and treatment of the more 
difficult case. This idea was to surface again more than 
once, particularly with the birth of the NHS. Cartwright 
(1977:166) describes this Dawson report:
"This revolutionary plan is one of the more important, 
although tragic, documents in the history of British 
medicine."
What had gone wrong? Some would blame the senior doctors 
holding that they are too conservative, and unwilling to 
move with the times (Klein, 1983). Yet it is the younger 
ones who are actively expressing disillusionment. Some 
point to increasing interference by party politicians.
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Perhaps we are passing through a transition phase from 
one form of medicine to another, and such periods of 
transition are historically accompanied by convulsions. 
Curative medicine, although based upon science, is 
afterall still primarily an individual art, and creative 
artists do not take kindly to bureaucratic control.
2.8. In the United States.
In the States medicine is also changing, with many 
external forces reshaping medicine in ways that the 
profession did not like. It was put succinctly by Bailey 
(1990) when he described the differing beliefs of the 
four major groups:
"Doctors believe that health care is worth what it 
costs, that it will continue to improve and that it 
will continue to cost more. They believe that patients 
government and corporations need to understand the 
primacy of quality and need to bite the bullet in terms 
of cost.
Patients believe that health care is no longer a 
privilege, that it is a right. They also believe that 
there must be a way for them to obtain high quality low 
cost readily accessible health care.
Business believes that the process of utilization 
review is being "gamed” and that the health care system 
is inefficient because physicians are poor managers. 
They also believe that money can be shifted within 
their corporate structure from health care costs to 
corporate profits if they can rearrange the manner in 
which health care is provide.
Government who believe that health care is an extremely 
important issue as health care policy can win or lose 
votes for individual politicians. Government in the US 
also believes that it can decrease its share of the 
cost of health care.”
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Bailey continues by explaining that based on these 
beliefs each group has drawn a set of conclusions that 
are taking shape in the decisions that are now being made 
and are reflected in the impact these decisions are 
having.
Doctors have concluded that patients want quality care 
at bargain rates but that only a few of these patients 
are serious about preventive medicine. Doctors have also 
concluded that the government is playing politics with 
the nation's health care system and that business and 
corporate interests are lobbying effectively to lower 
doctors' fees (and hence their income) through direct 
employment by health maintenance organizations, fee 
discounting and moves in the general direction of a 
national health care system.
Patients have concluded that doctors charge too much, 
make them wait too long and do not really care about them 
as individuals. They have concluded that the government 
can design a system that will give them low cost, easy 
access and high quality medical care when they are old 
and/or out of work. Friedman (1991) writes that the 
public has also concluded that business has an obligation 
to provide total health care benefits:
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"the unspoken agreement was that, if a person was 
employed, he or she would receive health insurance 
benefits".
Such insurance, according to Bailey (1990) costs in 
excess of $2,000 per person per annum but, employees wish 
to pay no more than $200 per person per year for it.
Next he states that business has concluded that doctors 
are responsible for the increases that have occurred in 
health care costs and as a result doctors are pushing 
industry into a zone of non-competitiveness. Corporate 
America has also concluded that patients will over use 
any health care plan that can be provided and therefore 
that the government can and should solve the financial 
problems of business through the implementation of new 
forms of health care similar to the Canadian system, 
which offers universal coverage through public sector 
insurance administered by officials at the provincial 
level who are the single payer and negotiator of budgets 
for hospitals and fees for doctors (Holahan, Moon, Welch 
and Zuckerman 1991).
Lastly Bailey says that government appears to believe 
that doctors provide too much unnecessary care and are 
responsible for increased use of expensive services. 
Government has also concluded that patients are willing 
to accept a system such as the Canadian system or the 
Veterans Administration Hospital system and that business
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can serve a useful purpose as the catalyst for driving 
the shift to increased regulation and decreased 
reimbursement for health care.
2.9. Some Present Dilemmas.
So clinical freedom is seen by doctors as again under 
threat, this time from a government determined to make 
doctors more accountable for the work they do. It feels 
that clinical freedom has gone too far, producing a kind 
of anarchy where the government has lost control of 
spending. The government believes a balance must now be 
struck between organization and freedom. Whether 
reasonable or not the public have to determine. There is 
a situation of mutual dependency. (Klein, 1990);
"the state became a monopoly employer: effectively 
members of the medical profession became dependent on
it the state became dependent on the medical
profession to run the NHS and to cope with the problems 
of rationing scarce resources in patient care."
The health care industry is said to be under pressure in 
both countries to reduce costs and increase efficiency 
without sacrificing the quality of patient care. However 
all those within the health care industry appear to feel 
that changes are strictly a cost reduction exercise with 
little consideration for the quality of patient care. No 
one however has yet focussed on the relationship between 
the two most powerful influences in hospital health care
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delivery, the manager and the doctor most involved in 
daily management often called the Clinical Director. If 
the relationship between the most powerful actors in 
healthcare delivery becomes more cooperative and less 
adversarial, creative energy can assist both 
administrators and physicians. (Simendinger and Pasmore 
1984) .
More than in any other institution, the hospital provides 
a unique arena for studying factors affecting cooperation 
among those in positions of power. Unlike industrial 
organizations the dual hierarchy of hospitals sets up 
barriers to, and at the same time necessities, for co­
operation between doctors and their managerial 
colleagues. Over the decades there has been a gradual 
change from a doctor managed health care system to a 
joint doctor/manager team. The management of a hospital 
has become a joint venture. Some would argue that the 
pendulum has swung even further, to a primarily 
professionally managed hospital health care system. The 
challenge now is for the medical profession, in the words 
of Klein (1990),
"to run the NHS and to cope with the problems of 
rationing scarce resources in patient care".
Klein continues:
"Given the certainty that conflict will continue and 
the possibility that the NHS may be living off an 
inherited but not necessarily renewable capital of
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commitment and loyalty is it possible to devise better 
strategies for managing the resentment generated by 
mutual dependency of the state and the profession?"
2.10. Lessons from Industry for the Health Service
Griffiths (1983) emphasised the similarities as;
a. The need to identify and satisfy real needs.
b. Delivery of the highest quality of service.
c. Securing a trained motivated workforce.
d. Setting short and long term objectives.
More important however are the differences. Smith (1984) 
says differences do exist and highlights them as;
a. prime motive is service, not profit.
b. beneficiaries are the public rather than owners.
c. performance measures are more qualitative.
He brought together a group of NHS and commercial 
managers and asked them to identify those dimensions of 
organizational life which differentiate the NHS from 
private sector organizations. They found this relatively 
easy and identified nearly fifty such parameters. They
felt the following were the most important:
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They represent what Maslow (1972), the late psychologist, 
called low synergy institutions. The reason why they are 
different is because hospitals are in fact professional 
bureaucracies and these differ in a number of ways, most 
notably because professionals have some control over task 
performance, task review and planning.
Hospitals have few of the formal characteristics of 
industrial firms (Friedlander, 1976); physicians and 
scientists are socialised to form a rational, autonomous, 
specialized, expert behaviour, which is antithetical to
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the organization of any but the most narrow 
individualized pursuits (Friedson, 1970b:xi);
"Health services are organized around professional 
authority, and their basic structure is constituted by 
the dominance of a single profession over a variety of 
other, subordinate occupations."
Early studies of hospitals by sociologists were made with 
studies of the factory in mind, and in general their view 
was that improved communication within and across the 
organization would settle difficulties of operation. But 
one problem at least, that of reconciling expert with 
hierarchical authority, remained. And the degree of 
expertise is very important in this problem. As Friedson 
(1970b:24) puts it:
"skill of such complexity and refinement that autonomy 
of judgement is necessary."
Smith (1958) emphasised two lines of authority, 
administrative and medical, and drew attention to the 
difficulty of operating with such a system. Goss (1961) 
studied how autonomy of professional judgement could 
exist in a hierarchical and supervisory hospital setting 
and observed
"that the two lines of authority are both established 
and maintained by the segregation of administrative 
decisions from areas where professional judgement was 
considered necessary, the former freely made and 
enforced by the authority of office, the latter left to 
the "authority" of the individual professional."
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On this foundation Goss constructed an organization model 
called "advisory bureaucracy". Friedson (1970b:90) refers 
to it as "professional bureaucracy". According to Engel 
(1969) and Scott (1965),
"The essential characteristic is that professional work 
is free from the exercise of the authority of
nonprofessionals even though the working professionals
are technically subordinates in a bureaucratic system".
However Bucher and Stelling (1969) feel that the concept
of bureaucracy may be entirely inappropriate for
professional settings.
According to Weisbord (1976), hospitals require three 
different social systems and not one as in industry. The 
links among the task system which administrators manage, 
the identity system which underpins professional status, 
and the governance system which sets standards, are 
extremely tenuous.
Inglehart (1983 and 1984) described the NHS not only as 
probably the nation's most popular institution but as 
also the largest and it is probably more complex than any 
other national enterprise. The average District Health 
Authority has, (or had before some split into trusts), 
many more employees than the average company. With 
unintegrated management, professional hierarchies and 
many external pressures, confusion of goals, internal 
competition for resources, differing disciplines all
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having differing internal goals, no organisational 
priorities, clinical freedom, contradictory perceptions 
of management, lack of reward system, and the need for 






The first half of this chapter sets the background to the 
way in which some doctors have become involved in 
hospitals. The second half from section 3.5. illustrates 
the manner in which doctors are now involved in 
allocating the resources of a hospital.
3.1. Historical Background
Historically the earliest hospitals were not founded for 
the primary purpose of medical care as we know it today. 
Many of those admitted were physically ill so nursing 
care was often necessary, and as a result medical opinion 
was sometimes sought, although medicine of the time 
rarely had much to offer. They were usually suffering 
from chronic or terminal illnesses and the hospital was 
only able to make them as comfortable as possible. Most 
medical practice in those days was conducted in the home.
In the early days, control of nursing staff in the 
hospital was entrusted to a "lady", educated, usually 
wealthy and of some social standing. Cartwright (1977).
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"All too often these condescended to their work, 
regarded themselves as 'gifted' to clear up the mess 
made by the ignorant male, and treated their 
colleagues, administrators and medical staff alike, as 
underlings whose sole duty lay in obeying their 
commands. Miss Nightingale experienced endless trouble 
of this kind."
3.2. Doctors' Involvement in Running Hospitals
There are all sorts of ways people can run complex 
organizations and it is important to define the use of 
the term "running" a hospital, an issue already addressed 
in the first section in Chapter 1. Most of the cost of 
running a hospital is the result of doctors' orders, so 
in that sense they do run a hospital, but they do not run 
it in an executive sense. Chairmen of departments or 
Clinical Directors can have varying degrees of influence 
in planning and resource allocation, and this influence 
depends very much on the degree of devolvement of central 
power and authority within that institution.
Generally, although doctors' influence in running 
hospitals had been diminishing in a strategic sense, it 
has not changed in a daily operational sense. Hence the 
relationship between doctor and administrator or manager 
has developed to a complex relationship regarding the 
doctors involvement in the organizational problems of 
today.
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It was not until later in the nineteenth century that the 
doctor began to play an important role in the hospital. 
Even after those times the doctor was not involved and 
indeed had no need to be involved in the management of 
the hospital (White, 1991);
"In early times the doctor was very much in control of 
his patients his authority was unquestioned in the care 
of the hospital patient. Professional independence was 
reinforced because for years the centre of his practice 
had been the home. Hospitals gradually developed but 
he continued to guard his position even when the 
patient was in hospital. In the second half of the 
twentieth century the hospital and medical treatment 
have become more complex. There are large numbers of 
people involved in treatment. As the organization has 
grown in size there has been a move away from 
professional independence to interdependence".
In some hospitals in the United States doctors did try 
running hospitals but they failed for a number of reasons 
to be discussed in the data Section 4.
Hospitals up until fairly recently were cottage 
industries and the craftsmen or the technicians were the 
doctors who ran their "workshops" within them and 
maintained complete and total authority over their own 
areas.
3.3. Management of Hospitals
Hospitals were of course not founded by the medical 
profession or operated by them when they were founded and 
perhaps it would be interesting to speculate whether, had
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this been the case, they would be very different 
institutions from the ones they are today. The doctors 
were not originally a part of the organization, although 
they had a vital role to play in the organization and 
this does explain why the doctor, with certain exceptions 
such as privately owned hospitals and nursing homes, was 
never in control of the institution. It is as the result 
of this historical development that many of today's 
difficulties facing the relationship between doctors and 
managers have arisen.
Drucker (1977) states that,
"hospitals everywhere present the same confusion of 
missions and objectives with resulting impairment of 
effectiveness and performance".
Should a hospital be in effect a doctor's work facility 
as many older doctors believe?
Should it focus on the major health needs of a community 
or should it try to keep abreast of every medical advance 
no matter how costly and how rarely used that facility 
will be?
Should it focus on preventative medicine and health 
education for the community, or should it concentrate on 
the repair of health damage already done?
61
These are only a few of the possible definitions and 
objectives of a hospital, and as every one can be 
defended, every one deserves a hearing. The effective 
hospital will be a multi purpose institution and try to 
strike a balance between various objectives. What many 
if not most hospitals do however is to pretend that there 
are no basic questions to be decided. According to 
Drucker (1977) the result predictably is confusion and 
impairment of the capacity of the hospital to serve any 
function and carry out any mission. One hospital in my 
study states its purpose as;
"to provide acute care that utilises the most advanced 
diagnostic and therapeutic techniques available, to be 
a centre of medical excellence,"
but it then continues paradoxically by saying:
"and meets an agreed standard of quality within 
available resources."
Another mission statement began:
"We aim to be the finest District General Hospital,"
but then went on to say:
"We also aim to be a specialist centre of excellence."
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Also being dependent on a budget allocation at whatever 
level placed, i.e. District level before the reforms of 
April 1991 or Purchaser level post April 1991, militates 
against setting priorities and concentrating efforts. 
Nothing worthwhile is usually accomplished unless scarce 
resources are concentrated on a small number of 
priorities. Being budget based appears to make it more 
difficult to abandon the bad things, the old and the 
obsolete practices. As a result Drucker (1977) feels 
that hospitals like all service institutions are more 
encrusted than businesses with the barnacles of 
inherently unproductive efforts.
3.4. Life and Work in Hospitals.
Although hospitals are often thought to have a unique 
administrative structure they do have some similarities 
to a number of Human Service Organizations, and inherent 
complexities (West, 1988):
"The large number of separate decision makers in the 
professions is what separates health care from most 
industrial and service industries."
Nelson (1989) however takes a different view;
"In many ways, health services are not different from 
any other service industry or, indeed, any 
manufacturing industry."
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Drucker (1990) regards hospitals as one of a number of 
"non-profit organizations" which do different things from 
business, which supplies goods or services, or 
government, which controls?
"A business has discharged its task when the customer 
buys the product, pays for it, and is satisfied with 
it. Government has discharged its function when its 
policies are effective. The "non profit" institution 
neither supplies goods or services nor controls. Its 
'product' is neither a pair of shoes nor an effective 
regulation. Its product is a c h a n g e d  h u m a n  b e i n g . The 
non-profit institutions are human-change agents."
All appear to agree that improved employee morale can 
improve organizational effectiveness. Davis and Cherns 
(1975) and Cummings and Molloy (1977) indicate that it 
has come to be accepted that an organization should be 
responsive to the social and psychological needs of its 
employees, and that improvements in the quality of work 
life are often linked to improvements in organizational 
effectiveness.
Despite the government's expectations of hospitals to 
increase efficiency, consideration of employee morale has 
not appeared to have been a feature of these demands.
The complexity of the hospital, lack of goal clarity and 
the conflicting interests of different groups are 
formidable barriers to improving operating effectiveness 
and the nature of work life within the organization. 
(Hanlon and Gladstein 1984).
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The hospital is not one organization, but a collection of 
empires in competition with each other for beds, money, 
manpower and other resources. To many who work in 
hospitals apparently there is no one higher than the 
consultants, no higher authority. Until recently the 
administrators were regarded as "the mere servants of the 
kings". They co-ordinated, and tried to keep the 
building and the non-medical staff functioning. They 
would not and it appeared could not interfere in any way 
with the way in which the consultants ran their kingdoms. 
Nor could they, being without medical qualifications, 
make valid priority judgements between departments. The 
old District Management Teams often decided who should 
get large sums of money under much pressure from the 
lobbying of a powerful consultant or group of 
consultants. But the consultant in his own department 
was autonomous. Only he decided how many patients to 
operate on, what types of operations to perform and how 
many patients were seen in his out-patient clinics. But 
significantly his power extended even over non clinical 
matters. As one consultant told me,
"He could even have a door moved a few inches to suit
him"
Following the various reorganizations new types of 
administrators and managers took over, but they were 
still largely without power, respect, or seniority. They
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were regarded only as housekeepers, and they had a hard 
time trying to control the hospital (Toynbee, 1979);
"The Administration had sent out directives to all 
consultants to admit only emergency cases. The laundry 
had ceased to function effectively and there was a 
severe linen shortage. The orthopaedic department 
suffered particularly since many of their admissions 
couldn't easily be categorized as emergencies. There 
was a lot of wheeling and dealing going between the 
consultants. I was with Dr Goodwin of the nephrology 
department one day during the dispute. He was pacing 
the wards, whispering to the Sisters. In one of his 
wards he found that a prudent Sister had stockpiled a 
vast amount of linen, plenty to keep his non-emergency 
admissions flowing. The sister was anxious that he 
shouldn't tell the Administration that she had all this 
extra linen, as she wanted to keep it for her ward.
"Do you think we could? Could we just admit a few, do 
you think?" he asked her conspiratorially. He went 
down to the Administrators in the end, and being 
careful not to disclose the ward in question said, "If 
I found the linen could I keep admitting my patients? 
There was a fairly indignant "no" from Administration, 
who were hard put to find enough linen for their 
emergencies. Dr Goodwin huffed off, in a bad temper, 
and no doubt the Administrators ordered a quick search 
of some of the ward linen stocks".
This anecdote shows how consultants operate in complete 
isolation from the rest of the hospital. They are almost 
completely autonomous. The consultants fight out amongst 
themselves in a series of complicated and unsatisfactory 
committees. Each of them strives to increase the size of 
their domain. Few, it seems, have any consideration for 
the general good of all patients, only, putting it at its 
best, caring for the rights of their own patients.
There is a belief amongst consultants, unassailable and 
inviolable, that nothing, no authority in the world must
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come between them and their patients. They and only they 
must have complete freedom to prescribe the right 
treatment. It is on this basis that the consultants can 
build around them such powerful empires. There is no one 
above or below them to challenge their authority. 
(Toynbee, 1979);
"I regard the Health Service as nothing more than a 
mechanism for paying for medical care of the patients, 
a sort of insurance, and nothing more. We consultants 
have no loyalties whatever to the Health Service, nor 
should we. All our loyalties are to our patients and 
the hospital.11
A comparison has been made between doctors and airline 
pilots. (West, 1988a);
”It is widely accepted that planes need well trained 
independent professionals to cope with whatever 
situation develops. But it is also accepted that the 
autonomy can be exercised within limits of financial 
and organizational efficiency set by the airlines.
........Furthermore, customer safety requires detailed
reviews every six months to check on the competence of 
the pilot in a range of situations.”
Care without direct payment of course carries on a 
tradition from the voluntary hospitals that pre dates the 
National Health Service. Then doctors gave their time 
free of charge in those hospitals, hence the name.
Several people I interviewed thought it probable that 
this charitable background may still be affecting the 
attitudes toward patients of many consultants today.
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Patients effectively have no purchasing power, they do 
not control the transaction in a market way. The 
consultant is paid a salary and the poor performer is 
paid the same as the best. I am of course ignoring the 
distinction award system, set up by the Spens Committee 
(M.o.H, 1948) in 1948 which rewards those consultants 
whose work is "over and above the call of duty" (Toghill, 
1992). The subject of debate and criticism, it is an 
endemic controversy within the medical profession (Dawe, 
1992). Doctors are extremely reluctant to talk about 
this system of secret payments, but managers are more 
forthcoming, for instance DGM?
"The strong grip that a few individuals have over the 
majority, means that it is often the case that out of 
say one hundred and fifty consultants, we only have to 
persuade three to press our case. They can all stand- 
up and rattle, but if the three Godfathers dissent, the 
views of the other don't matter. There is something 
inherently wrong with that arrangement in my view, and 
I cannot understand it. It will be perpetuated and can 
only be altered from within the profession itself."
Where the patient has a direct input into the choice of 
doctor and where an insurance fund will reward doctors 
for the treatments and service provided, as in the United 
States and many European countries, there is obviously an 
incentive to keep the patient happy and informed about 
the treatment.
Another factor, alluded to earlier, is that a consultant 
aged about 55, training young doctors today, will have
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been trained by consultants who entered medicine and had 
their attitudes shaped in the 1920's. According to Devlin 
(1985b)?
"There has been a sort of cosy consensus among the 
surgical oligarchy since the inception of the NHS or, 
more correctly, since the then oligarches returned from 
the 1939-45 war and diecast the NHS in the most 
favourable view they took of the surgical practice they 
had known prior to September 1939."
Doctors also came mainly from higher income groups and 
were chosen for their performance in science examinations 
and it is not surprising that they are frequently lacking 
in the area of customer relations. This pattern may 
however be altering (Lowry, 1992);
"that attitude is now changing, more schools 
acknowledging that people with only moderate academic 
achievement can cope well with the course and often 
have more to offer in terms of personal skills, 
attitudes and experience."
3.5. Consultants Use of Resources in Hospital.
The second half of this chapter is devoted to the way in 
which doctors are involved in the use of resources in 
hospitals. This is important because it reveals the 
extent to which they are major users of resources and can 
therefore have an equally large effect on managing those 
resources in a way which managers themselves cannot. It 
also demonstrates some of the lessons which Clinical 
Directors have had to learn about the ways in which a
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hospital operates, and what proportions of resources go 
into various aspects of the running of a hospital. It 
also demonstrates some of the areas in which change is 
occurring, for example in the culture, particularly to 
such things as bed holding for status and empire building 
in general.
Consultants use two main types of resources in hospital, 
those whose use they control more or less directly, and 
those where a task is referred to a service department.
A clinical or bed holding firm is usually allocated a 
number of inpatient beds or wards with supporting 
facilities and outpatient clinic time at one or more 
hospitals. For surgical specialities in addition there 
will be an allocation of theatre time with anaesthetic 
services and related equipment. But beds are usually the 
most important and expensive resource.
3.5.1. Directly Controlled Resources
The resources directly controlled by the firm are used in 
a way of the consultant choice. For some consultants 
beds are equated with status and their use will not be 
surrendered to colleagues even when for clinical or other 
reasons their occupancy is falling. They keep them full 
unnecessarily to prevent emergency cases from other firms 
blocking their next day's elective list admissions, a 
problem especially common in winter. To be fair about
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this however, one might consider how one would feel if on 
coming into work we found our desk (if we had one!) taken 
over by others, leaving no room for us to do our own 
work. Without incentives, the choice of how beds are 
used might not be efficient for the hospital. A 
consultant therefore has until recently usually taken no 
real interest in the management of hospital beds and 
faced few penalties for this lack of interest.
The use of operating theatres involves similar 
difficulties as with hospital beds. Theatres like beds 
are not always used effectively and a good deal of 
frustration results. One cause is lack of clear 
management and this could change in the new management 
structures which I shall outline in later chapters. Since 
managers have no real control over the consultants they 
can only make sure that a theatre is ready to provide the 
service expected of it. They cannot make the service 
happen. Theatre User Committees exist but for these to 
function effectively the consultant members may need to 
challenge each other about the use of facilities, 
something they rarely consider. Medical etiquette, 
loyalty to the profession and the "medical mafia" serve 
to prevent change.
The cost of under usage of theatres, or any other 
facility, is negligible to the consultant, but expensive 
for the hospital. Over use causes overspends beyond
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budgetary allocations, provokes irritation in theatre 
staff who may have to work longer hours unpaid, and keeps 
any surgical colleagues waiting. According to West 
(1988b);
"A more fundamental problem is the mismatch between the 
rate of detection of problems by GPs, confirmation by 
the consultant at outpatient clinics, and final 
treatment. A patient may be diagnosed in minutes for a 
condition that will take hours of direct treatment and 
days of hospital stay. As a result a waiting list 
starts to build up for either treatment or outpatient
clinics.......There is no real incentive to improve
performance.11
For surgeons especially there may be an imbalance between 
outpatient work and theatre time. It may not be easily 
practical to change this, nor in the consultant's 
interest for his private practice, nor may it be possible 
for the manager to change because of resistance from the 
profession in general. In the past managers have no 
clear incentive to increase performance, where even if 
the number of patients treated increases, the income to 
the hospital does not. With the new internal market, the 
more efficient a hospital becomes, spare capacity may be 
revealed which cannot be filled if purchasers have no 
money for extra work.
A further issue is that a consultant and his firm using 
resources for one case does not allow this to affect his 
firm's decision about another case as it would have no
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immediate, direct or apparent effect on their total 
resources. The service is apparently free to them.
3.5.2 Investigations and Resources
There are also at least three ways in which overusage of
resources by investigations may occur. The first, which
might be called legal over usage, and which tends to be
more overt in the States, is the overuse of resources as
a result of defensive medicine. This is practiced to
avoid potential criticism particularly if there is future
litigation or legal action and usually means doing
everything possible, in detail, even when the clinical
gain may be small or non existent. The second kind is 
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junior professional overusage, where overuse may be 
practiced by junior hospital doctors to defend themselves 
against criticism by their consultants on a ward round. 
And the last is patient overusage, where there may be 
overusage of diagnostic services authorized by a doctor 
because of the need to demonstrate concern or to reassure 
the patient that a problem is receiving attention, is 
under control or is not a significant problem after all. 
There is the very significant problem of unreal 
expectations by patients of what can be done for them, 
often reinforced by an abrogation of GP responsibilities 
regarding referral.
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Whatever the extent of these forms of defensive medicine, 
particularly the last which is widespread, because 
doctors are motivated to help people and may push this to 
the limit where they think it is worth trying, 
nevertheless as a result of the lack of incentives that 
have faced doctors, resources may not be used in ways 
that health economists and others might regard as 
efficient.
The trouble is however, that while everyone agrees that 
waste is a bad thing there is frequently no general 
agreement on the right clinical regime for a given 
patient with a given disorder, and audit and protocols 
are at present in their infancy as well as time 
consuming. With all this uncertainty it is probably 
wiser to think of improving hospital efficiency by 
eliminating obviously wasteful activities rather than 
trying to aim for medical consistency on patterns of 
resource use when there is no consensus on the right 
treatment.
3.5.3. Service Controlled Resources
So far we have only considered the so called bed holding 
clinical departments, but not the service specialities 
who have rather different problems with resources. They 
are the departments such as anaesthetics, pathology and 
radiology providing a service to other specialities in
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the hospital. Faced with a rising demand, they have 
either to increase their output from the resources 
available, which means everyone must work harder, which 
is likely to be unpopular; or they can claim more 
resource to meet demand at current level of efficiency, 
such extra resource rarely being available; or they have 
to restrict demand, which means disputes with clinical 
departments and difficult decisions about priority and 
rationing.
It has been easier to pursue efficiency in the non 
clinical support services such as cleaning, catering and 
the other hotel services, where there is no direct 
question of a threat to healthcare from reductions in 
staffing, although reducing or at least controlling 
demand is increasingly seen as an alternative way to cut 
expenditure within hospitals.
3.6. The Traditional Control of Resources
In many hospitals it appeared that the district 
administrator was already behaving as a Chief Executive, 
and administrators and managers with a strong personality 
effectively steered the unit. In other hospitals a 
different member of the team was the real leader and in 
some hospitals, doctors became involved in management and 
this is the subject of much of the discussion in later 
chapters. Traditionally in the National Health Service,
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doctors had taken or been given little or no 
responsibility for budgets. Neither had they been given 
or taken much interest in the resource implications and 
the costs of their decisions.
The early National Health Service hospitals had run very 
much like the model of a private hospital, or to some 
extent how American hospitals were run. In other words 
the doctor was not really regarded as an employee of that 
institution and until 1991, consultants, except those in 
teaching hospitals, were generally employees of the 
Regional Health Authority. They advised the managers of 
the hospital about what needed to be achieved medically, 
and it was the task of the managers to do their level 
best to satisfy the needs of the doctors. For the doctor 
it was a comfortable system.
To some extent from 1948 until the late 1970's it ran in 
that sort of way and each year more and more money was 
spent. Perhaps there were not as many increases as were 
happening elsewhere in Europe, or as much as doctors 
would have liked, but nonetheless each year, more was 
spent. The years of 1948 to 1978 were, relatively 
speaking, the years of plenty .
Then came the years of famine, with cash limits in 1979 
and cash planning in the early 1980's so that the old 
ways of running hospitals no longer applied. There is
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nothing unique about the National Health Service. Every 
country in the world is facing exactly the same problem 
of not having enough resources to achieve everything they 
would like to achieve, and therefore choices have to be 
made.
So the question raised was how to involve doctors in 
management and there are a number of ways in which 
doctors can be involved in and feel to be part of 
management in acute hospitals. The Griffiths Report 
(DHSS, 1983) emphasised the need for doctors to assume 
managerial responsibility, and suggested this may take 
place in two main ways:
a. By involving doctors in management within hospitals.
That was to say, by involving them in the management of 
resources which endeavours to make them more cost 
conscious.
b. By appointing doctors to general managerial posts.
3.7.0. Doctors'Involvement in the Management of Resources
Experience from other countries shows that doctors have 
not regretted participating in clinical budgeting. One 
of the main advantages is the strengthening of the 
doctors' position when negotiating resources. It enables 
discussion on standards and quality of care to be part of
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that discussion and some consultants have found this to 
be an incentive. However, some managers paradoxically 
feel that giving doctors resource management type 
information could be manipulated by consultants and 
intensify their "shroud waving" ability and not 
necessarily make them better team members. Also 
consultants are generally unhappy with management 
interference in medical workloads and they frequently 
distrust the accuracy of information.
There have been a series of attempts to move away from 
functional budgeting and to involve doctors more, each 
attempt increasing the degree to which they have been 
given more involvement, and these may be summarised as 
follows.
3.7.1. Clinical Budgeting
There is therefore a gap between the clinicians who make 
decisions about which patients to treat and how, which 
has had a major impact on resources use, and the managers 
who have the responsibility for controlling a budget and 
keeping within cash limits. Managers did not see it as 
their role to be involved in negotiating with clinicians 
how resources should be used. Nor since the beginning of 
the National Health Service have doctors wished to fill 
this role. Clinical Budgeting suggested that plans 
should be agreed by clinicians in conjunction with
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service providers and finance officers. Those plans 
should incorporate objectives for clinical activity, 
specifying the details of resources required into a 
financial statement. The essential change with Clinical 
Budgeting was the securing of an agreement with 
clinicians on a budget.
3.7.2. Management Budgeting
The Griffiths Report (DHSS, 1983) emphasised the need to 
involve doctors more effectively in the management of 
resources. It pointed out what has been emphasised on 
many occasions that it is the decisions of the doctors 
that largely determine how resources are used.
Griffith argued that clinicians should accept the 
managerial responsibility that went with the clinical 
freedom. He recommended (DHSS, 1983) that health 
authorities should
"Involve the clinicians more closely in the management 
process, consistent with clinical freedom.
Clinicians must participate fully in decisions about 
priorities in the use of resources.
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Clinicians need administrative support, together with 
strictly relevant management information, and a fully 
developed management budget approach."
Clinicians, although previously involved informally and 
implicitly with Management Budgeting, were in future to 
be involved formally and explicitly in financial 
management and decision making, and to be responsible for 
those decisions. The proposals thus had profound effects 
on general managers, treasurers and other professional 
groups, especially nurses. The discipline of management 
budgeting also meant that doctors would be accountable 
for their actions to a manager who might not necessarily 
be a doctor, a move which would have little appeal to the 
profession. It was essentially, however, similar to 
Clinical Budgeting.
A review of Management Budgeting (DHSS, 1986) concluded 
that it had failed to achieve its objectives due in part 
to a failure to win the support and commitment from key 
personnel, the absence of clear management structures and 
the rapid speed with which it had been introduced.
Management Budgeting was not just a matter of agreement 
between doctors and managers but required doctors to take 




A new initiative was therefore needed and in 1986 it came 
in the form of Resource Management (DHSS, 1986). The new 
approach was to aim for greater medical and nursing 
involvement, with a focus on measurable improvements in 
health care through better use of resources. There was a 
recognition that nurses and clinicians needed to be more 
involved than hitherto. The architect of the scheme,
Mills (1987) states:
"The resource management programme is principally about 
changing attitudes and encouraging closer team work in 
managing resources among patient care professionals and 
between such professionals and other managers".
Resource Management was intended to provide accurate and 
useful information to clinicians about their practice and 
costs compared with colleagues in the same hospital, 
district or region. In a sense it was the forerunner of 
medical audit in that it sought to encourage doctors to 
review performance and improve standards of health care. 
While some consultants found this information interesting 
and even useful, some became anxious about comparisons.
Winning over clinicians to Resource Management was going 
to take time. Earlier initiatives had failed because 
they failed to convince clinicians that they had anything 
to offer. Indeed the DHSS used the words "seriously 
antagonised" (DHSS, 1986) and went on to say that "there
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may be a case for suspending Management Budgeting 
development for the time being"; Devlin (1985a) said that
"unrewarding for the clinician, a fact that management 
consultants agreed in private conversations. In a 
cutback situation the health authority is having to 
grab every penny it can and will only squeeze further, 
consultants who improve their output. I think 
management budgets by incentive is fraudulent unless 
the clinician is prepared to go home and rest when he 
has reached his target output - doing more, more 
efficiently, negates the savings the health authority 
is really out to achieve, savings, not efficiency, is 
the real bottom line."
Resource Management therefore emphasised the human 
relations, whereas Management Budgeting was finance led? 
Resource Management was more concerned with making 
doctors more management conscious and accountable for the 
resources used. By now the doctor and manager had agreed 
the budget, and the doctor had been given responsibility 
and made accountable.
3.7.4. Clinical Directorates.
Here Clinical Directors or Clinical Chairmen (the terms 
vary between hospitals) are responsible and accountable 
for consultants and other medical staff within a 
directorate, and have the authority to manage the 
directorate. In a classical case the Clinical Director 
is supported by a Business Manager and Nurse Manager and 
this is described more fully later. One of the problems 
in the Health Service is that we tend to use the same
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word for a number of things? many hospitals now have 
Clinical Directors and yet what they actually do 
regarding responsibility, authority and accountability, 
varies from hospital to hospital.
Here finally the doctor was given authority in addition 
to accountability and responsibility. These are issues 
which will be discussed in depth in later chapters as it 
is in this way that the current changes are occurring in 
many hospitals. And they are the changes which seem to 
be producing most effect.
It is probably useful to summarise the changes in tabular 
form:



















Everything in Doctors 
directorate.
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More important regarding these are the differences within 
in the various stages of development, with regard to 
agreement, responsibility, accountability and authority 
which may be summarised as follows:






Budgeting Yes Yes ?
Resource
Management Yes Yes Yes
Clinical
Directorates Yes Yes Yes Yes
3.8. Appointment of Doctors to Managerial Positions.
Few doctors were willing to take general managerial 
posts. A small number were appointed in 1987 less than 8% 
at Regional and District level and less than 19% at Unit 
level (Stewart and Dobson, 1988). They were often on a
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part time basis, and the number has since fallen. A 
number of reasons have been given for this including 
(Scrivens, 1988):
Limited interest in management roles.
Lack of training in management skills.
Lack of ability in management skills.
Lack of suitable financial rewards for doing so, as it 
would have meant a cut in salary.
A feeling from colleagues that in doing so one had 
crossed to the other side if one were full time, and 
being part time was difficult.
There were difficulties in maintaining a career by 





This chapter shows how the separation of general 
practitioners and consultants arose, an important factor 
in the development of doctors and hospitals, and also 
helps explain the background to some of the present day 
problems.
4.1.0. Historical Background
The practice of medicine has from time immemorial been 
shared by orthodox and unorthodox attendants. Until very 
recently the larger part of the population depended upon 
unorthodox, unqualified practitioners. An unorthodox 
practitioner is not necessarily a charlatan. The bone 
setter, for instance, had an intimate knowledge of 
skeletal anatomy and based his practice on that 
knowledge. He became a charlatan only when he strayed 
outside his "speciality” (Cartwright, 1977).
The first Medical Act introduced by Henry VIII in 1511-12 
made it an offence to practice physic or surgery unless 
the practitioner was a graduate of a university or had 
been licensed by a bishop of his diocese after
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examination by a panel of experts. In 1518 Thomas 
Linacre, an Oxford graduate and MD of Padua who had 
served as tutor and physician to Prince Arthur, elder son 
of Henry VII, and continued to act as a physician to 
Henry VIII, petitioned Henry and obtained a charter 
establishing a Company of Physicians which became the 
Royal College of Physicians in 1551.
4.1.1. Physicians, Surgeons and Apothecaries
It is important to realize, and this has implications 
today, that before the eighteenth century the medical 
profession was divided into three groups, the physicians, 
the surgeons and the apothecaries. The physicians had 
the highest status? they were graduates, usually of 
Oxford or Cambridge, who had received religious and 
classical educations and subsequently had studied medical 
subjects in European Universities. The surgeons were 
craftsmen organised in a Guild associated with the 
barbers and they were licensed to perform a range of 
procedures that could be carried out on patients without 
anaesthesia (Drucker, 1968):
"Until well into the seventeenth century, surgery was 
performed not by doctors but by barbers who, untaught 
and unlettered, applied whatever tortures they had 
picked up during their apprenticeship. Doctors, 
observing a literal interpretation of their oath not to 
inflict bodily harm, were too 'ethical' to cut and were 
not even supposed to watch. But the operation, if 
performed according to the rules, was presided over by 
a learned doctor who sat on a dias well above the 
struggle and read what the barber was supposed to be
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doing aloud from a Latin classic (which the barber, of 
course, did not understand). Needless to say, it was 
always the barber's fault if the patient died, and 
always the doctor's achievement if he survived. And the 
doctor got the bigger fee in either event."
In 1540 Thomas Vicary who had become a surgeon to Henry 
VIII five years previously, secured the King's assent to 
a union of all the scattered Guilds in England to form 
the United Company of Barber Surgeons. Separation of the 
two took 200 years to complete but the surgeon was no 
longer required to act as a barber and barbers were 
restricted to dentistry.
Apothecaries were tradesmen who from 1617 were licensed 
by the Society of Apothecaries to sell drugs prescribed 
by physicians, as well as groceries. Historians think 
that James I initiated the separation, for in 1606 they 
separated from the grocers and in 1617 were granted a 
charter of the Society of Apothecaries. The grocers tried 
to reabsorb them but were frustrated by the personal 
intervention of James I.
4.1.2. Development of Hospitals
Before the eighteenth century treatment was essentially 
carried out in the home of the patient. Between 1700 and 
1850, partly because of the rise of the great voluntary 
hospitals, hospitals became more important in patient 
treatment particularly as they provided a setting for
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developments in surgery. In the reign of Queen Victoria 
(1837-1901), nearly every year saw a new voluntary 
hospital being founded (Kirby, 1991). By comparison the 
physicians hardly advanced their techniques and 
abilities. The prestige of surgeons rose and in 1745 the 
Company of Surgeons was founded, completing the 
independence from the barbers and enabling educational 
standards to improve. By 1800 the Company had become 
the Royal College of Surgeons of England.
4.1.3. General Practitioners
Apothecaries also advanced and by 1703 they were entitled 
to see patients and prescribe medicines themselves. This 
resulted in the appointment of general practitioners for 
the middle classes and the poor. The Apothecaries Act 
of 1815 gave the Society of Apothecaries the right to 
license those who had served a five year apprenticeship 
and passed examinations, and indeed some physicians took 
this examination in addition to their own exams.
The most important point however was that the voluntary 
hospitals were closed to these practitioners; hospitals 
employed the services only of those recognised by the 
Royal Colleges, so the distinction between specialists 
(consultants) and general practitioners had became 
established. This nineteenth century demarcation in 
England, but not in other countries, resulted in general
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practitioners not only having a monopoly of most primary 
care, but it also meant that more expensive hospital 
treatment was based on the outcome of two rather than one 
medical opinion. This historical accident was to prove a 
useful barrier to costly and possibly unnecessary 
hospital interventions, making significant savings for 
the future National Health Service not available in other 
countries.
The Society of Apothecaries pioneered improvements in the 
standard of education and raised the status of 
practitioners probably more than did the universities or 
Royal Colleges. Despite all this success, unqualified 
practitioners still flourished; the 1841 census showed 
over 30,000 doctors while the first Medical Directory 
published in 1845 showed only 11,000 qualified 
practitioners.
The demand arose for a single licensing authority and a 
single professional qualification. The strongest 
pressure came from the Provincial Medical and Surgical 
Association, a body founded in Worcester in 1832 which 
drew so much support that by 1855 it had changed its name 
to the British Medical Association. The campaign 
resulted in the passing of the Medical Act in 1858 which 
created the General Council of Medical Education and 
Registration, now called the General Medical Council, one
90
of its duties being to maintain a register of licensed 
practitioners.
4.1.4. General Practitioner v Hospital Doctor
The rivalry between General Practitioners and hospital 
doctors, particularly Consultants has been considerable 
and the British Medical Association actually felt it 
necessary to set out terms for the relationship in a code 
of ethics which made the General Practitioner responsible 
for his patients while the specialist should be consulted 
for opinion and advice on diagnosis and treatment. This 
enabled the General Practitioner to maintain a list of 
patients without the fear that if any of them were 
referred to a hospital doctor they would take them over. 
Echoes of this can be seen in the attitudes of hospital 
doctors even now and reference is made by Klein (1989:58) 
to the concept of the NHS as a National Hospital Service 
rather than a National Health Service?
"Above all there were the problems of coordination 
stemming from the division of responsibility as between 
the hospital the general practitioner and the local 
authority services. Britain so far, only had a national 
hospital service. Could this be translated into a 
national health service."
4.1.5. Bringing the two together
The idea of Primary Care and Secondary Care Health 
Centres (referred to in Chapter 2 section 2.7)
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coordinating the services of the two branches of medicine 
has been in existence since the Lloyd George coalition 
was returned in 1918 and set up the Ministry of Health in 
1919. The first Minister was a qualified doctor, 
Christopher Addison. He set up a Council on Medical and 
Administrative Services under the chairmanship of Sir 
Bernard Dawson which published a report on proposed 
reorganization in 1920.
The emphasis of this report lay on bringing together 
preventative and curative medicine. Consultant advice 
would be available at the Primary Health Centre, but the 
main working area of consultants and specialists would be 
in the Secondary Health Centres, located in hospitals 
capable of undertaking diagnosis care and treatment of 
the more difficult case. The scheme considered that most 
cottage hospitals and some infirmaries could be adapted 
as Health Centres although rebuilding would be necessary 
on some scale. Unfortunately a crisis in the middle of 
1920 prevented radical reform and the chance of hospital 
reform was lost and with it the chance of an integrated 
National Health Service.
In the late 19307s there still existed a division of the 
hospital service, one section depending upon voluntary 
subscriptions, the other upon compulsory rates levied by 
borough and county councils. In the first the doctor was 
an "honorary" giving his services freely, in the second
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he was a paid servant of the local authority. Proposals 
had already been made to end this separation and dual 
control, but the difficulties had proved too great and 
they had never been implemented. On the one hand both 
doctors and voluntary hospitals feared domination by 
local councils. On the other hand the powerful and power 
loving town halls saw no good reason to surrender an 
important part of their function (Cartwright 1977:172);
"Only a solution of these problems, acceptable to all, 
could produce a comprehensive and efficient Health 
Service of the kind envisaged by Lord Dawson in his 
Primary and Secondary Health Centres."
The reorganization of hospitals however never involved 
integration of the two branches of medicine, hospital 
services and general practice. The concept of multi­
disciplinary practices of health care will also be an 
issue raised later with U.S. practice where some useful 
lessons may be learned.
4.2. Professional Independence to Interdependence.
In early times the doctor was very much in control, and 
his authority was unquestioned in the care and treatment 
of the patient whether in the home or later when the 
patient might be in hospital. Professional independence 
was reinforced because for years the centre of his 
practice had been the home. Hospitals only gradually 
developed as a place to be when ill and the doctor
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continued to guard his position even when the patient was 
in hospital.
But in the second half of the twentieth century hospital 
and medical treatment advanced and become much more 
complex. There are now often large numbers of people 
involved in treatment, as well as complex laboratory and 
clinical facilities such as Pathology, Histology,
Chemical Pathology, Haematology, Radiology, Radiotherapy, 
Nuclear Medicine, Audiology, Physiotherapy etc. As the 
organization has grown in size so there has been a move 
away from professional dependence to professional 
interdependence. All this has occurred with a 
simultaneous development of professionalization of many 
of the other hospital departments, especially nursing, 
technical staff and administration. In medicine there is 
a problem of coordinating all these proliferating 
specialities which have arisen out of medical research 
and practice, in addition to the bureaucracies that have 
grown up around them.
One problem appears to be the lag time in acceptance of 
these developments by doctors. In the past the doctor's 
responsibility to the hospital was rarely made as 
explicit as his responsibility to the patient. It is the 
confusion arising from this dual role which is partly 
responsible for creating stress in the system. As Rosen 
(1972:289) says:
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"One may say that the Industrial Revolution has finally 
caught up with medicine, and that the medical 
practitioner is being brought into the "factory" (the 
hospital and the whole bureaucratic complexity for the 
provision of medical care) where he is being subjected 
to the necessary "labor disciplines"."
And during this time as the hospital has become more 
complicated there has been a growth in stature of the 
administrators and managers for whom there is also the 
problem with the medical staff of trying to maintain the 
rights and goals of the institution, while at the same 
time trying to preserve the professional rights of the 
doctor (Warden, 1991);
"They struck a blow for their craft that clinched the 
new managerial hierarchy in the hospital service and 
should cause rueful reflection in other professions, 
not least medicine, which now find themselves on the 
sidelines."
4.3. The Power of the Profession.
There are particular characteristics necessary to 
transform an ordinary occupation into a powerful 
profession. Two core characteristics described by 
Wilensky (1964) are esoteric knowledge (experts with a 
client) and service ideal (ethic), in which altruistic 
motives eclipse simple greed and the threat of exploiting 
a monopoly of specialist knowledge.
95
Schon (1983) describes how the professions have become an 
essential part of the workings of a modern society. Many 
of the principal functions are carried out by specially 
trained professionals, in war, defence, education, 
medicine, law, managing, designing and construction etc. 
We look to these professionals for the solutions to many 
of our problems and in return we have given them rights 
and privileges.
For the medical profession its apparent expertise and 
self disinterest ensured that it was given major 
responsibility for health service resources as the 
expanding welfare state put money into health care? Klein 
(1989) states?
"Implicit in the structure of the NHS was a bargain 
between the State and the medical profession. While 
central government controlled the budget, doctors 
controlled what happened within that budget. Financial 
power was concentrated at the centre? clinical power 
was concentrated at the periphery."
Who were given the task of organising those professions 
supplementary to medicine. According to Schon (1983 and
1991),
"The greatest achievement in the two immediate post war 
decades was to win general acceptance for itself 
professed altruism and expertise which also brought it 
new found wealth status and expertise."
Patients had to assume that the physician put their 
interest before his own. Sumners says (1981)?
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"This power is legitimized through the stereotype of 
altruistic doctors serving humanity, helping to quell 
one of the Four Horsemen. Perhaps the more common 
stereotype is that of professionalism. The physician's 
prerogative, furthermore, is protected through the 
institutionalization of medicine. Within this framework 
is taught the sense of professionalism, that the 
patient's interests come before one's own.”
There are however, signs of an increasing crisis of 
confidence in the professions generally. With failures 
of professional action, unanticipated consequences of 
action, sometimes worse than the original problem, and 
examples of widely conflicting advice from the 
professionals themselves. All of this has resulted in a 
loss of faith in professional judgement, a reaction to 
blame the professions, and calls for more external 
regulation of professional activity, and a general 
questioning of professional rights and freedoms which has 
now led to scepticism and attacks on the professions.
In 1962 John Kennedy, speaking at Yale, made a number of 
references to "a second scientific revolution" and "a 
knowledgeable society" (Lane, 1966) "a post industrial 
society" (Etzioni, 1967) "organized around professional 
competence". By the 1970's understanding began to lag, 
unsuitable remedies began to appear and professional 
dilemmas became a norm. A series of crises, such as 
deteriorating inner cities, poverty, pollution, and an 
energy crisis all seemed to have roots in science. 
Scientists and scientifically trained professionals found
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themselves in the unfamiliar role of villains. The 
public image of the professionals was becoming tarnished. 
They seemed like everyone else ready to plead their 
special status and put it to private use. Public 
confidence had begun to erode.
Professionals had claimed to contribute to social well 
being, to put patients' needs above their own and hold 
themselves accountable. But they now stood accused of 
serving themselves, ignoring their public service and 
failing to police themselves effectively. It might be 
argued that the profession has brought this on itself by 
not policing itself adequately, not the policing of 
members' conduct through the General Medical Council but 
by being resistant to cost effectiveness and proper 
evaluation of treatments.
It was, after all, only by government pressure that the 
colleges and specialist bodies began to insist on the 
profession beginning to participate in medical and 
clinical audit. It is the culture of professionals that 
they preserve their own identity and their own freedom 
yet they are part of the organization with colleagues 
supporting them. According to Handy (1985) they 
recognize no boss. Management is a household chore and a 
manager is accorded by them, to have the low status of an 
administrator amongst prima donnas. They do not receive 
orders willingly. Each wishes to be king of his own
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domain. One enters that domain by invitation, and 
command by consent. The administrator governs with the 
consent of the governed. Co-ordinated effort becomes an 
endless process of negotiation.
But for a doctor the individual is not subordinate to the 
organization. Ask a doctor what he does for a living, he 
does not say, 111 work for St X hospital,” the reply is 
always, "I am a doctor, a physician, a surgeon, etc."
Not one of the doctors in this study replied otherwise. 
The organization exists to help the individual achieve 
his purpose. They are a collection of individuals 
loosely gathered together, not mutually interdependent, 
and the organization remains largely unchanged even if 
one or two depart. It is their talent which is the 
essential asset of the organization.
They are hard to influence since they do not conceive of 
themselves working for the organization. Influence and 
change suggests infringement of liberty. Managing them, 
has been described as "like herding cats", (Bennis,
1992). They value freedom to speak and act as they wish. 
They like to be consulted and have the right of veto.
They are loners who do not really wish to work in the 
organization at all but do so purely for convenience. 
Bennis (1992);
"Trying to lead doctors is like leading an academic 
community. It's organised anarchy. Doctors are
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independent and autonomous, and the very reason they 
selected medicine was because of their fierce desire 
for autonomy."
Professionals do not like to be managed with all that 
management implies. The professions do not use the word 
"manager" for their high status roles, preferring instead 
President, Dean, Senior Lecturer, Clinical Director, Head 
of Department, etc. Management is synonymous with office 
management and housekeeping roles, the administration of 
the system. To the managers it is illogical to put the 
controls in the hands of the professionals but to the 
professionals it is insulting and degrading to have it 
any other way. The system now appears to doctors to be 
overmanaged and underled.
Some professionals have become aware of the complexity of 
the management of medicine itself, and they can see a 
larger system and a tangled web that traditional medical 
knowledge cannot untangle. Professionals are being 
called upon to perform tasks for which they have not been 
educated. And even if their knowledge did catch up, the 
result might be transitory as the situation is inherently 
unstable. The gap is changing, the body of knowledge is 
changing and the expectations of society are changing. 
This places on the professional a requirement for 
adaptability. The role of doctors will continually be 
reshaped by reorganization and rationalization.
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Ackoff (1974) observed that managers will not be 
confronted with independent problems but with dynamic 
complex systems of changing problems that interact with 
each other. He called such situations "messes”. He went 
on to say that managers will not solve problems but 
manage messes.
4.4. The Decline in the Profession's Confidence.
Some professionals have been critical of their own 
failures to solve social problems, and many have written 
on the failure of the health care system to keep pace 
with the expansion in medical technology. Some have also 
noted a new trend towards deprofessionalization, a 
decline in status and working conditions and a pattern of 
institutional change variously called 
"bureaucratization", "industrialization" and 
"proletarianization" of the professions. Professionals 
are unionizing in recognition of their status as workers 
rather than autonomous managers of their own careers.
This crisis of confidence in the professions and the 
decline in professional self image seem to be rooted in 
the growing scepticism about professional effectiveness, 
in doubts about the professions' actual contribution to 
society's well being, and the question of professional 
knowledge and whether this is adequate to solve the 
problems which it has helped to create.
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Sociologists usually point to Freidson's "Profession of 
Medicine" (1970) to mark the point when the image of the 
medical profession began to tarnish. The success of the 
profession was not due to the above mentioned 
characteristics, but rather to the degree of control the 
profession had managed to establish over the conduct of 
its own work. Medical power therefore rested on a high 
degree of autonomy in clinical work, which medicine 
claimed as its natural right. And I have devoted the 
whole of the next two Chapters to the question of 
Clinical Freedom or Clinical Autonomy.
In maintaining control over clinical work the profession 
established control over the distribution of health care 
resources, and created a special position for itself, 
according to Klein (1989:28);
"Most important perhaps for the future, the medical 
profession obtained a monopoly of legitimacy among the 
health service providers: a unique position, reflected 
in the participation of doctors in the running of the 
NHS".
Successive governments that have provided these resources 
became increasingly frustrated that their priorities, 
such as the care of the chronically sick, were frequently 
ignored. Thus from the mid 1960's the government began 
the first of a series of attempts to reform the NHS which 
in retrospect can be seen as attempts to curtail the
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control that the profession had over health resource 
allocation. Gradually, under the pressure of this the 
image of the profession was transformed from a bastion of 
altruism to another more powerful image of vested 
interest.
Despite the American Medical Association's rejection of 
socialised medicine because of its supposed threat to 
medical autonomy, the British doctor by and large still 
maintains more freedom of action than his American 
counterpart. Although on the other side of the Atlantic 
they feel the reverse to be true.
So that very same process that now threatens the freedom 
of action of the profession in Britain has already had 
considerable influence on health care provision in the 
U.S., and clinical autonomy there has suffered a similar 
decline over the past two decades. There it has been the 
funding bodies - whether government, insurance companies 
or employers - who have attempted to contain runaway 
costs by placing more and more restrictions on clinical 
freedom.
Thus American doctors find themselves increasingly 
working to guide lines as laid down by corporate and 
government sponsors. It has been argued therefore, that 
the profession in the United States is being de­
professionalized, as doctors lose clinical autonomy and
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simply become agents or employees of corporate providers 
of health care.
Now similar forces are at work in Britain in the NHS. The 
most recent proposals for reforming the health service 
offer the severest challenge so far to clinical autonomy, 
in that it is proposed to remove many medical decisions 
from doctors and give them to managers who will act 
according to market forces. According to Strong and 
Robinson (1990) even as far back as the Griffith 
reorgani zation
"it was general managers, not the clinical trades, who 
were now to decide on the division of labour, on the 
training, on the structure and the measures that were 
needed, on appropriate individual performance. The old 
coalition of separate but equal professions was dead."
and again:
"Where once there had been guaranteed seats on the 
board, doctors and nurses were now pushed aside to make 
way for the new general management. GP's and 
consultants disappeared from the team."
The power of the profession over the past century has 
been based on doctors organising themselves into a system 
of collegiate control and then applying pressure to gain 
considerable freedom over the content of their work 
(Johnson, 1972). Before this, when patient patronage was 
the norm the profession was much less powerful or 
unified. Increasing government intervention into the way
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health care is provided means a return to a kind of 
(government or corporate) patronage in which professional 
power is again reduced or destroyed. As managers 
threaten the profession's control over its work, the 
introduction of more market forces may challenge the 
unity of the profession. At the same time while fighting 
to maintain the gains of professional status the 
profession must also contend with those other groups 
which have emulated it in pursuing professional 
strategies of their own and are starting to break free 
from medical tutelage (Larkin, 1983). There is also the 
major internal threat of increasing polarisation of the 
profession between hospital and general practice.
General Practitioners from being second class citizens, 
have rapidly improved their position and may further 
their control over the hospital sector with the NHS 
reforms. The General Practitioners want and defend their 
separate independent status. They are politically 
powerful and have no desire to yield their autonomy 
(Enthoven, 1985).
This accentuates the problem caused by the primary thrust 
of cost containment falling on the hospitals. They are 
the health care industry's most conspicuous cost centre. 
But Sumners (1981) argues that the causes of high 
hospital costs are basically external to the hospital, 
the consequences of factors outside even the health care 
industry, the hospital is merely the most visible point
105
of their emergence. When confronted with situations 
involving illness people want medical intervention to 
disregard cost. To be accused of concern with money when 
health is at stake is a powerful moral sanction; the 
psychological imperative is to provide care, regardless 
of cost. He also continues his argument with the idea 
that a charitable or non profit organization precludes 
concern over cost. People assume an unidentified "they" 
will pay.
4.5. De-professionalization.
So instead of being part of the general movement to 
professionalize everyone the medical profession now faces 
the threat of de-professionalization. The response can 
only be to recognize the new climate and accept certain 
limitations on previous concepts of clinical freedom. 
Doctors have to learn that a satisfied patient is as 
important as a medically improved patient.
Weisbord and Stoelwinder (1979) note that physicians have 
limited interest in the improvement of administrative 
functioning and often fear that better management may 
result in limits to their professional autonomy. Migue 
and Belanger (1974) find demand for health care services 
to be high primarily because "of [a] patient's inability 
to evaluate the product he consumes."
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Summers (1981) says that patients must assume that the 
doctor puts their interests before his own. The 
abrogation of the consumer's ability to assess the 
quality of treatment gives the doctor tremendous power. 
Illich (1976), in describing this ignorance on the part 
of the consumer or patient, suggests it gives doctors a 
power which renders them almost godlike. In Illich's 
opinion, the doctor is given moral sanctions which enable 
him to define illness, thereby granting him considerable 
authority over those subject to medical examination. Yet 
even then Illich's description seemed somehow overstated 
(Sumner, 1981).
There is a rebirth of interest in craft, artistry and 
myth. The dilemma that afflicts the profession hinges not 
on science itself but on the post positivistic view of 
science. There is an irreducible element of art in 
professional practice. The situations of practice are 
unique events. It has been claimed that 85% of problems 
seen by a doctor are not in the book. The unique case 
calls for an art of practice. There is no satisfactory 
way of describing or accounting for the artful competence 
of practitioners. Hoffenberg (1991), drawing attention to 
the qualities needed "through the current phase of 
mutation in British medicine", recalled that in the Act 
of 1512 which foreshadowed the founding of the Royal 
College of Physicians reference was made to:
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"the Science and Cunning (that is, the Art) of 
Physick...to the perfect knowledge whereof be requisite 
both great Learning and ripe Experience"
Unable to make sense of the processes in professional 
knowledge, artful practice of the unique case appears 
anomalous. Problem setting has no place in a body of 
professional knowledge concerned exclusively with problem 
solving.
The systematic knowledge base of a profession has to have 
four essential elements: specialized, firmly bounded, 
scientific and standardised. Medical Education in the 
first two decades of this century, when medical schools 
devoted the first two years of study to the basic 
sciences, chemistry, physics, pathology, - thus there was 
a separation of the medical school curriculum into pre 
clinical and clinical, reflecting the division between 
theory and practice.
A dominant view of professional knowledge is that of 
application of scientific theory and technique to the 
problems of practice. This is the heritage of Positivism, 
the philosophical doctrine that applied the rise and 
achievements of science to the well-being of mankind. The 
history of the West has been shaped by the rise of 
science and technology, and the professions have been the 
vehicles for its application. Medicine, a learned 
profession with origins in the medieval universities was
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refashioned in the new image of a science based technique 
for the preservation of health.
4.6. The Doctor Patient Relationship.
Another factor, referred to in Chapter 6 on the 
consequences of clinical freedom, is the relationship 
between the doctor and his patient which can be one of 
two types.
Personal practice is the type of medicine until recently 
provided by the National Health Service. The individual 
clinician is responsible by name for service to the 
patient. Indeed his name and reputation may be at stake 
in the practice of his work. He can invoke no external 
person to explain his actions. This characteristic and 
doctor independence is assumed to guarantee that the 
patient's doctor will always do the best he can for that 
patient. That resources may be limited is not at issue 
and can be accepted by doctors and patients, albeit 
reluctantly, so that treatment thought to be desirable 
may have to wait possibly indefinitely. At least the 
patient can see that his doctor is doing the best for him 
within available resources.
What may now disturb the patient is that the doctor is 
being instructed in advance what options are to be
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considered. Personal medicine is free to adapt to change 
because it is dictated by the doctor's judgement.
Developments will be slowed if this mechanism is changed 
particularly as medicine is not static? things are 
constantly changing and stifling personal practice will 
only serve to suppress change.
Agency practice is provided in Public Health, School 
Medical and similar Health Screening activities. Here 
the work of the doctor can be restricted, whether it be 
his field of work, his responsibilities, his decisions or 
even his range of treatments. He can have work, and work 
targets, set in advance. He can be instructed to carry 
out any one of a range of options for treatment.
The new contract for GP's introduced by the government 
can be seen to undermine personal practice, and current 
changes in hospital medicine are having a similar effect. 
Agency medicine is encouraged by waiting list initiatives 
and block contracts. Yet lip service appears to be paid 
to the importance of personalized medicine by managers 
and politicians alike.
The government are perhaps totally unaware of this subtle 
change from personal to agency medicine. In seeking 
stricter controls and enforcement of these controls with 
the view that it will reduce waiting lists and give the
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population what it needs, it may have introduced a more 
radical reform not only of the Health Service but also of 
British medicine. The long term effects may be less than 
desirable, not perhaps what the government intended, not 






In previous chapters I have made several references to 
the notion of clinical freedom, a concept of major 
significance to doctor's participation in decision 
making, management and change. It has a pivotal role in 
the relationship between doctors and managers. The 
management of the professions is a key issue in the 
running of a health care organization, and is an issue to 
be addressed in a later chapter? for the present however 
I wish to consider in greater detail the whole concept of 
clinical freedom.
5.1. The Importance of Clinical Freedom
I have described in earlier chapters how clinical freedom 
has been enlarged so, for example, the doctor no longer 
has to worry about the patient's ability to pay before 
deciding on treatment. And I have shown how this freedom 
is seen by doctors to be under threat from a government 
which wants them to be more accountable for their work, 
and a government which believes it is trying to strike a 
balance between organization and freedom. As Griffiths 
(1983) put it?
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"Involve the clinicians more closely in the management 
process, consistent with clinical freedom”.
5.2. Descriptions of Clinical Freedom
Clinical freedom is the favoured term; however clinical 
autonomy is the more accurate description. As many of 
the participants in this study refer to it as clinical 
freedom, and this is the popular expression, many not 
recognizing the term clinical autonomy, I shall continue 
to use this form although freedom is not the ideal word 
to describe the concept. Alternative words to freedom 
are autonomy, liberty, autocracy, sovereignty or 
independence, of which the latter would be perhaps the 
most appropriate.
There are limits to freedom even in a doctor's 
independent practice. Limitless freedom is also an 
impossible concept. If the limits are exceeded or 
infringed, the penalties and sanctions which may be 
brought to bear can be readily and explicitly defined, 
and include the restraints of the criminal and common 
law, the limits of acceptable professional practice 
including the guidelines set by the General Medical 
Council and, in the case of employees, the limits, 
explicit or implicit, within an employment contract as 
well as the constraints of the National Health Service or 
local Health Authority or Trust. So freedom does not seem
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to be a very germane word, but popular and common usage 
make it difficult to change.
Further study and enquiry began to suggest the 
possibility that clinical freedom as it was commonly used 
in the National Health Service was not in fact a single 
concept but a group of concepts. Such a possibility 
would go some way to explaining certain people's 
instinctive sense that some consultants in the NHS had 
always been more clinically free than others
Tolliday (1978) has written in some detail on clinical 
autonomy in the National Health Service. She feels that 
there appear to be two commonly held assessments on the 
constitution of clinical freedom: either that doctors
have it by the very nature of medical work and that the 
medical culture is inconsistent with making a doctor 
subordinate to a manager, or that doctors and only 
doctors legitimately command clinical freedom. Indeed the 
Merrison Committee (1975) stated that the argument was 
widely accepted in the NHS that doctors cannot be managed 
because of the damage such an arrangement would cause to 
medical self respect and dignity and there was a need to 
maintain the self respect of the profession.
An alternative view is that consultants have clinical 
freedom in the National Health Service, firstly because 
of the nature of illness itself, and secondly because of
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the determination in the National Health Service to 
provide health care through confidential relationships 
between doctors and patients, that is to say to provide a 
personalized service as opposed to an agency service.
This is an issue to be addressed later in this chapter.
It is this determination, and the need for clinical 
freedom which follows from it, that makes it impossible 
for consultants to be subordinated to a manager. Not 
having a manager does not mean however that doctors in 
the National Health Service are free to do just as they 
please. Control mechanisms have been set in place which 
set limits upon the work which consultants undertake 
within the National Health Service.
A consideration of these two views suggests perhaps that 
the concept of clinical freedom embraces not one or two, 
but several features which might be unravelled for 
separate consideration. Clinical freedom as commonly 
used in the National Health Service has many distinct and 
separable elements and I feel that rather than just 
consider all the elements separately it would be helpful 
first to group them under the headings of those elements 
which embrace the idea of clinical freedom, and secondly 
those elements which, although part of the concept, are 
nonetheless in reality, rather more arguments for 
retaining clinical freedom, and lastly to discuss some of 
the implications of clinical freedom.
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In the first group those elements which make up clinical 
freedom include independent practice with unmanaged 
status, patient choice, practitioner choice, primacy and 
prime responsibility. Personalized service, medical 
dignity and the nature of illness are more to do with the 
second group.
5.3.0. The Elements of Clinical Freedom
5.3.1. Independent Practice with Unmanaged Status
This allows the doctor to use his judgement without it 
being subject to scrutiny and modification by anyone 
else. The right to independent practice rules out 
management of the practitioner by a manager carrying 
responsibility at a higher level for the work carried 
out. Independent status is sometimes alleged to amount to 
doctors being endowed with enhanced or special status in 
society. However independent status can be justified to 
provide the patient with the personal confidential doctor 
patient relationship thought to be essential for the 
anxiety of illness.
There is also the question, whether doctors in general, 
(although not exclusively, as access for instance to 
dental care is an exception), act as the gatekeepers to 
the National Health Service. A medical qualification may 
equip the holder to understand the needs of the patients
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in totality better than any non medical professional 
qualification. But such an assumption is increasingly 
being challenged in health care in the National Health 
Service, and to the extent that it is not a single field 
of care but separate fields of care, does complicate the 
allocation of the elements of clinical freedom to 
professional roles.
5.3.2. Patient Choice.
Clinical freedom entails the right of the patient to 
choose his practitioner or doctor. This is called patient 
choice? the relationship is personal, freely entered into 
and based on confidence and trust. In general practice 
patient choice is more explicit than in specialist 
practice where for a consultant the principle of patient 
choice is not so clearly established. In reality such 
choice is usually limited to the practice of the 
patient's general practitioner choosing a particular 
consultant on the patient's behalf, allowing the patient 
to state a preference for a particular consultant or to 
grant the patient's right to ask for a second specialist 
opinion.
The preservation of clinical freedom, including freedom 
of the choice of doctor within the resources available, 
can ensure for the patient the same degree of personal 
quality and confidentiality of care under a national
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service as under other types of service. The patient has 
in effect a personal doctor and it is for that doctor to 
handle the bureaucracy on the patient's behalf.
5.3.3. Practitioner Choice.
In addition the doctor has a right to refuse an 
individual as a patient. According to Enthoven (1985);
"In the name of clinical freedom consultants can choose 
the kinds of cases they want to see, accept or refuse 
referrals, arrange their operating schedules, pursue 
their intellectual interests independently of patient 
needs, and keep patients waiting for months",
although in the National Health Service this right is to 
some degree limited by the terms of service of most 
medical practitioners. Klein (1985) discussing the 
decision making autonomy of clinicians says:
"..clinicians are free to determine whom they select 
for treatment and how they treat them."
And Light (1991) in his observations of the National 
Health Service, and the work of Pope (1991), on waiting 
lists, reinforce the idea that consultants may use 
considerable choice in who they treat?
"They are not a first come, first served queue but more 
like a singles dance, where (simply) the gals whom the 
guys pick are determined by what the guys are looking 
for, how much time they have, and how skilfully or 
persistently the chosen put themselves in the minds of 
the choosers".
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While such researchers may be able to identify examples 
of this, my study suggests that usually, and I am 
primarily referring to surgical waiting lists, patients 
were before the 1989/90 reforms admitted in chronological 
order according to strict clinical priority and need, 
with an additional case mix adjustment according to the 
needs of training for junior doctors. The introduction 
of the internal market has largely changed that to one of 
selection according to the priority or ability of the 
purchaser to pay (i.e. the Health Authority or General 
Practitioner Fund Holder). The consultant remains in the 
position, however, of assessing priority of an individual 
case within a group contract.
5.3.4. Prime Responsibility.
Health care is rarely now within the competence of a 
single profession, and when ensuring those professions 
who may be able to contribute to a patient's 
investigation, treatment and care are made available and 
that they are all co-ordinated effectively, the normal 
practice is to allocate prime responsibility for the care 
of each patient to a specified practitioner. Prime 
responsibility may of course be re-allocated from one 
practitioner to another.
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In the situation of medical treatment in hospital, 
whether as an inpatient or outpatient, many members of a 
variety of professions are often involved in the 
investigation, diagnosis and treatment of a particular 
case, but the consultant who has prime responsibility is 
ultimately in charge of the case. He co-ordinates the 
actions and discussions of all those doctors brought into 
the case and ensures that all the underlying needs of the 
patient are met. Jaques (1978) sets this out neatly 
under two headings, firstly that it will be necessary to 
make an assessment of the general needs of the patient at 
the time of assumption of prime responsibility, to 
undertake any action needed or to initiate such action, 
through junior medical or ancillary staff, and to refer 
when necessary to colleagues and other professionals for 
collaboration in further assessment or action or for 
action in parallel, while remaining continuously aware of 
the progress of the case and taking further initiatives 
as necessary. In other words this is a co-ordinating 
rather than a managerial role. And secondly the doctor 
with prime responsibility has a right and duty to decide 
when to relinquish extended collaboration with colleagues 
or when to terminate all further action on the case. 
However as he points out this is probably only true for 
personalized medicine, an issue to be addressed later.
In this context it is worth noting that difficulties do 
arise in linking clinical freedom to particular roles.
120
For example consultant radiologists and pathologists do 
not fit the criterion agreed for clinical freedom. Many 
of them do not have their own patients but always work on 
problems presented by doctors carrying prime 
responsibility for the patient, i.e. usually a clinical 
consultant. They only perform tests upon receipt of a 
written request; if they feel that further investigations 
or tests are required they only advise on this. It is 
then for the doctor with primary responsibility to decide 
whether to write a further request for additional 
investigations. Nonetheless all groups of doctors were 
afforded clinical freedom although as a group they fail 
many of the criteria associated with the concept. They do 
not have primacy, prime responsibility, nor do they 
provide a personalized service or have a personal 
relationship on a named basis with patients.
There are therefore certain doctors who regularly carry 
prime responsibility as defined above and others who do 
not. In general it includes all who can talk about 
"their" patients, general practitioners, surgeons, 
physicians, psychiatrists etc. Anaesthetists, 
radiologists and pathologists are unlikely to carry prime 
responsibility. There are however exceptions such as 
haematologists investigating and treating patients with 
blood disorders, anaesthetists treating patients in 
intensive care units and pain clinics etc. By and large 
there appears to be a very well developed etiquette in
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medicine itself as to who carries prime responsibility in 
any case and at what point it transfers, but there are 
significant pockets of doubt, such as consultants and 
general practitioners regarding, for example, patients in 
cottage hospitals. Rowbottom R.W. et al. (1973). It seems 
therefore that the automatic allocation of prime 
responsibility as so far defined must always be limited 
to some particular field of work.
Jaques (1978) summarises prime responsibility:
"In a situation where many members of a variety of 
professions are involved in the consideration of a 
particular case, the practitioner who has prime 
responsibility is ultimately in charge of the case. He 
co-ordinates the actions and discussions of all those 
practitioners brought into the case and ensures that 
all underlying needs are met. More specifically he has 
co-ordinating but not managerial authority to:
a. make a personal assessment of the general needs of 
the case at the time of assumption of prime 
responsibility.
b. undertake personally any action needed or to 
initiate such action, through subordinate or ancillary 
staff.
c. refer, when and as necessary to colleagues and other 
independent agencies for collaboration in further 
assessment or action or for action in parallel.
d. keep continuous awareness of the progress of the 
case and take further initiative as necessary.
2. Further, although it may not be true for agency 
service, where the practitioner with prime 
responsibility is in independent practice he has the 
right and duty to decide when to relinquish extended 
collaboration with colleagues or when to terminate all 
further action on the case.”
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5.3.5. Primacy.
The idea of primacy springs from prime responsibility. 
Cang (1978:94) defines it as the automatic allocation of 
prime responsibility. According to Tolliday (1978:44);
"Where one profession is held to have a more 
encompassing and comprehensive knowledge of all the 
fields of care available in the National Health Service 
than any other discipline or profession, such that 
prime responsibility automatically falls in the first 
instance to a member of that profession. Thus that 
profession may be said to have primacy."
It is only doctors who have primacy in the National 
Health Service. Dental care is however one exception 
where the dentist usually carries out all his own 
treatment. The identification of independent practice, 
primacy and prime responsibility as separate components 
of clinical freedom, however, make it possible to 
recognize that the apparent influence and power of 
doctors and consultants arose not so much from their 
status as from their primacy. Tolliday states (1978:45) 
"they make the National Health Service what it is". They 
are the group authorized to determine who shall be 
patients and who shall receive the services of the 
National Health Service, and are further empowered to 
determine what skills other than doctoring skills are 
appropriate to the care of those defined as patients.
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Furthermore primacy always remains with the doctor, even 
though he may transfer at his discretion care to other 
professions, and even the prime responsibility for that 
patient care to members of other professions.
5.4.0. The Reasons for Maintaining Clinical Freedom
5.4.1. Personalized Medicine
A prime reason for the retention of clinical freedom for 
consultants was in order for patients to have the 
continuing right to a confidential, personal relationship 
with their own particular named doctor. A personal, 
private and confidential relationship between doctor and 
patient is built on the clinical freedom of the doctor. 
Full clinical freedom contains a number of constituents, 
all of importance to the patient, namely his independent 
practitioner status and the carrying of prime 
responsibility by the doctor and mutual patient doctor 
choice. Clinical freedom ensures doctors work as 
independent practitioners who are then free to diagnose 
and treat in accord with their own best clinical 
judgement and in the best interests of the patient.
I have already discussed in Chapter 4 Section 6 how the 
individual clinician is responsible by name for service 
to the patient, and the conseguences that flow from that 
for the doctor patient relationship. Society has placed
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confidence in the individual clinical judgement of a 
highly trained and selected group of people, relied upon 
as professionals, given genuine freedom but not absolute 
licence, freedom within appropriate limits, fixed by law, 
including explicit National Health Service policies and 
the requirements of the General Medical Council.
Cang (1978:92) argues that this independent practitioner 
status precludes consultants from having a managerial 
superior. They are managerially freestanding, working 
within the very broad terms of reference established by 
their contracts with a Health Authority or Trust. The 
quality of their clinical work and decisions is not 
subject to managerial scrutiny or review unlike junior 
doctors who are in a manager subordinate relationship 
with a consultant, although this may not be overt. These 
ideas may make managerial control of consultants 
problematic, but whether they make it impossible is open 
to debate.
Medical audit does not supplant clinical autonomy 
although it is sometimes thought to do so if it only 
ensures that a doctor stays within policy limits.
Doctors have clinical autonomy in the National Health 
Service because, although care is state provided, the 
policy for National Health Service care is that of 
personalized care. The patient has his own doctor in whom
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he can place his trust and confide the most intimate of 
his desires, fears, and secrets without anxiety that such 
information will become public property for use other 
than in the management of his illness.
It is the policy of providing personal care of this kind 
that largely, if not entirely, gives doctors their right 
to unmanaged status. In other words clinical freedom is 
directly linked with the work of the medical profession 
and not with membership of the medical profession. Thus 
perhaps only those doctors providing personal clinical 
services, including some consultants, should have 
clinical freedom and its associated unmanaged status. 
Clinical autonomy, far from being a matter of concern 
only to doctors, is crucial for patients, if they are to 
continue to have personalized care.
5.4.2. The Nature of Illness
Traditional sociological thinking has justified the 
unmanaged status of doctors on the grounds of possession 
of esoteric knowledge and skills. In the discussions 
concerned with establishing management arrangements for 
the reorganized National Health Service, some doctors 
have argued vehemently that they should retain their 
clinical autonomy because of their professional status. 
Tolliday (1978) feels;
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"exploration of some of the practical problems arising 
from general and sociological explanations of doctor's 
clinical autonomy had lead us to the realization that 
the real reason for the NHS's retention of clinical 
autonomy for doctors, despite the attacks on it, was 
far more important than anything related to doctors' 
self interest or self esteem: that reason lay in the 
nature of illness and arising from that, the form of 
health care most likely to benefit the patient."
5.4.3. Medical Dignity
One argument widely accepted in the National Health 
Service is that doctors cannot be managed because of the 
damage such an arrangement would cause to medical self 
respect and dignity. Reference has already been made to 
the Merrison Report (1975) which spelt out the need for 
the medical profession to maintain its self respect.
If the dignity of the profession as a whole and 
individual members is at stake, it is difficult to see 
how any government can allow doctors to be managed.
Much pf the writing on the creation of the National 
Health Service assumes that doctors' clinical freedom was 
built into the service because the medical profession 
wanted it so and the government of the day was not strong 
enough to refuse it. Foot (1962), in an account of 
Aneurin Bevan's negotiations with the medical profession 
in the 1940's, suggests that doctors' clinical freedom 
and unmanaged status in the NHS was the price the 
government had to pay to get doctors to enter into the
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health service in the first place. In such accounts, 
clinically autonomous practice was seen as consistent 
with a contract for service between doctor and patient 
where the patient pays, but inappropriate to practice 
where the state, and not the patient, employs and pays 
the doctor. In other words, the argument runs, doctors 
have clinical autonomy in the National Health Service 
because they insisted on practising in a state provided 
health service in an identical fashion to the way they 
practice privately. Clinical freedom in the National 
Health Service is thus seen to be an anachronism and 
anomaly, only preserved because of the preference and 
power of doctors.
In the face of a radical reorganisation embarked upon in 
the 1989 reforms the doctors were ardent defenders of a 
nationalised structure. They had taken refuge in the 
doctrine of central control, i.e. regional appointments 
for consultants and uniform terms and conditions of 
service to avoid interference from local authorities.
The medical benefit societies had gone, as had the 
spectre of municipal control of doctors. Clinical 
freedom had been increased by the formation of the 
National Health Service. Honigsbaum (1990);
"Clinical freedom had been enlarged as well, as the 
doctor no longer had to worry about the patients 
ability to pay before deciding on treatment. The 
profession was enjoying greater freedom than at any 
time since club practice began in the 1820's."
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According to Tolliday (1978);
"Thus far then employment in the NHS has curtailed 
medical practice no more than it is curtailed when 
undertaken privately.”
Although that probably is no longer the case as cost 
controls have become ever more explicit. Even in the 1974 
reorganization Klein (1989) felt that,
"In the case of the medical profession, the new 
managerialism presented a potential threat to their 
clinical autonomy as traditionally conceived, their 
immunity from scrutiny appeared to be at risk. In short 
the basis of the implicit concordat on which the NHS 
was founded - that ministers would decide on resource 
levels while consultants would have complete autonomy 
within any given budget - seemed to be in the process
of being eroded........ No wonder too, that the medical
professions sense of insecurity translated itself into 
low morale and a tendency to see the chronic 
shortcomings of the NHS as an acute crisis. If 
rationing by consultants had always been a fact of life 
in the NHS, it was perhaps becoming less attractive to 
accept responsibility for it during the second half of 
the 1980's and more tempting to blame the government".
A sense that doctors' clinical freedom is vulnerable in 
the NHS has been increased with the expansion in the 
number of separately established professions in health 
care during the last ten years or so. The assumption in 
the Service that clinical freedom is in the gift of the 
medical profession, and is awarded to all its members, 
means that if other professions reach maturity and full 
professional status, they too will expect their members 
to have full clinical freedom. Such an eventuality would
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appear to present the National Health Service with an 
impossible management problem. One way to avoid this 
would be to deny everyone clinical freedom. It is this 
scenario which many doctors most fear.
5.5. The Implications of Clinical Freedom
Providing health care on the basis of a personal doctor 
patient relationship has profound consequences for the 
organization and structure of the National Health 
Service. Because of the emphasis on accountability in 
the service, many have been in favour of establishing 
Chief Executive Officers and General Managers carrying 
responsibility for health services within a hospital or 
district, in the same way as managing directors in 
industry. However because of the nature of health care 
as established in the 1946 Act and based on the personal 
doctor service, consultants could not be subordinated to 
a hospital or district Chief Executive Officer or a 
General Manager.
This does not mean that consultants cannot be made 
accountable. Confusion seemed to exist in the minds of 
many people about this, some arguing that consultants 
could not have managers because of the work they perform. 
It was also argued that they could not be involved in 
management, or even be made accountable.
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Clinically autonomous practice, whether in the private 
sector or within the National Health Service, is not 
entirely free practice. All doctors are accountable for 
staying within certain limits, the limits established by 
the medical profession, representing acceptable medical 
practice, as well as the limits binding on the behaviour 
of all citizens, and of course financial limits.
As an example the National Health Service, together with 
doctors, is held liable for negligence. It does not do so 
through managerial authority however; it uses a 
monitoring authority, being informed of work carried out, 
advising doctors where work is contravening limits and, 
if it falls outside these limits, suspending or 
terminating the contracts of individual doctors.
There are of course difficulties of such monitoring and 
these are well known. The binding standards of any 
profession change with changing social attitudes and 
technology. The boundaries of acceptable practice are 
shifting constantly. Speller (1971) in quoting Lord 
Justice Denning's judgement shows;
"It would, I think, be putting too high a burden on a 
medical man to say that he has to read every article 
appearing in the medical press; and it would be quite 
wrong to suggest that a medical man is negligent 
because he does not at once put into operation the 
suggestions which some contributor or other might make 
in a medical journal. The time may come in a particular 
case where a new recommendation may be so well accepted 
that it should be adopted".
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Until recently, employment in the National Health Service 
curtails medical professional practice no more than it is 
curtailed when undertaken privately. What has occurred 
recently however, is that cost control has become more 
explicit and the limitations of budgets have dictated 
amounts of health care in a hospital or district. The 
devolution of budgetary control to the individual faculty 
or firm has now set financial considerations higher on 
the agenda for individual consultants than hitherto when 
considering individual patient care.
To provide for this monitoring of clinically autonomous 
doctors and ensuring that their practice keeps not only 
within the limits binding on all consultants but also 
within the policy and resource limits determined for the 
National Health Service as a whole and locally, the 
policies and resource limits have to be such that 
consultants feel they are allowed to accept 
responsibility for treatment prescribed for their 
patients. If these policies and resource limits mean that 
consultants feel that what they do for their patients is 
unacceptable, then who carries responsibility? In the 
words of Tolliday (1978);
"If prevailing policies leave doctors feeling that what 
they are able to do for their patients is personally 
unacceptable, no one carries responsibility."
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Ways must to be found to ensure that policies are 
acceptable. The only practical way is to oblige 
consultants to gather together to see if they can 
establish a medical view acceptable to all of them, i.e. 
what they think of proposed policies or what they 
themselves wish to propose. This may use the 
representative principle developed in the past with local 
hospital medical committees where the consensus views are 
negotiated through elected representatives, although this 
role has been subject to change as discussed in later 
chapters. Indeed the whole of the next chapter is devoted 
to the effect that the concept of clinical freedom has on 
the management of consultants.
5.6. Clinical Freedom and other Health Care Professions
Not only has the clinical freedom of consultants been 
preserved in the National Health Service, but also 
professional independence in the form of independent 
practitioner status is being steadily granted to an 
expanding number of professions within the Service. The 
issue of liberty thus reappears not only in the retention 
of clinical freedom for doctors but also in the possible 
extension of prime responsibility to professions other 
than medicine. Some members of established non medical 
health professions began to question the clinical freedom 
of consultants monopoly in hospital.
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To see this in its true context one needs to consider the 
definition, and the aspirations, of a profession. There 
have been many attempts to define a profession. There is 
a considerable body of sociological literature on 
professions all filled with attempts to find an adequate 
definition. Possession of a body of particular and 
specialised knowledge, adoption of a service ethic, 
existence of a professional association, control of 
training and testing of competence, public registration, 
length of training, and many other factors have been 
given due weight by various commentators (Wilensky, 1964. 
Goode, 1969. Hickson and Thomas, 1969).
Others claim that the whole attempt to find a rational 
definition is misguided, that professions are simply 
those occupational groups who have been lucky or clever 
enough to negotiate themselves into a situation of high 
status and power. Johnson (1972). The word profession is 
significant and must be defined accurately. Clearly the 
word has everyday currency and conveys something beyond 
the general term of an occupation. There is in everyday 
usage an implication that being a professional means 
bringing specific theoretical knowledge and insight to 
bear which non professionals do not have, or have in a 
lower degree, in the process of assessing real needs and 
appropriate responses. There is also an implicit 
expectation that the true professional will exercise his 
own judgement in particular cases as impartially and
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objectively as possible. In other words there is the 
implication of some kind of ethic. One question stands 
above all others in the demands of disparate groups to 
share the privilege of clinical freedom. These are the 
demands of other professionals for clinical freedom based 
on a wish to enjoy a confidential one to one 
relationship, or maybe they merely desire unmanaged 
status.
To the extent that the answer to this question is not 
relevant to this thesis we need consider the matter no 
further, but to the extent to which the issue has been 
raised as stated indicates the problems to which the 
National Health Service is subject, namely that if the 
increasing demands for clinical autonomy in the National 
Health Service by other professional groups are 
successful and if they are based on demands for unmanaged 
status rather than the other precepts of autonomous 




THE CONSEQUENCES OF CLINICAL FREEDOM
6,0. Introduction.
The National Health Service is not only a very large 
organization, it is also an extremely complex one. Much 
of its complexity arises from the provision of 
personalized rather than agency health care and from the 
multi-professional nature of modern health services. The 
discussion of clinical freedom has indicated some of the 
complexities and difficulties this creates within the 
Service. The association of clinical freedom with the 
nature of the work done, rather than with the prestige of 
the medical profession, allows explicit recognition of 
the nature of illness and the National Health Service's 
response to it. Further analysis has led to the sorting 
of elements of clinical freedom and the possibility this 
has given for professions other than medicine to achieve 
unmanaged status, indeed for non medically qualified 
professionals to assume the right to practice 
independently and to assume prime responsibility.
An analysis of the meaning of clinical freedom has also 
raised questions about the domains of National Health 
Service activity, the nature of the boundaries of the 
professions, their relationships to National Health
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Service activity and policies bearing on that activity.
As I have shown in the previous chapter clinical freedom 
is not just about how much freedom doctors should have.
It is also about freedom of patients to make choices, as 
well as choices about the nature of health care.
Elliott (1978) talks about criticisms of a grey mediocre 
uniformity under a national governmental monopoly 
service, the serious issues raised, and problems not 
easily avoided. He lists a number of conditions which 
must be established if these criticisms are to be 
answered.
1. patient choice of doctor
2. reciprocal right of doctor not to have a particular 
patient
3. private and confidential relationship between doctor 
and patient
4. doctors' right to independent practitioner status
5. avoidance of records on patients unknown or 
unavailable to patient.
He feels these criteria should apply to any health 
service, governmentally provided or otherwise, which 
perhaps reinforces the view that clinical freedom is not 
just about the interest of doctors. Hayek (1960) states 
that
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"There are so many serious problems raised by the 
nationalization of medicine that we cannot mention even 
all the important ones. But there is one the gravity of 
which the public has scarcely perceived and which is 
likely to be of the greatest importance. This is the 
inevitable transformation of doctors, who have been 
members of a free profession primarily responsible to 
their patients, into paid servants of the state, 
officials who are necessarily subject to instruction by 
authority and who must be released from the duty of 
secrecy so far as authority is concerned. The most 
dangerous aspect of the new development may well prove 
to be that, at a time when the increase in medical 
knowledge tends to confer more and more power over the 
minds of men upon those who possess it, they should be 
made dependent on a unified organization under single 
direction and guided by the same reasons of state that 
generally govern policy. A system that gives the 
indispensable helper of the individual, who is at the 
same time an agent of the state, an insight into the 
other's most intimate concerns and creates conditions 
in which he must reveal this knowledge to a superior 
and use it for purposes determined by authority opens 
frightening prospects."
However, the growing independence for other professional 
groups may make it possible for the National Health 
Service to move in exactly the opposite direction to that 
predicted by Hayek. In the words of Jaques (1978);
"Not only has the clinical autonomy of both consultants 
and general practitioners been preserved in the NHS, 
but professional independence in the form of 
independent practitioner status is being steadily 
granted to a wider and wider range of professions in 
the service. The issue of liberty thus reappears not 
only in the retention of clinical autonomy for doctors 
but also in the possible extension of prime 
responsibility to professions in the service. The issue 
of liberty thus reappears not only in the retention of 
clinical autonomy for doctors but also in the possible 
extension of prime responsibility to professions other 
than medicine."
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6.1. Management and Clinical Freedom.
Much concern has been expressed by consultants that if 
they were organized into managerial hierarchies they 
would lose their clinical freedom as professional 
practitioners. Given the nature of clinical freedom 
according to Rowbottom (1978) some of the issues that are 
encountered are to do with how far external management or 
direction of professional work is appropriate or possible 
in medicine. Can doctors be managed by their employers 
and if so in what sense of the word? Can they 
appropriately be placed under the control of senior 
general managers or lay administrators? How far can 
employing authorities themselves properly guide or direct 
the work of their professional employees?
Secondly could doctors appropriately manage other doctors 
without improper interference with the exercise of 
professional judgement? And thirdly if doctors, for 
example, have authority over nurses or other paramedical 
staff, how far should it extend and what justifies that 
authority? There is no one set of answers which apply 
equally to all the various occupational groups under 
consideration.
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Rowbottom (1978) identifies four characteristics:
1.Degree of professional development - whether the 
group possesses its own specific body of theory and 
practice which has moved beyond the stage where non 
members can be expected to appreciate emerging 
possibilities for extension and further development.
2. The practice assumption - whether the assumptions 
explicit or otherwise of the nature of the practice in 
any given situation are consistent with what may be 
called agency service, or whether they demand what 
might be called independent practice for the individual 
practitioner.
3. Existence of an "encompassing" profession - whether 
or not another profession or occupation exists which is 
regarded as having a deeper or more encompassing view 
of practice in the field concerned.
4. Primacy - whether members are recognised as 
automatically carrying prime responsibility where 
members of other occupational groups regularly work 
together with them on the same cases or projects.
In considering these characteristics it is useful to 
develop the ideas with respect to the relationship 
between the management of the doctor and clinical
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freedom. I shall develop further only the arguments with 
respect to the first two, because the last two I have 
covered in the previous chapter in some detail as well as 
clarifying the issues of primacy and prime 
responsibility, which the above classification has 
confused.
6.2.0. Degree of Professional Development.
The key question is just how far it is possible or 
appropriate for a senior administrator, General Manager 
or Chief Executive to exercise control over doctors. The 
issue here is not whether they could physically do, with 
equal proficiency, all the work of those of various 
specific professions or crafts of whom they are in 
charge, nor even whether they could give detailed 
technical instructions to the doctors. The real issue is 
whether they actually understand enough about the work 
and the needs which it has to meet, to manage the 
performers of that work, i.e the doctors. Now one is 
obliged to clarify what is meant by the word manage, and 
in this context I shall first use the definition of 
Rowbottom (1978:74)
"a manager as someone who is accountable for his 
subordinates' work in all its aspects, who is not only 
able to assess the quantity and quality but the 
effectiveness of the work of his subordinates.”
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This definition is to some extent supported by Jaques 
(1976:64) who talks of;
"the accountability of a manager for the work of a
subordinate to his own superior.”
Clearly with this definition the more developed a 
professional group becomes the more difficult it is for a 
non-member, however generally capable, to perform this 
managerial function adequately. When a manager cannot 
help his subordinates with technical problems 
encountered, where he cannot really judge their all round 
competence in any precise degree and where he lacks any 
perception for emerging possibilities of practice or 
ability to guide the practitioner in important new 
developments, it is necessary to question in what sense 
the word manager is being used.
Some hospital managers were willing to assert (privately 
if not publicly) their collective competence to manage 
doctors or any other profession in hospitals, however 
specialised or advanced the nature of their work. However 
further exploration would demonstrate that these same 
managers did not mean by this that they would feel able 
for example to assign priority to clinical cases, allot 
particular clinical cases to doctors or to make effective 
assessments of their clinical as well as general 
abilities. Nor would they feel able to carry full 
accountability for all aspects of the work of doctors, or
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indeed of any other professionals, in the same way that 
they would naturally do for the work of their own 
immediate assistants. Nor would they feel competent to 
guide doctors in important developments in medical 
practice.
But this is normal for many managers? lack of competence 
to undertake a task of a subordinate does not prevent a 
person managing. The main difficulty seems to be in 
identifying a universally agreed definition of managing. 
As Boyatzis (1982) states?
"Having the word manager in one's job title does not 
necessarily mean that person is a manager.”
Appley (1969) defines a manager as
"someone who gets things done through other people.”
In fact Boyatzis (1982), synthesising the work of Appley 
(1969) and Drucker (1977), describes management as five 
basic functions: planning, organizing, controlling, 
motivating and coordinating.
Clearly the managers referred to above were carrying some 
relationship of control or guidance, even if not 
gubernatorial authority, in respect of the doctors and 
other professionals. It is possible to identify clearly
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two distinct types of relationship, a monitoring and a 
co-ordinating role.
6.2.1. Managerial Role.
One managerial role arises where a manager is fully 
accountable for the work of another or others. The 
manager is usually expected to help in the selection of 
X, to instruct X in the role expected of him and to 
assign work and allocate resources. The manager usually 
expects to keep himself informed about X's work and help 
deal with problems. It is normal for the manager to 
appraise X's general performance and ability and in turn 
keep X informed of his assessments, arrange or provide 
training, change roles or arrange transfers or 
dismissals. Lastly the manager needs the authority to 
veto the selection of X for a particular role, to make an 
official appraisal of X's performance ability, and 
perhaps to initiate transfer or dismissal.
6.2.2. Monitoring Role.
A monitoring role may arise where it is felt necessary to 
ensure that the activities of an individual conform to 
satisfactory standards in some particular respect and 
where a managerial supervisory or staff relationship is 
impossible or requires supplementing. The aspect of 
activity to be monitored might for example be adherence
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to contract of employment i.e. attendance and hours etc, 
safety, financial propriety and security, levels of 
expenditure, technical standards of work or adherence to 
personnel policies.
The monitor would be expected to obtain adequate 
information on the effects of the activities of a 
particular individual and to discuss possible 
improvements with them or their superior, to report to 
the manager or superior body any sustained or significant 
deficiencies, and to recommend new policies or standards 
where required.
The monitor needs authority to obtain first hand 
knowledge of the individual's activities and problems, 
to persuade the individual to change performance but not 
to instruct. But does not need the authority to make or 
recommend official appraisals of the individual's work 
nor to set new policies or new standards. According to 
Rowbottom (1978);
"What neither relationship includes is either the right 
to issue final or binding prescriptions in the face of 
strongly conflicting views, or the right to make or act 
upon fine assessments of performance of personal 
competence, as is expected in the managerial 
relationship."
One might also question why the roles of certain doctors 
do not fit the aforementioned facts. Why is it, for 
instance, that doctors employed as civil servants and
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junior medical staff are organized into managerial 
hierarchies, which it is claimed are absolutely 
incompatible with the type of work performed by a 
qualified doctor? The answer to these apparent 
inconsistencies lies in the nature of the work of doctors 
in these examples. In the first case the civil servant 
doctors are not primarily employed as doctors but as 
civil servants and they have no direct doctor patient 
relationship and no prime responsibility as a named 
doctor to a patient? they are not engaged in personalized 
medical practice. In the second case the junior doctor is 
only an agent of the consultant, carrying no prime 
responsibility? the consultant remains the named 
consultant responsible for the personal medical care of 
the patients. It is thus possible to see from these 
exceptions the importance of the provision of 
personalized medicine in the concept of clinical freedom. 
This leads to the second of the four characteristics 
outlined by Rowbottom (1978), the establishment of a 
strong one to one therapeutic relationship, which argues 
for independent practice in medicine. For doctors who 
are employed outside clinical work without an involvement 
with individual patients, for instance epidemiological 
work, medical administration, screening or immunization 
programmes, then the same arguments do not apply.
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6.3. The Practice Assumption.
Possibilities for managerial organization caused by the 
occupational characteristics of medical practice 
described thus far have significant implications. They 
affect management, but they do not prohibit some form of 
managerial control. Either the profession can be 
incorporated into pre-existing managerial hierarchies, 
which is the form now being pursued by most hospitals in 
the UK implementing the new reforms from the White Paper, 
(1989) or an independent professional managerial 
hierarchy may be created on its own under the employing 
authority along the lines that used to exist before the 
1974 reorganization. Bureaucratically, management 
organization is therefore still possible.
A patient arriving in a hospital has their medical care 
supervised by a particular, identified and named 
consultant, who is an independent practitioner, employing 
clinical autonomy and employed to pursue a professional 
practice as they think most appropriate within the broad 
terms of a contract.
The patients' have confidence that their doctor has 
complete freedom within certain broad limits to diagnose, 
investigate and treat as they personally judge best.
Under these circumstances mutual trust is likely to be 
the outcome. Thus independent practice is linked in this
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particular case to the requirement to establish a strong 
clinical relationship. This in turn implies the 
possibility of choice, and in the previous chapter I have 
discussed the freedom of the patient to choose or change 
his doctor and indeed the ability of the doctor to 
transfer his patient where a minimal necessary level of 
trust and co operation cannot be established.
However, there are circumstances, for instance when one 
psychiatrist or one geriatrician automatically deals with 
all cases arising from one predetermined geographical 
area, in which there is no effective choice for the 
patient. Pathologists, radiologists or anaesthetists in 
independent practice rarely have patients of their own 
and patient choice is again usually non existent. The 
question therefore arises whether pathologists and 
radiologists etc are in independent practice. There seems 
to be only one firm ground rule, that of a voluntary 
relationship of trust and co-operation between a 
specifically identified professional and a specifically 
identified patient. Independent practice is therefore 
the basis of personalized medicine.
6.4. Implications of Independent Practice.
The question of the management of other professionals by 
non professionals often leads to the comparison of 
doctors with airline pilots. It is widely accepted that
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planes need well trained independent professionals to 
cope with whatever situation develops. But it is also 
accepted that the autonomy can be exercised within limits 
of financial and organizational efficiency set by the 
airlines (West, 1988). The pilot does not however have a 
personal, confidential or individual relationship with 
the passenger. The passengers' do not have a right to 
personal choice of pilot. Although the pilot is not able 
to choose passengers the pilot probably does have a right 
as captain, to put off the plane anyone considered a 
danger to other passengers. The pilot does not have 
primacy and although there is prime responsibility while 
in the air, the pilot's position could be seen as that of 
an agency service as opposed to a personalized service.
It has to be recognized that many patients may not 
realize that they have this choice of consultant.
Managerial control may be inconsistent with independent 
practice and therefore with personalized medicine. Where 
independent practitioners work together there can be a 
monitoring and co-ordinating relationship. Although 
doctors may be difficult to manage there is a need to see 
that they are co-ordinated and integrated with other work 
and developments. Thus as Clinical Directors emerge, 
this title implies not so much a managerial role but 
rather a monitoring and co-ordinating one carrying within 
it a limited authority and only applicable within the
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general terms of any policies or practices adopted by the 
unit, department or hospital as a whole.
The personal attitudes and styles adopted in the 
interaction are of course another matter. Having 
authority does not necessarily mean behaving in an 
authoritarian way. Indeed the question of authority is 
addressed in a later chapter. Equally encouraging 
participation in decision making does not necessarily 
mean relinquishing authority, According to Rowbotton 
(1973);
"..no prescriptive rights exist between doctor and 
doctor, other than where the second doctor is in 
training or specifically employed as an assistant."
This applies even between surgeons and anaesthetists or 
physicians and pathologists.
Even for professionals intent on staying in independent 
practice however, there are many obvious advantages to 
working in a larger organization, and a number of ways of 
arranging this. The professional may find himself 
working alongside fellow professionals some of whom may 
be more senior or eminent, but again if independent 
practice is truly required, this is inimical to the 
establishment of managerial relationships. Even the 
employing body itself will have no right to impose 
particular rules or policies or to demand that specific
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tasks be accomplished or that specific methods be 
followed, unless any of these have been the subject of 
specific contract negotiation.
The National Health Service recognizes no right on the 
part of a sponsoring bodies such as a FPC, FHSA, HA, or 
Trust to tell the professional how to diagnose or treat, 
or what priorities to give to patients or how to organize 
their work. And although hospital consultants are 
actually in the salaried employment of HA's or Trusts who 
provide their premises, supporting staff, equipment and 
materials, they too recognize no constraints on work that 
are not the subject of specific agreement.
Doctors are usually grouped with fellows into divisions 
or departments and firms, and it is usual for a senior 
member chosen by the group itself to act both as 
spokesman to the external world and as a co-ordinator 
within the group. However the role of such elected 
representatives has many limits and in no way can they be 
held accountable by the employing authority. In addition 
there will need to be certain designated senior staff, 
not necessarily of the same professional group, who act 
unequivocally as agents or officers of the employing 
authority with the job of carrying out such additional 
and broader focussed co ordination as is necessary, as 
well as monitoring adherence to contract conditions.
151
Where a number of distinct specialities exist, questions 
on how many should have separate representation to speak 
and negotiate on their behalf may arise. How many 
specialities should be banded together? It is difficult 
for non members of any distinct professional group or sub 
group to be able to command adequate understanding of the 
specific needs and emerging possibilities for new 
developments and so to act as effective spokesmen.
As any profession develops, it will be natural for 
members to seek to interact with one another through 
specifically formed professional associations to put 
forward the development of their common practice and 
knowledge. This is over and above any desire to associate 
to protect their collective interests, a desire which 
they may share with less well developed occupational 
groups. Second it will be natural for them to begin to 
take an increasing interest in training and the setting 
of qualification for practice. Thirdly they will tend to 
want control of their own practice development in 
specific organizations where they are employed in large 
numbers. They will look to the establishment of 
management posts to be filled by their own members and 
the direct access of such members to policy forming 
bodies.
The gathering together in recent years of all social 
workers in social services departments, headed by
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directors who are increasingly chosen from the ranks of 
qualified social workers themselves, suggests recognition 
that social workers too have now reached a stage of 
professional development which prohibits effective 
management by non members.
One issue that seems appropriate to raise now is that a 
professional manager has to work within a professional 
code of conduct whereas a non professional manager or 
administrator has no such code (Heys, 1991);
"Managers have a unique position within the NHS. In 
contrast to almost every other discipline in the 
service there is no code of conduct to judge their 
actions against.”
Although Dixon (1991), former director of the Institute 
of Health Service Management, said
"..that although the conduct issue had been discussed 
frequently it was dismissed as "inappropriate"."
An all party select committee of M.P.'s however felt that 
managers should also be held accountable for their 
mistakes (HMSO, 1990).
6.5. Clinical Freedom and Resource Constraints.
One issue is the question of the effect or possible 
effect that limited resources might have on clinical 
freedom. The consultant has the discretion to make
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decisions about patients now under treatment without 
those decisions being reviewed or overturned by anyone 
else, even someone from the same discipline. What is 
done can be shared in a peer review context, where it can 
be discussed, but it is voluntary, no one can insist on 
knowing why something was done nor can they change it.
Clinical freedom has to do with treatment of patients, it 
does not affect management work. It is also concerned 
with current patients being treated? there is no clinical 
freedom to make decisions about future patients. Those 
are planning decisions. It is the issue of resources 
through contracts which seems to be the major fear for 
clinical freedom.
6.7. Summary and Conclusions.
The key question is how much independence should 
professionals, in this case specifically doctors, have 
when in theory and practice they are employed within an 
organization. From the discussion outlined there is 
almost no general answer. It appears however that where 
the work assumptions of the professional group in certain 
situations demand independent practice, as appears to be 
the case with doctors involved in clinical work, that 
this is inconsistent with managerial hierarchy or 
technical direction, although co-ordinating and 
monitoring relationships are feasible.
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But in the words of Rowbottom (1978);
"Over and above this they offer definite statements 
about the conditions under which any professional may 
be assimilated into bureaucratic organization, and the 
specific circumstances in which radically different 
organizational arrangements become necessary."
One difficult issue in the NHS is that of the development 
of an adequate managerial structure. There has been a 
desire to establish a unified managerial structure, 
neatly and tidily organized under a single unit manager 
or Chief Executive Officer. But for the reasons outlined 
this has not proved possible or satisfactory. It has 
been rejected because consultants, it is claimed, cannot 
be managed. It is not organizationally possible to place 
a Chief Executive Officer in a position of managerial 
accountability to consultants and retain clinical 
autonomy as the foundation of personalized services for 
patients. It is not possible to do so even if the Chief 
Executive is himself a doctor.
Another possibility, according to Jaques (1978), was to 
separate doctors from the rest of the services;
"A role might then be established which would carry co- 
ordinative authority only in relation to the doctors, 
but managerial authority with respect to the other 
services.
This concept, however, also proved unacceptable since 
it was found to run counter to the professional 
independence required in a wide range of medical 
services including for example, nursing, community
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medicine, medical administration, many paramedical 
services, and the administrative services."
The questions which arise are, who should be the leader 
of the team, and who in the final analysis should be 
responsible if anything goes seriously wrong? Who should 
be concerned with the investigations, diagnosis and 
treatment and who should be responsible for a prognosis. 
It is these questions which reflect the lack of provision 
for explicit allocation of primacy or of prime 
responsibility to professions other than medicine. For if 
primacy or if prime responsibility could be specifically 
allocated to one or other member of a team, then the 
uncertainty concerning leadership and final 
responsibility would not arise. When things go wrong 
individual accountability can all too easily be lost or 





7.0. Introduction to Validity
This study is based on participant comprehension or 
ethnomethodology, a research methodology which moves 
towards the break down of the traditional distinction 
between the role of the researcher and the subject. This 
is succinctly described by Heron (1989). In the old 
paradigm, only the researchers do the thinking that 
generates ideas, designs the project, manages the 
research and draws conclusions. The subjects often know 
nothing of what the researchers are thinking, and are 
involved only in the action and experience of the 
research. The more the methodology moves into the new 
paradigm the more this separation of roles is dissolved. 
Those doing the research as co-researchers are also 
involved as co-subjects. The same persons devise, manage 
and draw conclusions from the research and also undergo 
the experiences and perform the actions that are being 
researched. In effect you are involving more than one 
brain on the topic, which generates more ideas and 
designs, assists with the conclusions and which in turn 
helps to avoid researcher bias. Often the local 
knowledge provided by the researched may prove valuable 
in explaining certain actions and events. The extent to
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which I have moved into this new paradigm is discussed 
fully in the next two chapters.
Having read some works on methods of Social Science 
research, I was concerned over the problems of bias and 
validity. One striking, but not surprising, feature and 
discovery is that the same issue is seen as different by 
differing people and differing groups. Doctors and 
managers, as we shall see in later chapters, see problems 
in their own particular world not only as different, but 
as separate. Indeed it has been suggested that problems 
are not organizations' problems but people's problems.
As Sims (1987) states, problems are not "things” with 
some external provable existence but constructions or 
definitions made by us to make sense of our world.
This leads on to the validity of the research and the 
methods used. I was anxious to make use of the value of, 
a detailed investigation of, a few participants, rather 
than the responses to a questionnaire of many. The 
project involved in-depth interviews with 118 
participants which were recorded and transcribed, with an 
additional 10 interviews not recorded as they took place 
informally over lunch. However, all the interviews had 
post interview impressions recorded by me together with 
brief notes.
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The questionnaire type of investigation, although usually 
involving a larger group of respondents, means each has 
only a relatively short time to provide information. Not 
only is there less time for each answer, this answer 
tends to be an instant or automatic response. There is 
little time for considered reflection. The answer does 
not allow discussion around the topic. The range of 
responses is often limited to those decided by the 
researcher in advance. The detailed collaborative 
investigation allows for an in depth answer, probing of 
the responses, talking around and about the subject, 
discussion and clarification of issues and pursuit of 
related topics which may be relevant to the original 
question.
The first response given to a question may be only the 
initial response, given without perhaps the opportunity 
for considered thought. The response may be influenced by 
the person asking the question. The answer may be 
something which the interviewee thinks is helpful, or 
something the researcher wants to hear. The answer may 
be that which is most likely to bring the interview to a 
rapid close without seeming rude. Indeed the whole thing 
is a tangled mass of various influences and prejudices 
that have to be taken into account. I was anxious to 
avoid "simple answers" but to initiate a thinking aloud 
by the participants and I therefore moved from an initial 
rigid series of questions similar and related, for both
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doctors and managers. The initial interviews considered 
the questions under three headings:
1. Whether they perceived themselves as a manager.
Then why, and the preparation (if any) for this.
2. The management role. Asking questions about the 
details of what the subject actually did in this 
managerial role.
3. The management relationships. The concept of it, its 
development and the changes ahead.
Initially the interviews were kept tightly within these 
boundaries but I later moved to a more freely structured 
interview, allowing the participants to develop ideas in 
whatever direction they felt appropriate. This often 
resulted in a discussion leading to some general 
questions. For example the question of clinical freedom, 
consultant power and influence, the changes that are 
occurring, and coping with these changes. These changes 
later developed into the method described under 1.7.4.2. 
on Details of Data Collection in Chapter 1.
7.1. Some Approaches to Validity
In orthodox research the approach is primarily about 
methods. One approach to validity relates to the idea of
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measurement, that is to say, a valid measure is one which 
measures what it claims to measure. A second approach to 
validity relates to experimentation (Campbell and 
Stanley, 1966). Here it relates to what is sometimes 
called internal validity, that is to say, did the 
treatment make a difference in this experiment? And 
external validity, that is to say, to what groups can 
this effect be generalised to include?
Reason and Rowan (1981:240) however feel there is another 
way of looking at validity, which is to think not only 
about the different sorts of validity, such as internal 
and external as referred to above, but also whether it 
looks right to a knowledgeable observer, so called "Face 
Validity"; whether a number of different views point in 
the same direction, so called "Convergent Validity"? 
whether measurements of different things come up with a 
difference - "Discriminant Validity"? whether 
observables can be seen "in terms of" more than "ideas" - 
"Construct Validity"; and (Diesing, 1972:203-224) how 
data fits within the whole picture - "Contextual 
Validity".
But Reason and Rowan (1981) also stress the need to be 
more involved with people, and they state that "We have 
to start looking at our notion of truth "to get away from 
the subject-object split". Schwartz and Ogilvy (1979:53) 
argue that it is possible to move away from the notion of
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objectivity and subjectivity by developing the notion of 
perspective. This is defined as "a personal view from 
some distance” and "suggests neither the universality of 
objectivity nor the personal bias of subjectivity".
Reason and Rowan (1981:242) also state that we should 
move away from the idea that there is one truth and that 
there is some simple continuum between error and truth?
"Certainly there are many ways of being wrong, 
(ignorance, illusion, collusion, delusion, 
hallucination, lies...) and also as many ways of being 
right".
The issue for me in practical terms was how to address 
the issues of making the research credible to others, 
dependable for myself and others, and confirmable should 
anyone attempt to do so. The most important for me was 
how could I establish confidence in the truth of my 
findings, and whether my research could be repeated with 
the same findings and to what degree the findings were 
the characteristics of the participants and the context 
and not derived from the bias, motivation, interest and 
the perspective of me the investigator.
The traditional view seemed to be that the findings would 
be worth taking account of if one could establish the 
truth of the findings, i.e. the internal validity, and 
secondly if one is able to show to what extent the 
findings were applicable to other participants, i.e. the
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external validity. The traditional view also talks 
about reliability, that is to say, how one can be sure 
that if the inquiry were repeated with the same or 
similar subjects or respondents in the same or similar 
context the findings would be the same. According to Ford 
(1975:324) it must be reasonable
"to assume that each repetition of the application of 
the same, or supposedly equivalent, instruments to the 
same units will yield similar measurements."
However according to Reason and Rowan (1981)
"Reliability is not prized for its own sake but as a 
precondition for validity."
And finally the traditional view is that objectivity is 
important. How can one establish that the reasons, and 
to what degree the findings, are those of participants 
and not from the biases, motivations, interests or 
perspectives of the inquirer. Lincoln and Guba 
(1985:293);
"Objectivity is threatened then by using imperfect 
methodologies that make it possible for inquirer values 
to refract the "natural" data-putting questions not 
directly to "Nature Itself" but through an intervening 
medium that "bends" the response? by engaging in 
inquiry with an openly ideological purpose? or relying 
on the data provided by a single observer."
In considering the treatment of this problem Guba (1981) 
proposes certain techniques, the chief of which are 
prolonged engagement and persistent observation,
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triangulation, peer debriefing, negative case analysis 
and member checking.
Reason and Rowan (1981) feel that conventional criteria 
are inappropriate for post positivistic research. But if 
so what should replace them? According to Lincoln and 
Guba (1985:295) the solution includes truth value or 
credibility, (cf internal validity);
"When naive realism is replaced by the assumption of 
multiple constructed realities, there is no ultimate 
benchmark to which one can turn for justification- 
whether in principle or by a technical adjustment via 
the falsification principle. "Reality" is now a 
multiple set of mental constructions."
It is therefore necessary to show that both the findings 
and interpretations that are also reconstructions are 
credible to the builders of the original multiple mental 
constructions. Secondly there is applicability or 
transferability, (cf external validity);
"It is in summary n o t  the naturalist's task to provide 
an i n d e x  of transferability; it i s  his or her 
responsibility to provide the d a t a  b a s e  that makes 
transferability judgements possible on the part of 
potential appliers."
Thirdly there needs to be consistency or dependability, 
(cf reliability). A major technique being the 
confirmatory audit (Halpern 1983) where raw data 
including field notes, data reduction and analysis, 
condensed notes, summaries, theoretical notes, working
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hypotheses, concepts and hunches, data construction, 
findings, conclusions, interpretations and inferences, 
final report, connections to existing literature and 
integration of concepts, relationships and 
interpretations, process notes etc. are subject to a 
"confirmability audit".
Lastly there is neutrality or confirmability. (cf 
objectivity). Described by Scriven (1971:95-96) there is 
a reference to the q u a l i t y  of the testimony or the report 
or the (putative) evidence, and so I call this the 
"qualitative sense". Here, "subjective" means 
unreliable, biased or probably biased, a matter of 
opinion, and "objective" means reliable, factual, 
confirmable or confirmed, and so forth. It removes the 
emphasis from the investigator onto the data itself. The 
issue is no longer the characteristics of the 
investigator but of the data: are they confirmable or 
not?
7.2.0. Some Practical Aspects of Validation.
Reason and Rowan (1981:249) feel that it is important, 
instead of a single cycle of data collection, for there 
to be multiple cycles, where the theories and concepts 
are progressively extended, refined, differentiated and 
integrated reaching towards a theoretical saturation.
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7.2.1. The First Validation.
Immediately after an interview was completed I either 
wrote or dictated an impression of the main points which 
were left in my head. I worried that this might generally 
be the last, or one of the last topics discussed, but 
this proved not to be. Within days (though later in the 
case of the US hospitals) a transcription of the whole 
interview was produced.
The notes of the interview, the post interview notes or 
transcription and the main interview transcript were then 
reviewed for the main ideas and a summary of about two A4 
sheets produced. This was sent to the participants with 
a letter, thanking them for their help, assistance and 
time and inviting them to correct any errors of 
substance, understanding or change of view.
Every participant in the U.K. except one agreed to this 
and returned the paperwork. The participant in question 
had already indicated that she would not do so, stating 
that she stood by what she said on the tape, the meaning 
of what she said was clear and she would not wish to 
change anything.
The returned information was often heavily amended, 
changing the emphasis and occasionally the meaning. One
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participant rewrote and retyped the whole of the two 
sheets.
From the U.S. only about half the letters were returned. 
This may have been partly because of poor postal services 
as the returns did increase when faxed.
7.2.2. The Second Validation.
Any queries from this first cycle could then be answered 
by a second letter, fax or telephone call. I used this on 
a few occasions to deal with specific queries which 
became apparent later as my knowledge increased.
7.2.3. The Third Validation.
The third validation or cycle was carried out by second 
interviews. In view of the large number of first 
interviews it was not possible to interview everyone 
again, especially in the U.S. hospitals as I had failed 
to secure any funding for this. My aim was to concentrate 
on those who had revealed most knowledge, enthusiasm and 
willingness to participate; even though this might be 
give a bias, I judged that continuing to interview 
unwilling, negative participants was unlikely to provide 
me with any more information than I already had from 
them.
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7.2.4. The Fourth Validation.
It was only when this saturation point referred to above 
in section 7.2.0. had been reached with the Clinical 
Directors that I felt able to move on to the next stage 
of interviewing participants outside districts but who 
had regional or national roles, and the academics in the 
field. With these interviews I used exactly the same 
validation methods described above, with the cycle of 
correspondence etc.
7.2.5. The Fifth Validation.
The fifth validation cycle was to involve participants in 
workshops and group meetings. Some of these were on a 
informal basis but a number were formally set up as 
feedback sessions with both clinical directors and 
managers present, the final one being a group of ten 
pairs of each. Here a range of finalised issues 
concerning relationships and authority surrounding the 
two groups was discussed openly.
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7.3. Some Problems of Bias.
Entering a research project of this nature I recognized 
that I had preconceived notions, existing experiences and 
prejudices. We are all influenced by our background, our 
training, our reading and our work. Unless it were 
possible to bring in a "man from Mars” Enthoven (1985:5) 
who had no prior knowledge of anything to do with our 
culture and experience it would be difficult to exclude 
bias. Even the "man from Mars" could be biased as he 
might favour the way one group works, looks or behaves. 
The more I investigated all these issues the more I 
realized that one could become seduced by the issues 
themselves and as this was not to be a thesis into social 
science methodology but had to remain firmly practical, I 
had to look for the practical solution which seems to be 
based on awareness. I took recourse in Reason and Rowan 
(1981:304);
"Awareness is, however, a great step towards
prevention."
So although bias is inevitable, it can be recognised and 
acknowledged, and this is a step towards resolving the 
difficulty that it introduces.
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7.4. Researcher and Participant Biases.
Researcher Bias Participant Bias
The Bilateral Biases 
Personality Bias Personality Bias
Perceptual Bias Perceptual Bias
Cultural Bias Cultural Bias
Class Bias Class Bias
The Unilateral Biases 
Solitary Bias Conversational Bias
Ethical Bias Documentary Bias
Experimenter Bias Perspective Bias
Observer Bias 
(Self) Observational Bias 
Theory Bias
It seemed to me that there were likely to be a number of 
biases and these could be considered under a group of 
headings. I put them into three categories, those that 
were particular to the researcher, those affecting the 
participants or subjects of the research, and a group 
which affected both but which might need to be considered 
separately for both researcher and participant. To a 
certain degree they all link and may merge into one 
another.
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7.5.0. The Bilateral Biases
The problems of researcher bias and of participant bias 
are similar in one respect. In both cases, bias results 
in a partial or one-sided account of the subject being 
studied. But whereas researcher bias could be checked and 
corrected by using another researcher with a different 
bias, this is hardly possible with participant bias. It 
is extremely unlikely that two researchers will 
investigate with the same participants simultaneously. It 
might be possible to cross-check and combine research on 
similar participants, but there would still be a problem 
determining which participants were similar enough in all 
respects. Mannheim's suggested solution (1936:95) is 
that when a bias cannot be checked against the output of 
a different bias or perspective, it can be checked for 
its compatability with the subject being studied.
7.5.1. Researcher and Participant Personality Bias
Personality biases can be located, interpreted, and to a 
degree allowed for on the basis of awareness and 
knowledge. This came with greater involvement and 
experience as the project progressed. I identified the 
sterotypical macho manager and the arrogant consultant 
attitude.
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What was more difficult to evaluate was the effect of my 
personality particularly on the interviews. Even my 
initial approach may have had some effect on the 
resulting responses. Initial impressions are often 
important and may take time to change. Two or three 
participants told me later in the interviews things they 
said they would not have told me earlier and sometimes 
they even changed their views as a rapport was 
established. A manager said?
"Well I can tell you this now I feel I know you, that I 
certainly would not have done in the first few 
minutes."
And a Clinical Director explained?
"I feel I can tell you things now, an hour ago I would 
not have even considered saying and change things that 
I might have said previously. I feel that I can trust 
you now.”
So to some degree the achievement of greater self 
knowledge and self awareness is an important part of 
training for, and outcome of the project.
7.5.2. Researcher and Participant Perceptual Bias.
Perceptual and cognitive distortions may occur in 
material in which the informant is personally involved. 
Important details may be missing in material or 
information in which they are not immediately involved,
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and so on? the writing of Vidich and Bensmans (1960) and 
Llewellyn and Hoebel (1941:29-37) considers this.
This means that statements cannot necessarily be accepted 
as truth, but have to be checked against other evidence 
where possible. The purpose of this cross checking is 
not just to find the true and dependable subjects and to 
discard the rest, as there might then be little material 
left, but rather to estimate the probable direction and 
amount of bias and to interpret the information 
accordingly.
The pattern of this bias itself can be of interest. The 
particular pattern of distortions can help to locate a 
participant relative to other subjects. If other 
evidence indicates that a particular report is idealized, 
the pattern of idealization and the relation between 
ideal and actual reveals something about the institution.
Stories and descriptions of events by one group about 
another can be interpreted as a statements revealing the 
teller's fears and hostilities. In short, the statements 
of a participant cannot be treated as totally objective 
descriptions of a subject by an outsider, but rather as 
part of the subject being studied.
Hypotheses or interpretations derived from direct 
observation and the statements of a subject can be tested
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by asking a subject's opinions about them. According to 
Diesing (1972:153) in a conversation he reports with 
Needham;
"for some British ethnologists this is said to be the 
ultimate test of an interpretation, and nothing that 
fails this test is acceptable, no matter how strong the 
other evidence for it may be."
7.5.3. Researcher and Participant Cultural Bias
The problem of cultural bias is also a difficult one. 
Within the UK it relates to cultural differences between 
doctors and managers, but between the UK and USA there 
are additional cultural factors. As a member of the 
medical profession I know that there is a stereotype view 
that we regard managers in hospital as inferior. This is 
an issue that I address in the chapter on doctors and the 
chapter on managers and their views. It is also discussed 
in the latter chapters.
Diesing (1972:323) feels that to some extent the social 
sciences can be said to have transcended the ethnocentric 
predicament by their extensive traditions of cross- 
cultural research, though cross-cultural sensitivity is 
still inadequately diffused. In addition he sees the 
beginnings of a partly autonomous culture of science, 
drawing its members from all over the world and thus 
incorporating elements from a variety of cultures. But he 
feels that;
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"The above suggestions will not impress those 
philosophers who deny the existence of uncontrollable 
bias in themselves. They may admit that some people 
are irrational, but their recommended solution is 
likely to be that of Russell; Be more rational, like 
me. For these philosophers the foregoing remarks serve 
only as a partial rationalization for my choice of the 
method used in this book. I have hoped, by joining the 
cooperative, empirically controlled enterprise of 
science, to subject my own biases to some measure of 
eventual control."
7.5.4. Class bias.
The problem of class bias, although difficult to deal 
with, I felt was not a major problem in this study. 
Mannheim (1936) discusses it at length with the 
suggestion that
"insofar as social scientists are drawn from different 
classes and insofar as they can achieve a partial 
autonomy from their class background and a tolerant 
appreciation of other viewpoints, the various class- 
bound viewpoints can supplement and counteract one 
another somewhat."
For me the question was not one of class origin but of 
experience within the field of activities that I was 
investigating. The question seemed immaterial as I was an 
insider to the acute care hospital environment. The fact 
to which some participants referred that managers and 
doctors attended different schools or universities, or in 
the case of managers, had not had a university education 
was recognized however, as was the fact remarked upon 
more than once that managers and doctors belonged to
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different golf clubs. This issue has parallels with 
cultural bias.
Having recognized this rather than ignored it, I 
addressed it as an issue and have discussed it in the 
sections on data and conclusions.
7.6.0. The Researcher Biases
The problem of researcher bias is that in which the 
presence of the researcher changes the subject studied. 
Researcher bias occurs throughout the social sciences but 
is important in clinical and field methods. Every 
investigator must perceive and interpret the subject 
matter from some standpoint and thereby bias the 
conclusions. Also every scientist must be active within 
the subject matter in some fashion and must therefore 
change it as it is studied. Even the act of singling 
people out for investigation has an effect on them.
7.6.1. Solitary Bias
I was researching this as an individual and not part of a 
multi-disciplinary team. Apart from recognising that as 
an issue this was difficult to overcome, I did consider 
it was useful to arrange for some of the interviews with 
both managers and doctors to be carried out by a third 
person, not involved in writing, although this did not
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resolve the possible problem of the writing up, 
conclusions and suggestions being carried out by one 
individual. I have tried to balance the problem by 
taking account of and arguing the case as given me by 
other professional groups, attending meetings and 
conferences organised by the Institute of Health Service 
Managers and the Royal College of Nursing, on topics 
relevant to the study, but particularly by discussing 
these issues openly in multi-professional groups of 
doctors and managers. I have organized workshops to 
include members of other professional groups to discuss 
together and obtain feedback on all the issues raised.
The study being largely iterative and enfolded, the view 
that emerges is not that of a solitary author but the 
collective views and judgement of many individuals, from 
many disciplines, varied professional experiences and 
backgrounds.
7.6.2. Ethical Bias
A closely related ethical problem is that of the 
researcher's indebtedness to his participants for the 
knowledge he obtains by studying them. The subjects take 
time to talk to the researcher, they befriend him, make a 
place in their lives for him, concern themselves with his 
work and seek out ways to be helpful. What can the 
researchers do for them in return? Gusfield (1960:106)
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expresses the researcher's feeling of indebtedness 
nicely:
"The WCTU was my bread and butter....They had been 
pretty helpful to me in many ways, and I was using 
them. This kind of situation is bound to fill the field 
worker with ethical misgivings, and I had a sincere 
feeling that they deserved some kind of repayment,"
Indebtedness may not be such a problem in experimental 
work where subjects are paid by the hour for their 
participation, and this is considered to be a sufficient 
discharge of the experimenter's obligations. One might 
expect it to be a problem for other researchers, who ask 
their subjects to take up to several hours to fill out 
questionnaires, take tests, or give interviews; however 
Diesing (1972) says:
"I have never come across any expressed recognition of 
this problem, either oral or written."
He says that field workers, in contrast, frequently 
express awareness of the problem. Perhaps the difference 
is because of the participant observer's more personal 
involvement with his subject, which contrasts sharply 
with the tester's or questionnaire writer's 
impersonality. Or perhaps the greater contribution of the 
field worker's subjects produces a greater actual 
indebtedness. Several solutions have been devised for 
this problem (Wax 1960);
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"Probably the most important form of repayment is the 
continual small courtesies of the field worker? he 
should be a good listener, express genuine respect or 
deference in attitude, perform small favours, 
participate seriously in ceremonies if asked."
But no matter what form of repayment is found, there must 
always be a residual indebtedness inherent in the diffuse 
relationship that the field worker develops with his 
subject. In a specific, quasi-contractual relationship, 
indebtedness is also specific and can be completely 
discharged by a specific payment, but in a diffuse 
interpersonal relationship, indebtedness is diffuse on 
both sides and can never be definitely eliminated. The 
result is a lingering sense of debt and guilt on the part 
of the field worker. This may express itself in over- 
indentification with the subject, a reinforcement of the 
identification and involvement that normally results from 
participant observation (Gans 1967:444) and (Miller 
1952:97-99).
7.6.3. Experimenter Bias
The experimenter appears to try solving the problem of 
objectivity by detaching himself from his experiment and 
his subject matter as fully as possible, emotionally and 
physically. In this way he hopes that experimenter bias 
will have a minimal effect on the results. It might be 
argued that this is also the proper solution for the 
participant observer? although he cannot be as detached
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and objective as the experimenter, he should still try to 
imitate him by remaining detached and passive where 
possible.
7.6.4. Observer Bias
The problem of observer bias occurs when observation 
reports are distorted and mistaken. Redfield has 
suggested a solution to this (1960:132-137) cf also 
(Myrdal 1944); he proposes that the same case be studied 
by two or more investigators with different biases, so 
that each can reveal and correct the exaggerations and 
omissions of the other. Objectivity is approached by 
combining the accounts and by rechecking where there is 
direct disagreement, the sign of falsehood being either 
direct contradiction or the incompatibility of the 
different accounts.
7.6.5. (Self) Observational Bias
Self-observation is a special source of evidence 
sometimes overlooked. When an observer has been well 
socialized, or when a clinician has established a 
substantial relationship to a patient, his own reactions 
become part of the system he is studying. Consciously 
and intellectually he is still the detached observer, but 
emotionally and subconsciously he has become part of the 
subject matter. Diesing (1972:151);
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"Personal observation is a most important kind of 
evidence, chiefly because it is cheap and readily
obtainable......The main problem with observation is
observer bias."
7.6.6. Theory Bias
All the theories and hypotheses the observer takes into 
the field affect his perception and interpretation. 
Theoretical biases can be isolated by having one's 
theories made explicit to oneself, and by consciously 
searching for evidence that contradicts one's own 
theories and hypotheses (although I doubt whether anyone 
is truly able to do this). And most important, 
observations need to be checked against other kinds of 
evidence.
Nevertheless it seems to me that this other evidence may 
be no more dependable than any other, and that 
informants' opinions are as much in need of 
interpretation and evaluation as any other bit of 
information. An informant may agree with an 
interpretation because he wants to be agreeable, or 
because he is not interested in the topic and does not 
want to be involved in an argument about it, or because 
he is momentarily persuaded by the eloquence or the 
status of the participant observer. He may disagree and 
correct an interpretation because he wants to show the 
researcher that the latter is still an outsider who does
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not understand, or because the style of theorizing is 
unfamiliar or disagreeable to him, or because he wishes 
to protect esoteric knowledge.
Consequently it is necessary to evaluate the opinion in 
terms of the relationship to the observer, the style of 
thought and expression, and the interest and involvement 
in the subject being discussed. If all of these factors 
are just right, the informant becomes a kind of 
collaborator and his opinions are most valuable, but this 
does not happen often. Here also we see one of the links 
between various biases, in this case between theory bias, 
perceptual bias and conversational bias, and possibly 
other links.
7.7.0. The Participant Biases
Nor are the biases solely related to the researcher. The 
participants may knowingly or unwittingly cause bias.
7.7.1. Conversational Bias
Interviewee statements may be biased in various ways, 
depending on the topic, the circumstance, the 
interviewee, or the relationship to the researcher. To a 
stranger a participant is likely to give an idealized 
version of what happens or how he feels. A co-operative 
participant may say what he thinks the researcher wants
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to hear or would find interesting. Esoteric material may 
be simplified to the researcher's presumed level of 
comprehension. The participant may relate official 
versions of events that have been read, or may summarize 
biased accounts read in papers or journals or may quote 
recent statements by biased friends and colleagues.
7.7.2. Documentary Bias
The same cautions that apply to participant perceptual 
bias and conversational bias apply to documents and 
written records. Unofficial memos and reports must be 
interpreted in their organizational context. Official 
records give only an idealized public version of what 
happened. Often the omissions are more interesting than 
the inclusions in such records, Dalton (1964:77-81). One 
Clinical Director recognized this when referring to 
records of hospital meetings;
"Some people "wash the minutes" so you never detect 
there is any type of spirited discussion about anything 
and I am against that. I think the minutes ought to 
reflect everything, without mentioning individuals, but 
say there was a big fight over this, and the majority 
of people shouted down the speaker, and this is what is 
going on. Well, it is the only institutional memory 
of what happened."
7.7.3. Perspective Bias
The position of the individual and their mode of 
involvement can provide a bias of perspective. This does
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not mean that observations need to be discarded as 
invalid, they simply need to be interpreted. Biases of 
perspective can be located, interpreted, explained, and 
allowed for on the basis of comparison with observations 
from different perspectives.
7.8. Creative Value of Bias
What I had read, and so far summarized, began to mount up 
evidence for suspecting that the whole project might be 
riddled with defects, but there is another side. 
Participant observation depends essentially on the 
creative use of bias to discover things that would 
otherwise not be observable, so the minimizing of bias 
and involvement could destroy the method. An observer 
not involved will be unable to empathize, to see things 
from the perspective of his participants, and may well 
miss much of the meaning of what is seen. As a result the 
wrong questions might be asked, (Ladd, 1957:xiv);
"cf. the informant Bidaga's complaint: "I have been 
trying to explain these things to you for thirty years, 
but you never asked me the right questions.11
And one might look in the wrong places. In addition, a 
too emotionally detached person might not be as readily 
accepted into confidential activities such as the Medical 
Executive and Management Board Meetings because the 
coldness and aloofness would disturb the atmosphere.
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There are situations in which detachment might be 
welcomed, such as quarrels, and there are public 
situations in which the observer's attitude could be 
unimportant, but in personal contacts, detachment would 
seem a barrier.
Finally, an observer who does not actively probe and 
provoke may miss important aspects of his research, what 
the participants really consider as important to 
themselves, the defences the participants have against 
perceived threats, their reactions to crises and problems 
and so on.
7.9. Discussion
By now it is clear that the holist ideal of studying, and 
taking account of, all the important aspects of a 
particular human whole, is unattainable, and we must be 
satisfied with approximations, and the recognition of 
certain assumptions. The various solutions that people 
have devised may move in opposite directions, or may 
combine parts of both directions.
One direction is for the investigator deliberately to 
circumscribe a limited area of study, making his limits 
explicit and hoping that others will supplement his
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efforts in other areas. This appears to be the line 
suggested by Gluckman and Devons (1964). They add that,
"only the investigator should keep an open mind about 
whether the closed system he has set up is an 
appropriate one. As his investigation progresses he 
should be ready to shift boundaries to include 
important new factors in his system."
Diesing (1972) however feels that a bias is only 
misleading or inappropriate if it prevents the researcher 
from entering into the world of his subject and acting 
within that world;
"When the researcher's actions and resources are 
inappropriate from the standpoint of the subject, when 
they produce confusion and misunderstanding, the 
researcher is acting on premises that are different 
from those of the subject. This always happens during 
the period of the researcher's socialization, but if 
confusion and misunderstanding persist they show that a 
persistent bias of the researcher which is unacceptable 
to the subject is preventing him from understanding the 
subject. Consequently the researcher can check the 
appropriateness of his biases to his subject by noting 
persistent difficulties of communication and rapport."
Such checking is, of course, easier to do if the 
researcher is aware of his biases and can take a somewhat 
detached attitude toward them. Fortunately the 
participant observer is more thoroughly and more 
continuously active than practitioners of other methods. 
He does not take the detached neutral position of the 
experimenter and the survey researcher, but actively 
involves himself in his research, emotionally, 
cognitively, and behaviourally.
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He has to accept and work within the systems of the 
people he studies, and form genuine, not feigned 
attachments. Such a socialization process is 
transactional, with influences coming from the socialized 
as well as socializer. Beliefs may be selectively taken 
on and reinterpreted, and attachments may necessarily be 
selective if they are genuine. Diesing (1972:280):
"In addition, the participant observer continually 
changes his subject matter as he works with it in his 
newly learned roles, and the changes necessarily 
reflect in part the contributions he has made to his 
own socialization."
Thus one could say that the participant observer not only 
perceives his subject matter from a bias, as all 
scientists do, but also that he remakes the subject 
matter in his own image as he studies it. Reason and 
Rowan (1981:246):
"I know myself well enough, I know my bias as a 
researcher. Every researcher brings to the research his 
own biases, rigidities of character and these 
contribute to the perspective."
So this research was not conducted alone. There were 
colleagues, peers, mentors, friends, wife and children 
who could challenge and shock me out of habitual ways of 
thinking. To do this research one needed both people who 
could offer support, and those willing to challenge and 
confront.
187
An issue that concerned me was consensus collusion. Heron
1981:164) says?
"However many persons agree in the research conclusions 
this is per s e  no guarantee of their validity.
C o n s e n s u s  g e n t i u m  is no adequate criterion of truth? it 
may simply represent widespread collusion to ignore 
crucial and relevant variables."
I countered this by inviting some of the co-researchers 
to take devil's advocate roles so that by confronting, 
challenging, disagreeing, picking holes, and so on, the 
inquiry process was successfully progressed. For example 
in a workshop I asked groups of Clinical Directors and 
Managers to take identify areas of new ideas, new 
connections and possible errors in the cognitive maps 
discussed later in the data section.
There is inevitably bias, not only from my background, my 
academic training and my personal experiences but in my 
choice of topic, my choice of methodology, my choice of 
participants. I do recognize these biases and in the end 
the results of the research do contain an element of my 
own view of the question asked, the answers given, the 
feedback and validations, the literature review 
supporting or denying my arguments etc., although I have 
tried to be as impartial as human nature allows. I have 
recognised that bias must creep in. This is an issue 
which I have addressed more fully in Chapters 9 and 19 on
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my personal lessons and personal reflections and the 




Theory and Choice of Research Methodology
8.0. Introduction
Lincoln and Guba (1985:15) describe three eras of 
research , prepositivistic, positivistic and 
postpositivistic The first was the longest and is the 
least relevant to this work. It is typified by passive 
observation. Later scientists began to try ideas to see 
if they worked and they became active observers and the 
positivistic era had begun. Not only did it influence 
hard science but also religion, politics, and even 
philosophy.
But there are challenges to positivism and much has been 
written but Lincoln and Guba (1985:24) summarize the 
following:
1. Positivism leads to inadequate conceptualization of 
what science is.
2. Positivism is unable to deal adequately with two 
crucial and interacting aspects of the theory-fact 
relationship.
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3. Positivism is overly dependent on operationalism, 
which has itself been increasingly judged to be 
inadequate.
4. Positivism has at least two consequences that are 
both repugnant and unfounded: determinism and 
reductionism.
5. Positivism has produced research with human 
respondents that ignores humanness, a fact that has not 
only ethical, but also validity implications.
6. Positivism falls short of being able to deal with 
emergent conceptual/empirical formulations from a 
variety of fields.
7. Positivism rests upon at least five assumptions that 
are increasingly difficult to maintain:
Ontological assumption, that things can be broken 
apart and studied independently, and the sum is then 
the total of the parts.
Epistemological assumption, concerning the separation 
of the observer and the observed.
Problems of contextual and temporal independence, 
that what is true at one time and place may, under 
appropriate circumstances (such as sampling), also be 
true at another time and place.
Assumptions of linear causality.
Assumptions that the study is free from bias.
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It is the result of some of these criticisms that 
investigators particularly in the social sciences have 
moved into the postpositivistic era, where the basics are 
almost the reverse of the characteristics of positivism. 
Data is not detachable from theory, theories are the way 
facts are seen, the language is less exact and meanings 
are determined by theory. So although much evidence has 
emerged of the value of postpositivism from the hard 
sciences, the arguments for its value is greater when 
human beings are studied.
Conventional inquiry is often labelled as positivistic 
and Lincoln and Guba (1985: preface) refer to "the 
difficulties it is currently encountering.11 Positivistic 
research is sometimes criticized for producing 
questionable results (Phillips, 1983), but Das (1983) has 
stated that the two approaches are not to be regarded as 
opposites but appropriate to different areas of interest?
"Qualitative and quantitative methodologies are not
antithetical or even alternative."
So a paradigm revolution has occurred. It is said that 
postpositivism is a new paradigm not reconcilable with 
the old, although there have been those who have 
suggested the time has come for a realignment. But 
equally there are those who regard compromise as no more 
possible than it could be between prepositivism and
192
positivism. Interestingly Gioia, Donnellon and Sims 
(1989) describe an example of a set of data analysed in 
both the positivist and postpositivist methods. They 
reviewed videotaped interviews and used a method of 
mapping the script and compared it with previous analysis 
done by coding the utterances. The results were not 
contradictory but the two methods saw different things.
8.1. Effect on this research project.
The key to the choice of methodology is the nature of the 
research question, and having read studies on management, 
organizational development, change in organizations and 
studies of human service organizations, I decided that 
the most appropriate method of investigation and the most 
useful and reliable results came from postpositivistic 
methods, sometimes called naturalistic. These studies do 
not seek to verify a theory but instead allow the theory 
to emerge from the data. Whenever the researcher 
imposes theory before the data is collected there is 
always a danger of moulding the facts to the theory.
8.2. Postpositivist Methodology
People do not behave like chemicals, nor do they behave 
simply in response to some stimulus; they construct a 
meaning to the stimulus and behave or react in a 
meaningful way. A simple organism may recoil at the heat
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of a fire, but a man may run for water, to ring the fire 
brigade or into the building to rescue someone calling 
for help. Humans act towards things on the basis of the 
meaning that the things have for them.
The meaning that certain events have for individuals is 
itself the product of experience and interaction within 
society. The person seeing the fire may do none of the 
above and be rooted to the spot in terror because of a 
childhood experience. The meanings of events, 
situations, things and experiences are all affected by 
previous knowledge, experiences and knowledge about 
others' experiences.
The role of the researcher may be affected by the 
researched's behaviour, or by the feelings of the 
researched to the researcher or by previous research etc. 
The person seeing the fire rushes into the building to 
rescue the child of a hysterical mother, but may act with 
more coolness and calculation if in the company of a 
person who has experienced such a disaster. Thirdly, 
meanings may be modified and handled by a process which 
causes different interpretations to be ascribed to words, 
actions and behaviour. Anyone observing these reactions 
of the person described above and observing in a purely 
"positivistic” way might place any interpretation on what 
he had observed and build up a case to support that. For
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my research I needed to know what the researched thought 
and felt and why they did what they did.
Human beings are therefore initiators of action and not 
just responders. All these influences need to be taken 
into account. The research methodology has therefore to 
be appropriate to such a perspective. Such a method is 
not that of positivism with its emphasis on statistical 
data, averages and theory requiring proof.
In the words of Kant (1969);
"Perception without conception is blind? conception 
without perception is empty."
Thus to avoid the emptiness it is necessary to 
participate with the researched while observing them or 
to spend a considerable amount of time talking to them in 
a relatively unstructured way about their perceptions and 
actions.
Various names have been given to the new paradigm largely 
because the people who practice it take differing views 
on what it implies: naturalistic, postpositivistic, 
ethnographic, phenomenological, subjective, case study, 
qualitative, hereneutic, humanistic, new paradigm. Terms 
from the whole range merge into one another and are not 
entirely distinct. Authorities on each method, hold 
views that theirs is the right way to do it. Basically
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there are the ethnomologists, the structuralists and 
those in the middle.
Neither can Naturalism be defined in simple terms. In 
fact Guba (1978) has cited nine differentdefinitions of 
naturalism. What I regard as most important however, are 
two factors: That the researcher does not manipulate or
influence the researched, and that the researcher sets no 
theory on the outcome before analysis of the data. With 
the new inquiry there are five basic axioms. Lincoln 
(1985);
Axiom 1. The nature of reality or ontology which the 
Oxford English Dictionary describes as a study of the 
nature of being. In the positivistic theory reality can 
be fragmented into independent process and variables 
which can be studied independently whereas in the 
naturalistic version the realities can only be studied 
holistically.
Axiom 2. Considers the relationship of the knower to 
known and is referred to as epistemology. The Oxford 
English Dictionary describes this as the theory of the 
method or grounds of knowledge. It means in effect that 
the researcher and the subject of the inquiry interact 
and influence each other.
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Axiom 3. Concerns the possibility of generalization. 
Naturalistic inquiry does not develop a body of 
knowledge in the form of a law, theory or hypothesis 
that holds true anywhere and anytime, but rather "seeks 
to form” a working hypothesis to describe an individual 
case.
Axiom 4. On the possibility of causal linkages 
positivism explains every action as the result of a 
cause either preceding that effect or occurring 
simultaneously with it. Whereas the naturalistic 
version is that all things are in a state of mutual 
movement and development, and it is impossible to 
distinguish cause from effect.
Axiom 5. Discusses axiology or the theory of value. 
Positivistic inquiry is value free, whereas 
naturalistic inquiry is not and for the following 
reasons. The inquiry is influenced by: the researcher's 
values, in the choice of inquiry, boundaries and focus 
of the research? the choice of method of carrying out 
the investigation? the choice and method of data 
collection? the analysis of the data and the 
interpretation of the results.
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8.3.0. Various Postpositivistic Methodologies
Having reviewed the arguments for the appropriateness of 
postpositivistic methods I will now summarize the well 
documented arguments about the value of the various 
detailed techniques, beginning with the more conservative 
approach and working further into the postpositivistic 
methodologies. In particular I will consider the method 
and problems which occur in the practical application of 
various studies, commenting on the appropriateness to 
this project, the problems of analysis, and issues of 
validity. Lastly a set of criteria and the reasons will 
be set out for the choice of method.
8.3.1. The Constant Comparative Method. Grounded Theory.
The constant comparative method (Glaser and Straus 1967) 
(Glaser 1978) for grounded theory building, is concerned 
that any new emerging theory is strangled by preconceived 
ideas on the part of the researcher. They collected data 
by interview and observation, which were coded sentence 
by sentence into categories which had certain properties. 
Ideas that linked the properties and categories were 
noted and the whole eventually linked to form a theory.
Concepts and properties could also come from relevant 
academic literature as this was regarded as relevant data 
but could not come exclusively from this source. The new
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ideas would then emerge from what people do and say. The 
process continued until a saturation point was reached 
and the result is a theory fitted and worked for that 
setting.
Relevance for my research
The amount of data was likely to be overwhelming and the 
difficulties in implementing the technique are discussed 
by Miles (1979). It is said that the researcher pays 
more attention to biases and it sensitizes one to the 
data in more depth. The main drawback I felt was the 
amount of data likely to be collected and the sheer 
volume of work in processing it. It seemed likely to 
generate ideas, but it really seemed most appropriate in 
a situation where there was rather limited data and as 
much information as possible had to be squeezed from it.
I liked the idea of using evidence available from 
academic literature in addition to fieldwork of 
observation and interviews. This method appeared to make 
no particular reference to the problems of the 
relationship between researcher and subjects, which is 
one of the axioms of the postpositivistic methods.
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8.3.2. Unobtrusive or Participant Observation Method
The participant observation method, (Bogdan and Taylor 
1975) and (Taylor and Bogdan 1984) is careful observation 
by the researcher, present in the setting for a period of 
time, and who interacts with the subjects of the research 
and who unobtrusively and systematically collects data. 
The researcher has no personal stake in the setting but 
is supposed to empathize with the subjects. According to 
Diesing (1972:291)?
"The participant observer tests the adequacy of his 
account by seeing whether its various parts are 
acceptable and intelligible to the people he is working 
with, though not necessarily identical to their own 
verbal formulations. He does this not by asking their 
approval of an article - which tests mainly friendship 
and politeness - but in informal discussion continued 
over a period of time. Or, expressed somewhat 
differently, he tests the adequacy of his understanding 
by acting on it and seeing where his actions are 
unintelligible or puzzling to others."
Participant observer methods appear to have been first 
developed by anthropologists, though they are frequently 
used by sociologists, social psychologists, political 
scientists, and organization theorists. They are useful 
for studying a formal organization or institution, the 
emphasis being on the individuality or uniqueness of the 
system, its wholeness or boundedness, and the ways it 
maintains its individuality. Diesing (1972:5);
"The primary objective is to describe the individual in 
its individuality, as a system of rules, goals, values, 
techniques, defense or boundary-maintaining mechanisms,
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exchange or boundary crossing mechanisms, socialization 
procedures, and decision procedures.”
Relevance for my research
Although this fitted the careful observation I planned to 
make within my own hospital environment and considered 
the relationship between researcher and subjects, I felt 
initially it had little overall value as a scheme as I 
did have a personal stake in the setting and I felt the 
method had little to offer the criteria I was seeking.
As the study moved on and I expanded the boundaries 
outside my own hospital I was drawn more towards this 
method.
8.3.3. Participant Comprehension Method. Ethnomethodology
Disciplined abstractions from intimate familiarity were 
described by Lofland (1976) who wrote what was a guide 
for participant comprehension. The researcher had to 
develop an "intimate familiarity" with the setting. The 
need to be close to the data is obvious, and the problem 
of bias inherent in unobtrusive observation disappears 
when the researcher becomes too close to the setting, 
while the results of pure observation may be meaningless 
speculation. Mangham (1978) says "the way to avoid 
emptiness and stimulate groundedness is to be intimately 
familiar with one's subject matter, to have a detailed 
and dense awareness of a particular set of social actors
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over a period of time and to seek to understand how it is 
that they go about defining and acting in their 
particular social world, to participate with them while 
observing ...their perceptions and actions." Again 
Lofland (1976) also regretted the lack of "intimate 
familiarity" in studies to date, but pointed out the 
difficulties often involved in entering settings together 
with difficulties in analysis. The presence of the 
researcher also has to make sense for the subjects. This 
is tackled in Action Research in which the researcher 
sets a real and relevant task for the people in the 
setting. (Rapoport, 1970. Susman and Evered, 1978 and 
Sanford, 1981). Lofland (1976) also states his ideas on 
how explanations can be developed from data.
Relevance for my research
Here were some really useful concepts. I was already 
intimately familiar with the setting, close to the data 
and could plan to undertake a real and relevant task for 
the people in the setting? I would be a student of ideas 
and not just a participant.
8.3.4. Endogenous Research
Maruyama (1978) went even further in the idea of the 
researcher becoming intimately familiar with the setting. 
He works with the subjects and they become co­
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researchers. They decide the relevant research question 
for themselves, design the plan and even undertake the 
research. The role of the researcher is to help with 
this endogenous research.
Relevance for my research
Unfortunately it is a method appropriate only to certain 
situations. Reference has been made elsewhere to the 
difficulty of entry to studies of medical work and of 
doctors and there is no way that this sort of time 
commitment could or would be given by the subjects of 
this research, even to a colleague.
8.3.5. Cooperative Inquiry
The new paradigm of research involving cooperative 
inquiry is explored in collected papers on naturalistic 
methods by Reason and Rowan (1981). These go beyond 
participant observation and ethnomethodology to the form 
of inquiry which includes the subjects as co-researchers. 
They feel that the grounded theory approach is "firmly 
within the old paradigm”. They feel that the 
researcher's own learning and interactions are the 
essence of the experience and the research. The knowledge 
is characterised as:
propositional knowledge or facts, 
practical knowledge or skills,
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experiential knowledge which is " knowing an entity- 
person, place, thing, process, etc - in direct face to 
face encounter and interaction.11 (Heron 1981).
There is similarity with endogenous research. They also 
acknowledge the criticism of the researcher needing to 
know him or herself (through co-counselling for example) 
which makes him or her seem like a person on a higher 
plane, specially aware and "pure" enough to do the 
research. They counter this by saying, "We cannot study 
human processes except as aware human beings..."
Relevance for my research
Again while the idea of cooperative inquiry is appealing 
it would require what the subjects would regard as an 
unreasonable amount of time. It also involves the 
possible danger of personally damaging feedback in a 
setting in which I would continue to work after the study 
had been completed. Also there was the possibility that 
some of the information fed back might offend the 
principle of confidentiality which I had promised to all 
the participants.
8.4. Criteria for this project.
Having been trained in the positivistic methodology, even 
as someone who had some reservations and doubts about it
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in certain circumstances, I had to balance my initial 
scepticisms for postpositivist methods against the 
obvious need to use a form of naturalist inquiry for this 
research. I was also keen to involve the subjects of the 
research, but within the limitations of time they would 
be prepared to give the project. There was in addition 
the danger I wished to avoid of setting off a chain of 
consequences after the study was completed while I 
continued to work there. Clearly there had to be limits 
to the sharing of knowledge and therefore the involvement 
of the subjects as co-researchers, although I feel very 
sympathetic to the idea and which would clearly produce 
good results. I also felt the need to keep a tight 
control of the direction of the research whilst remaining 
open to contributions to enhance my understanding.
8.5. Analysis of Naturalistic Data
My biggest worry after clarifying the details of what 
data to collect, was that of analysis of the data, 
especially as it would obviously be a considerable 
amount. The complexity and difficult thinking that goes 
into analysing naturalistic data has been well described 
by Marshall (1981). Allowing ideas to develop has been 
set out by Daft (1983) who likens the research to story 
telling as a poem rather than as a novel. He points out 
that research decisions are not linear and advises 
relating ideas to common sense and to learning about
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organizations at first hand. This is similar to Morgan's 
(1983) advice to engage with the data and treat the 
research as conversation.
My early anxieties about the volume of data were not 
allayed or dispelled by my reading; indeed the more I 
read the more it seemed likely to be a problem. However 
my hope was that previous researchers were on the right 
lines, and their experience and results were a 
reassurance in the early days of the project. I later 
found the amount of data useful in looking for concepts 
and evidence to support or refute ideas.
8.6.0. Dilemmas in qualitative research
From the start having read some works on Naturalistic 
Inquiry I was particularly concerned about the problem of 
bias and validity discussed in the previous Chapter. One 
of the striking, but not surprising, features and 
discoveries is that the same issue is seen as different 
by different people and different groups. Doctors and 
managers see problems in their own particular world as 
different.
8.6.1. Validity of accounts
If the participants are part of the research and gaining 
something from it, they are more likely to tell the
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truth. On the other hand because of my lasting 
involvement and working relationships in the hospital 
setting, I could conceive of situations where the 
accounts may be less than truthful. I felt however that 
my familiarity with the environment would enable me to 
identify this.
8.7.2. The researcher as expert
There is also the relationship caused by the differing 
expertise of the researcher and co-researchers or 
research participants. Initially I felt unsure whether 
this would cause problems, in that although the people 
involved are treated as co-researchers they may feel and 
behave like research subjects. This was something of a 
problem as I was sometimes asked for my opinion on issues 
that I was researching, but more often my opinion was 
dismissed as based on "unscientific methods”. This was 
particularly likely to occur when the participants had an 
academic background which is positivistic.
An effort was made to educate the researched in the new 
paradigm, but this did then tend to induce in the 
participants' mind a feeling that the researcher was an 
expert, a situation found particularly in my own 
hospital, and which I feel exacerbated the feelings of 
ridicule for my methodology in particular and the topic 
in general. This role conflict between being
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collaborative and being an expert, has been identified by 
Blackler and Brown (1983).
8.7.3. Publication and feedback of sensitive accounts
There may be dilemmas concerning publication of material 
that could be attributable to sources who gave 
information which they felt was confidential. I have 
therefore not identified quoted sources except to say 
whether doctor or manager, and to indicate their 
position. When trust appears to have been established 
participants seemed only too willing to talk freely and 
openly.
Backer (1969) makes two points about the ethics of 
publication, first that the researcher should feed back 
the information gained in order that those researched may 
benefit from it, and secondly that information not 
necessary to the argument or that would cause suffering 
out of proportion to its scientific value should not be 
published. As Miles (1979) points out there is no real 
possibility of real anonymity inside a site, but this 
research covers many sites, and individuals cannot be 
identified from the writings. However, on a more 
positive note, the sharing of the analysis may provide an 
important source of validation. I had then to be wary of 
people's attempts to portray themselves in a more 
favourable light by alterations to the accounts given and
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by later discussions. I was aware of this problem 
particularly in my own hospital and have had to take 






According to Lincoln and Guba (1985) the design of a 
naturalistic inquiry cannot be given in advance but must 
emerge as the study proceeds and always take place in the 
field not in contrived settings. Even at an early stage 
certain decisions had to be made with regard to the 
method of inquiry.
The study takes place within the setting of the running 
of a major hospital and concerns the role of the doctor 
(i.e. consultant or specialist but known in America as a 
physician) in managing that organization. It does not 
study the role of clinical decision making.
In this chapter I will explain how the study is built up 
from various sub-units attached to the main core, how and 
why the various hospitals, units, Clinical Directors and 
Managers were chosen to be included and what I have done 
not only to gain their cooperation but also what I have 
tried to do with the data, and how this has produced 
useful information. I will further describe the actual
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First the consultants involved in the project are those 
who have been elected, selected, or otherwise chosen or 
volunteered to be Chairmen of Faculties, Heads of 
Departments or Clinical Directors either now or in the 
past. This title has slightly different meanings in 
various hospitals, but all of them, as far as this study 
is concerned, have some role and function of being partly 
or jointly responsible for the decision making and 
budgetary control of some part of the clinical aspect of 
the hospital. The only differences are in the size of 
unit for which they are responsible, the amount of 
responsibility and the degree of authority and 
accountability. All of these factors depend on the 
degree of decentralization or devolvement of central 
management in the institution. In some hospitals each and 
every clinical faculty or department has a Clinical 
Director, but none is represented on the Hospital Board. 
Whereas in other hospitals there are fewer Clinical 
Directors who each have responsibility for more than one 




There is a dual hierarchical structure in hospital, 
(professionals and managers), and much of the day to day 
"running" of a hospital is of no direct interest to the 
doctors, and forms no part of this thesis. What is of 
interest to both doctors and managers is the control of 
overall medical and clinical activity rather than the 
control of diagnosis, investigation and treatment which 
is primarily of interest to doctors rather than managers 
except when significantly affecting financial 
performance. So I have considered managers as part of 
the study, and I have set out in separate chapters the 
history of professional management in hospitals, together 
with the changing relationship between professional 
management and the medical profession, as well as the 
reasons for arriving at the present situation.
9.2. Outline of Study
The main backbone of the project is a study of the 
management, decision making process and change within my 
own National Health Service District General Hospital. I 
have tried to study this at three levels, as Clinical 
Director and previously as Chairman of a Faculty and 
Division within the hospital; as a member on the Medical 
Executive Committee on which all the Clinical Directors
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sit; as an observer of the Management Board on which 
originally three Clinical Directors sat. The last has 
sadly not proved possible. After I had carried out an 
initial interview the Chief Executive agreed to my 
suggestion that I sit in as an observer provided that I 
obtain the agreement of everyone else on the Management 
Board i.e. the Medical Director, the Nursing Director, 
the Human Resource Director, the Finance Director, the 
Medical Director and the three Clinical Directors. Within 
a matter of hours I had obtained the full and 
enthusiastic agreement of all of them except one clinical 
director. While he agreed to the idea he was not prepared 
to give me any time for a form of research which he 
scoffed at. Even that I felt was relevant to my previous 
impressions and would have been surprised had I not found 
one sceptic amongst the doctors.
However in spite of three approaches to the manager over 
the ensuing months, two in writing, for an invitation to 
the Management Board meetings nothing was forthcoming. 
This omission at my own hospital was however filled by 
attending Board meetings, at other hospitals both in the 
UK and America. It was interesting that over the ensuing 
months one Clinical Director ceased to serve on the 
Management Board for personal reasons, followed by the 
Medical Director through ill health, and he was replaced 
by two of the Clinical Directors in a joint Medical 
Director role, a subject of discussion in a later
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chapter. As a result they were obliged to give up their 
Clinical Director role and the Clinical Directors were 
instead replaced by a Medical Services Manager, a 
Surgical Services Manager, a Clinical Services Manager 
and a Business and Facilities Manager, none of whom was 
medically qualified. Thus all Clinical Director input was 
effectively removed from the Board.
Because I work in this District General Hospital I know 
and therefore have access to the Managers and Clinical 
Directors in a way that would not be possible to an 
outsider. I know them well and the hospital 
organizational structure is one that I am familiar with. 
Nevertheless I was unprepared for some of the initial 
subtle and not so subtle hostility towards the project 
from some of the managers and doctors in my own hospital 
something, I have not found in other hospitals either in 
the U.K. or America. I was therefore surprised that 
although there were open and explicit requests for the 
use of the findings of my research, when I produced 
papers on the topics requested, they invariably met with 
a lack of response or at most a comment that the subject 
was "interesting", but nothing more. So my lasting 
impression was not of hostility but lack of interest, 
which on reflection was not a surprise.
Although the study actually "crosses" the boundary 
between two eras in the Health Service, the introduction
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of the radical changes in the White Paper (HMS0.1989) it 
is possible that this may have had an effect on some of 
the relationships within the hospital, but this fieldwork 
has been structured to study the situation "post" the 
changes.
Secondly but in a "fleshing out" role is the study of 
Clinical Directors and Managers at various other District 
General Hospitals around the country. I have set out the 
reasons for the choice of centres and the different 
methodology for this part of the study.
Lastly I will be drawing on data from a study of the role 
of doctors in management in the United States of America, 
using a similar methodology to that for the comparable 
second part of the study mentioned above. I will also 
elaborate on the motive and the importance of including 
this aspect in the work.
9.3. Methodological Approaches
This study is loosely based on "co-operative" inquiry but 
not the new paradigm for research explored by Reason and 
Rowan (1981) which breaks down the traditional 
distinction between the role of the researcher and the 
subject. It is firmly bedded in the middle ground of 
ethnomethodology or participant comprehension. Still far 
removed from the positivistic methods succinctly
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described by Heron (1988). In the old paradigm only the 
researchers do the thinking that generates, designs, 
manages and draws conclusions from the research? and only 
the subjects - often knowing nothing of what the 
researchers are aiming for - are involved in the action 
and experience which the research is about.
While I did not undertake the research with the subjects 
as co-researchers they did help devise, manage and draw 
conclusions from the research? and they also underwent 
the experiences and performed the actions that were being 
researched.
In collecting data from Clinical Directors and Managers 
from other units and particularly from the United States 
it would not have been practical to use the same methods. 
I therefore devised a method based on the concepts of the 
ethnomethodological approach but adapted to fit the 
practicalities of the data collection. This I have 
outlined.
9.4. Choice of Units
In Chapter 1 Section 1.6.4. I have given details of the 
scope of the project: 60 NHS Consultants, 18 NHS 
Managers, from 13 NHS Hospitals. The hospitals other than 
my own were chosen and added as the project proceeded by 
personal contact, networking, the hospitals' interest in
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my project, recommendation of interviewees, and my 
attempts to include as broad a spectrum as possible to 
include Directly Managed Units (DMU) and Trusts, large 
and small hospitals and Teaching Hospitals as well as 
District General Hospitals (DGH).
In the United States I interviewed 27 Consultants and 13 
Administrators at 6 hospitals. These were chosen by 
writing to my opposite number in 18 hospitals asking if 
they and their hospital would be interested in 
participating in the project. I received 8 replies all 
favourable and chose 4 centres in different States, as 
laws vary from State to State. They then set up and chose 
the participants for me. In two cases they arranged 
visits to another hospital, hence the 6 hospitals from 4 
centres. I would have liked to have visited the other 4 
centres (in different States) but the centres visited had 
already taken me away from my clinical work for three 
months in two visits.
The main unit, the centre of the study, is my own 
District General Hospital, one of the largest in the 
country with a catchment population in excess of 420,000. 
I have worked there for over twenty years and have seen 
many changes occur not only in the National Health 
Service but in this particular hospital. I know the 
organization, finances, workforce, management and morale, 
as well as the Managers and Clinical Directors and I have
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easy access to them. I therefore have the benefit not 
granted to an outsider of being close enough to these 
people for them to be honest with me and tell me what 
they think and feel, perhaps in blunt terms.
There is however, another side to this coin. I have 
spoken in the earlier Chapter on bias, the bias of my 
involvement. This familiarity might perhaps be an 
opportunity for bias from the subjects of the research, 
an opportunity for "axes to be ground". I see this as a 
strength of my position however, because after 
recognizing this possibility I do have the opportunity to 
get hard, heartfelt feelings.
I wanted to avoid the bias of researching only people I 
knew well and therefore decided to expand the data 
collection by going out into other districts and 
interviewing other Clinical Directors and Managers.
It would have been easy, in an attempt to reduce the 
complexity of the situation, to have only included 
certain fixed subjects, i.e. only Clinical Directors and 
General Managers. So I chose deliberately to increase 
the opportunity to examine data from as many viewpoints 
as possible, not just that of the Clinical Directors, to 
have as many groups as I could manage, including Regional 
Medical Officers, Governmental Medical Officers and 
Health Care Academics giving a view, looking at the data,
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reflecting on it, feeding back interpretation of the 
data, testing the information to make the conclusions as 
reliable as possible.
The most obvious diverse element between the professional 
and the managerial or administrative career background is 
that they both have smug, stereotypical and critical 
views of each other. I made no attempt to study only 
those outside groups which had been particularly notable 
in their successes and had therefore received notoriety 
for this feature. I have included some minimal data 
input from other human service organizations. I 
initially thought that because of the different funding 
arrangements for private and American hospitals the data 
would not be solely applicable to the Public Sector. 
However the U.S.health care system is undergoing changes 
which will leave their hospital services more like our 
own. The health maintenance organizations, H.M.O.'s, 
which purchase healthcare, are looking more at costs and 
are seeking to rationalize the contracts they have with 
hospitals. Hospitals are having to justify their costs 
and translate prices into perceived value. Although the 
funding of health care in the U.K. and the U.S. are 
different with different customer groups, the new 
fundamentals of marketing now remain the same.
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9.5. The Gender Issue
Finally on the question of gender, no attempt was made to 
limit the study to male or females, but in fact I could 
find no female Clinical Directors let alone any who were 
prepared to participate in the study in this country. In 
the U.S. group there is one female Clinical Director.
Also in the U.S. group there was a moderate proportion of 
female managers.
9.6. Activities Undertaken
9.6.1. Committees and Boards
At the start of the project I approached the District 
General Manager for his approval to carry out the study 
within the District General Hospital. I then approached 
the Unit General Manager to obtain his approval and 
cooperation in the project, together with similar 
approaches to all the Clinical Directors on the Hospital 
Board. I have already described my experience with them 
above. The Unit General Manager, now the Chief Executive 
Officer and the Chairman of the Hospital Board, agreed to 
approach the management/administrative members of the 
board although subsequently he asked me to make my own 
approach. This is described above.
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I explained to each member the background and purpose of 
the study and outlined the concept of postpositivistic 
thinking. All have been supportive and agreed to 
participate and also to contribute. As described above 
one Clinical Director regards the whole notion of 
management studies as valueless and indeed no more than a 
joke and has taken a very negative attitude to the whole 
project. He did however agree not to block my study but 
made no active contribution. If anything however, it 
made the attitude of the other members of the Board more 
supportive and constructive. I explained the time 
commitment required of them and gave assurances on 
conf identiality.
I was to attend as observer at a series of Board Meetings 
which are held monthly and feed back any information or 
data to individual members in a series of separate
meetings to discuss it. At the end of meetings I would
have been given time to review data and thoughts with the 
group as a whole. Unfortunately as described above this 
was not to prove possible. Lastly I had hoped at the end 
of the data gathering session to have a meeting held 
solely with the purpose of obtaining feedback and 
response from the group. This has also not proved 
possible at my own hospital for reasons given above. I
was however asked to write a paper for the Board and 
Medical Executive Committee on how consultants could be 
more involved in the management of my own hospital. This
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resulted in two meetings of the M.E.C., one of which 
devoted considerable time a discussion on this and the 
second was devoted entirely to a feedback on this 
document. As a result I had a good opportunity for 
validation and review with some of the participants of 
the whole project.
9.6.2. Interviews
There is an extensive literature on interviews revealing 
a vast variety of interviewing procedures (Richardson et 
al 1965). A typology according to Massarik (1981) 
describes the following types of interviews:
The Hostile Interview.
Here there is mutual hostility between interviewer and 
interviewee. The interviewee may withhold information 
which the interviewer wants. As soon as minimum 
objectives are obtained or if the task appears useless to 
one or other, the interview terminates. An example is 
police interviewing suspect. Clearly this was 
inappropriate for my purpose.
The Limited Survey Interview.
Here there is relative indifference or minimum trust. 
Little consideration is given by the interviewer and the
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interviewee response is one of minimal acquiescence. An 
example might be a market research poll where the 
questioner elicits responses almost automatically.
The Asymmetrical-Trust Interview
There is a substantial imbalance in the trust 
relationship. Typically the interviewee is more trustful 
of the interviewer although the latter is not hostile. A 
good example is patient and doctor or other professional 
interview. The interviewer is regarded as a counsel or 
source of wisdom.
The Rapport Interview.
This opens up a more human relationship between 
interviewer and interviewee to establish a rapport. There 
is some mutual trust, small talk, and interpersonal 
activity. The interviewer is acting a role but not 
denying their personality and individuality. An example 
might be a high quality survey interview, with open ended 
questions, with cooperative information seeking and 
giving etc.
The Depth Interview.
Here the interviewer tries to explore the views of the 
interviewee more thoroughly than in the rapport
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interview. The level of rapport is also greatly elevated. 
They meet as peers. The interviewer is concerned for 
interviewee as a person and this feeling is reciprocated. 
The time frame being not tightly constrained, the 
interviewee may also ask questions, exploring, seeking 
clarification and actively participating in the process. 
Examples include open ended market research, journalistic 
inquiries and some clinical interviews.
The Phenomenal Interview.
Here there is maximum trust, the interview attains a 
genuine and deep experience, with a caring relationship 
between interviewer and interviewee and a commitment to a 
joint search for shared understanding. Both respond as 
total persons, ready to examine, disclose and share 
experiences, responses and thoughts. They meet as 
companions. Here there is a joint commitment to the job 
in hand. The time frame is fluid. Ideas may be set aside 
and re-examined later in a changed context. There is 
little simple question and answer, but rather free form 
communication with review and clarification of thoughts 
and issues.
Value of Interviews.
I was concerned about the interviews being research 
rather than journalism. Journalists plan an
224
investigation, interview people, ask pertinent questions, 
perhaps uncover new facts, reach conclusions, check facts 
from more than one source, communicate the results etc. I 
had to be sure that what I did was research and not 
journalism. Reason and Rowan (1981) in discussing issues 
of validity gave me some clear ideas on this.
They accept that some researchers might begin with 
unstructured interviews as might journalists, that they 
both might produce theories, and that they both might 
check their findings from different directions, the 
researcher by asking peers about peers or the journalist 
by comparing accounts of different investigators. So what 
do they feel are the important differences?
They feel the key difference is that the researcher went 
round the cycle more times. Over and over again he 
interviewed, theorized, fed back theories, interviewed 
more, theorized, fed back, tried out, interviewed... over 
and over again checking impressions, tentative 
conclusions, concepts, refining and clarifying and 
deepening and differentiating them;
"When [the researcher] finally wrote his book it was 
with a sense of having reached a reasonably stable 
point in the process."
"[The journalist] on the other hand did what amounted
to just one round.......... did not make the same number
of opportunities to check [the] data. A journalistic 
inquiry tends therefore to be relatively 
impressionistic."
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A characteristic of good research is that it goes back to 
the participants with the tentative results and refines 
them in the light of the participants' reactions. Reason 
and Rowan (1981:248):
"Another difference seems to be that journalists tend 
not to feed back to their subjects the conclusions they 
are coming to."
The key guestion was how to turn the interviews into 
research. Reason and Rowan explain (1981:248);
"Instead of an "unstructured" approach, which simply 
leaves the way open for all the cultural expectations 
to get in the way of finding anything out, there needs 
to be an approach which deliberately opens up the area, 
and gives explicit permission to explore usually 
u n a c k n o w l e d g e d  realities."
There needed to be an involvement with the person which 
enabled a process of correction of impressions to take 
place. This did not exclude the possibility of the 
interviewee doing some theorizing and some checking too. 
As Sims (1981) shows, under the right conditions 
"interviewees" can quite easily turn themselves into co­
researchers .
So it was important that instead of a single cycle of 
data collection, there had to be multiple cycles, where 
the theories and concepts were progressively extended,
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refined, differentiated and integrated reaching towards a 
theoretical saturation.
9.6.3. Individual Interviews
I have already referred to the scope of the interviews in 
Section 1.6.4. on Data Collection in Chapter 1. There 
were a total of 118 interviews taking in excess of 200 
hours and this together with notes and transcripts of 
parts of meetings and feedback sessions produced 
transcripts totalling more than 500,000 words.
The aim of the project was to try for as many 
"phenomenal" type interviews as possible. Some achieved 
this but many fell short into the "depth interview". 
Unfortunately some fell below this to a "rapport" type of 
interview. Only one was almost "hostile" in the sense 
that the interviewee was reluctant to give any 
information. When asked, for example, after considerable 
evasion on any question, to express his feelings about 
the way doctors are involved in the running of a hospital 
one American doctor said:
"Well I have no feelings in the matter".
AW: Do you think doctors do know enough about the 
management of hospitals?
Doctor: I will answer you that, if you will tell me one 
subject on which doctors do know enough.
AW: Do you think they might benefit knowing more?
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Doctor: The same answer.
AW: Would you like to see their level of knowledge 
improved?
Doctor: I am not in a position to prescribe for the 
physicians with respect to their education.
The participants were all given a list of topics covering 
no more than half an A4 sheet some days ahead of the 
interview. The interviews lasted anything from an hour to 
four hours when the subject was allowed to talk freely 
about the subject in any way they chose. The technique 
was to use reflective listening and only interrupt the 
discussion if it were to get well away from the topics of 
interest.
I originally began with a rigid series of questions 
similar and related for both doctors and managers. The 
initial interviews were tape recorded in addition to my 
taking written notes. Questions were considered under 
three basic headings:
Are you a manager?
The why, how and the preparation for this role.
The management role of the interviewee.
Asking about the details of what the subject 
actually does on a daily basis.
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Management relationships.
How did the interviewee see it developing and what 
changes were envisaged?
Specific questions.
About topics such as consultant power and influence. 
What changes are occurring. How they were coping 
with changes.
The questions were specific and too much like a 
questionnaire even though I had tried to avoid that.
Notes are taken of the main points raised and after the 
interview a recording made of my immediate post interview 
impressions. These two recordings were transcribed and 
these together with the notes were used to construct a 
summary of the main points covering no more than two 
sides of an A4 sheet. This was posted to the interviewee 
who then had the opportunity to change anything which had 
been misunderstood, correct anything said in error, or 
add any additional thoughts.
The tape recording did not prove to be any problem and 
although the recorder is fairly large, the subjects soon 
warmed up and seemed to be unaware of the presence of the 
recorder. Occasionally a manager would ask for the 
recording to be stopped, a request I always complied 
with, although I was free to continue to take notes of 
what was said. This recording gives most of the factual
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data on this aspect of the project. Interestingly one 
manager asked me to "switch off the machine in the 
interests of accuracy".
By listening again to the recordings and to a lesser 
extent by rereading the transcripts I discovered that I 
was forcing the participants to stick too closely to my 
agenda and preconceived ideas. So I developed my 
interview techniques, wishing that I had learnt this 
earlier, as I felt on reviewing some of the earlier 
interviews I could well have missed important data. As a 
result I found the later interviews much more valuable.
Having again reminded the interviewee of the meeting a 
few days ahead, and included a set of broad topic 
outlines I use the following approach to the interview.
1. Having introduced myself and the research I 
confirmed that the interviewee was happy for me to 
use the tape recorder.
2. I then asked about the participant, his job 
title, what it was, what he did, and generally what 
it involved. I asked about how they fitted into the 
organization, who they reported to and who they 
directly supervised.
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3. I asked questions about their career background, 
how they reached their present situation and their 
training for their managerial role.
4. I then moved into the topics previously outlined 
to them:
Their views of the role of doctors in running a 
District General Hospital and how this has 
changed and the likely future developments.
The power of the medical profession and clinical 
freedom, past, present and future.
The relationship between manager and consultants, 
how this has changed and likely future 
developments.
Factors discussed included the practical aspects of 
managing, and the relationships between doctors and 
managers including preconceptions and experiences. I 
also explored their vision of future developments. But I 
made no attempt to keep them to this if they were happy 
to talk freely once started. This is a theme which I 
return to in Chapter 19 on my personal learning curve.
In general doctors and mangers agree about more things 
than otherwise, and relationships improve or deteriorate
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on beliefs they have of each other rather than accurate 
perceptions of each other.
The United States study followed a similar pattern. The 
centres were chosen by selecting a centre in a number of 
States across the country where I had been able to 
identify heads of departments of my own speciality. I 
then wrote to these individuals by name outlining my 
project and about three quarters replied within a month, 
all expressing a willingness to participate. From that 
collection I selected four centres, who seemed most 
enthusiastic and from which I could visit the most 
hospitals. Each example comes from a separate State 
where the regulations and laws are slightly different 
They include both large University units as well as 
smaller non teaching hospitals, Veterans Administration 
hospitals, private hospitals, Community hospitals and 
religious hospitals where money is not such an overriding 
issue. This gave a spread of views of both larger and 
smaller units than my own which is a large postgraduate 
teaching hospital.
9.6.4. Feedback After the Interviews
Reason and Rowan (1981:249) feel that it is important 
that instead of a single cycle of data collection, there 
had to be multiple cycles, where the theories and 
concepts were progressively extended, refined,
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differentiated and integrated reaching towards a 
theoretical saturation. This has been described in 
Chapter 7 and only when this saturation point had been 
reached with the Clinical Directors did I feel able to 
move on to the next stage of interviewing participants 
outside district level, but those who had regional or 
national roles and the academics in the field.
9.7. Personal Lessons
From the outset of the project I kept a diary of 
thoughts, ideas and my learning experiences. My 
background is in medicine and I felt pretty ignorant of 
social science, so I knew that I initially had a lot of 
reading to do. This was a time of intense background 
reading on experimental methods and post-postitivistic 
methodology. About errors, experimenter influence, and 
how profound discoveries can be made by those who, while 
playing a part, can still be their own observer. After
reading a number of key authors, I found they were
referring to each other's work and there was a sense that
I might have grasped what the main issues were.
Six months into the project I was introduced to the idea 
of the cognitive map, (Eden, Jones and Sims 1983) and 
used this in developing ideas, reviewing data, in 
discussions with participants and groups and writing up.
I drew one map out on an A4 sheet of paper and within
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weeks there where the equivalent of a hundred A4 sheets 
taped together (albeit with felt tip writing) and I then 
realized the extent of my task ahead.
It led me back again to the question of management of 
hospitals and the values of doctors and managers and 
questioning whether the profession had abdicated its 
responsibility to the administrators. Part of the map 
was leading to the idea of training doctors for 
managerial roles, combined medical management degrees, or 
staff college concepts, but to transfer from an M Phil to 
the PhD I had to produce something in writing on what I 
had so far achieved, and this occupied some weeks. I 
produced some 20,000 words most of which I now regard as 
immature, naive and second rate padding. I cringe to 
read it now. At the interview my worst fears were 
confirmed, what I was doing and how was not clear and I 
needed more detail on my methodology.
I needed something positive to come from this so I 
immediately went and arranged with the Executive 
Directors of a hospital to interview them and sit in on 
their meetings. One Medical Director was very negative 
and dismissive of the whole project but I was comfortable 
to accept that, as perhaps he felt the issue was 
threatening. At this suggestion he became extremely 
defensive but I let the matter rest there. During the
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next week or so I rewrote two chapters on Methodology 
which have formed the basis of those in the thesis.
So the first year ended, I felt frustrated that to date I 
had not interviewed a single person, and could only 
discuss what I had discovered from the literature. But I 
did have a much clearer idea of what I was doing, how to 
do it, and why etc.
I tape recorded virtually all my interviews and have been 
able to relisten to them and mentally return and catch 
the nuances of meaning which I missed while concentrating 
and making notes. I suspect this information because the 
body language is missing, although the longer the 
interview the more reliable I felt the information 
became. This was partly because an atmosphere of trust 
was being built up between the participant and myself.
But I had no way of telling whether the participant was 
really revealing his true thoughts initially, and this 
was confirmed by some interviewees who changed their 
views and information as trust developed.
But I have also recognized the occasions when I have 
missed data by interrupting. I learnt early on by 
listening to my interviews that I was forcing the 
participants to stick too closely to my agenda and 
preconceived ideas. As I developed my interview 
techniques I wished that I could have learnt this earlier
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as I felt that on reviewing the earlier interviews I 
could well have missed important information. As a 
result I found the later interviews much more valuable.
9.8. Fieldwork
My first year of fieldwork both in this country and 
America was both daunting and exhilarating. An abiding 
memory will be of landing in San Fransisco in the early 
hours of the morning after a 27 hour journey to find a 
series of interviews arranged for me at Stanford 
University Hospital, beginning with the President six 
hours later. It gave me a great sense of achievement 
that I felt the interview went well despite being heavily 
jet lagged and more than a little awestruck at the 
cultural differences between that hospital and my own.
One of the biggest disappointments arose in that the 
sheer volume of work involved in the transcription and 
selection of essential data for validation. The great 
amount of enthusiasm that had seemed present while in 
America apparently faded and a number of the validations 
were never returned. Again I found this very 
discouraging as it seemed that although this was an 
important subject to me I had failed to express this 
adequately.
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On returning to this country it was very hard to begin 
interviewing again. I had begun to feel that the 
Americans were more inclined to change and move forward 
whereas in this country everyone seemed to want to keep 
things as they were. It became clear, that there was 
going to be far too much data for the thesis, but it was 
proving difficult to know where to stop even though it 
was becoming obvious that I could gather little more new 
information, it was beginning to become repetitive. 
Eventually a decision was reached that no more routine 
interviews would take place and that I would begin 
writing. I was however, to carry on with interviews of 
some academics and attending workshops and seminars for 
continuing feedback on ideas and theories.
Everything went without too much of a problem. Sometimes 
interviewees took me to lunch which made it difficult to 
record or take notes so that I had to resort to memory 
and tape recording and making notes immediately after the 
interviews. I am sure this gave me less information as 
the transcriptions and recording have been immensely 
helpful for second and third trawls for information, as 
well as looking for appropriate quotations. Only one 
interviewee refused to accept the idea of validation 
saying she stuck by what she said, she knew what she had 
said and would wish to change nothing. I suspect, 
looking back at the interviews, although time consuming 
and sometimes of little use they were becoming
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fascinating in themselves. I was enjoying my new found 
ability to meet new people, to listen objectively and to 
learn and not least share ideas with people of like mind.
About this time I was approached by the Open University 
to write for them on a Module to be published in a few 
months, and 1 was asked to take part in a Wessex Regional 
Workshop on Managing Change and to run a module of a 
workshop for Clinical Directors and their Business 
Managers in Wessex on Models of Clinical Management in 
September. I was also being overwhelmed by the number of 
meetings arranged with Clinical Directors and Hospital 
Managers so my wife helped out by taking over some of the 
interviewing. No sooner was that organized when I was 
approached to write a book for Hodder and Stoughton the 
title to be "Management for Clinicians".
I felt the pressure was on now. I reconsidered the 
problem of the validations which were attempting to 
sometimes reduce seventy pages of typescript to two. It 
was time consuming and I was anxious that I might be 
losing some of the essentials in such a drastic reduction 
exercise, particularly when some people have a lot of 
useful thoughts. In those cases I need the ability to 
keep more. Some people had so little substance of use in 
the transcript that I do not need the two sheets.
I was also still behind with the USA summaries although 
managing to keep up to date with the UK ones. I decided
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to try catching up by merely going through the 
outstanding transcripts and cutting out the "waffle", the 
irrelevancies, the repeats etc.
By now I was hearing the same answers to the questions, 
nothing different seemed to be emerging. I felt that 
there was nothing further to be gained by asking any more 
clinical directors or managers these questions. I began 
to ask different questions but still tended to receive 
the same information.
It seemed as if nothing has changed in many respects 
since before the reforms in the NHS. This appears to be 
a combination of factors, the relative strength of each 
depending on the hospital. The doctors through lack of 
initiative, lack of understanding, lack of time, 
disinterest, unwillingness to take over. And for the 
Managers through lack of understanding or unwillingness 
to let go.
Time was definitely becoming a problem and with 
increasing numbers of commitments of my time as a result 
of my work I was now not doing any more extra work but 
concentrating on starting the writing of the thesis. My 
book was finished and with the publishers so over one 
weekend I drew up a plan of the remaining time and how it 
was to be utilised.
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One of the main problems that I have encountered is the 
assumption by many of my peers and indeed my employers 
that the study and information I have gleaned can and 
should be used at the very many conferences, seminars and 
workshops that I have become increasingly involved with. 
This situation arose partly from my own research and 
interest but also from the changes taking place within 
the health service.
Many of the meetings were time consuming and often boring 
and I found that as the project continued I often found 
myself better informed than many of the others present.
I was fast becoming an expert in the field. This 
produced conflicts with peer groups within my own 
hospital who found this enthusiasm and knowledge 
alarming, and possibly threatening. This has been 
something of a problem in my relationships with 
colleagues and I am very aware that at times I have been 
less than tolerant with them. This may be because I have 
felt that I would like to convert many of them to my 
views, and any lack of enthusiasm I have often detected 
as my failure to do so.
It became apparent very early in the project that my 
subject was highly topical and I have found it impossible 
to refuse these invitations. This was partly because the 
Health Authority were funding my University fees, but 
mostly because I have looked on each additional task as
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part of my learning process. I am basically a very shy 
person and have previously used the mystique of medicine 
to act as a shield when dealing with patients. This has 
largely changed as the work has progressed I have learnt 
to listen and to hear what is being said. It has not 
been easy, as medical training has not only been strictly 
science based, but has ingrained the feeling that people 
want my views and over years an insidious arrogance can 
build up.
There did not seem to be much interest in using what I 
have learned at my own hospital. Although the book had 
been enthusiastically received by the publishers there 
was not going to be a living in writing such books. And 
the health service did not seem interested in spending 
any money on improving the involvement of doctors in 
management as all the courses I ran I did for travelling 
expenses only. I had serious thoughts about what to do 
with what I had learned when the thesis is written. 
However, a useful tutorial gave me some insights into how 
I might plan future developments after the thesis is 
written. I learnt to be patient and wait. I should say 
that I always found my tutorials of great benefit. My 
tutor was unfailingly encouraging and I invariably came 
away feeling inspired to continue.
Well into the third year I received a letter from the 
Chief Executive of my own hospital asking me to write a
241
paper for discussion on the structure of the Clinical 
Directorates and how it should be organised in the 
future. It received a mixed response but little changed.
9.9. The Emerging Thesis
The thesis was beginning to emerge as a total plan now, 
as were plans and ideas for the future. I was also 
embarking on a massive final read of about two dozen 
books which I have been putting "on hold" through 
pressure of other things. Every now and then I found a 
statement of something which I had previously considered 
an original personal thought or idea. Rather like 
Handy's "Gods of Management" right at the beginning. I 
could see my thesis ending up as a jigsaw of ideas from 
diverse sources being collected together to make a 
different but perhaps not new picture. But then someone 
once said a painting is only a different arrangement of 
existing colours invented by others. The picture was 
becoming clearer and the loose pieces fewer so there was 
less choice about where to put them.
I wrote a summary section of three pages to outline the 
design and layout and ran through the arguments to 
conceptualize my idea of the dissertation and this acts 
as a sort of map for anyone reading it. The summaries 
which I took from all the interviews now seem to 
concentrate on the wrong issues. I would now do things
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differently if I were starting again. As Diesing 
(1972:20) says;
My cry is the cry of all fledgling field workers: "If
only I had known at the beginning of my field work what
I know now, I would have done so much better!"
The problem was that these details cannot be learnt in 
advance from books or others, they come from getting into 
the subject, learning from the project as it develops, 
adapting to new ideas as they occur and generally being 
flexible, but necessarily critical and thoughtful, in the 
approach to the research. I hope however that I have at 
least reached what Gluckman (Epstein 1967:xiii) calls 
"the method of apt illustration" or which Diesing 
(1972:20) describes as a step higher up the ladder than 
the traveller's report."
It was so lucky the interviews were transcribed and also 
having a search facility on the word processor I could 
find important text to support my writing.
I was beginning to see a picture emerging from the fog of 
data, an outline of how sections should go. I was much 
heartened when I read a whole book over a weekend about 
the NHS and the new management structure and thought they 
had mis-interpreted Griffiths in particular. At last I 
felt I had a real grasp on some of the subject and could 
be more critical of what I read and heard. At last I was
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beginning to have a real confidence in my own 
interpretation of events. Re-reading some of the original 
books I had begun with, now embued with the data of my 
own research findings, has also been a new learning 
experience, revealing different aspects and suggesting 
new approaches.
I had so much data it was actually quite difficult to 
handle. I have taken to writing a chapter using a 
cognitive map to create the headings and subheadings and 
contents for each chapter. This made it easier to keep 
the thread of the argument on track.
An American Medical Company contacted me to discuss the 
offer of an appointment as Chief Executive or Medical 
Director. I also attended workshop at the Royal College 
of Physicians on Clinical Directorates. This was very 
useful as a feedback for my thesis because here were 
people who came from hospitals where it was working. My 
own hospital seemed to remain centralised because the 
consultants did not want devolvement any more than 
management. Perhaps they have been unconsciously 
colluding together. I was surprised therefore, to be 
telephoned by a consultant to say that a group having met 
with General Practitioners had got together and written 
to the management expressing concern about the lack of 
locally devolved management.
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Sad to relate that our own Chief Executive is now leaving 
to go to elsewhere. There is a certain feeling amongst 
the consultants of smugness that in spite of all the 
attempts to change the health service and controls in 
hospitals it was the Chief Manager who did not survive, 
whereas they as consultants are still there and have 
survived it all. On the other hand a few feel that 
perhaps we may now have the opportunity to get a new 
manager more willing to decentralize authority.
I have found the entire process of research and learning 
enormously stimulating. I hope it has made me more 
understanding and aware of the difficulties faced by 
doctors and managers in these times of great change. It 
has provided me with opportunities of putting the 
research into practice and enabled me to feel I am 
contributing in a useful and positive way.
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CHAPTER 10
PHILOSOPHY OF DOCTORS IN MANAGEMENT
10.0. Introduction
The next seven chapters comprising Part 4, I have 
constructed and written using fairly tight and discrete 
groupings within a cognitive map drawn up by the doctors 
and managers who have participated in this study and 
which has been added to both individually and at various 
groups, seminars and workshops. A very much simplified 
version of part of the map appears on the next page 
(p.247).
Certain distinct patterns emerged when I had amalgamated
all the various maps produced by the various individuals
and groups, and made any additions or corrections which
the individuals or groups suggested. It was possible to
divide the map into six main areas. The first is a
philosophy of involving clinicians in management and
which I address in this chapter. Next discussed in
Chapter 11 are some of the reasons for involving
clinicians in management, from both the doctors and
managers viewpoint. This leads into a discussion of the
tensions in these views which is the subject of Chapter
13. Chapter 14 addresses the issues of management skills,
learning these and support for doctors in management
roles. Chapter 15 then covers
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some of the emerging models and structures of clinical 
management. And finally in Chapter 16 the charcteristics 
of these models are revealed together with some of the 
problems that have been highlighted by interviewees.
At the beginning of each chapter is a copy of the 
simplified version of the cognitive map with the apects 
to be discussed in that chapter highlighted in red. The 
map relating to this chapter is on the following page.
(p.249). Two further interesting items sprang from this 
exercise. Firstly that although there are various cross 
linkages between the groupings which I made for the 
practical purpose of writing about them, they all link 
with the concept of "decentralization" of management.
This is not altogether surprising because when doctors 
become involved in management/ as opposed to doctors 
becoming managers, devolution is necessary.
Secondly there is an area of the map which is not well 
covered by the groups referred to above, being "visited" 
only rarely, concerning the views of what sort of doctors 
are involving themselves in management, and why, and the 
possible disadvantages for doctors of being involved. In 
later feedback sessions it was therefore possible to 
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COGNITIVE MAP CHAPTER 10 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF WHY, WHO AND WHERE
Occasionally I refer to the literature during the data 
section? this is generally because one of the authors has 
been included amongst the participants interviewed, and 
the discussions with them have only amplified views they 
have written about in the published literature, and the 
written quotation remains the most succinct way of 
presenting their viewpoint.
In this chapter I will discuss the cultural differences 
that have emerged between doctors and managers, and the 
reasons for involving doctors in management from both the 
point of view of the doctors and the managers. It is 
also pertinent to point out that there is and always has 
been some existing involvement of doctors in management 
roles and I give as an example the role of Public Health 
and Community Physicians. Lastly I discuss the end of 
functional accounting and management in hospitals as 
clinical management takes over.
10.1. Cultural Differences
It has always seemed difficult to involve clinicians 
constructively in the problems of management, yet it is 
important that they should be involved. There have been 
few incentives to encourage doctors outside their own 
group or department. There is also a cost to the doctors 
themselves in increased workload, financial loss and 
tensions with colleagues. As one consultant put it;
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11 It has always been somewhat difficult to be really 
involved, it takes up so much time, can cause problems 
with colleagues and all the meetings really eat into 
your practice."
The NHS Management Inquiry (DHSS 1983) known as the 
Griffith Report, was only one of a series of central 
initiatives for involving doctors more effectively in 
management, but it offered little practical advice as to 
how that could be achieved. One of the main issues 
appears to be the difficult relationship between doctors 
and managers, to which I devote chapters 12 and 13.
There is a need to explore and understand the tensions 
existing between doctors and general managers, some of 
which are historical, others related to differences in 
training, the different contexts of their work and 
cultural differences.
Handy (1991) symbolised the different styles of 
management and cultures found in organizations. Apollo, 
the god of order and bureaucracy, the patron god of the 
role culture, based not on personalities, but on 
definition of the jobs to be done, and Dionysus, the 
preferred god of artists and professionals, within the 
culture of people who owe little or no allegiance to a 
boss:
"Dionysians recognise no "boss", although they may 
accept co-ordination for their own long-term 
convenience. Management in their organisation is a 
chore, something that has to happen like housekeeping.
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And like a housekeeper, a manager has small renown: an 
administrator amongst the prima donnas is bottom of the 
status lists.”
Unfortunately doctors, especially consultants, have a 
management style, which they often do not recognise as 
such and which might well be termed as arrogant, 
authoritarian, paternalistic or pompous. Wraith and 
Casey (1992b) in an Organizational Development Checklist 
for Clinical Directorates list nine items related to team 
work. The consultant should be a part of that team, 
however it is doubtful if many consultants understand the 
true nature of teamwork. And there seems to be no 
awareness of the need for what one consultant called 
"followership":
"We talk a lot about leadership in medicine, we seldom 
talk about followership, talk about being the good 
citizen, without being the leader and I think that's 
something else that probably needs to be cultivated 
among medical staff."
Consultants only see themselves in the role of leader and 
like true Dionysians recognise no boss. One Consultant 
said:
"We are the natural leaders."
10.2. Reasons for Involving Doctors
Authors all appear to agree that consultants have always 
had a major effect on the resources used. About 80% of
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the costs involved in running a hospital are thought to 
be the direct result of doctors' orders (Klint 1992). And 
the DHSS (1989) support this view:
"hospital consultants - whose decisions effectively 
commit substantial sums of money".
This view has been given to me from many sources but is 
typified by the President of an American University 
hospital;
"Most people believe that at least 60% and perhaps up 
to 80% of costs in hospital are as a result of doctors 
orders."
Consultants respond to changes in demand for their 
services and to advances in scientific and medical 
technology. They usually make the judgements about the 
skills and interests needed to replace retiring 
colleagues and are responsible for other major matters of 
policy. Developments that seem natural and proper to 
clinicians may take resources away from other parts of 
the hospital and may well create problems for future 
planning in other departments. Historically, many 
consultants appear to have been concerned more with 
"empire building" and preservation of their individual 
practices, even to the extent of inappropriate 
appointments of colleagues, rather than wider issues of 
improvement in services to the public and appropriate use 
of resources. One Manager said:
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"Doctors try to manage the service to suit the doctors. 
I see that as a big disadvantage of involving them 
more."
The major reasons Consultants give for the need to 
encourage more doctors to become involved in management 
seem to be a need:
1. To reduce costs.
2. To save money.
3. To reduce overspends.
4. Generally to assist with financial problems 
particularly of resource not matching demand.
Although Disken et al (1990) in a booklet produced by the 
Institute of Health Service Managers give as the reasons 
managers see for moving into some kind of clinical 
management:
1. Decentralisation and delegation.
2. To complement rapid developments in information 
systems.
3. To pave the way for new information systems
4. To break down barriers between professional 
hierarchies and groups.
5. To improve the quality of clinical services to 
patients.
6. To reduce the cost of high cost services.
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7. To bring the consultants "on board" as a group.
8. To allow more explicit evaluation of clinical work 
and outcomes.
9. Severe financial problems
They go on to state:
"that in most units there was a combination of such 
reasons and the roll out programme for resource 
management has speeded up the process of implementing 
clinical management structures. Reducing costs appears 
to have been the primary motivation in very few 
instances".
Though most managers reiterated the comments of the 
doctors with such remarks as:
"We will get better value for money."
"There will be coal face identification of problems."
"It will help make savings and reduce our expenditure 
in a sensible rational way."
As doctors "allocate" a large percentage of the available 
resource it is felt that control could not be achieved 
without their cooperation and involvement.
However there are other reasons for doctors to be 
involved in management, as one Clinical Director said:
"Within a cash limited system, the responsibility of 
doctors within the health service, which presumably 
strives for equity, changes? everybody has to be 
accountable for what they actually do."
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According to (Chantler 1992b):
1. With limited resources, and increasing demands 
because of aging populations and scientific and 
technological changes, it would be unethical for them 
not to be involved in deciding priorities.
2. It actually ensures that maximum clinical freedom 
continues because it ensures that the maximum, most 
efficient and effective use is made of the available 
resources.
The problem had always been that in clinical work 
consultants were not subject to any significant 
management control but worked in a professional hierarchy 
with considerable clinical freedom. Doctors at the 
outset of the NHS were given support services, placed 
under some relatively tight financial and administrative 
constraints, then left to get on with the service in the 
ways each doctor thought best. The doctors had no boss 
and their individual performance went unmonitored.
British medicine was administered, not managed, although 
the attempts to alter this and control doctors, and the 
costs of their work, has not been just a U.K. phenomenon 
but appears to affect every Western industrialized 
country.
10.3.0. Existing Involvement of Doctors in Management
There is a long history of consultants being involved in 
management within the NHS going back to the old Medical 
Superintendent role. As one Consultant put it:
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"They had responsibility for all aspects of hospital 
administration at the beginning of the health service. 
They knew the price of every everything and they worked 
from an office with one secretary and matron."
Another Consultant said:
"The Medical Superintendent was responsible for running 
the place on a day to day basis and he knew quite 
clearly that he had to deliver the hospital within the 
budget set by The Board of Governors."
These roles became less common and gradually lay or 
professional administrators took over the administration 
of the hospital, although the Bradbeer Report (1954) 
proposed the idea of a Medical Administrator.
10.3.1. Role of Public Health and Community Physicians
Many managers felt that those doctors, mainly in 
community medicine, were a failure although one or two 
had been outstanding. This failure may have been partly 
through lack of management training and experience. A 
Public Health doctor said:
"unless we put at least as much emphasis in public 
health doctors' training to the learning of management 
skills, as we do on the epidemiological skills, we're 
never going to get anywhere in being effective as 
Public Health Physicians."
Many community physicians were often thought to be 
incompetent, even within the limited role that the NHS 
then offered them, but some were also held to be grossly
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partial to the medical profession which affected their 
judgement. As one manager observed:
"You always knew he would side with the consultants no 
matter what the issue."
However lowly the status of Public Health or Community 
doctors within the medical profession, they were still 
members. One Public Health doctor said:
"Now you can't run a health service without good public 
health function, and there is no doubt that the 
consensus teams had ineffectual Public Health 
Physicians, Community Doctors, as a general rule."
Another said;
"..they fight their corner and I think they tend in the 
main to consider themselves representative of the 
medical profession."
Thus, far from fighting medical power, many supported it 
or alternatively were too weak to oppose it. Given these 
difficulties many general managers took a harsh view of 
this fledgling attempt to involve the medical profession 
in management. In the absence of powerful community 
physicians, the consultants all too readily had their own 
way. A Regional Public Health doctor said:
"where there was research done looking at the consensus 
teams, the Community Physician usually came out looking 
the least effective person on the team."
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If the quality of many community physicians was thought 
to be poor, some exceptions were still made. Whereas 
some managers thought that community medicine had largely 
failed in management terms they still singled out cases 
from other districts:
"he was very good, a wheeler dealer getting in among 
the consultants."
"in those districts where there was an effective 
Community Physician and effective General Manager, you 
could achieve an awful lot."
Another, although critical of community physicians 
elsewhere, was full of praise for the medical managers 
who worked in his authority and modest about his own 
relative abilities. As a Health Service academic put it:
"There were a few visionaries and a few very good 
people, but they were relatively isolated."
So a rather uneasy marriage had existed between 
epidemiology, medical administration and the old Medical 
Officer of Health and Public Health functions. A 
Professor of Public Health medicine said:
"it was a real horror story for a lot of them [the 1974 
reorganization], they went through a dreadful time.
Some of them survived that, but many of them struggled 
and never really adapted to the Health Service, so part 
of the reason for the shifting fortunes I think was 
that post 1974 there were a number of people who were 
really fishes out of water, who were never really quite 
clear about what was expected of them."
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Another academic Public Health Physician who had studied 
the early post Griffith D.G.M.s said:
"the strong impression we got was that they [the 
D.G.M.'s] desperately wanted good Community Medicine as 
it was then called, but they couldn't get it, and those 
that did get it valued it very highly."
10.4. The End of Functional Management
Strong and Robinson (1990) and others talk of Griffiths 
as a rise in the general standard of management and that, 
in respect of the elimination of functional management, 
is correct. But in referring to the 1984 reorganization 
Strong and Robinson (1990:25) suggested that where once 
doctors and nurses had been guaranteed seats on the board 
they were now pushed aside to make way for new general 
management. General Practitioners and consultants 
disappeared from the team. Now nurses could manage 
doctors and administrators could manage nurses. Districts 
removed purely clinical doctors from the management team 
(Strong and Robinson 1990:26). It seemed that government 
was no longer willing to share power with the medical 
profession, no longer content to leave matters in the 
hands of the doctors.
Indeed some managers viewed the reduction of the nursing 
voice as a distinct disadvantage because it placed too 
much emphasis on involving doctors in management?
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"The reduction of the influence of nurses is regarded 
by some nurses as a walk over by the more powerful 
tribe. And I think it is a particularly unfortunate 
event after the results of Salmon and then the 
regrading. Their morale has been badly affected."
Strong and Robinson (1990:65) wrote about Griffiths:
"consensus management had to go. A loose tribal 
confederacy was no way to run a modern health service. 
Without just one central power, any group could run 
riot. If there was no firm leadership, nobody could be 
called to account. The core of the 1984 reorganization 
was, thus, the assertion of central managerial 
control."
They felt however that Griffiths was, in its own way, 
still consensus oriented (Strong and Robinson 1990:68) . 
There had however, been a huge change. The old consensus 
had been shaped by a team of nominal equals. Now just 
one person was in charge. Consensus, of a kind, still 
had to be reached, but general managers were in charge of 
the consensus.
As I have discussed elsewhere (see Chapter 2, Section 
2.6.2) it is now claimed however that Griffiths was 
actually recommending delegation (Griffiths 1991), rather 
than the general management structure imposed on the 
health service:
"One or two things I did not intend. Whilst my name at 
the time was primarily connected with general 
management I personally took this as shorthand for the 
introduction of an effective management process. I did 
not intend that the result should be yet another 
profession in the National Health Service to work in 
parallel with the other professions."
261
And Griffiths (1992) spelt out the continued involvement
of doctors even more clearly later:
"From the very outset in 1983 I made it clear that I 
envisaged a strong role for doctors in the management 
of the NHS and my report subsequently confirmed this."
Indeed one of the aims of the White Paper in 1989 
"Working for Patients" (DHSS 1989) had been;
"to ensure that hospital consultants - whose decisions 
effectively commit substantial sums of money-are 
involved in the management of hospitals? are given 
responsibility for the use of resources? and are 
encouraged to use those resources more effectively."
A health care academic in discussing the historical 
origins of the notions of doctors being involved more in 
management, reinforced this view?
"Griffiths really pushed it forward, the general 
management document really pushed it forward with a big 
push. Then there was the Resource Management Initiative 
which has become in some fields almost synonymous with 
the notion of Clinical Directors."
How this has been done in different hospitals has been an 
evolutionary process. Each has set up its own 
organizational structure, some indeed really making no 
change from existing structures apart from the changing 
of names or personnel or both as I discuss later in 
Chapter 15. However the government had with certainty
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since the Griffith Report been attempting to involve 
doctors. (Pollitt et al 1988):
"Since the NHS Management Inquiry of 1983 there has 
been a concerted effort, initiated by central 
government, to induce doctors to be more interested in 
(narrowly) costs and (more broadly) resource 
management."
Interestingly they state that a major factor is the 
difficulty of turning doctors into resource managers and 
what has made the whole issue harder to resolve is that 
NHS managers have:
"demonstrated scarcely more enthusiasm for such 
attempts than have doctors."
According to one medically qualified C.E.O;
"Before the National Health Service, when consultants 
were "honorary" they knew the price of every ampoule of 
catgut and worked within a very small budget, so that 
providing health care within a constrained budget was 
something very real to them. Before 1948 the role of 
doctors in cost containment in hospitals was perfectly 
understood, because the hospital never had enough 
money, and had a Medical Superintendant who knew too 
that he had to keep within the budget of the Trust 
Board. Managers now do not seem so obsessional about 
their budget, though they may talk about it a lot."
A manager put it like this:
"The health service appears to have trained successive 
generations to the notion that the service is free, 
regardless of the ability to pay and regardless of the 
ability of the government to pay."
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As one doctor manager put it:
"There are still staff who say don't talk about money, 
when lives are at stake".
The latest reorganization is forcing people back to the 
allocation of health care within fixed resources. In the 
words of a doctor who has been a UGM:
"The fundamental problem of the health service is the 
inability of any advanced health service to do 
everything possible to everybody's benefit. You can 
never fund yourself out of that problem and you can't 
manage yourself out of it either. That problem will 
always be there but it does have to be managed."
For the community physicians however the Griffiths 
reforms were a double edged sword. They were scarcely 
over the change or loss of jobs with the loss of the 
Areas when this new phase of the Griffiths reforms began. 
According to one Regional Community Physician:
"Public Health Doctors felt that they had been squeezed 
out, a lot of them wanted to get the management jobs, 
but actually weren't up to it. And there was a strong 
feeling then that this part of the profession was going 
to fall apart because the managers had not supported 
Community Physicians."
10.5. The Rise of Clinical Management
The trend towards involving doctors in management in 
acute hospitals is not confined to the U.K. Its origins 
are usually traced back to the events at the Johns 
Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore between 1979-84 (Heyssell, 
1984). According to Brody (1992) however, doctors at the
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Johns Hopkins have been involved in management for over a 
hundred years.
If serious clinical management was wanted, something far 
more radical was needed. Not only did doctors appear to 
continue to have exceptional power, but there was also 
some organized professional resistance to any form of 
external monitoring of medical performance. And the 
White Paper (DHSS 1989) attempted to address some of 
these issues.
For Public Health doctors abruptly it was a new era, as 
one put it:
"Suddenly it became recognised that a lot of the things 
that the Public Health had always advocated like 
rationally clear about what health services we actually 
required and trying to do something about making sure 
that what was being done was actually being effective. 
Loosely called assessment audit or evaluation, it 
suddenly became right at the front of things and there 
was almost reborn Public Health Profession, having all 
the required skills to carry out this huge agenda."
Their dilemma was that there might not now be enough of 
them left with the skills to deliver. He continued:
"All of that is extremely difficult to do trying to 
handle all that, so there is the danger that we may 
again fail to deliver what is expected, because it is a 
totally unrealistic expectation."
Suddenly the underdogs of the profession had a key role 
and a feeling of new strength. Regional Medical Officer:
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"I mean some of the Gung Ho Public Health Physicians 
which I spend my life now curbing, and saying "stop, 
because you are going to destroy relationships".
Public Health doctor:
We have one or two very macho Public Health Physicians 
now who believe they have all the answers."
As a result there seems to be a slightly paranoid feeling 
developing amongst clinicians that Public Health doctors 
now have a lot of power, that "there may be a certain 
settling of old scores". One put it to me:
"A consultant was saying the other day that I was the 
person, he understood, who would decide what he could 
and couldn/t do, but I don't actually think that is 
remotely the case, or should be."
And one Public Health doctor admitted:
"Community Physicians did run into serious battles with 
consultants, occasionally won, but usually came away 
with a bloody nose and I guess it would be unusual 
given what people are like if they weren't going to 
start to use their new power to redress some of the 
battles they lost."
10.6. Professional and Management Accountability
In the early stages one of the issues frequently raised 
by managers was what they perceived as a possible problem 
with professional and management accountability. This 
division they felt would create difficulties. Nurses
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could not report to doctors, consultants could not report 
to consultants. Consultants could not report to managers.
It is important to differentiate between professional and 
management accountability. A clinician is professionally 
accountable to his patient and this accountability is 
audited in various ways by the various professional 
bodies, The General Medical Council, The Specialist 
Associations, The Royal Colleges etc. Professional 
accountability lines are not changed; nurses report 
professionally to nurses, doctors to doctors.etc.
A Clinical Director said:
"Professional and management accountability can be seen 
to be distinct and can be isolated from each other at 
least to a large extent."
And another Clinical Director put it in more detail;
"I'm accountable as a doctor, professionally through 
the systems that you and I understand. Nurses are 
accountable professionally to the Director of Nursing 
and the RCN and the UKCC. We all have our professional 
lines of accountability. Management accountability 
for working in this place using public resources is 
separate. I'm accountable within this place, as a 
clinician, for the resources that I use and the 
services I provide, and we can separate the two."
And a Chief Executive;
"At the moment in all our Clinical Directorates the 
doctor is the leader of the group, so you might say 
that the nurses are managerially accountable to a 
doctor. However not professionally, if the 
nurse/manager in that group is unhappy about the 
professional side of nursing within that group, she
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goes to the Director of Nursing who can then intervene 
at a much higher level in the organization. It's never 
actually had to be used, but it exists and everybody 
knows it exits.”
Although not everyone agrees about this clear cut 
distinction:
"There is a distinction between doctors who provide 
personal doctoring services within the NKS and others 
who are employed in the managerial hierarchy, and the 
argument basically goes, that for doctors who are 
employed in the business of providing services and care 
to individual patients on a personal accountability 
basis, there is complete exclusivity between that 
phenomenon and being in a managed position. You cannot 
be both; the argument then goes on that there tends to 
be a conflict between being in that position and being 
a manager of others and it all revolves around those 
arguments, and that in most situations it is not 
sensible to try and place every part time consultant, 
whose whole culture is different, into roles like that 
and pretend, as many are still doing, that they can be 
managerially accountable for staff and to the UGM or 
whatever."
Another line of reasoning put to me by a consultant who 
had managerial experience before the 1989 reforms was 
that irrespective of professional accountability a doctor 
has a responsibility to be managerially accountable for 
resources because:
"The remuneration of the clinician in the NHS comes 
from central government? it can be legitimately be 
represented as coming from the patient from whom it is 
raised by taxation and it is only reasonable that all 
staff should be accountable managerially for their use 
of resources within the institution for whom they 
work."
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A final view put by a Chief Executive was that many 
individuals were already accountable in the NHS to people 
in different professional groups:
"All staff are managerially accountable to individuals 
who often come from a different professional 
background."
One medically qualified ex UGM neatly summed it up as 
follows:
"The Chief Nursing Officer is still responsible for 
managing nursing but not nurses."
10.7.0. Final Thoughts on Rarely Mentioned Topics
Having covered all the items which most often come up in 
discussing the philosophy of involving doctors in 
management it remains only to mention those aspects which 
attracted least attention for the reasons given, why some 
doctors are involving themselves in management and the 
possible disadvantages. I have already given some that 
were often introduced by managers.
10.7.1. The Sort of Doctors Involved in Management
Taking first the sort of doctors involving themselves, 
most criticism came from other doctors, who were not 
themselves involved; the usual and traditional accusation
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was that management attracted only bad doctors who were 
failures at clinical work. A Consultant said:
"Only bad doctors go into management."
Some admitted that while this might have been possible in 
the past it is now necessary to be a successful clinician 
first in order to have credibility with clinical 
colleagues. Very many doctors, whether involved in 
management or not, and managers, stressed the need for a 
continuing clinical commitment to maintain this 
credibility.
The question to which I therefore sought an answer was, 
why did some doctors feel negative towards colleagues 
involved in management? A number of possible answers 
emerged:
"I suspect their [referring to colleagues involved in 
management] motives. They are trying to change things, 
and I'm happy with the ways things are. We don't need 
things being stirred up."
"They are trying to get power, playing by the new 
rules, and do some empire building."
"It's the new way to acquire power and tell us all what 
to do, but he is not going to interfere with my 
practice, no one tells me how to treat patients."
On the other hand some consultants recognized that though 
they might not like the idea of consultants involved in
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management, if someone else did it and it suited their 
own purpose then they were happy with that arrangement;
"We thought that if we have him in charge he will stop 
things being changed; there is no way he will let the 
managers change the way we run things, and we'll back 
him all the way."
Some doctors also pointed out that those doctors 
dissatisfied with medical work and wanting to go into 
management might serve some useful function. One 
Consultant typified this view:
"Doctors in management serve a useful purpose as 
firstly they are at least trying to change things, and 
secondly it does enable those who have no desire for a 
management role, certainly at present, to opt out, as 
we will know it will not have to be our turn sometime 
in the future, as used to be the case."
Some doctors however accepted that it might not be 
unreasonable to involve doctors in clinical management, 
and that while they themselves might feel like a fish out 
of water, they would be very happy to support a colleague 
who had a talent for management:
"to take on the role for us, particularly if his 
motives were right, and he felt the need of that sort 
of challenge."
10.7.2. The Disadvantages of Doctors' Involvement
The disadvantages were again largely identified by those 
doctors not involved, although acknowledged by those who
271
were involved. And again it revolved around the issue of 
motives. If the involvement was to acquire personal 
power, to control colleagues' activities, to build 
empires at the expense of corporate hospital goals, or to 
prevent changes then the opportunity for involving 
doctors was seen as a disadvantage. What was striking 
however was that the feeling was common that involvement 
was advantageous to the hospital, the patient and the 
service, whereas the disadvantages were more difficult to 
tease out. However this might be a reflection of the fact 




MANAGEMENT VIEW ON DOCTORS' ROLE IN MANAGEMENT
11.0. Introduction
Having in the previous chapter discussed some general 
aspects of involving doctors in management it is now 
appropriate to move into the next group of items that 
contain linkages with the items in Chapter 10. These are 
shown in the cognitive map on the next page (p.274). This 
chapter therefore covers the questions of both doctors' 
and managers' roles in management, as perceived by 
existing managers, and it reveals the tensions between 
the two groups. I will also discuss their view of the 
hidden and private agendas of private practice and money, 
departmental tribalism, and problems of working as teams.
11.1. Definitions
There can be some difficulty with an accepted definition 
of the word manager in the health service, as doctors, 
managers, nurses and other health care professionals are 
all now regarded as managers. "Lay manager" is regarded 
as a rather derogatory term for professional managers, 
and "non medically qualified managers" is not appropriate 
as some of the managers in this study did have medical 
qualifications. For the purposes of this thesis unless
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COGNITIVE MAP CHAPTER 11 
THE REASONS WHY IT IS IMPORTANT
otherwise indicated the term "manager" refers to both non 
medically qualified and medically qualified, professional 
full time (or virtually full time) managers.
11.2. The Traditional View
If the National Health Service was a pyramid then perched 
high on the apex would be consultants, a little above the 
general practitioners. They have to cope with the 
responsibility of managing disease for which each has 
been trained in the best of modern scientific medicine. 
Below them, towards the base of the pyramid, are a vast 
support staff aiding the work of the doctors, all serving 
medicine as in turn the doctors service each patient.
Such is the scheme as seen by many managers, perhaps not 
so very different from the doctors' view.
West (1988:98) describes hospital management as the art 
of juggling and rationing the available services to meet 
the constant pressures from patients, doctors and other 
staff. As a UGM put it:
"Medicine generates a constant demand for more services 
and equipment. Patients and staff generate all the 
hassles of large groups of people while the public at 
large expects more and more from the service."
There are the specialised managers of each component of 
the service, but they have especially in the past been
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usually also competitors for resources not allies of the 
general managers of the hospital.
A Chief Executive talked about
"Managers trying to reconcile competing pressures so 
that the hospital runs as well as possible while 
avoiding major conflicts and serious overspending."
Several managers described their roles as "all about 
balancing resources", trying to resolve conflicts in 
which they may have to find compromises which favour one 
vested interest over another. One UGM felt that
"It may also be easier at times to do nothing about a 
problem particularly if focusing attention on it may 
lead to more expenditure."
A Chief Executive also gave the following example?
"A problem was presented to the DGM who realized he had 
no money so he passed the problem down to the UGM to 
sort out. A way of delaying a decision. He had thrown 
it into another scenario. But the UGM could not make a 
decision because the only person who could release the 
money was the DGM."
Managers feel there is no need to look for work as there 
is usually so much being generated by all the different 
interest groups among the staff and by patient 
administration and complaints. Hospitals generate vast 
amounts of paper and data which must be organised into 
sensible statistics.
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11.3. The Inability to Control
Managers generally feel powerless to manage because they 
feel that doctors are uncontrollable and do not 
understand the complexity of managing a hospital. 
Overspending is possible because the power to spend money 
is not solely in the managers' hands. Pharmacies may 
overspend because of a change in drug prices or the type 
of drug used by doctors. Nursing may overspend because 
of the need for sickness cover or a change in patients' 
patterns of care. Laboratories may overspend because of 
additional night calls for tests by doctors. None of 
these can be directly controlled by the managers and not 
every change can be budgeted for at the start of the 
financial year. It is difficult at times to get staff to 
face up to financial problems. Some cost items, notably 
drugs and disposables, increase with the amount of work 
done.
Managers recognize that their thinking process may be 
different from doctors but generally also feel the NHS 
"lacks management". One UGM said:
"Doctors' thinking process is so different from 
managers'. I really don't think that doctors appreciate 
the complexity of the management problem or how 
undermanaged the NHS as an organization is."
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Another CE:
"Consultants have to be aware of the complexity of 
decision making."
There was some support for this from a Public Health 
Physician:
"I think a greater understanding of what it is that 
managers do and their approach to the health service 
will help doctors increase their respect for and their 
desire for knowledge of those techniques."
However, whatever the complexity of the management 
processes, the formal management arrangement in the NHS 
is that managers are usually seen, by both sides, as 
negotiating with consultants and not handing down 
decisions.
11.4. How Managers See Their Role
A manager's views on the new NHS cannot be understood 
without careful consideration of what went before. When 
the NHS was created in 1948 administrators were faced 
with the power of the medical profession. Managers feel 
that many of the problems are because of a failure to 
establish a proper management structure and an integrated 
corporate culture.
There are also certain unique characteristics of any 
health care organization. These are mostly related to
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some of the concepts of clinical freedom discussed in 
Chapters 5 and 6. I have described how in the 1974 
reorganization, faced with the power of medical 
profession, a different tack was tried. If consultants 
could not be ordered to do things, it was argued that 
perhaps they might join a team. Consensus management 
was, therefore, the slogan that characterized that 
reorganization. An attempt was to be made to manage the 
health service, but its management was to be conducted by 
a group of eguals, a group of fellow professionals.
Consensus management proved fundamentally unrealistic or 
perhaps merely went out of fashion. Managing change was 
difficult in the NHS. Layer upon layer of consultation 
was needed. Although such tendencies had been inherent 
from the beginning of the NHS, they were reinforced by 
the 1974 reorganization. Every interest at every level 
was built into the formal structure of the organization. 
Yet in spite of all this the clinical services themselves 
remained largely unmanaged. Also consensus management 
was not always felt to be a negotiation between equals. 
Some felt that the issue of the power of the medical 
profession had not been addressed. One manager explained:
"Tribalism in the NHS is very strong; there are many 
but the two most significant are the medical tribe, 
which is extremely powerful, and the nursing tribe 
which is very large.”
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11.5. Are Doctors Unmanagable?
Tribalism is a term often used by general managers, 
referring to characteristic features of the health 
service professional groups, particularly doctors. Their 
differing cultures, histories and organizations, the huge 
fragmentation of the organization with so many groups, 
each with its fierce internal loyalties, appeared to lead 
to a lack of any external vision or overall control. The 
difficulty was that despite the commitment of everyone to 
the patient, in trying to provide an effective, 
coordinated overall service, doctors, it appeared to 
managers, pushed forward only the boundaries of their 
practice and departmnent and simply refused to be 
managed.
While the 1974 reorganization might have resulted in a 
new class of medical administrators or medical managers, 
the community physicians, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, were simply advisers and planners, despised by 
many of their colleagues and with no control over the 
consultants. In short, the NHS still took a most 
peculiar form (Short and Robinson 1990):
"a giant state organization which was controlled 
simultaneously both by Whitehall and by thirty thousand 
doctors."
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In 1948 the whole profession had been granted powers of 
unlimited clinical freedom the like of which many of its 
members had previously only dreamed. In 1974 nothing had 
been done to confront this individual medical power.
The power of the medical profession also meant that 
little information was gathered on individual medical 
activity. And what information there was could hardy be 
used for fear of what doctors might say. The contrast 
with the United States was instructive. There the macro­
system was a mess. American health care was widely 
separated into large numbers of purchasers, vast, hugely 
expensive, sometimes shockingly unfair and unmanaged, at 
least at the national level. But in some local matters, 
there were real achievements to note. Given their very 
different powers over doctors and the systematic 
information on individual activity that a fee for service 
system provided, American hospitals had begun to pioneer 
new methods for medical micro-management? methods which 
were the envy of the lowly administrators within the NHS.
11.6. General Management Begins
So there was a gradual end of consensus and the rise of 
general management. But, despite this, the core problem 
remained, that the NHS now had local managers, close to 
the clinicians and regularly reviewed by the tiers above,
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but what could they do to actually manage? The Griffith 
Report (DHSS 1983) put the problem like this:
"If Florence Nightingale were carrying her lamp through 
the corridors of the NHS today she would almost 
certainly be searching for the people in charge."
The crucial division between general practice and the 
hospital sector was also left untouched, a theme referred 
to in earlier chapters and to which I shall return at the 
end. In each tier, a single leader, a general manager, 
was installed. General managers, as their title 
suggested, would, it was thought, manage everyone.
Whereas the old district administrators had simply 
chaired meetings of the management team, each general 
manager was to be a real boss, in charge of the doctors, 
the nurses, the other professionals, the treasurers and 
accountants, the personnel department, in effect 
everyone.
In short, managers thought that it was going to be the 
general managers, not the clinical professionals, who 
were now to decide on the division of work, the training, 
the structure and the organization needed, as well as 
appropriate individual performance. The old coalition of 
separate but equal professions was thought to be dead.
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Managers felt that specialists, i.e. consultants, 
possessed a parochial rather than a global perspective. 
DGM:
"We need to widen the perspective of doctors, open 
their eyes to a greater vision. They are, so many of 
them, parochial and inward looking."
It was thought that only generalists, i.e. managers, 
could balance the clinical and the financial sides of 
things, integrate the doctors, the other professionals 
and the patients, and view the whole. It followed that 
the health service should not be ruled, as it had been in 
the past, by specialists in health care, by doctors and 
nurses, but by those trained in health service 
administration and management.
Strong and Robinson (1990) set out the managers' 
indictment of medical individualism and power. At a 
micro level, doctors would still be free to run things in 
the way that they wanted but the power of the medical 
profession had meant, so managers argued, that 
individualism reigned throughout the service. One UGM 
(who was a doctor himself) said:
"It is almost impossible to get children to do what you 
want them to do. They are just like doctors."
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Another UGM:
"I am answerable to nearly a hundred doctors who are 
answerable to God, and many of them do not even accept 
that."
11.7. Medical Individualism
There was medical individualism exemplified in every type 
of decision made by doctors. There are wide ranges of 
variations in medical treatment decisions, variations 
which are a key topic in the management conferences which 
surrounded the introduction of Griffiths (1983).
Managers saw medical individualism equally evident in the 
distinctive way in which doctors' participation in 
management decision making was effected. Decisions by a 
medical committee might carry little weight with any 
individual doctor unless they were on the committee. The 
only way round this problem of representation was to 
include everyone of the advisory committee, but this had 
it own difficulties.
The managers also felt that not only did doctors lack 
interest in corporate decision making, but the 
consultants were often ignorant of management issues, 
unable to understand the new management proposals and 
unwilling to play any part in such matters.
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In addition there was little sense of institutional 
responsibility among some doctors; some consultants were 
engaged in ruthless competition with one another for more 
power and resources. Indeed, this empire building and 
competition for clinical resources proceeded, almost 
regardless of any financial or institutional constraints. 
As one UGM put it:
"Not having general or orthopaedic surgeons or some 
other powerful group for instance diverting resources 
that would be better deployed for say an extra 
radiologist or ophthalmologist which is what we really 
need."
There was clearly a lack of a clear common interest in 
hospitals. The physicians and surgeons, radiologists and 
pathologists, the anaesthetists and psychiatrists etc., 
all have their own plans and patients and few common 
interests. A Clinical Director:
"At the M.E.C. the radiologists want another colleague, 
the surgeons want another general surgeon, the 
physicians want another endocrinologist and a 
cardiologist, but the anaesthetists say we must have 
another two anaesthetists. They all have a very 
convincing case but who can say what the hospital needs 
most?"
Many managers also argued that medical science and 
technological progress often generated vast costs, many 
of them potentially unnecessary. New, highly expensive 
techniques appeared in a largely random untested fashion 
in respect to cost effectiveness and outcomes, propelled
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by a mixture of personal ambition, scientific interest 
and concern for patient welfare. A DGM:
"Some departments have spent large sums on expensive 
equipment which has hardly been justified by the use it 
gets, often bought with charity donations, the upkeep 
then having to be taken over by the hospital.11
Managers know how doctors affect managerial choices when 
they expand their operations and treatments without 
taking account of the resource implications. Doctors 
often change treatments or operations without even a 
thought for the effects on the hospital. A physician may 
suddenly change to a new and much more expensive 
treatment without any thought for its effect on the 
departmental finances or the consideration of warning 
those trying to balance the finances. A UGM:
"The radiologists recently started using a new contrast 
medium, it was hugely more expensive. They never told 
anyone it just appeared as a dramatic sudden overspend 
in the budget. And there are similar stories with 
cardiology and paediatrics. No one appeared to have 
considered whether the costs were even justified."
The hospital may continue to stock up with a particular 
prosthesis when the surgeon will suddenly and without 
warning decide not to do that operation any more. A CE:
"The orthopaedic surgeons suddenly started using a 
different prosthesis, and we were still ordering to 
keep up the stocks of the old sort. They didn't think 
to tell anyone."
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I have already referred at the beginning of this chapter 
to the problem of a change in doctors' prescribing 
habits. Another CE:
"We have had examples of new, very expensive drugs 
suddenly being used instead of the standard one; the 
drug bill has shot up tenfold for that particular 
department, and it has been months before we have been 
able to identify and isolate the problem. The doctors 
never thought to tell anyone what they were doing. I 
don't suppose they even thought through what they were 
doing."
Nursing overspends through the need for changes in cover 
or a change in patients' patterns of care as a result of 
doctors' changes in work patterns or types of work have 
also been highlighted as lack of doctors thinking through 
their actions. A Director of Nursing:
"It took the nurses some weeks to fathom out what was 
going on and why the pattern of nursing had changed; 
then they discovered that it was because the surgeons 
had all swopped around their operating lists."
Laboratories overspend as a result of additional night 
calls for tests by doctors, often done to fit in with 
changes in other doctors' patterns of work. A CE:
"The consultant had changed his ward round and was 
seeing the admissions for surgery in the evening; as a 
result patients were coming in later. The patients were 
happy enough but it resulted in the lab doing a lot 
more tests in the evening."
None of these can be directly controlled by the managers 
and not every change can be budgeted for at the start of
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the financial year but if doctors were acting less as 
individuals and were more involved in the management 
processes then even if they were not controlled, at least 
the management might get warning of changes.
11.8. Personal Agendas
Managers often feel that a shift in clinical direction 
may owe more to personal interest than to the needs of 
the hospital. A DGM:
"They go off on study leave or some conference and when 
they come back they've developed some new interest.
Some surgeons are only interested in doing their 
particular thing, some operations that they are 
interested in. They forget there is a lot of routine 
work, we all have boring things to do. For myself 
large elements of the work are boring, large elements 
I dare say for an ENT Surgeon are boring and there does 
come a point when you need to make a change.11
Or some say that private practice interferes with 
hospital activity, a DGM:
"the whole negativeness problem was really bound up 
with private practice income. What comes over is that 
what matters first is private practice, and anything 
else can be arranged around that. Now that isn't 
necessarily a bad thing, it's just not a good thing if 
that dominates everything."
Managers find it frustrating that spontaneous actions by 
consultants can upset financial programmes for a unit, 
hospital or district. Managers therefore face the 
difficult task of getting doctors to accept that their
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clinical freedom must be counterbalanced by an awareness 
of, and responsibility for, the effective management of 
resources.
This task is made more difficult by managers' lack of 
clinical knowledge, which makes them hesitate when 
discussing professional and technical standards and can 
make them feel vulnerable when issues are raised with 
doctors on quality improvement. As one ex UGM put it:
"Managers find medical discussions direct and harsh to 
the point of sarcasm. On the other hand doctors find 
managers' conversations equivocal, facile and vague, 
and their thinking woolly."
11.9. Playing by the Rules
Managers feel that they try to be careful in taking 
clinical issues into account in both the short and long 
term, through formal and informal consultation. They 
feel that arrangements are made for clinicians to 
influence and participate in management decision making 
at all levels. There is however a major disharmony 
between management and financial planning, and clinical 
practice and developments. Both are of course legitimate 
but at times they seem incompatible. Again we see that 
doctors' individual power rested crucially on their 
monopoly of medical knowledge. A CEO:
"There has to be much greater honesty and realism about 
priorities."
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Such problems it appears are multiplied in medical 
schools. A CE of a University Teaching Hospital:
"The technical and imperial attitudes of acute medicine 
increased dramatically in teaching districts."
University and medical school doctors often appeared to 
have very special powers. They not only dominated the 
old administration but they appeared more able to stand 
up to the new general management.
Thus the individualistic ethic of medicine allowed the 
most powerful individual clinicians to dominate service 
priorities. At the same time, although doctors might be 
in fierce competition with one another for resources, 
this was a game they played among themselves. A medically 
qualified ex UGM:
"Faced with any outside challenge, they merely closed 
ranks. It was always highly effective."
For managers, the emphasis on the right of individual 
doctors to take their own decisions too often meant a 
tacit agreement to support colleagues whenever they 
could, simply because they were colleagues.
Given the enormous power of the medical profession in the 
eyes of the managers, many of the old health service 
administrators had, it was argued, simply given in.
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However, even in the new era, managers felt that many 
consultants expected to be dealt with individually at the 
very highest level. Particularly they felt, as one DGM 
says,
"That consultants tried to do deals with everyone, with 
treasurers over breakfast, with colleagues over lunch, 
with the chairmen at dinner, or even directly with 
managers. Moreover, the medical, self proclaimed right 
to go to the very top, the assumption that all 
managers, no matter how senior, were there to service 
them individually, still carries over even into the 
private sector."
11.10. The Central Influences on Managers
Managers also feel they suffer pressure from the centre, 
(Region and Government), to ensure that Regional and 
National priorities for care are met and that resources 
are used efficiently and effectively, while at the same 
time meeting all the local needs and the aspirations of 
consultants to provide increasingly expensive high 
technology medical care. In addition they suffer the 
frustrations of having to meet these responsibilities 
within tight financial constraints, changing population 
needs etc. As one CEO put it,
"With limited resources people simply put off making 
decisions."
There seems little doubt that managers recognize that 
they have no direct control over the major user of 
resources i.e. the doctors, this division of
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responsibility having been inbuilt in the health service. 
Williams (1985) states:
"An unfortunate division of responsibility seems to 
have grown up whereby costs are the business of 
administrators and treasurers, while benefits are the 
business of doctors and nurses."
11.11. How Managers See Doctors
So far I have only considered the managers' views of 
doctors' managerial role, but how do they see doctors as 
a group? On the whole managers were not over 
enthusiastic about doctors, and because there were so 
many views which covered such a wide spectrum it is 
probably helpful to consider both ends of the spectrum 
individually and then present a balanced discussion in a 
third and separate section.
11.12. Managers Unsympathetic to Doctors
Doctors came in for a good deal of abuse from many 
managers. Some doctors, they argued, were selfish, 
egocentric, lazy, greedy and arrogant; as one CEO put it:
"Previously being employed by Region, they had gone on 
study leave, and if that left us short they would say 
"tough luck". A lot of consultants, certainly some of 
the more senior, have found it incredibly difficult to 
come to terms with that [the recent changes J, they 
suddenly find that they cannot just change around their 
programme because it suits them, they now have to talk 
to someone and almost get permission for that. The 
younger consultants have no problem with that concept."
One UGM said:
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111 think consultants are lazy, I think consultants 
actually want to do less work, at least here. It is 
possible they want to go down the road more, [referring 
to a local private hospital].”
Consultants were seen as highly aggressive on their own 
account but always willing to cover up for each other, an 
issue already referred to when they close ranks. A DGM 
said:
"many doctors are too loyal to each other. They sit 
and listen to things that they know are wrong, things 
that they will come and tell you are wrong, but they do 
not have the bottle to stand up and say, this needs to 
be put right, and once you have gone through this for a 
long time it does tend to cause unnecessary loss of 
respect in terms of testing the motivation of 
clinicians".
Another DGM:
"The basic test is, that if you would not let your 
family be treated by that person, why do you sit 
quietly and protect that person and let everyone else 
do the same? So there is something about those 
collective values that I feel are quite negative and 
dishonest when placed against the backcloth of saying 
they want to do the best for the patients."
Also they are very parochial, or as one DGM put it:
"they are only interested in their own particular 
speciality."
In the view of a UGM now CEO,
"There is not enough corporacy to say, how do we 
provide better medical services here? You are all 
very good at saying how you provide very good medical 
services, but how can you improve the hospital.......go
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and talk to an ENT Surgeon, very good at doing the ENT 
bit, but there is a reluctance to sort out, say, the 
terrible General Surgeons, who they meet every day on 
the corridors, and who are actually impinging on and 
impeding the service that your hospital provide. And 
managers are prevented from doing that.”
11.13. Some Qualifications
Most managers feel that these views which they expressed 
applied to the characteristics of doctors as a group. At 
an individual level, many managers praised the doctors 
within their hospital. So, for all managers' fierce 
criticism of doctors, their comments were often balanced 
by some positive remarks, although I suspect that such 
remarks as,
"having said all that, they are good chaps really”,
were an apology to me for what they had said. But most 
managers often took care to qualify their criticisms; 
many described doctors as very hard working, even 
workaholics, and some noted super workers who had loyalty 
to the institution or organization. So the complaints 
from managers were, for the most part not about the 
doctors' individual attributes but more about their 
properties as members of a profession. Moreover, even at 
the group level, their attributes vary. The doctors with 
joint appointments found colleagues in a non-teaching 
district far more reasonable than those in the teaching 
hospital.
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Such views were held by many different sorts of manager, 
both with and without clinical backgrounds. So that 
although doctors might be slowly moving towards a more 
corporate view of things they remain, so it was argued, 
individualists at heart. That individualism might vary 
from one doctor and one institution to another, but the 
medical profession as a whole entity still, it seemed, 
blocked most attempts at corporate planning and allowed 
the minority to dictate to the majority.
Managers would like doctors to be able, as one DGM said,
"to sit down and look at the impact of their activity 
on the total health care of the district and to get 
them to see their activities and the effects of those 
activities in the context of the broader view, the 
whole hospital or institution, even the whole district, 
and not just take a blinkered view of the problem in 
front of them.”
From then it might be possible to make reasoned 
allocations of resources. Managers recognise that it is 
important to involve doctors more effectively in 
management although few expressed very clearly what that 
meant in detail or how that might be done. The desire 
was common however, the following being typical comments 
by managers:
"To remove the barriers and mutual suspicions between 
doctors and managers. If we could both accept that 
even though doctors not unnaturally offer a different 
perspective to management, we could try and move the
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organization in the same direction and all pull 
together.11
"If we could get doctors to accept that managers need 
to match services to resources for the whole 
organization and understand what that actually means."
"To help and join with managers in making choices by 
the realization and acceptance that resources are 
limited."
Managers accept that doctors need to take a key part in 
management but by participation and compromise not by 
veto. Unfortunately not all managers share these views; 
as one extreme management view is that managers, as one 
DGM put it,
"Must curtail the excessive power of the doctors, 
curbing them in to ensure that district plans are 
achieved."
11.14. Managers Sympathetic to Doctors' Attitudes
On the other hand some managers see the medical 
profession as a powerful organization which should not be 
emasculated but carefully cultivated so that the doctors' 
skills, energies and intelligence are harnessed to tackle 
issues and even manage themselves more effectively, and 
to continue and increasingly to involve doctors in taking 
corporate decisions at district level, as opposed to them 
advising on decisions but not making them. These latter 
views are of course easier for managers within units and 
departments. But it is at the higher levels where it is
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more important to manage the medical profession by 
enlisting the doctors' cooperation in management or 
encouraging them to work as managers. As one DGM put it:
"A lot of managers do not like to admit that they [the 
doctors] are important, but I see them as by far the 
most important set of people, potentially, either for 
good or for ill. If you do not have the consultants 
wanting to go in a particular direction, then the 
hospital or the health service is lost. And whether 
you think you should be a manager who should control 
them, or support them in the old fashioned 
administrator sense, as I was taught, (we were the 
"oiling the wheels" men if you like, would bow down to 
what the surgeon wanted and help him get there), that 
subservient role or right through the spectrum to I'm 
the manager and I'm going to tell you what to do. 
Whichever way, it seems to me, unless you actually are 
either subservient to getting them to do what you want, 
or as a manager to do what you want, the hospital is 
not going to do the right things."
Another CEO (not medically qualified himself) put it like 
this:
"I see them as the most important group and a lot of 
people do not like that, and lot of people do not 
believe it, and a lot of doctors do not believe it 
themselves these days. They do not feel they argue 
with any credibility or importance. A lot of managers 
do not like to admit that they are important, but I see 
them as by far the most important group."
Some managers recognised the different aspects to the 
relationship, and also how it might vary between 
different types of hospital and with different doctors. 
As the Chief Operating Officer and Vice President of a 
U.S. teaching hospital put it, the relationship was
"Positive, comfortable, strained, angry. I think the 
strain has to do with finances, availability of staff,
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equipment, opportunity to develop new and interesting 
programmes. My background is all large private 
community teaching hospitals, not state institutions, 
and there is a big difference between the two.
Doctors in the private institutions understand referral 
relationships, communication, seeing patients, clinical 
excellence, working relationships with other 
colleagues; in this particular institution, I find less 
of that.”
11.15. Discussion
Not surprisingly managers show elements of all views, as 
was demonstrated in the last quote from North America, 
although varying in relative proportions not necessarily 
in relationship to their training or background but 
perhaps related to their management style and the 
problems they face and the characteristics of the doctors 
with whom they work. There has long been a stereotyped 
view of how managers regard doctors. One academic in 
health care management put it thus:
"There has been a long and dishonourable tradition of 
mistrust between managers and doctors, which is not 
surprising since whatever the particular organizational 
forms that we use at any one time, basically the 
managers have the money and the doctors do the work, or 
at least do things to patients. That introduces a 
very interesting and necessarily tense relationship 
between the two sides. The question therefore becomes 
how to mediate that relationship best, so that it is 
for the mutual benefit of both."
To some managers the problems are seen as creating 
opportunities:
"To enable this hospital to be more than it is, to put 
into the balance, both the needs of the clinicians, the 
research staff, etc., to provide appropriate management
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so that we would have resources, both financial and 
people, to make sure that we survive the twentieth 
century into the twenty-first century.
Our location is a problem to us, and we have to change 
the way we relate to people, because there are plenty 
of other locations, health care centres, medical 
centres, hospitals, clinics for patients to go to. If 
we don't treat people as they should appropriately be 
treated, then one day they'll go somewhere else."
Others recognised that in the past they had not competed 
for resources. Now they have to cope with that, as a CEO 
said:
"Finances are a constant problem; health care is 
becoming increasingly day case orientated, there is 
less demand for beds, and hospitals are going to get 
smaller or close."
Managers felt that they had been too concerned with 
running hospitals on a day to day basis rather than 
taking a strategic long term look. This had not been 
helped by the relationship between doctors and managers:
"I think we may have taken ourselves [the hospital] for 
granted. What we have to do is create, access and 
service, make sure our staffing is good, that we have 
the necessary equipment and services. That will then 
allow us to compete in a larger geographic area."
Involving doctors in these strategic management processes 
was seen by some as an essential prerequisite of this 
process:
"There are a few hospitals where a clearer management 
line has reached the technical and professional areas 
and they have become involved in strategic planning."
299
11.16. Management and Decision making in the NHS
Before leaving the question of managers I would like to 
introduce the role of management in the decision making 
process within the NHS. Klein (1985), asking the 
question, who makes decisions in the NHS, feels that the 
National Heath Service is a remarkable organization 
because almost everyone working in it - whether as a 
doctor or as a nurse, as an administrator or as a ward 
orderly - is a decision maker. He says:
"It is precisely this proliferation and pervasiveness 
of decision making that makes any attempt to anatomise 
the process - to identify with precision who is 
responsible for what - so frustrating and baffling."
The large number of separate decision makers in the 
various professional groups is what would most separate 
health care from industrial and service industries. To 
look at management in more detail it is necessary to 
separate the management and decision making process into 
operational management, the day to day running of 
hospitals and related services, from strategic management 
where the big decisions will affect the service over 
years rather than days. I have already referred in 
previous sections to at least 60% and perhaps up to 80% 
of the costs in hospital being the result of doctors' 
orders.
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11.17. Operational and Strategic Management
Operational management is generally thought to be the 
preserve of the junior managers, the clinical and support 
services managers, and strategic management the 
responsibility of the General Manager or Chief Executive 
Officer. One manager, a DGM put it like this:
"I do not see my job as taking decisions; my job is to 
make sure that decisions are taken with the appropriate 
people engaged in that process to get the best 
decision. An important part in all this is involving 
the right people to provide the right advice to 
establish all of those things.”
And finally, strategic decisions are the preserve of the 
Health Authorities or the Trust Boards. The issue for 
some managers seems to be the threat of Clinical 
Directors to their own control and authority. One 
manager a CEO put it like this:
"I would like to ask, what problems do the consultants 
actually need to be involved in? Consultants have to 
accept that in the management structure their work 
process entirely is day to day although psychologically 
they believe they are much higher.”
However US managers feel somewhat differently. A 
President said:
"Clinical Chairmen have a great amount of influence as 
well in any planning and resource allocation and 
deployment mode."
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Another U.S. Hospital has a planning retreat every year 
where all twenty members of their Medical Executive 
Committee participate in providing strategic planning to 
the hospital. The Chief Executive Officer includes 
Clinical Directors in their discussions, regarding 
budgeting and planning activities.
11.18. Winning Over the Doctors
American managers from Johns Hopkins Medical School 
emphasized the necessity of winning medical consent but 
recognised the power in some hospitals to sanction 
recalcitrant doctors by terminating their contract. A 
U.S. CEO explained:
"All our doctors are on two year contracts although we 
would give them a year's notice if we wanted to get rid 
of them. The Chief of Service (a doctor) carried a lot 
more clout than anyone comparable in the NHS. He is 
appointed by the Dean and the Director".
At Johns Hopkins itself and many other academic centres 
however, many of the medical staff hold academic 
appointments and are less easily controlled by the 
hospital.
However, there has been a big cultural change of heart in 
the last few years. Most of the chiefs of service are 
now very management oriented and very responsible; they 
are data oriented, noting for instance if a doctor's
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length of stay for in-patients is grossly abnormal. As a 
result of the changes in approach a lot of the old chiefs 
left, unable to cope with the changes. They didn't like 
the management style. The newer ones do, and work well 
with the system.
In Britain however, given doctors' lifetime contracts and 
the power of the medical profession, it has been almost 
impossible for managers to remove them. It could just be 
done, but only in the most damning of circumstances, and 
it would take many years of struggle and extraordinary 
effort so that it has rarely even been attempted.
11.19. Hospital Management Generally
West (1988a) considers that the actual control of 
hospital managers is different from that of managers in 
other organizations. This is because managers must 
liaise with various professional groups and coordinate 
activities from outside. However, one manager felt that 
his perceived success was because he was from outside the 
National Health Service. He said:
"I have been relatively successful here because I am 
not an administrative professional."
Managers on the whole felt that the impact of the 
Griffiths Report in 1983 was limited because of the key 
role of the professional staff who had not become more
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involved in management. Although this is an issue that I 
will discuss in my conclusions, it seems appropriate to 
give the managers' views for this now. Managers feel 
they are trying to reconcile competing economic and 
resource pressures so that the hospital runs as well as 
possible, while at the same time avoiding major conflicts 
and serious overspending. To resolve conflicts in 
operational management they feel they often have to find 
compromises which favour one vested interest over 
another, so that it may be easier at times to do nothing 
about a problem, particularly if focusing attention on it 
may lead to more expenditure.
It is also worth noting the style of management in the 
National Health Service. Because so much of the senior 
management task is negotiation with key groups rather 
than day to day control of individual departments 
managers spend most of their time in meetings and much 
less time at the grass roots where many of the problems 
arise. One medically qualified UGM felt that his small 
residual clinical commitment was an advantage in allowing 
him to go into the wards, the outpatients and theatres 
and see and get a feel of the atmosphere of what was 
happening. He added:
"Courses on Medicine for Managers are no substitute for 
going into the hospital, and managers spend too much 
time in their offices."
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They would argue that there is usually so much work being 
generated by all the different interest groups among the 
staff and by patient administration and complaints that 
there is no need to look for work, and walking around the 
hospital seems low on a managers' agenda by comparison. 
Carlson (1982) refers to this as "Visible Management” and 
"MBWA - Management By Walking About”. Hospitals generate 
vast amounts of paper or computerised data which must be 
organised into sensible statistics. Medicine generates 
constant demands for more clinical services and 
equipment. Patients and staff generate all the hassles 
of large groups of people while the public expects more 
and more from the service. However a health care 
academic who had been an experienced UGM and DGM 
admitted:
"The reality of having to go into the changing room or 
into the theatre or clinic to meet a surgeon is still 
daunting for most managers today I think. The fact 
that you've got lots of younger ones, and they're 
changing makes it even more difficult for them."
He felt that managers have always subconsciously felt 
subservient and inferior to the doctors:
"We were very subservient to the medical profession, 
who were very powerful and I think many of us who were 
trained in that era still have that reverence, fear, 
antagonism, shown in different ways, to the medical 
profession. That is sometimes why people want to 
manage it, to sack them, that sort of attitude, it 
stems from an inferiority complex. Managers are 
usually much less well educated, whereas most medical 
people coming in recent years have had a very high 
standard of education. So I think the relationship 
between the two, was that we were traditionally rather
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afraid of the medical profession. And that still 
exists today, even though there's all this macho 
management talk."
And in America there is this same feeling, as one Chief 
Operating Officer put it:
"I truly think that the adjectives that they [the 
doctors] would use are removed, distant, and in many 
cases not terribly bright. I think some physicians 
feel that some hospital administrators are frustrated 
physicians and couldn't get into, or complete, medical 
school."
11.20. Conclusions
To summarize I have discussed the topics brought out by 
managers about how they see their own role in management 
of the hospital clinical activity, and how they feel 
about doctors being more involved, as well as their 
feelings for doctors as a professional group. In each 
area I have identified specific issues which often result 
in tension. In the next chapter I propose to show the 





During the course of considering the results of the first 
few interviews my attention was drawn by my wife, a 
trained Relate counsellor, to a technique they use for 
seeking the true feelings about relationships by using 
stones to represent individuals, and asking clients to 
place them in relation to each other and explaining why 
they have done this.
I therefore decided to experiment with this technique 
(Skynner, 1976) and began with two discs, one 
representing the medical profession and the other the 
managers/administrators. I then refined it by asking 
them to place the two discs not only in relation to one 
another but also in relation to the hospital, represented 
by a sheet of paper or card. This forms the basis of the 
first test - the two group and hospital test.
12.1.0. The Two Group and Hospital Test




The doctors generally acknowledged the central role of 
managers in the organization. One doctor who had 
experience of being a Clinical Director and a Unit 
General Manager who was insistent that they still be 
called administrators, said:
"Administrators are firmly in the hospital? you cannot 
run the hospital, without skilled administration. You 
cannot leave any organization to run itself with its 
operational management.”
About three quarters of those interviewed felt that 
managers and doctors were working together within the 
institution. Typical of the responses of Clinical 
Directors are:
"They are both serving the patients and responsible for 
the patients, which is then fronted by the medical 
profession. What this is suggesting [referring to the 
position of the discs on the card], is that the 
management are there to back the medical profession who 
are there to deal with the patients, but you could 
equally well say that the management are there to 
provide an environment and a service, in which the 
medical profession is just one of the things that 
patients need, also needing nurses and catering.”
"There should be a shared set of values, aims and 
aspirations and the more the different interest groups, 
and in some cases pressure groups, can communicate and 
share those values and standards, the better for 
everybody and certainly for the people it's supposed to 
be about.”
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Some of the doctors felt that although working together, 
they were both partly marginal to the hospital but for 
different reasons:
"The medical profession has its professional authority 
outside of the hospital and the management and 
administrators have the need to manage the external 
environment, so both must spend some of their time 
looking outside to see what is going on."
and some felt that they were working in different 
directions:
"I think the biggest problem is the money. We have the 
problem where the management think they have to go out 
and look for patients in order to get more money, and 
we feel we have more than enough patients anyway. They 
want us to try and treat patients who will generate 
funds and we say we decide what we are going to do 
purely on clinical grounds."
The remaining quarter were equally divided between those 
who felt that the doctors were marginal to the hospital, 
those that felt the managers were marginal to the 
hospital and even those who felt the managers were not 
truly part of the hospital but imposed from outside.
12.1.2. U.K. Managers
The managers were much more unanimous than the doctors. 
Managers were working together, within the hospital as an 
institution, but their language was less assured, and 
they were less able to verbalise the reasons for their 
choice:
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"Discs should be on top of each other within the 
hospital, no order, no particular reason."
"Overlapping within the hospital, because their 
interests need to overlap."
"I've put the management and the medical profession at 
the same level, because I don't think either can, or 
should, dominate the other."
12.1.3. U.S. Doctors
Here again the majority view was that the administrator 
and the doctor were both working together:
"Both inside, we have to be partners or we aren't going 
to get it done."
"Well I mean my job depends on both of them being 
inside."
Again some of the doctors saw the two groups both having 
roles inside and outside the institution:
"I see both of them straddling the edge."
The doctors felt that the medical profession were on the 
edge of the institution, more outside than in. About a 
third of doctors felt that the doctors were entirely 
outside the hospital as an institution and they were as 
much customers of the hospital as the patient. About 
half felt that they were just about outside the hospital.
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In a sense this feeing was reflected in the answer given 
by one doctor:
"Physicians, one third into the hospital, and two 
thirds out, in the sense that their activities are so 
oriented to non hospital affairs now."
Some recognized that some doctors were inside and some 
outside:
"Definitely the administration inside the hospital? 
they do take their job seriously whatever else you may 
say about them, they do want to see the hospital 
succeed in all its missions, but doctors, some are in 
and some are out."
However, the majority view was that although the 
administrator and the doctor were both working together 
the doctors were primarily outside:
"I see the administrators as primarily in the hospital, 
but to some degree they're also outside administering 
it."
"I think physicians are primarily outside the hospital, 
but that's a perspective from the Department of 
Medicine."
"I think the physicians would be more outside the 
entity and the administrators more inside the entity."
These differing views have already been referred to in 
the different way in which American medicine, based on 
private fee for service, with the doctor being a customer 
of the hospital, compares to the U.K. cost limited 
service:
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111 would have to say that if you go across to the most 
successful hospital in town, that's xxxxx Hospital, 
that's a private hospital, in that you have the 
administration inside and the medical profession 
outside. It is a business, they contract with the 
physicians, and they need those physicians.11
But some doctors recognized that things were changing?
”1 think management would have to be effectively inside 
the hospital, but there is a way that it is going to be 
changing. And the reason it is going to be changing is 
the concept of joint ventures which may be something 
you are not familiar with. A joint venture would be 
say, that the hospital and the medical staff would go 
out to the market place and set up some type of managed 
care proposal."
12.1.4. U.S. Managers
No difference in response to their UK counterparts, but 
more positive and willing to elaborate:
"Both inside. They have a common agenda. There may be 
conflict, that is natural, but there must be a 
balance."
"This hospital is largely administrator driven, 
although we do have a physician Head. But the idea of 
running a business with the doctors outside of it, 
relating to us in a We/They fashion, is not nearly as 
attractive as being in partnership."
"The doctors generally are very grateful for help and 
if you are really interested in helping them achieve 
their objectives their loyalty to you is incredible, 
and the relationship can be very rewarding. So we're 
in it together."
"If you are working for a hospital that has a mission 
which is not consistent with the mission of the 
physicians, then you can easily get crossed-wires and
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in many ways be adversaries, although some people say 
it's essential we have an adversarial relationship, 
because that is a check and balance kind of thing. So 
I would say we work at it together”
"I don't think I can exist outside the organization so 
for my perspective the administrator is always inside 
with the physicians.”
As in the UK there were a few who did not wish to 
elaborate:
"Both inside."
"In our system, both inside."
12.1.5. Comments
I have already mentioned in Chapter 13 section 6 the 
question of those influences outside the hospital which 
impinge on the working of both consultants and managers. 
Although in the answers and discussions both doctors and 
managers acknowledged that doctors have need to be partly 
outside the hospital; some now saw the need for managers 
to work outside too. Some U.K. academics who had been 
managers did agree that this was important:
"Management needs to be more outside the hospital 
because they are, more than most doctors, concerned 
about the boundaries between the hospital as an 
organisation and the rest of the health service, the 
public, the politicians and society at large. So I see 
them half in half out of the hospital. I see the 
medical profession as mostly in, because most of their 
energy and attention are focused inside, but with a 
significant piece outside, but a little less than the 
amount for the managers."
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Others thought it would be beneficial for the service as 
a whole for the doctors to be more detached from the 
hospital:
"I'd like to see more of the medical profession 
uncoupling from the hospital as an institution and 
seeing things in a more holistic way. You see it in 
some specialties already; paediatrics for example, has 
largely managed, mentally to disassociate itself from 
the hospital and see the whole of the delivery of 
service for children as being something that's not the 
be all and end all in the hospital.
On the other hand, most surgeons it seems to me, take 
the view that there is a hospital, and there is this 
boring bit outside which we throw the patients back 
into, and they don't want to know about. Maybe that 
is a caricature, but not a wholly unfair one."
12.2.0. The Relationship Test
The second test consisted of asking about the doctor, 
manager and patient relationship to each other. This 
project is not about the doctor patient relationship but 
I thought it might be interesting and instructive to 
consider whether, by deliberately introducing this third 
party into the test, it might have an effect on the 
outcome of the findings. The second test was therefore 
for the participants to relate the three, the patient, 
the doctor and the manager/administrator, to each other, 
and explain the reasons.
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12.2.1. U.K. Doctors
Three quarters regard the three groups as equal partners?
"Three discs overlapping equally. The doctors and the 
managers there to serve the patients."
The only thing they felt unsure about was how much of an 
overlap. The work that doctors do in a hospital is to a 
large extent obviously not part of operational 
management, and similarly the work of management is not 
medical, but they see an area of joint responsibility for 
the processes and systems within the hospital.
Doctors spend a lot of their time relating to the 
patients, but patients' interests are partly different 
from doctors' and managers'? the perceptions of patients 
of what health is and what they want out of it, are not 
necessarily congruent with what the professionals within 
the organisation think. Patients often value things 
differently from the way professionals value things. I 
was given two separate examples expressed by doctors:
"Maternity care, where there is a good consensus with 
doctors and managers that people should have their 
babies in hospital, but actually there was a 
significant patient resistance to this and not because 
they were ignorant, but because women genuinely were 
prepared to take the risks, because of their perceived 
benefits."
"Aids patients have demanded a type of care that would 
not have naturally arisen from within the 
organisation."
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The majority felt that all doctors were managers now and 
that everyone was ultimately there for the benefit of the 
patient. A typical view was:
"To me we are all managers. On top is the patient, 
because that is the product of what we are trying to 
do, and what this is meant to represent is that all 
other professions are working together to serve the 
patient."
But a fifth felt that the doctor stood between the 
manager and the patient. This view was expressed as a 
feeling that the hospital was increasingly being run to
balance the books rather than to serve the needs of the
community, and that only doctors were fighting for the 
needs of the patient:
"Increasingly the pressure is to operate on patients 
for money. If they are patients of a GP Fund Holder 
they come in next week. If their GP is not a Fund 
Holder they are placed on a waiting list for a year or
more, even though they may be clinically more urgent.”
12.2.2. U.K. Managers
The UK Managers were less enthusiastic about an equal 
relationship between the three groups, only a half seeing 
them as equal. But again they did not seem willing or 
able to express reasons:
"I think, something like that. I don't know why."
"Just like that. No reason."
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A third put the managers and doctors together on top of
an inverted triangle;
"I put patient under there because I usually think of 
it from the perspective of managers, and also of the 
medical profession. You could I suppose also have 
patients on top, supported by managers and medical 
profession, but I would prefer it this way."
12.2.3. U.S. Doctors
Here again like their U.K. counterparts three quarters of 
those doctors interviewed expressed a view that the 
relationship was equal:
"I have to put them in an equal triangle, which is 
probably the least helpful answer you can get. What 
actually happens is that the management if you like, 
tries to provide services which patients are coming to 
receive, and the medical profession, in this hospital 
at least, partly work here to provide patient care but 
also to do other things as well, and they don't really 
run this relationship very much.”
”In terms of the ideal situation you would tie them in 
as an over-lapping area, because management must be 
responsive to the demands of the patient and the 
demands of medical profession. For example if the 
hospital was very dumpy, in a lousy area, patients just 
won't come, if the hospital makes it extremely 
difficult for physicians to get work done, then the 
physicians will just not come.”
"I think they all have to be inter related; the 
hospital administrator must be as concerned about the 
patient care as he is about the physicians delivering 
patient care. The patient must be aware that the 
hospital does not have a printing press in the basement 
and is printing out dollars and can do anything for 
free."
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"I think there has to be an inter-relationship and I 
think they have to be an inter-relationship of equals, 
not that the doctors are over the other, that this has 
got to be a team approach. No longer can the 
physicians do it alone."
Although the difference here was that about a fifth saw 
the administrator intervening between the doctor and 
patient, rather than as in the U.K. where the doctor came 
between the patient and manager):
"They are between the physician and the patient, 
facilitating the physicians work. Their job is to see 
that the essential relationship between patient and 
physician works, to provide and facilitate whatever is 
necessary for that."
12.2.4. U.S. Managers
Again exactly half of the US administrators saw the 
relationship as equal just as the UK managers had done. 
But again they were more forthcoming, thoughtful and 
thought provoking:
"Basically equal, and changing that would be difficult 
to do."
"All three pretty much equal. From the perspective of 
management these [patients and doctors] are our two 
biggest client groups, the patients being the biggest, 
but the medical staff being equally important, they're 
just smaller in numbers."
The difference was the third who felt that the 
administrator separated the doctor from the patient,
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rather than as in the UK group where the managers saw the 
doctor coming between the manager and the patient:
"I would like them still to be between the doctors and 
the patients, but facilitating; I think their role is 
to see that relationship between the patient and the 
physician works well. The administrators should be 
almost invisible, but doing a great job."
12.3. Discussion
Some of the participants were unable to grasp the concept 
of what I was trying to achieve, possibly because of my 
poor explanation, but mostly the idea was quickly and 
rapidly grasped. On the whole those who did so gave 
considerable thought to positioning the discs, reflecting 
and changing them, sometimes thinking aloud as they did 
so;
"It's been a long time since I thought about anything 
like this. How I'd like it to be. The patients are 
hardest to put into the equation, I don't quite know 
what to do with the patients."
A few were hostile or dismissive. One Clinical Director 
said as I laid the discs on the table:
C.D: "I see no reason to change what you have set out.
A.W: You are entirely happy with that?
C.D: I'd like them to be in alphabetical order, they 
appear to be in reverse alphabetical order.
A.W: Why would you put them in alphabetical order?
C.D: Because that's the conventional collating sequence 
for literal strength. P. M. A. In the conventional
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alphabetical sequence it would be sorted on the first 
letter."
Another manager literally threw the patient disc to the 
corner of the room saying:
"Patients are not involved in this relationship. It is 
all about doctors and managers."
It was only later that I discovered how accurate this 
remark turned out to be about the relationship between 
doctors and managers. The question I did not ask 
directly but which I was later to observe from the 
results of, and explanations given for, the two tests, 
was, how were managers and doctors seeing each other in 
relation to each other? In other words, was what they 
were doing fitting with what they were saying, and what 
was more important and meaningful, was what they had told 
me during the previous hour or so of interview fitting in 
with the information I was now obtaining from them? 
Although I had not planned it as such, it turned out to 
be another validation.
It was here that I encountered some interesting findings. 
I have discussed power struggles in a section in Chapter 
13.2, where I showed doctors think the balance of power 
has tipped in favour of managers, doctors and managers 
see an increase in the managerial control of doctors' 
work, and doctors fear they are being removed further 
from decision making.
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I have quoted Strong and Robinson (1990) who feel that 
this is a worldwide phenomenon, whereas others like 
Chantler (19910, (1992a) and Griffith (1991), (1991b) and 
(1992) have put a different interpretation on things.
Does this further information support these impressions?
Of the U.K. doctors interviewed only a tenth see the 
managers as in control, and seventy percent see 
themselves on an equal footing with managers. Indeed all 
the managers see themselves equal with the doctors in the 
control of the hospital. Now it may be that this is a 
change from a previous position, but those who discussed 
the situation as it was, the present situation, and the 
likely future change, did not see managers increasing 
their power and influence as seemed the popular theory. 
This would fit the idea of Charlwood (1992) who feels 
that many managers are beginning to feel uncertain about 
their future.
This is a situation where half the doctors and half the 
managers demonstrate that it is the doctor who is 
dominant in the management of the strategy of the 
hospital, the decision making processes and how it
changes. A doctor put it thus:
"I can't imagine how I could possibly put the
administrators on an equal plane with us. You know if
they are doing well and the hospital's making money and 
we have all the latest equipment and there is no
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problem about getting some new toy that is really 
necessary and if you can justify it. No I have no 
problems at all about that arrangement."
Two administrators summed it up:
"This is a doctor driven institution, no question about 
that and the administrators are here together to serve 
the doctors and patients."
"I think management and administration need to support 
these groups. We need to find ways to help doctors 
work better and smarter."
The remainder seem equally divided, whether it is a 
partnership of equals or whether the managers determine 
priorities of strategy. Now this is partly through the 
diverse nature of the American hospitals, the driving 
forces being somewhat different for University Hospitals, 
Private Hospitals, Community Hospitals, County Hospitals, 
Religious Not for Profit Hospitals, Veterans Hospitals 
etc., but my investigation included representatives from 
each type. Those interviewed suggested no dominant 
change of the balance of power in favour of managers. On 
the other hand maybe they had never really thought about 
it in depth before. A Clinical Director said:
"I have a hard time deciding whether to put 
administrators over the medical profession or next to 
them or below them. They're really not our direct 
bosses, although to a certain extent they are, 
depending on what we are talking about. But they are 
more likely to work with us. We have a great majority 
of effect over the patients and they have some effect, 
but very little. I am happy with this, but as I look 
at it more, perhaps it should be different. Therefore 
the administrators are in reality having more influence 
on patient activities than I prefer and therefore it
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may be in reality that they have a lot more influence 
than I like to think or prefer and I would much prefer 
to have them alongside us and let us have, as the 
medical profession, most of the influence, not all of 
it."
This U.S. view by both parties to the dominant role of 
the doctors leads to an acknowledgement by administrators 
that their supportive role still needs to take account of 
financial constraints. One administrator said:
"My view of management administration is that we need 
to be facilitators to accomplish the best that we can 
for these groups within whatever financial reality that 
we have to deal with."
Another administrator put it like this:
"So I see administrators as the bottom of the pyramid 
trying to be the support for these groups and that if 
you then say, what about the medical profession, well 
patients, are probably up here a little bit, I believe 
that doctors have to always be advocates for their 
patients. That in any decision that costs money, I 
always ask the people that advise me, get involved, 
look at all the issues, tell me what needs to be done 
for this patient. Is it reasonable to consider 
transplanting a liver in this patient, if it's really 
reasonable in this patient, not just a last ditch 
effort in which we're throwing money down the drain, 
then it's my job to try to find the money to get you 
the liver transplant. But you've got to really 
consider things, because you've got to realise that if 
we spend $100,000 on a liver transplant that's a 
$100,000 I don't have to give you for something else. 
But if it's necessary for this patient, we all have to 
do it, it's our job as administrators to do it, we'll 
try to make up the $100,000 some place else, by being 
more careful etc."
One of the doctors recognized that the administrators may 
have a dual role:
"I think it is appropriate for the management and 
administrators to support the ability of the physicians
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to care for the patients. But it is also the 
responsibility of the management to make sure that that 
is done appropriately well and with the appropriate 
cost controls. So I see the managers being underneath 
and above.11
12.4. Future Developments
This part of the discussion with the participants often 
led naturally to a consideration by them as to how they 
saw the current changes developing in the future, as 
there was total agreement that things were changing.
Many participants, both doctors and managers, commented 
that the patient was being removed more and more from 
choice in health care; although that in itself is not 
part of this study it does reflect on the possibility of 
doctors having less control in the management and 
decision making processes in hospital care. A U.S. doctor 
said:
"But I truly think that the major issue here is that 
patients are going to be further and further removed 
from their choice of health care, because as managed 
care becomes a larger and larger payer, these people's 
choices virtually disappear, and I actually think you 
should begin to have a fourth circle - insurance."
On the other hand some doctors feel that the patient is 
generally not sophisticated enough to make the choice:
"I think part of the trick, in this non trick question, 
is really that patients should be the drivers and 
that's really very hard to do and that's a problem on 
both sides of the Atlantic. We delude ourselves here 
that private medical care, third party funding and all
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the rest of it for patients, allows them to choose the 
kind of health care they receive and they have greater 
flexibility, to seek out what is excellent and 
therefore by free market economy type mechanisms, the 
patients really do get what they want and I just don't 
think that happens. And I don't think it really can 
happen. I think it should be that patients' needs are 
addressed from the patients' perspective more than they 
are, but I don't think the patients will ever be 
sophisticated enough to do that without the medical 
profession and probably professional hospital 
management people doing it for them."
There is agreement that doctors should be, are on the 
whole trying to be, and are needed to be, more involved 
in management. A manager typifies this attitude:
"We're trying to get more of the doctors involved in 
making decisions that says there's not an unlimited 
amount of money, we all have to use what we have and 
use resources in the most thoughtful way."
One manager saw the manager and doctor merging into one 
professional group. Although others saw whatever the 
background of the person who acted as the manager, they 
would then become gatekeepers. The issue worldwide is 
that resources are not limitless, and to do the best for 
the most the response of this Clinical Director sums up 
many doctors views:
"I regard my involvement in management as an extension 
of my clinical freedom, and I think it would now be 
unethical not to do so."
325
CHAPTER 13
THE DYNAMICS OF THE DOCTORS' MANAGEMENT EXPERIENCE
13.0. Introduction
In this chapter I will explore some of the factors which 
make up the tensions for doctors in management roles and 
between doctors and managers, including differences in - 
career structures, agendas, power bases and power 
dependencies, education, autonomy (clinical freedom), 
values etc.
13.1. Clinical Freedom
The medical profession was given a distinctive position 
within the NHS when it was founded stemming from special 
characteristics acquired by British medicine over the 
previous two centuries. Before the formation of the NHS 
hospital doctors had fallen into two main groups. The 
most prestigious and the elite worked in the "voluntary" 
hospitals, which had largely originated as eighteenth 
century charities. These hospitals were governed by 
Boards of Trustees, but there was no overall person in 
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WHY THERE ARE TENSIONS AND THE DIFFERENT CAUSES
Their colleagues in municipal hospitals however, much the 
larger group of hospital doctors, were in a very 
different position. Their services were controlled by 
local politicians and, more immediately, by a doctor who 
was also a manager who had very considerable powers, the 
Medical Officer of Health.
Although all consultants within the NHS are paid a 
salary, they have been managed on the voluntary not the 
municipal model. Thus, until the formation of 
independent trust hospitals, no hospital doctor had an 
overall boss and no doctor had a manager. The privileges 
of the elite had been extended throughout the whole 
sector. No hospital doctor needed to accede to local 
politicians or to a Medical Officer of Health. Although 
the NHS claims considerable power over the profession as 
a whole, it appears that its ability to control 
individual doctors is severely limited.
Once British doctors have qualified and become partners 
in General Practice or Consultants they are all nominally 
equal. Doctors are also strongly independent. British 
medical organization is, thus, fundamentally syndicalist 
in nature (Klein 1983). However Strong and Robinson
(1990) in discussing this issue argue that
"every tier must have its leader who monitors, 
integrates and controls all those who work within that 
tier and every such leader must be directly responsible 
to the leader of the tier above. Without such methods,
328
so it is argued, there is an inexorable tendency for 
the workforce to wander off and do their own thing.”
The freedom that the medical profession as a whole 
enjoys, enables the profession as individuals to a very 
large degree to do what it wants. A District General 
Manager says:
"You may advertise for a general surgeon with an 
interest in something that the hospital has a need for, 
but when he is in post he can do what he likes, and 
that may be completely different."
And this was a view reinforced by two consultants who 
recognized that consultants could do whatever work 
interested them, even if it meant ignoring or neglecting 
other hospital priorities, or even what they were 
appointed for:
"I was employed as a head and neck surgeon, but my real 
interest is in cosmetic surgery, so that is what I 
spend most of my time doing."
"The job was advertised as a otoneurologist basically 
but now he only does nasal work, and we still have a 
problem with the otoneurology."
13.2. Some Effects of Clinical Freedom
Strong and Robinson (1990) also argue forcefully that 
this power of the medical profession has to a large 
degree moulded every health care system in the Western 
industrialized world, regardless of its methods of 
organization. In other words the problem of managing the
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medical profession may be seen as universal. However, 
although medical dominance poses huge problems for each 
Western nation's attempts at modern health care 
management, that power can take specific national forms. 
Strong and Robinson (1990) feel that in the United States 
the overall system is a mess. At macro level health care 
is vast, hugely expensive, unfair and even unmanaged at 
the global level, although some argue that overmanaged 
might be a more appropriate description. Typical of the 
comments were this one from a President of an American 
University Hospital:
"armies of little clerks and bureaucrats, small armies 
in hospitals, enormous battalions in insurance 
companies and governmental agencies? the fact of the 
matter is there are hundreds of controls. There is 
enormous inefficiency and consumption of resources by 
this plethora of administrative, insurance and 
bureaucratic schemes and systems and services in this 
country, it is undeniable there are all sorts of 
statistics that show the relative waste, or at least 
overexpenditure and administrative costs of 
bureaucracy."
This comment from a Clinical Director summed up the views 
of most American consultants:
"Our health care system is absolutely in a mess, we 
have the problem with increasing technology, the 
increasing costs of that, malpractice looming still 
significantly, and the idea of equal care for 
everybody, and we are bankrupting the country with what 
we are doing. And yet we have 37 million uninsured or 
underinsured, who do not have access to treatment."
But in local affairs the system has shown real 
achievements. American administrators have different
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influences with doctors, and the information on 
individual activity that a fee for service system 
provides, has enabled American hospitals to pioneer new 
methods for medical micro management. A manager at an 
American hospital illustrated this as follows:
"The Pap Smear team reduced the turn around time from 
five weeks to one day. And we did not add any staff.
We had already tried adding staff but that did not make 
it any quicker. It has to do with focusing on the 
cause, being willing not to leap to a conclusion, just 
remaining and studying the data and doing experiments 
and seeing the results in the data."
13.3. Effect of Cash Limiting the Service
But as Chantler (1991) (1992a) and (1992b) consistently 
points out there is a fundamental difference between a 
private hospital and a cash limited hospital or service 
in the NHS. In the private sector the doctor in many 
ways can be seen as a customer along with the patient 
because the doctor introduces the patient to the hospital 
and the patient is responsible either directly or 
indirectly for paying the cost of treatment. Obviously 
consultation between the management of the hospital and 
the doctors is important in order for a proper service to 
be provided and to ensure reasonable efficiency in the 
use of resources.
In the cash limited public sector both in the UK and 
elsewhere in the world difficult choices have to be made
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regarding the allocation of resources. Efficiency is 
paramount because profligacy in one area may deny access 
or adequate treatment in another. There is an ethical 
requirement to strive for both clinical efficiency 
(resource management) and clinical effectiveness 
(clinical audit).
The British doctor (not in a training grade), is 
therefore in many ways more independent than his American 
counterpart and this has obvious consequences on his 
relationship with managers. The British consultant 
continues to receive in effect a life time appointment 
and can not be removed except for major transgressions, 
although there are indications that this may be changing 
with the introduction of short term contracts, 
performance related contracts and a downsizing of the 
hospitals especially in places like London following the 
Tomlinson Report (1992).
13.4. Consultants' existing management experience
It is important to recognise what many consultants were 
very ready to remind me that clinicians are inevitably 
involved in managing people, departments and resources 
whether or not they or managers explicitly recognise such 
as a managerial role. A Clinical Director said:
"I have a responsibility to make the Department the
happiest possible place for people to work in. People
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have always looked to me to sort out problems within 
the department. It is my responsibility to manage, 
certainly the junior staff, and to some extent the 
junior Consultants, having a frequent and regular 
dialogue, so we know what we are all doing, and so that 
what we do provides a coherent structure of work for 
the department, that is to say that we do not all go on 
holiday at the same time, that we do not all do the 
same sort of operations, and that we do not all pursue 
the same interests and we leave other interests on one 
side."
One Clinical Director described his managerial role like 
this:
"A short term and a long term role. In the short 
term, the day to day management of the department and 
patient services, and in particular the freedom and 
ability to organize clinics and operating lists as I 
think most efficient for myself and for patients, to 
make most efficient utilisation of the facilities. The 
day to day control of things like drugs, support 
services, X-rays, secretarial services, provision of a 
service to General Practitioners in the shape of 
discharge letters and summaries. A teaching role 
which we are all obliged to perform at least for junior 
staff, even if we are not involved with medical 
students.
In the longer term I think all consultants should be 
thinking about where their specialty is going, how 
changes which are coming through the system might 
impact on their future practice, new techniques, 
development of more personnel, the finances, the 
requirements of General Practitioners and making best 
use of resources and having some sort of plan for where 
they want to be, in say five years in the future."
Reviewing the extent to which these roles are played and 
how effectively, and whether they should be extended to 
include more financial aspects of management with more 
decentralization of responsibility, accountability and 
authority, it is necessary to consider whether more 
should be done or could be done to develop the necessary
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skills. In the last decade or so there have been 
increasing attempts to invole doctors in the management 
of clinical services, particularly in the areas 
mentioned, in the United States and the United Kingdom 
(Disken et al 1990) which requires two things to occur?
A. Managers to relinquish central control.
B. Doctors to accept managerial responsibility.
And the first is unfortunately universally resisted by 
managers. An ex Unit General Manager and now health care 
academic told me?
"The classic bad manager is somebody who cannot 
devolve, who cannot give up control. This is a 
particular problem in the health service because many 
managers already have difficulty devolving to other 
managers, so devolving to professional groups who they 
feel have no experience in management is even more 
difficult for them."
13.5. The Cultural Change
To persuade doctors to accept managerial responsibility, 
in addition to teaching and educating and training 
doctors to be managers, it is also necessary to organize 
a culture of understanding health care in the wider 
context, as well as to encourage doctors to accept more 
managerial responsibility and to work with managers as a 
team. A Clinical Director:
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"Doctors have an ethical responsibility to ensure that 
resources are spent wisely to ensure efficiency and 
effectiveness, particularly so when resources are 
limited."
But this was not a common view. Many Clinical Directors 
spoke more like the following quotes from Clinical 
Directors:
"Finding the funds is not my problem, that is up to the 
managers. If they want to make cuts, then they must say 
so, but it must not be me who does it for them, which 
is the danger of doctors getting involved in 
management."
"I do not want to give up clinical work to manage."
" Who is going to do my work if I have to spend some of 
my time managing? They will not employ anyone, the 
juniors cannot be expected to do it, and they will not 
pay my colleagues to do it even if they had the time. 
And what happens when I have finished managing! Where 
will my job be then?"
So neither of these necessary prerequisites of the change 
anticipated have so far happened as widely as might have 
been hoped or expected. Duncan Nichol (1991) said
"that in some areas managers still had to win the 
respect of consultants. If there is no respect for the 
leaders they will not be followed. We have to build on 
that relationship and in some areas we have a long way 
to go."
The other problem which seems to be developing following 
the reforms and the move towards more decentralization of 
management is that the doctors would like to have more 
managerial authority, and the managers would like to
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devolve more responsibility and accountability. Another 
medically qualified interviewee who had experience as a 
UGM explained:
"There is a tendency for central administration to 
decentralise responsibility but not financial authority 
or operational authority, whereas the reverse tendency 
is for clinicians in the decentralised management 
structure to wish to acquire authority without 
responsibility and accountability. These issues need to 
be discussed and worked through for the system to be 
effective."
13.6. Power Struggles
Some doctors felt that the reform following the White 
Paper (1989) had lead to an increase of power in favour 
of managers Lee-Potter (1991);
"The relationship between doctors and managers has 
always been delicate, often strained, often heated. The 
government made it clear in the recent reforms that the 
Department of Health's doors were open to the ideas of 
managers, but closed to doctors objections. To the BMA 
and others the message was clear, in government circles 
a manager is more important."
Doctors have long feared that management, i.e. general 
managers and chief executives, were trying to encroach on 
their long held, professional independence, their freedom 
to determine their individual work loads and pattern of 
working and even their clinical freedom. And the view of 
a number of managers support that belief. A Chief 
Executive:
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"I think that what we badly need is an organization to 
manage, firstly medical practice and secondly medical 
people."
Another Chief Executive said:
"I think the White Paper is not about saving money and 
improving health care but about breaking up the power 
bases of the consultants, controlling them more tightly 
and reducing their freedom, which has so far prevented 
management from managing."
Doctors also fear that managers will remove them further 
from the decision making machinery thus leaving the 
mangers free to ignore medical advice. A Clinical 
Director:
"Once we are employed by the hospital and the Chief 
Executive is our boss, and we are on short term 
contracts we will have to do what management says, 
which may not be what we would have chosen for the 
patient. We will end up doing operations we are told 
to do, because they bring in money, and not based on 
clinical priorities."
Strong and Robinson (1990:xi) support and recognize this 
when they state that
"the push to control doctors is not a British but a 
worldwide phenomenon that affects every Western
industrialized country......there is no going back on
general management. No politician would willingly give 
up the power it offers over doctors."
However, that is only one interpretation that has been 
put on the reforms and the introduction of general 
management. Others like Chantler, (1991), (1992a), and 
Griffiths, (1991),(1991b) and (1992), take the view that
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general management reforms were not intended to create a 
new profession of managers but that all staff within the 
NHS should contribute to the management of the service. 
This is an issue which has been discussed already in 
Chapter 2 when considering the third reorganization and 
the Griffiths Report (1983).
13.7. Personalities and Cultural Differences
Many of the difficulties in the responses of doctors to 
management stem from their cultural norms contrasting so 
strongly with the managerial culture. This has already 
been alluded to in the reference to the work of Handy
(1991). Doctors are trained to do all that needs to be 
done for their patients regardless of the effort or cost. 
They learn to be self assured in defending their opinions 
and practices. They are expected to strive for the best 
available evidence before making a decision. They are 
used to working to short term immediate goals and they 
assume managers are working to long term goals, although 
as we shall see in section 13.6. when I consider the 
different career structures these are muddled, wrong and 
misunderstood views.
Doctors rarely receive any training in management or 
organizational skills. They tend therefore to have a 
poor grasp of, or indeed little respect for, managerial 
skills or structures. A General Manager:
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"Doctors may also misunderstand their role for medical 
advice and negotiation and therefore be ineffective in 
the medical advisory machinery."
Doctors believe managers are there to oil the wheels, 
ensuring adequate facilities and equipment when they are 
needed. President of a US hospital:
"the hospital administrator was relegated to a fairly 
maternal role of clucking around seeing that all these 
artists [the consultants] were happy and the best 
administrators were those that were able to keep their 
craftsmen the happiest."
An ex District General Manager now an academic:
"we were the "oiling the wheels" men, if you like we 
would bow down to what the surgeon wanted, and help him 
get there."
13.8. Education
There appears to be a culture amongst consultants that 
managers are failed doctors or in some other way 
educational failures. And this is admitted by many 
managers. Unit General Manager:
"Managers are usually much less well educated? we only 
had degree courses coming in for managers in the middle 
sixties thereabouts, and often they were people with 
middle grade university requirements."
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Chief Executive:
"The consultants are much more educated than I am, I do 
not understand what they are saying sometimes, when 
they quote Latin or Greek, I just wish they would talk 
in English."
District General Manager?
"Most medical people coming in recent years have had a 
very high standard of education. So I think the 
relationship between the two gets very difficult. We 
are traditionally rather afraid of the medical 
profession. And that still exists today, even though 
there's all this macho management talk".
Another ex DGM and now academic supported these views;
"Only yesterday I met to discuss two consultants with 
their Clinical Director and a manager and the manager I 
think wanted me there as an older administrator, one 
who is used to dealing with doctors as he was worried 
about how to handle the particular problem he was 
facing. To say he was frightened was going too far, 
but there was an element of fear in it."
And the concept of apprehension was reinforced by another 
comment from a UGM:
"The reality of having to go into the changing room or 
into the theatre or clinic to meet a surgeon is still 
daunting for most managers today. The fact that you've 
got lots of younger ones, and they are changing makes 
it even more difficult for them."
This attitude was seen even in the United States in the 
past as an American CEO said about his fellows:
"Lay persons in administration, are not held in high 
esteem, they were essentially glorified "go-fors" to
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the physicians. Now this country has developed a 
number of academic programmes, higher education 
programs in health care administration and started 
pumping out these Master Degree people who are going to 
be professional administrators".
And it was a view not confined to lack of confidence on 
the part of the managers? consultants do really believe 
it is true. Clinical Director:
"The most intelligent, the most highly trained, the 
most motivated and most workaholic people are the 
consultants, because society has selected them over 
many years to be that kind of individual. The best 
scientific brains in the country have gone into 
medicine for a long while. Now to simply try and 
control that group by people who are not as intelligent 
or so well informed or anything else is bound to run 
into trouble."
Some consultants are more acerbic:
"Managers in the NHS are just the failures and rejects 
from business".
Even the British Medical Association speaks in similar 
terms. According to its Secretary Lee-Potter (1991);
"In a well managed company the best, the brightest, the 
leaders, are the managers. In the health service the 
best, the brightest, the leaders, are the doctors."
Some administrators from the States however held some 
similar views about doctors as an American CEO said about 
doctors:
"they are being very well trained, but not particularly 
well educated in the ways of the world!"
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Of course such descriptions about sets of cultural 
attributes can easily slip into stereotypes, and few 
doctors or managers fit neatly into these ideal types. 
Many of the medical profession have a constructive and 
sympathetic view of management and many managers respect 
the position of the doctors and these views have been 
discussed in Chapter 12.
13.9. Differing Agendas
Clinical Director:
"The agenda of the clinicians is not the same as the 
agenda of the managers or even of the trust or of the 
purchasers."
Clinical Directors:
"The clinicians have an agenda and the managers have an 
agenda. The agenda at the fore front for the managers 
at the moment is the waiting list initiative to be 
completed by the end of March. We are spending a lot 
of management time on that as there is money to go with 
it. There has been a bit of encouragement to get the 
clinicians to do extra work for extra money and we are 
managing to achieve this in most areas."
"I think there used to be an Us and Them attitude 
before we became a trust? I think as the budget becomes 
our budget then it should become an Us and Us 
relationship. I am quite pleased with the progress 
we've made, we're not all the way there, but we became 
a trust last April and I became a Shadow Clinical 
Director almost two years ago and we've created a 
corporate being of a Surgical Directorate within a 
large trust which didn't exist before. So that's a 
bonus."
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Managers and Consultants appear to have different 
agendas. But a factor complicating this issue is that 
not all the clinicians nor all the managers appear to 
have the same agenda either. Colin-Thome (1991) felt 
managers were the quiet accomplices of some clinicians, 
striving to improve services often in the teeth of fierce 
opposition from colleagues. He describes how his local 
hospital had opposed his proposals for improving patient 
services, although the manager had accepted and 
implemented them. However Galbraith (1991) felt that 
managers were marching through medicine at the behest of 
the government putting financial considerations before 
clinical ones:
"Let loose like bulls in a china shop without the
constraints or peer pressure that applied to doctors".
13.10. Differing Power Dependencies
Kotter (1977) introduced me to the term power dependence. 
He suggests that in complex organizations it becomes more 
difficult if not impossible for managers to achieve their 
ends independently or through persuasion and formal 
authority alone. They need to influence other people on 
whom they are dependent. He compared the situation of a 
Plant Manager and a Hospital Manager. Although he did 
not separate specifically the ideal dependencies, 
influences and authorities, I thought it might be 
instructive to compare those of a hospital consultant and
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manager or chief executive, which might lead to some 
interesting ideas.
A doctor's performance is more directly dependent on 
their individual talents and efforts, whereas a manager 
may be dependent on superiors, subordinates, peers in 
other parts of the organization, the subordinates of 
peers etc. As all the people on whom the manager is 
dependent have limited time, energy, talent and possibly 
competing agendas, this may produce frustration and 
difficulties.
In a paper the following year Kotter (1978) demonstrated 
the importance of power orientated behaviour to 
managerial success by showing how much of the working 
time and energy was engaged in power orientated 
behaviour. He further demonstrated that variations in 
power orientated behaviour were closely associated with 
what he called job related dependence.
Although he recognised that the dependence inherent in a 
manager's job may be high, medium or low, he did not seek 
to divide it in any other way or indentify any way other 
than arbitrary impression on the manager's part of why 
any particular dependency went into any particular group. 
I felt that it might be easier to classify the level by 
considering it in four groups, those that instructions
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are taken from, those that account is taken of, those 
they need help from and lastly those that they rely on.
Managers agreed that they acted on instructions or 
contracts from G.P.Fund Holders and District Health 
Authorities as these are now purchasers of the services 
of the hospital. This was new to the introduction of the 
internal market within the health service. Previously 
the General Managers had little contact with or input 
from the General Practitioners, feeling that this was 
part of the consultants7 work only. In addition they took 
instructions from the Trust Board of the Hospital,
Region, the NHS Management Executive and through them 
instructions from government. They took account of the 
local community and therefore future or potential 
patients. They needed help from staff and relied on 
their staff.
The Consultants also took instructions from G.P.Fund 
Holders and General Practitioners themselves rather than 
the District Purchasing Authorities, as the Consultants 
were dependent for their work on referral from General 
Practitioners. To a degree they also took instructions 
from patients who indicated their agreement to undergo 
treatment. They also took account of General 
Practitioners7 and colleagues7 views in the management of 
their work, as well as their speciality associations, 
Region and the profession in more general matters
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concerning their work. They needed help from the hospital 
and colleagues in other specialities in the facilitation 
of their work and relied on junior doctors for certain 
routine items of work, although unlike managers they were 
not dependent on this as they were qualified to do this 
work themselves if the need should arise.
Consultants and managers listed the powers, influences 
people and organizations which most affected them in 
their work as follows:
CONSULTANTS. MANAGERS.
Local Politicians.




NHS Management Executive. 
Trust Board.
District Purchasers 









The interesting thing about this, although not entirely 
unexpected, (the issue was recognized in the previous 
chapter), is that the common ground is only with the 
patient or potential patient. Since the introduction of 
the internal market, the common ground has extended to 
include general practitioners, particularly if they are 
Fund Holding practices, because of the need to attract 
their custom to the hospital. However this is balanced 
by the relative loss of Regional influences, common 
influence on both managers who received a considerable 
managerial input from there, and consultants whose 
contracts were then held by them.
The other issue about power dependence, and Kotter (1977) 
discusses this as well, is that trying to control others 
by directing them on the basis of power associated with 
one's position does not always work, because there are 
people who will not accept orders just because the 
manager is the manager, and do not accept that managers 
have formal authority. Consultants fall into this 
category. Chief Executive:
"There are times when I feel a damn good dictatorship 
would make my life a lot easier because then you do not 
have anybody that says "No". You do not get 
consultants or anybody questioning you. You may be 
going completely in the wrong way, but at least you are 
doing it in a comfortable manner."
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Clinical Director, about his Chief Executive:
"He is not my boss, he cannot do what I do, when he can 
do the operations, and do them as well as I can, then 
he can tell me what to do."
Another Clinical Director about the Unit Manager:
"He stands behind me. When he can do the operation as 
well as I can, then he can stand next to me."
Kotter (1977) feels that the larger the number of job 
related dependencies the more time and energy the 
managerial incumbent tends to put into power orientated 
behaviour to cope with those dependencies. Also the 
larger the organization the more the manager must depend 
on other specialities and support services. Both of 
these have implications for the doctor manager 
relationship. In arguing the case of the dependency 
problems of the hospital manager Kotter (1978) feels that 
it is important and useful for the manager to exhibit in 
such situations a high profile availability and to be 
seen about the hospital. Clinical Director:
"I want a chap who at 11 am, in say a coffee break, 
pops his nose in for a cup of coffee and says, how are
things going, what are the problems? By the way I
think you ought to know this, I think you ought to know 
that, and incidentally that operation you did the other 
day cost x number of pounds, I hope it was a success.
In other words a chap who is popping in, chatting to 
people, knows everybody, a friend of the family. Now,
he only needs to come in for half an hour a week. He
can see everybody in the departments in half an hour 
once a week, but I want to see the chap, and I want him 
to know what is going on day by day."
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Medically and dentally qualified Unit General Manager:
"Managers in the NHS spend too much time in their 
offices and not enough time in the hospital, getting a 
feel of what is going on, getting to know the people 
who do the work."
Clinical Director:
"I have never ever seen our Chief Executive in our 
department, or outpatients, let alone in theatre. Some 
of the staff would not know him."
Even one Chief Executive agreed:
"Managers do not spend enough time going round the 
hospital, through wards, into theatre."
West (1988:103) thought this different style of 
management in the NHS was because so much of the senior 
management task is negotiation with key groups rather 
than day to day control of individual departments, so 
that managers spend most of their time in meetings and 
much less on walking about.
13.11. Differing Career Structures
Managers stressed the virtues of interpersonal skills and 
of enlisting the co operation of others. They expect to 
subsume individual interests to those of the 
organization. They were trained to be aware of the wider
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implication of any activity within the organization and 
were expected to make optimal use of limited resources.
Managers are normally trained to work to long term goals 
though this may not always be very evident in the health 
service where managers are usually only in post in any 
one hospital for comparatively short periods compared to 
a consultant. District General Manager:
”1 felt very acutely as a young administrator, moving 
every two years, that whenever I talked to surgeons or 
physicians, they would say, you are only here for a 
short while, we have heard it all before. And so, in 
any department, you were starting on the wrong foot 
because they were very unhappy with that, but with the 
advantage that at least if the person was no good, at 
least they only had to wait two years to have somebody 
else."
ex District General Manager and now an academic:
"The lack of continuity in management is a major flaw. 
Or at least was? I think it is just as bad as it was, 
but I am a bit out of touch. The continuity provided 
by the consultants is a major plus, with the 
reservation that people get stale and get very insular 
and are not prepared to look outside. So you could 
argue that perhaps the two together could provide a 
good balance. But it is unfortunate that they are 
different professions, rather than different 
individuals with the balance."
Manager:
"If I was going to change just one thing I would rather 
have some more continuity for managers than lots more 
instability amongst the seniors, because you don't have 
one surgeon, you usually have two, three or more and 
you would be very unfortunate if they were all the same 
age, so there is some turn around. Also there are a 
large number of physicians and surgeons in most DGH's
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so it is not as if you have eighty people who are all 
the same age."
Clinical Director:
"They come and go every few years, they never have to 
live with the mess they make. I've seen it all before, 
they all make the same mistakes, then move on."
13.12.0. Managers' and Doctors' attitudes to each other
So far I have discussed the findings of the doctors and 
managers in how they see their own roles, their cultural, 
educational, agenda, personality, and career differences 
etc. In this chapter on the findings I thought it 
helpful to gather together not only the views which they 
wished to unburden about each other, but also to suggest 
ways in which they suggested one might help and 
understand the other.
13.12.1. Managers' views of Doctors' Management Skills
Some managers have graciously acknowledged, with perhaps 
some surprise, the aptitude of some consultants for 
management and admitted they had under rated their 
abilities in the past. DGM:
"There's no doubt that many doctors would make 
excellent managers and I do believe it's about the 
balance of that and certainly in debates in terms of 
sharing the organisation the contribution that comes 
from doctors is very, very important. Very 
influential and quite essential when you want to 
deliver change, so what I am saying is that there is a
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very important contribution to be made as with all 
other managers.
I think doctors are no better equipped than other 
professionals, because at the end of the day it's about 
how they can, have they got the basic skills, basic 
personality, to withstand the pressures on them. I 
think in some ways the pressures on doctors from their 
colleagues are greater than other managerial groups.
But I'm thinking it could work, though it depends on 
the situation.”
And another DGM:
"If I can draw from experiences that I have had from 
working with doctors in management, I think the 
following things come to the fore. Some are very good, 
they really ought to pack up and become managers 
because they actually display a talent for it, and they 
can impact on the organization in a much greater way, 
than perhaps others are able to."
Some also recognized the problems it created for doctors 
by becoming involved in management. A DGM?
"The one person I know who wanted to really get 
involved became totally ostracised by his colleagues. 
There are tensions about doctors in management and 
whether they are acceptable to other doctors, or 
whether they are seen as having passed a divide."
Another referring more specifically to the problems of 
elected representatives rather than Clinical Directors 
who are appointed:
"They usually have intense difficulties dealing with 
their colleagues in a managerial sense, both because 
their colleagues are actually more awkward with them I 
would say than with managers from other disciplines on 
occasion, and secondly, which I've always found quite 
interesting, because of the theory that if you've got 
doctors in charge then the doctors will do it - that's 
silly really. I think for many of them particularly 
in systems which are elected, or for time barred
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things, common patterns of behaviour appear, it's like 
Chairmen of the Medical Staff Committee, you know if 
they're there for three years you give them six months 
you've got to make sure that any hard decisions are 
taken within the period of the first eighteen months, 
because after that eighteen months they're busy 
thinking what people will do to them when they go back. 
But I don't believe elected systems actually work, and 
they place people in too many difficult situations."
And another DGM referred to the question of doctors' 
tribalism, seeing themselves primarily as doctors and 
only then as managers:
"There are also all sorts of personal problems that 
come into play, that influence the way they behave when 
they are in managerial posts. Many doctors believe, 
that although they are individuals, they are brought up 
to stick to the great body of doctoring as priority 
number one. That raises conflicts which in my view are 
not always conducive to success in management."
13.13. Ways in which Change can be Assisted
It was suggested that there are a number of ways in which 
managers could help doctors fulfil their role in 
management.
Firstly managers must show more understanding of the 
doctors' point of view, and make sure that efforts which 
any doctor makes to improve a hospital service has some 
direct and immediate effect on his own department. Chief 
Executive:
"For instance when consultants make efforts to improve 
the management of their service either in terms of 
efficiency savings or income generation it is vital 
that their department receives much of the benefit and
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they do not see it spirited away to a central fund. 
Without some incentive, disillusionment can quickly 
arise."
A common and often successful argument which plays on 
both the doctors' fears and needs has been to stress that 
they must either help to manage or be managed, that 
unless they become involved in managing their services it 
will be done for them, perhaps by people who are less 
aware of the issues as seen by the doctors on the ground. 
Chief Executive:
"This ploy has been rather over used and is easily and 
increasingly countered by the argument that only 
doctors can make many of the decisions and therefore 
this argument has been seen as an empty threat."
A few managers have acknowledged that their lack of 
medical knowledge has been a handicap, not only in their 
dealings with the medical profession but also in their 
work. The courses to help managers learn about medicine 
have in the words of one DGM:
"Been a great help in my work and in breaking down the 
barriers of misunderstanding between managers and 
doctors, and yet there is a enormous way to go yet."
And doctors have shown ignorance too. Sometimes managers 
assume, often incorrectly that doctors are easily able to 
interpret the information for themselves particularly 
financial information. Gross ignorance here can damage 
doctors' credibility in the eyes of management.
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Management decisions which sometimes look arbitrary or 
ill advised to clinicians, often are so because they rest 
on incomplete information and/or appreciation by 
management of clinical actions and developments of the 
clinicians. Doctors need therefore to ensure that 
management is informed and understands any changes in 
their current activity likely to have resource 
implications, and longer term developments or technical 
improvements that they plan to introduce.
13.14. Doctors' Views of Managers
Some managers have demonstrated basic misconceptions 
about medical matters and have thereby allowed the 
doctors to dismiss them as naive about health matters. 
Clinical Director:
"Our Chief Executive could not understand why notes 
from other doctors or hospitals relating to a patient's 
previous treatment might be valuable. "Surely our own 
hospital notes are adequate?"
Other managers have lost credibility by appearing unduly 
patronising, or by promising more than they could 
reasonably deliver.
Management information is a potentially useful tool in 
building up the role of doctors in management. But again 
management credibility is damaged if the information is
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inaccurate. And if the information is accurate, 
medically qualified Ex UGM said:
"Managers lose credibility by misunderstanding or even 
by failing to show that they understand its clinical or 
epidemiological implications."
Doctors need to keep in touch with colleagues using 
directorate meetings as a forum to establish effective 
clear channels of communication between management and 
clinicians, so that management is kept informed of any 
change likely to have resource implications, and 
similarly so that they themselves are able to keep 
informed of the intentions of the management.
General managers and chief executives usually seem 
relatively unaware that the doctors are suspicious and 
fearful, and of the extent to wich consusltants feel this 
about managers. There appear to be four main reasons for 
this although this is by no means inclusive of all 
reasons given.
13.15. Erosion of Values
Doctors have always felt that health care is distinctive 
and special, a feature that makes it unresponsive and not 
appropriate for a managerial or commercial approach. 
Ethical values, it is felt, should not be tainted by a 
business mentality. Consultants often see discussions of
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resources as somehow improper, believing that such 
discussion conflicts with their responsibility to the 
individual patient.
There is a fear that more management power may lead to a 
financially led assessment of health care, thereby 
forcing doctors to make decisions on economic rather than 
clinical grounds. Many words and phrases seem to have 
different connotations with the two groups. Phrases such 
as "quality assurance", "performance review", "objective 
setting", "monitoring", and "efficiency" may be 
interpreted by consultants as tools for either checking 
up on doctors or for cutting services.
Doctors see the use of terms like "consumer" in place of 
"patient", or "marketing", "public relations", or "annual 
report", as evidence that health service values are being 
replaced by commercial ones. There are often mutual 
misunderstandings of the significance of particular words 
and hence of each other's values.
13.16. Erosion of Clinical Freedom
In Chapters 5 and 6 I discussed Clinical Freedom and some 
of the issues surrounding that. Some doctors see managers 
as bureaucratic henchmen, in post to ensure that 
instructions from the centre are implemented. Individual 
performance review and performance related pay for
357
managers has exacerbated these fears that a manager 
worried about an adverse personal review might act more 
as an agent of the centre, and have a drastic effect on 
doctors' clinical freedom.
13.17. Conclusions
The successful relationship between managers and doctors 
is crucial to the success of a hospital, and resolving 
the differences between the two groups is essential to a 
constructive and collaborative relationship. "Doctors and 
managers must build up a relationship of mutual trust if 
the NHS reforms are to work." Nichol (1991:10):
"We need to sustain the unigue doctor-patient 
relationship and then build a new and mutually 
supportive doctor-manager relationship."
Chawner (1991) hoped that managers would no longer talk 
about doctors being involved in management but of their 
being part of management. This is something which is 
becoming very much part of the culture of change in many 
of the hospitals I studied. No longer is the "them and 
us" attitude the norm? more and more I have found 
managers willing to share responsibility with doctors, 
but many doctors are coming to realize that this is the 
way to make progress with this issue. There remain two 
main problems: firstly the big group of doctors who are 
so far unwilling to accept the challenge for some or all
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of the reasons outlined; and secondly the problem of 
giving doctors responsibility, making them accountable 
but not giving them equal measures of authority, 
particularly financial authority. This issue has been 
discussed in Chapter 3 section 3.7.4., touched on also in 
section 3.2. and will be returned to in Chapter 17. 
However before that I would like to discuss in the next 
chapter the management skills required of doctors in 
running clinical services and ways of encouraging them to 
become more involved in management.
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CHAPTER 14
DOCTORS' MANAGEMENT SKILLS AND SUPPORT REQUIRED
14.0. Introduction
In this chapter I will discuss various management skills 
which Clinical Directors and Managers have felt are 
necessary for them to fulfil that role successfully. And 
later in the chapter I will consider some ways in which 
doctors can be encouraged and supported to undertake 
management roles. Again these are highlighted on the 
cognitive map on page 361 overleaf.
14.1. Commitment
There are different levels of commitment by consultants 
to management just as there are different levels of 
management skills possessed by consultants. The first can 
be identified as follows, based on a typology by White 
(1992b):
1. Leaders. Those who understand and are committed to 
the contribution of a management role to patient care.
"I think that we have to be involved, we have an 
ethical duty to ensure that limited resources are used 
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2. Helpers. Those who see it in their interest to 
become involved in what they see as management.
"If doctors don't become involved then someone else 
will take control from us."
3. Followers. Those who can detect a shift in the 
balance of power and realise that it is in their 
interest to become involved in management.
"There is a tide running at the moment in favour of 
doctors controlling resources more. If that is how it 
is going to be, then I think we should make sure we 
remain on the winning side as it were."
4. Opposers. Oblivious to management and typified by 
their comment;
"I am only here to treat patients."
People can of course vary in their level of commitment 
according to mood and circumstance, but on the whole it 
is an evolutionary process to proceed up the scale. Some 
of those at stage 2 can be dangerous, being there for the 
wrong reasons and seeing no reason or value to aim for 
stage 1. Most efforts and study seem at present to focus 
on the first group, those who in the words of a medically 
qualified UGM
"Demonstrate motivation, commitment and enthusiasm for 
the management process."
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It is the other groups that I shall return to in my final 
chapter outlining the directions for further work.
14.2. The Management Skills
Mintzberg's (1973) classic research on the managers7 ten 
roles suggests that they are under constant pressure to 
acquire and disseminate information, to develop 
strategies without time for analysis, to influence the 
behaviour of others without being dictatorial, to react 
sensibly to external initiatives without creating an 
impression of weakness, all of which require a manager to 
develop a network of relationships which depend 
critically on the art of communication. He classified 




Monitor, disseminator and spokesman.
Decisional Roles.
Planner, disturbance handler, resource allocator and 
entrepreneur.
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It was therefore instructive to consider the roles of the 
Clinical Director under these headings and to identify 
existing roles and areas where there might be difficulty 
in involving doctors in management.
14.2.1. The Interpersonal Roles.
These are the leadership roles. Doctors have difficulty 
with leadership roles; at least they have problems with 
what might be called followership roles. Consultants 
especially see themselves as autonomous; they recognize 
no boss. Clinical Director:
"We talk a lot about leadership in medicine, we seldom 
talk about followership, talk about being the good 
citizen, without being the leader and I think that's 
something else that probably needs to be cultivated 
among medical staff."
The Clinical Director is frequently the leader of the 
directorate and takes full responsibility for devolved 
operational management. Clinical Director;
"You need to be creative, ambitious and a leader."
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Motivation and enthusiasm are required to set the style 
and pace of the directorate. The Clinical Director is 
the one person accountable, leading the decision making 
process but also ensuring that others are empowered to 
make decisions, an enabler and facilitator. UGM:
"One of the problems we encountered was that having 
devolved authority to Clinical Directors, they seemed 
unwilling or unable to devolve it onwards.”
One Clinical Director referred to a recognition of this:
"Delegation of leadership means people are more in 
touch with leadership."
There is a clear responsibility to determine directorate 
organizational behaviour and standards, to be a powerful 
voice in what the directorate does and how it does it, to 
be responsible for issues of audit, review and 
evaluation, staff development and appraisal, and to 
determine whether the directorate has a high or low 
profile. The management style of the directorate is set 
by the manner, behaviour and actions of the Clinical 
Director. The Clinical Director may act as a role model 
for others, and it is a responsibility to provide an 
effective and successful role model which other staff 
wish to emulate.
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Leadership also includes the ability to inspire and 
influence others to work towards the attainment of 
objectives and goals. This is necessary because of the
task of getting work done by and through others.
It is therefore necessary to choose a method of 
leadership appropriate to the situation. People need to
be motivated. Clinical Director?
"The best motivator is challenge which then allows for 
a feeling of achievement, although it has to be 
followed by recognition."
Clinical Directors need particularly strong leadership 
qualities to establish a directorate from scratch. 
Later, in just running it with the help of business and 
nurse managers, they need to create a team spirit not 
only amongst the immediate team (the business and nurse 
manager), but also amongst all the members of the 
directorate. Typical were the following quotes of 
Clinical Directors?
"Their responsibilities [referring to the Clinical 
Directors] aren't just fiscal, they're also to do with 
managing people and playing a part in a multi­
disciplinary team."
"In a Clinical Directorate, there is a doctor, an 
administrator and a nurse. That is the management team 
for the Clinical Directorate."
"It is important to try to engender a team approach, 
delegating responsibilities, for example giving ward 
sister control over everything that happens on the 
ward."
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"The emphasis is on a team approach, the basic team 
comprising the doctor, the business manager and the 
nurse manager working together."
And a UGM referring to the difficulty one Clinical 
Director had with the idea of teamwork described a 
situation:
"Where one of the Clinical Directors, who never liked 
the system and had not really played as part of the 
team."
A well defined directorate leadership acknowledges, 
respects, values and uses professional differences, 
similarities and contributions. Clinical Director?
"One has to be able to recognize good ideas from all 
members of the directorate team."
A clinical director must invest all the members with a 
sense of identity in the directorate, helping other 
consultants to adapt and contribute fully to the new 
structure and process? analyse problems, make decisions, 
accept responsibility for those decisions and be 
accountable for those decisions, being part of the 
corporate hospital management? Establishing clear 
complementary and effective roles and responsibilities 
with the other managers of the directorate, and review 
and update them as the skills of each develop.
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14.4.2. Informational Roles
The flow of information is a multi directional process to 
reach superiors, subordinates and peers.
The Clinical Director was seen as a spokesperson, 
coordinating a medical input into management information 
providing in one direction a clinical perspective to 
management but also allowing colleagues to debate and 
influence management decisions. Clinical Director;
"I am there to enable clinical colleagues to know about 
things, so that they can be discussed and a view to be 
represented to management.11
In the other direction it ensures colleagues are informed 
of management decisions, ensuring clear, relevant, 
informative and comprehensive communication. Clinical 
Director again:
111 am able to tell them what the Management Board 
decided, and also why they came to that decision.”
The importance of clear accurate lines of communication 
was stressed many times by Clinical Directors, for 
example:
"The information going out of the directorate must be 
realistic and accurate and the incoming messages must 
be clear." ,
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What was not clearly stated so often was the need to 
communicate across the organization, between 
directorates. One Clinical Director noted?
"But also there needs to be a link [referring to 
communications] transversely with other directorates, 
and that tends to be forgotten."
Good communication within the directorate and between 
other directorates is a process of people relating to one 
another, listening, empathizing, checking, understanding, 
providing feedback. Clinical Director;
"It is vital to have really good communication skills 
to prevent and diffuse potential areas of difficulty
with staff and colleagues."
Information and communication skills and networks are 
important and the Clinical Director uses his influence to 
ensure that these are good. Clinical Director;
"We have to learn that consulting with others and 
taking their advice is about building strengths and not 
about admitting your weaknesses."
Many clinical directors feel particular vulnerability in 
expressing a need for guidance, support and learning for 
themselves. The Clinical Director needs to be able to
relate in groups, or one to one situations, to be able o
lead discussions and meetings competently, to prepare 
and present arguments based on facts, and to resolve 
claims on competing resources. Clinical Director:
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"Reluctance to admit the need for guidance can hinder 
personal, professional and directorate growth and is 
not a good example to colleagues."
Directorate culture must be to support all staff 
development within the group. Wraith and Casey (1992) 
feel that external resources provided by other sites, 
academic institutions and organizations should be fully 
utilised for this purpose.
It is as important that the hospital listens as readily 
as it talks. What is important here is whether the 
Clinical Director has an adequate voice in the corporate 
decision making process. Several Clinical Directors 
stressed that they had no really effective voice as they 
were not on or represented on any management board or 
committee. One Clinical Director typified this:
"I am working very much in isolation, I go to the MEC 
and I hear what we are told, they might just as well 
write me a letter, the meeting is just to tell us what 
is happening and what we are expected to do. There is 
no listening to what we might have to say, the 
decisions have already been taken at a higher level."
The dilemma of how many Clinical Directors make for an 
effective corporate management and decision making body 
is an issue to which no one has yet provided a 
satisfactory answer. The BMA/CCSC (1990) emphasise
" the requirement that the management body is not too 
large to be unworkable".
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It is an issue raised on a number of occasions. To some 
extent it depends on the size of the hospital, but it 
also relates to the time available, and the management 
skills and ability of the Medical Director. A medically 
qualified ex UGM summed it up:
"The more Clinical Directors on the Board the better 
for the organization, but it vastly increases the work 
of the chairman, who is usually the Medical Director, 
who must do most of the work outside the committee 
before the meeting, ensuring that everything runs 
smoothly."
Part of the current role of Clinical Directors is to 
ensure that effective audit mechanisms are in place, that 
reporting of audit is occurring and that improvements and 
changes are monitored to improve effectiveness. (White 
1992c). This responsibility for the quality management 
or effectiveness of the organisation is brought closer to 
the patient by an impact on the quality of service 
delivered. Quality needs to be understood and embraced 
as an integral part of everything everyone does. People 
need to see the impact of their own particular 
contribution to the success of the organization as a 
whole. Clinical Director:
"The managing of a balance between quality, quantity 
and cost, particularly quality in contracts will 
probably be a more important part of the Clinical 
Director's future role."
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14.2.3. Decision Making Roles
Uncertainty has now become the expected way of life in 
hospital rather than an occasional threat. There is a 
greater emphasis on opportunities rather than on 
problems, on creativity rather than routine and control. 
Clinical Director:
"Innovatory practice is valued, but it has to be and 
rewarded. Implicit in that is the expectation and 
acceptance of the possibility of making mistakes, of 
learning from them and modifying practices accordingly. 
This risk taking and its consequences need to be openly 
supported however."
For Clinical Directors dealing with conflicts is often a 
problem. Chief Executive:
"Doctors have problems with negotiation and conflict. 
Doctors have difficulty in believing in teams. They see 
committees as looking after territory rather than the 
whole organizations."
And two Clinical Directors said:
"The most difficult thing is dealing with personnel 
problems. I had never been involved in a disciplinary 
issue before. Fortunately I had full support from the 
personnel department."
"This relates very much to working with people, being 
aware of others and seeing things from another person's 
perspective, to read or interpret other people's 
thoughts and feeling even when they are not obvious, 
developing others and working as a team."
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They also have difficulty thinking strategically, to make 
a stand on critical issues. Problems need to be faced 
openly and honestly. An increasingly important role for 
the Clinical Director is influencing the activity of the 
directorate in the identification of opportunities and 
encouraging and developing awareness of business planning 
in colleagues, leading the discussion to analyse issues 
and make decisions, and agreeing realistic achievable 
activity levels through contracts. Clinical Director;
"I have to ensure that business plans are reasonable, 
achievable, acceptable to colleagues and subsequently 
monitor them, analysing progress against the plan and 
expenditure against budget at monthly intervals and 
taking appropriate action if the results are not 
matching targets.M
Meetings and discussions with medical and other staff may 
be necessary before agreeing work patterns and targets 
within the directorate and to monitor progress through 
the year and to ensure they are consistent with the 
overall objectives of the hospital.
Financial management was an issue discussed many times.
As many Clinical Directors, CEs and UGMs pointed out:
"You need to get your hands on control of the money, if 
you are to play any meaningful role in management."
Clinical Directors need to know who really makes the 
decisions and how. A UGM suggested that a good test was
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"to take as an example take a recent piece of equipment 
and find out who really made the decision to buy it."
To be part of the management structure the Clinical 
Directors have to be part of that process. But in 
addition they need to be informed of the total budget 
position of the hospital? a budget in isolation may be 
meaningless. A Clinical Director summed up the financial 
management role as having three parts:
"Firstly accepting financial responsibility for 
provision of defined services although only after 
personal involvement in the negotiation. Secondly 
encouraging financial awareness among colleagues and 
participation a in financial review of the directorate. 
And thirdly to advise on clinical priorities so 
ensuring that the directorate stays within budget."
Many Clinical Directors stressed the need to have 
mechanisms in place to monitor the financial performance, 
so that corrective action could be taken as appropriate, 
operating within the statute, rules and conventions of 
trusts or self governing unit. One UGM warned:
"The rules need to be set out beforehand. Management 
retains its power by not setting out the rules 
beforehand."
14.3. Attitudinal Change
There are certain prerequisites to involving doctors in 
management. The most important lesson from the 
introduction of clinical management is the need to change 
attitudes of all the people concerned. The views of
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several Clinical Directors when discussing the thing they 
would most like to see change are summarised by this view 
from a Medical Director:
"I would most like to see a change in the attitude of 
my colleagues.11
and a consultant who had spend some years as a UGM summed 
up the views of a number of Clinical Directors:
"The importance of getting the structure right has to 
take second place. If this change of attitude is not 
properly discussed and debated before introducing a 
system it is unlikely to be successful and these 
discussions and decisions which should take precedence 
over the introduction of information systems."
It was shown to me by many doctors and managers that 
there had been an increasing if reluctant acceptance by 
many clinicians of the reality of cash limits, and within 
that the ethical responsibility of all concerned to 
ensure that resources were spent wisely to ensure 
efficiency and effectiveness. One Clinical Director put 
it like this:
"Where money is limited, extravagance or even lack of 
concern for the financial repercussions in the care of 
one patient, may lead to the reduction or denial of 
care for another."
Constant attention is now accepted by many to the idea of 
improving efficiency in financial and economic terms and 
to ensuring the effectiveness and validity of treatment 
to produce the best outcome. This, of course, links
375
into the range of initiatives described in Chapter 3 
(Doctors and Hospitals) section 3.5.1-3., in the 
management of resources, clinical efficiency and also the 
more recent development of medical and clinical audit, 
i.e. clinical effectiveness.
14.4. Time Commitment
One of the issues raised with great frequency was the 
question of time. Everyone agreed that if clinicians are 
to be involved in management they need be allowed to 
fulfil that responsibility on a part time basis. The 
problem is that if they are required to devote too much 
of their time to their management function, then they 
will cease to be clinicians and the views of several 
Clinical Directors and some Managers could be summed up 
by the following remark from a Clinical Director:
"their unique perspective as clinicians will no longer 
be contributing to the management task."
The general feeling was that given that an important part 
of the task of the Clinical Director is leadership, this 
role would be inhibited if he were no longer a clinician. 
One Clinical Director said:
"Once a doctor is so involved in management that he 
becomes a manager full time he ceases to be a doctor? 




If doctors are to fulfil these managerial 
responsibilities on a part time basis, then the Clinical 
Director must be prepared to share responsibility with 
other members of the management team, recognizing that 
the Clinical Director role is managing and not 
administration. They need to be supported by able 
business managers and nurse managers. The emphasis is on 
a team approach and the basic team comprises the doctor, 
the business manager and the nurse manager working 
together. The intra group relationships can take one of 
three forms, White (1992), and the leader does not 
necessarily need to be a doctor although the tendency has 
been for this, nor does a leader need to be agreed 
explicitly Clinical Director Ex UGM:
"The leadership of this group does not need to be 
specified, though the tendency has been at least 
initially for this role to be filled by the doctor."
And Ross (1992) agrees:
"The most suitable person should be the Clinical 
Director, not necessarily a doctor".
377
14.6.0. Information Support
Some of the hospitals studied are not decentralizing but 
retaining power at the centre by retaining information. 
This is a common complaint of Clinical Directors:
"I would like to have some more information.”
"This role [referring to being Clinical Director] would 
be a whole lot easier if I had access to basic, 
reliable information."
"They expect you to do things with virtually no 
information."
"The trouble is the information I get is always about 
two months old by the time we get it. By then it is 
pretty useless for most purposes, it's just history."
"There seems to be a lot of information available in 
the district offices, although I'm not sure how 
accurate it is, but trying to get hold of it is mighty 
difficult. They seem reluctant to share it."
It is important that information available within the 
directorate is accurate and timely if a Clinical Director 
is to be usefully involved in management. Clinical 
Director in centralized unit struggling to devolve:
"I would like direct access to information, activity 
data etc."
Another view was taken by the Chief Executive of a well 
decentralized hospital:
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"I expect the Clinical Directors to be responsible for 
collecting their own information and telling us what is 
happening, and why, and what they are doing about 
getting it right if things are going off track. Not the 
old way of information coming down from on high, and 
the MEC being told that it was all wrong. They can't 
say the information is wrong now, because they produce 
it themselves."
It was generally felt that many of the roles concerned 
with information should be the prime responsibility of 
the Business Manager, particularly the gathering of 
relevant information. It might be necessary for the 
Business Manager to review and refine available 
information. But the Clinical Director uses that 
information for problem analysis and solving and to 
disseminating information to colleagues following 
management decisions. One Clinical Director put it like 
this:
"She [referring to the Business Manager] collects the 
information, analyses it and presents it at our weekly 
meetings? everyone knows what is going on, how we are 
doing on targets for contracts, and I can make 
decisions on any changes that need to be made."
14.6.1. Information systems
It is argued by some consultants that one cannot manage 
without sophisticated information systems. One Clinical 
Director said;
"It is all very well wanting me to manage the 
department but I just don't have the computer equipment 
to do it."
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While this idea is widespread, it is the case that the 
better the information the better the management function 
can be. A Clinical Director:
"Once we started to get the right information, and we 
could rely on its accuracy, things became a lot 
easier."
A few Clinical Directors believed that it was perfectly 
possible to run a clinical directorate without 
sophisticated information technology. One said:
"All you need is a notebook and a pencil to keep a 
record of what is going on."
Several Clinical Directors in successfully decentralized 
units stressed the point that information systems should 
be designed in the first place to improve the running of 
the clinical directorate and in the provision of the 
clinical service and only then should the necessary 
management information required both in the periphery and 
centrally be added on.
They also stressed that it was vital to introduce new 
accounting systems which were not functionally based in 
the traditional manner but which detailed all costs 
incurred within the decentralised structures. Clinical 
Director:
"I need to see a budget sheet showing the details of 
what is happening within the directorate, showing me 
exactly what the money is being spent on."
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14.7. Having Realistic Expectations
What is it that management hopes, demands and expects 
from doctors involved in management? This was neatly 
summarised as follows by a C.E. referring to his 
expectations of the Clinical Directors in his hospital:
" I demand integrity. I hope for the best. And I 
expect a considerable variation in performance from 
different Clinical Directors."
What they get seems to be varying levels of competence at 
the role. But competence can be classified too into 
three main groups. One Chief Executive neatly put it like 
this:
" First there is natural ability, although that ability 
maybe doubted by the individual Clinical Director. Then 
there is trainability, that is to say those who can do 
a reasonable job when trained. And thirdly there is 
unbelievability, by which I mean those who think they 
can do it but can never learn how."
What came across strongly from the participants was a 
belief in the need for doctors to be involved, that 
belief being held by both managers and doctors. But it 
was also thought necessary for the doctors to have a 
belief in their own value and capacity to undertake the 
roles required, albeit with training, as touched upon by 
the Chief Executive mentioned in the quotation above.
And finally there was a need to take account of time,
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time for undertaking the roles, time for training in the 
necessary skills, but above all a recognition that it was 
a part time role with continuing clinical commitment.
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CHAPTER 15
MODELS OF HOSPITAL CLINICAL MANAGEMENT
15.0. Introduction
This chapter, again highlighted in the cognitive map on 
the next page (p.384) discusses the ideas and models 
currently being tried to involve doctors in management of 
hospitals. Some of the problems are discussed, for 
example whether Clinical Directors are elected or 
selected, the problems of setting up clinical 
directorates, failure to centralize and confusion over 
roles. Then various styles of Clinical Director are 
introduced highlighting differences. Some well known 
examples of clinical directorate structure are discussed 
before setting out some basic principles and areas of 
concern. Finally having considered on one level the 
problems of how to involve doctors, later at a more 
radical level, the question is raised whether doctors 
should be involved.
Some hospitals have attempted to encourage their medical 
professionals to participate more in managing the 
hospital by becoming responsible for their colleagues as 
part of the management structure. Other hospitals have 
felt that the extent to which they are truly involved 
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managers, have been given some financial independence, an 
issue discussed in the previous chapter Section 14,2.3.
A general General Manager's comment was typical:
"You need to give them [the doctors] hands on control 
of the money"
This view is supported by West (1988:98);
"a great deal will depend on the extent to which 
managers (professionals involved in management) at each 
level have some financial independence".
Equally important is the extent to which such clinical 
directors can take a corporate view and see themselves as 
part of the hospital management, West again? (1988:98)
"Equally important is the extent to which such managers 
(professionals involved in management) see themselves 
as part of the hospital management or first and 
foremost as part of their own department".
one UGM described this as
"Breaking out of their tribal groups"
as opposed to being first and foremost part of, and 
representing, their own department. This departmental or 
representative attitude is typified by the following 
comment from a Clinical Director in a centralized 
hospital:
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"I represent the department, put my department's point 
of view and generally fight to get what my department 
feels it needs. And also to make sure we do not lose 
out to other departments."
There have in the past been specialised managers of 
certain departments of the hospital, for example an X-ray 
department represented by its superintendent or 
consultant radiologist, the pathology laboratory probably 
by a consultant pathologist, the audiology department, an 
audiological scientist, consultant otolaryngologist or 
audiological physician, and beyond that the ward sister, 
the firm consultant, etc., but as a medically qualified 
ex UGM, now academic pointed out,
"They were usually competitors for resources not allies 
within the general organization, and the resources they 
were given were set by those in local control of the 
whole service".
15.1. Clinical Involvement in Management of a Hospital
In any discussion it is important to distinguish between 
the clinical management structure within a unit or 
department and the management structure within the 
hospital, district or trust. The two are different 
structurally with important differences of emphasis, and 
the structure within one does not necessarily reflect the 
structure within the other.
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It is also important not to confuse the Trust Boards of a 
hospital which are generally for strategic management, 
and where medical input is from a Medical Director, and 
the Management Boards which are for the operational 
management of the hospital or trust although they may 
from time to time need to take a strategic view, and 
where medical input comes from the Clinical Directors.
The roles of the Medical Director and Clinical Directors 
are different, although one hospital in my study has 
attempted to combine these roles.
The clinical directorate is for the operational 
management of the faculty or department or unit within 
the hospital, and again although it is primarily an 
operational unit, the clinical director may need to take 
a strategic view at times. Clinical Director:
"Management can be broadly divided into two parts, 
namely guidance or strategy and delivery or operational 
management. The task of a clinical directorate is 
mainly operational management but the Clinical Director 
representing the clinical group should have a voice in 
strategy."
Discussion in this chapter is therefore limited to 
doctors' involvement in the management structure at 
directorate level, i.e., as Clinical Directors.
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15.2. Clinical Directorates
A number of hospitals have increasingly been 
experimenting with variations of the so called clinical 
directorate management structure. All the hospitals 
which I studied claimed to have adopted a clinical 
directorate structure to manage clinical activity. This 
is the latest in a series of efforts to secure the active 
participation of clinical staff in the management of a 
hospital. The chief executive of the NHS made this plea 
at a seminar on clinical directorates (Nichol, 1990):
"Doctors and managers must build up a relationship of
mutual dependence if the NHS reforms are to work”
He went on to say that there was a need to sustain the 
unique doctor patient relationship and then build a new 
and mutually supportive doctor manager relationship, an 
issue to be addressed in later chapters.
There is however, not one clinical directorate structure? 
there are many variations and no one example seems to be 
clearly better than another, but whatever arrangement is 
chosen or found, for it to work well, it has to be that 
which is best suited to that hospital, given all the 
local factors namely of size, history, personalities and 
whether the hospital is on one site or several. There 
are certain principles associated with success or 
failure. In studying this aspect, one of the problems is
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that what hospitals think and profess to have chosen as a 
clinical directorate structure, does not always bear any 
resemblance to what an outside researcher can observe.
Examples from various acute hospitals have been studied 
from a small hospital having six Clinical Directors with 
no decentralization of management, to a large hospital 
with twenty four Clinical Directors and again no 
decentralization although claiming to be fully devolved. 
On the other hand I have studied small and medium sized 
hospitals with good decentralization and four to six or 
seven Clinical Directors as well as large hospitals with 
twenty or more Clinical Directors.
In the smaller hospitals there seem to be typically four, 
five or six directorates with some of the larger 
hospitals having up to double that number. There are 
hospitals with over twenty and at least one hospital is 
planning to introduce fifty or sixty directorates. In 
large hospitals where there are between one and two 
hundred consultants it is usual, although by no means 
universal, to split directorates into sub-directorates or 
associate directorates. In this situation it is often 
the clinical directors who have difficulty in devolving 
their managerial control. Consultant and Ex UGM:
"It's curious, because we've actually come across 
another problem since. We feel that we have to de­
centralize further than the fifteen Clinical 
Directorates, down to Clinical Teams within the new
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health service. I think it's absolutely essential, but 
it is the devil's own job to persuade Clinical 
Directors to decentralize. And we are actually having 
to change our whole management system now because the 
resistance they have put up to opening certain areas, 
to allowing that further decentralization to take 
place.11
There appear to be no hard and fast rules for splitting 
the hospital into clinical directorates. The size of the 
hospital and total number of consultants and the numbers 
of consultants within each specialty are factors which 
have to be taken into account. As one UGM now academic 
said about introducing clinical directorates,
"They are not to be applied mechanistically but within 
their own cultures."
The ideal seems to be to produce groupings of similar 
specialities with roughly some equality of size. A major 
centre with a large specialist unit would probably have 
separate directorates for those units, but directorates 
of more than about fourteen or fifteen consultants are 
probably too large, whereas those with less than a half a 
dozen, too small. A useful rule of thumb is that medical 
and support service directorates can be larger than these 
figures as they usually contain less disparate groupings. 
The activity and control of the surgical specialities 
where services and activities are somewhat different has 
a far greater effect on hospital income.
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There are no hard and fast rules. There are differences 
and anomalies. Directorates of only one consultant do 
exist alongside other directorates in the same hospital 
with more than fourteen consultants. These anomalies 
appear to exist for reasons of personality and history 
and lack of management control. There are many hospitals 
which for local reasons have managed their directorate 
structures in differing ways, for instance where 
hospitals are split between two or more sites. In such 
circumstances certain specialities, even though 
relatively small in their own Specialist Hospital or 
site, may have their own Directorate as a result.
15.3. Clinical Subdirectorates
Large hospitals with perhaps two hundred consultants may 
have more than thirty [sub] Directorates although these 
are grouped into about six or eight Clinical Directorates 
with the remainder as Associate Clinical Directorates, 
the Clinical Directors of the Associate or Sub 
Directorates being responsible for running them in 
exactly the same way, except that those (Associate) 
Clinical Directors do not sit on the Management Board, 
but meet regularly with their particular Clinical 
Director, their spokesman who negotiates for them on the 
Board, although he is not their representative.
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15.4. Clinical Director: Elected or Selected?
There are important differences between these two things 
and it is an issue underlying a number of problems that 
have surfaced in discussions. As Jaques says (1978:330),
"Elected representatives must be distinguished from 
individuals who are appointed by some external agency 
to advisory or executive bodies because they are 
typical of the group from which they come."
As a medically qualified Chief Executive pointed out:
"The representative can have more problems with, and 
complaints from, his colleagues in difficult decisions 
because he is a representative rather than an appointee 
as the basis of the roles are different."
It might of course be possible to have every faculty, 
speciality and department or cost centre represented on 
the Management Board and this would produce a very flat 
management structure. It does however cause some 
confusion in the minds of those Clinical Directors who 
view their role, as representatives of their department, 
as continuing to exhibit tribalistic, departmental 
attitudes, whereas they should be exhibiting corporate 
and visionary attitudes.
In one hospital in this study which contained twenty four 
directorates twenty three of those clinical directors 
felt their role was to represent of their colleagues and 
their department. The Clinical Directors attitudes can be
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summarised by the following comments of five different 
consultants:
"I put my department's point of view.”
”To make sure my department doesn't lose out."
"To make sure other departments are not fobbing my 
department off."
"To gain a sympathetic hearing from my colleagues for 
the problems of ray department."
"To represent my department and enable it to get the 
support of others."
Interestingly this hospital had centralized management.
On the other hand some Clinical Directors in other 
hospitals, which were very devolved, did recognize that 
their role was not as representative as the following two 
quotes i1lustrate:
"Then you are beginning to move towards Clinical 
Directorates, when I think the roles change because you 
are not just representing yourself or your own 
specialty but you are having to speak on behalf of 
other people, and absorb the interests of other groups 
and their intentions and take on board the five year 
plans of others and try and mesh them into a larger 
organization."
"The role of consultants in this directorate is to 
combine with all the various directorates to make the 
best use of resources."
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15.5.0. Some Pitfalls of Setting up Clinical Directorates
15.5.1. Failure to Decentralize
The biggest pitfall seems to be a system where the old 
Cogwheel Division system of the hospital remains 
unchanged but the titles of the various leaders and heads 
are changed. For instance the Head of Department becomes 
the Clinical Director, and the General Manager becomes 
the Chief Executive. In such an event there is the 
illusion of change, but disappointment when hoped for 
improvements do not occur. One ex Clinical Director and 
Manager who was widely recognised for his expertise on 
the subject told me:
"They are only too glad these hospital Unit General 
Managers, or District General Managers to stamp 
Clinical Director on somebody's back and then forget 
about them, and it will just not work."
Such a system appreared in one of my study hospitals with 
many Clinical Directorates having no representation on 
the Management Board and no structure for direct 
communication with that Board. The Clinical Directors in 
such a system felt that they still carried a 
representative role rather than a corporate role.
Interestingly one of the smallest hospitals studied, 
which had also not devolved clinical management, still 
worked a sort of pre 1983 consensus management system,
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although it had appointed people to a post 1989 type 
structure, preferring to call its Clinical Directors, 
Clinical Chairmen. Yet in spite of that, one of their 
Clinical Chairmen did recognise his corporate role. He 
stated:
"The task of the department is to work in association 
with all the various disciplines to make the best use 
of resources for the benefit, not only of the patients 
but also of the staff. If one makes good use of the 
resources, then one is going to have spare money to 
improve things."
It is not therefore the structure or the hospital 
environment which necessarily determines the attitudes of 
the consultant to his management role. But the 
enlightened attitude of one Clinical Chairman is no match 
for the majority view of the failure to decentralize, as 
he went on:
"Unfortunately most of the doctors involved in 
management and wanting to be involved in management 
have been those who want to build their own empires.
We have a perfect example here where we need a 
pathology department update, and the Pathologist who is 
a super person insists he wants virtually everything 
new. Histology, haematology, microbiology, chemical 
pathology etc. He sees nothing else in the rest of the 
hospital, and some of us are saying well we do need a 
microbiology department, and let us just stick with 
that for the moment, that would do first."
15.5.2. Confusion over Roles
In all the hospitals where this failure to decentralize 
occurred there was also confusion over what structure and
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what committee had a management role and could make 
decisions and which were talking shops, to air their 
problems. At one Medical Executive meeting made up of 
all the Clinical Directors, the Medical Director who was 
chairman wanted to refer an item concerning operational 
policy for a decision to the Medical Staff Committee, a 
body of all Consultants in the hospital, until it was 
pointed out by the Chief Executive that the Medical Staff 
Committee (MSC) had no management role, whereas the 
Medical Executive Committee (MEC) should have. During 
the time I studied this committee no decision was ever 
taken over any problem or issue. Another medically 
qualified ex Unit General Manager:
"Never set up a structure without knowing about who 
makes decisions and on what. You must fully understand 
the organization you are putting in place: if you are 
then faced with difficulties you will understand how to 
cope with these.”
An academic put it like this:
"The means of approaching problems should be clear even 
if the solution is not."
Chantler (1992a) sets out four points that he considers 
important to the introduction of clinical directorates:
A. Professional and management accountability are 
discrete and should not be confused.
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B. Decentralisation should be encouraged to produce a 
broad and flat management structure for operational 
purposes with clear definition of responsibilities and 
authority (which must be commensurate) and 
accountabi1ity.
C. Management commitment of the professionals involved 
in general management at clinical directorate level 
should be part-time so that they can continue to fulfil 
their professional responsibilities. To be successful 
teamwork must be encouraged and the leadership of the 
team does not need to be defined in advance but does 
need to be determined.
D. Adequate information systems should be introduced 
and these should be determined by the clinical needs 
which should have primacy as well as the management 
requirements.
15.6.0. Some Different Models of Clinical Directorates
The range of model found in the U.K. and indeed American 
Hospitals is almost infinite between two extremes of a 












Although Fitzgerald et al (1992) feel this useful in 
showing the different perspectives on patient, financial 
responsibilities and the sphere of interest they point 
out that it does not explicate the issues of 
accountability. However as I have shown in Chapter 3 
Section 7.4 agreement, responsibility or authority are 
more important factors in the continuum. They are issues 
which I shall discuss in detail in the next chapter.
There are other flaws in Mumfords model, not least that 
medical audit is educational rather than managerial 
(DHSS, 1989. SCOPME, 1990. andBatstone, 1992).
15.6.1. The Traditional Two Models View
A . True Manager
At the one extreme is the true manager, the Clinical 
Director, Chief, Chairman, Director of Faculty (the terms 
vary) the clinician leader of a care group or speciality 
and half manager, half clinician. Regional Medical 
Officer:
"A manager of a unit or department who is allocated or 
negotiates a budget, with senior management and is 
responsible for spending that budget. He has two
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contracts, one a contract as a clinical consultant, the 
other as a manager. He is therefore, properly placed 
in general line management, bound by the ethos of being 
a manager. He may manage staff other than his own 
immediate junior staff, nurses for example, although 
professionally they remain accountable to the Senior 
Nursing Officer."
It is a part time activity as they are generally 
practicing clinicians. The guality of their support 
staff is vital. One Chief Executive described their role 
as follows:
"These Directors are responsible and accountable for 
the planning of the service, allocation of the 
resources and all operational work including the 
specification of internal contracts, taking 
responsibility for service planning and service 
development and working alongside a speciality manager, 
responsible for daily operational management. The 
clinical director is at the heart of the process and is 
the key decision maker. This draws the clinician into 
corporate responsibility, accountability and 
influence."
The difficulty lies in combining the time consuming 
management responsibility with a clinical practice.
There are problems of time and motivation to say nothing 
of the cost to the service of the loss of "hands on 
clinical work". At present there are few clinicians in 
this type of role. There appear to be two main reasons 
given for this: firstly that there are few clinicians 
with the necessary management expertise for the role, and 
secondly there are few who wish to undertake such a role.
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B. The Chairman
At the other extreme is the position previously known as 
the Chairman of Division, a representative who has been 
labelled a Clinical Director but for whom nothing else 
has changed. A Regional Medical Officer described the 
role in this way:
"Here a speciality manager agrees activity targets 
between the U.G.M. or C.E.O. and the clinicians. The 
speciality is then provided with full management 
support by the speciality manager, the budget holder. 
Management responsibility lies with the full time 
manager and clinicians concentrate on clinical work, 
where they remain on the periphery and consequently are 
less directly accountable. Managers in this situation 
are much more at the point of managing professionals 
directly."
There is support for this view of two distinct models 
from The Institute of Health Services Management (Disken 
et al, 1990); they describe the differing clinical 
management structures at six Resource Management 
Initiative (RMI) sites as also blustering around two 
distinct models.
The first is the traditional model where a consultant is 
elected as chairman of a clinical division; a medical 
advisory structure produces medical representatives for 
the management board and nurses, therapists, technicians, 
etc., are managed in their own hierarchies. And the 
second is the directorate model where the Clinical 
Director is accountable to the U.G.M. and sits on a 
management board; medical representatives are no longer
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involved in the management board and nurses and other 
core staff in each clinical service are managed by the 
clinical director who holds the budget. They also see 
these models as at opposite ends of a spectrum. These 
authors did not find a unit showing a pure version of 
either although as the work was published in January 1990 
this was very early into the latest reforms.
15.6.2. Three Models View
Moore-Smith (1992) describes three organisational models 
of clinical management based on the work of Disken et al 
(1990) .
A. The Consultant Co-ordinator
This is the old style hospital management with no 
devolvement of responsibility or authority.
The UGM retains control and accountability for 
professional and managerial hierarchies.
The Consultant coordinates and monitors colleagues.
The Consultant does not hold the budget.
The Consultant is not responsible for the management or 
performance of other team members.
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Teams are not corporate and not accountable for budget 
or performance of group.
B. The Clinical General Manager
The operational management of clinical services is 
delegated to clinical managers who may be from any 
professional background.
Medical/management relationships are conducted through 
medical representatives but there is no explicit 
contract between consultants and managers.
C. The Consultant Manager
Operational management of the Clinical Service Team is 
highly decentralised.
The UGM is in contract with the Consultant Manager who 
coordinates colleagues and other medical staff.
The Consultant holds the budget for staff and services 
within unit.
The Consultant is responsible for day to day 
management, recruitment and selection, staff appraisal 
and staff development.
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The UGM is no longer a manager but negotiator and 
coordinator of clinical contracts.
Moore-Smith (1992) regards each of these models as a 
stage in the development of the role of clinicians in 
management. The Consultant Co-ordinator is the old style 
of hospital management with no devolvement of ownership 
or responsibility. The Clinical General Manager he 
regards as an "idealist" solution, and presumes a massive 
shift in cultural attitudes within the hospital and 
within individual professions. The Consultant Manager is 
the classic Clinical Director model where the directorate 
is managed by the Clinical Service Team of Clinical 
Director (Consultant), Nurse Manager and Business 
Manager.
15.6.3. Chairman or Clinical Director
Before considering various models it might be helpful to 
consider the characteristic organizational features of 
the traditional model, where the consultant is co­
ordinating head or Chairman of a team or department:
Individual consultants prescribe treatment and care for 
their patients.
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The Chairman is elected from the consultants within the 
faculty or division.
All the Chairmen sit on a Medical Executive Committee.
The Chairman of that committee is elected by that 
committee.
That elected Chairman sits on the Management Board.
Nurses and other professional groups are managed within 
their own separate hierarchies, and each has separate 
functional budgets.
Sometimes the Chairman of the M.E.C. might be a senior 
consultant who was not a Chairman of a division or 
faculty but who had been appointed by a caucus of senior 
consultants within the hospital.
The Clinical Director model differs in a number of 
important ways.
The Clinical Director is accountable to either the Unit 
General Manager or Chief Executive or the Medical 
Director.
404
The Clinical Director holds the authority for the 
budget, and is responsible and accountable for the 
service.
Medical representatives of each and every faculty or 
division may no longer be represented on the Management 
Board.
The nurses and other core staff in each clinical 
service are managed by the Clinical Director, but 
professional accountability remains distinct.
At the beginning of this study the pure form of the true 
directorate was rarely seen, but it is becoming 
increasingly common. Most Clinical Directors did not 
feel accountable to the Unit General Manager or Chief 
Executive although the same Unit General Manager or Chief 
Executive usually felt that the Clinical Directors were 
accountable to them. The fact was that doctors tended to 
feel more comfortable when reporting to another doctor 
and for this reason it may be desirable that a Clinical 
Director should report to the Medical Director rather 
than the General Manager or Chief Executive but more 
Clinical Directors are now openly accepting that they are 
directly accountable to the Chief Executive.
It might be appropriate to state that the Clinical 
Director does not necessarily have to be a consultant,
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but could be another senior professional within a 
department. Ross (1992) stated:
"The most suitable person should be the Clinical 
Director, not necessarily a doctor".
15.7. Specific Examples
Some specific models have been published and achieved 
fame, particularly as they are often quoted as a model by 
which a particular hospital works although often this may 
not be an accurate picture of the structure working 
within that hospital.
A. The Johns Hopkins Model
Here each functional unit is headed by a Functional Unit 
Director (clinician). Reporting directly to each is a 
nursing director and an administrator, the three working 
together as a Management Team. They are accountable for 
all direct costs associated with the operation of the 
unit, including services from other departments, such as 
laboratory, medicine and radiology. Costs that pertain 
to the operation of the institution as a whole e.g. 
central personnel administration, security, accounting, 
billing and insurance are allocated to the functional 
unit. Each unit may use services such as housekeeping, 
dietary and maintenance, from central hospital 
departments, but the unit may also switch to other
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providers. Each functional unit has of course to operate 
within the general policies of the hospital. It was felt 
that management strategies directed by physician managers 
were more likely to be successful as they could influence 
the behaviour of their colleagues.
B. The Guy's Hospital Model
The experiment in decentralized management at Guy's is 
succinctly described by Chantler (1992b):
,fA group of clinicians had been watching with interest 
the experiment of involving clinicians in a 
decentralised operational management structure for a 
hospital conducted at the Johns Hopkins Hospital, 
Baltimore after 1972. They persuaded the district 
management team to visit the Hopkins and they too were 
impressed with what they saw. It was therefore agreed 
that an experiment would be started in April 1985 to 
introduce a similar management structure to Guy's. The 
essential nature of the contract was that the 
clinicians would take a dominant responsibility for the 
operational management of Guy's and in return for the 
authority to influence the allocation of resources they 
would accept responsibility and accountability. This 
accountability included acceptance of financial 
accountability.”
Thirteen clinical directorates were established, (this 
has since been increased to twenty four), each being 
headed by a clinician assisted by a nurse manager and a 
business manager? Chantler (1991). The business managers 
were mostly chosen from professional hospital 
administrators but could be nurses or other professionals 
such as scientific officers. Some directorates share a
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business manager. Management accountability is seen as 
very distinct from professional accountability.
Clinical Directors were not elected but appointed, on 
advice from colleagues, with regard however to their 
management capabilities, as seen by the Chairman of the 
board and the District General Manager.
Responsibility was then decentralized to the directorates 
so that over 60% of total staff report within the 
directorates. These comprised doctors, nurses, clerical 
and scientific staff, etc. Centralised outpatient 
appointment and management arrangements, admissions, 
management of waiting lists, were dismantled, the 
responsibility being assumed by the individual 
directorates. Rules for bed borrowing were also 
established and the authority of the ward sister over the 
ward was re-introduced, including management of the ward 
budget. Chantler (1992a) says that the Guy's system 
initiated in 1985 continues to evolve.
C. The British Medical Association Model
In describing what it saw as the clinical directorate 
model the BMA (1990) stated that:
" Although the ultimate managerial responsibility for a 
unit lies with the accountable officer, the executive 
responsibility for the management, finances and other 
resources of the unit should be carried by a single
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management body which contains a significant number of 
senior medical staff as full members.”
The BMA model has a single management body on which all 
clinical directors sit as full members, this body having 
full executive authority for the management of the units 
including finances and resources. Clinical Directors 
elected by consultants in that speciality are responsible 
for certain personnel and peer review matters, such as 
medical audit, but cannot over ride the clinical 
judgement of colleagues. This does have difficulties if 
there are large numbers of Clinical Directors sitting on 
the management board because of the difficulty of 
handling large meetings requiring decisions, in addition 
to the possible difficulty caused by Clinical Directors 
being elected by their colleagues, to act as their 
representatives.
15.8. Basic Principles of Clinical Directorates
Certain principles seem necessary if clinicians are to be 
properly and genuinely involved in management. As a 
Clinical Director described:
"This includes decentralization of authority and 
responsibility and the development of team work between 
different professional groups. It is important that 
the management skills of the other groups, the business 
managers and nurse managers, are also developed."
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A Regional Director of Public Health felt that it was 
vital that the Clinical Director did not remain as a 
Chairman with a new title and no authority;
"but ending up as a glorified middle manager taking the 
responsibility for reductions in services together with 
all the budget restrictions. This may well curb 
clinicians if they have a management contract for the 
general management component of their work since they 
can be instructed to do certain things as manager, 
which they would never contemplate as a clinician.
This would be a middle management role that does not 
effect the allocation of resources.”
This was initially a common phenomenon and is a picture 
of a Clinical Director, really little more than the old 
style Cogwheel Chairman, representative of his 
colleagues. As a medically qualified academic put it:
"He is not part of the management chain but has 
alongside him, a Business Manager, part of that 
management chain and who between them manage the unit."
The Clinical Director here does not carry budget 
responsibility, is not part of line management, but is 
the doctor representative of colleagues, negotiating with 
the Manager. The only new feature in this organization 
is that the management structure is allied to the 
clinical structure.
15.9. Some Concerns about Clinical Directorates
Kennedy (1990) raises concern that there may be serious 
flaws in the Clinical Directorate model, ultimately
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making it unworkable for consultants and bad for nurses 
and others. He challenges the Clinical Directorate 
concept by asking a number of questions about the 
management responsibilities of the consultants, whether 
Clinical Directors can successfully direct consultant 
colleagues and whether there is true representation. But 
as I have stated previously most authorities do not 
regard a Clinical Director as a representative in the way 
that the Chairman of a Division was a representative, 
because for instance he is not elected by his colleagues 
and takes a corporate rather than a departmental view.
Neither is a Clinical Director a director in the sense of 
ordering people, particularly his colleagues, how to 
treat patients etc., hence the dislike of the term by 
some hospitals and consultants. Some still label the 
role "Chairman”, others "Consultant in Administrative 
Charge”, others "Head of the Department". Whatever the 
actual title, this is less important than the functions. 
What is important is that a review and evaluation of a 
departmental organization should focus on the roles of 
the Clinical Director, Business Manager and Nurse Manager 
as a Clinical Management Team. Such a review should 
include consideration of the following, a summary of some 
of the main views of several Clinical Directors with some 
inevitable overlap:
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Is there proper delegation of authority from the Chief 
Executive?
Is there proper responsibility, accountability and 
authority?
Is the Clinical Director properly supported to make 
best use of his skills and time?
Are colleagues in the department aware of the 
implications for the hospital of the decisions it 
makes?
Is there collaboration, cooperation and working as a 
team?
Are decisions being made at the level of impact?
Are initiative, innovation and risk taking encouraged 
or suppressed?
Is proper training given in health service 
organization, accountancy and information technology?
Is there proper recognition given to the work regarding 
remuneration and a career structure?
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15.10. Conclusions
There is no holy grail for a structure to run a 
successful hospital, but if the clinical directorate 
model is chosen then as one Clinical Director put it,
"The Clinical Director does need to lead the 
directorate, take a role in hospital planning, be an 
ambassador at corporate level and involve the body of 
consultants in the management process. There also 
needs to be a changing of mind sets and boundaries by 
some of the people involved both clinicians and 
managers."
The change in culture and the time scale necessary for 
this was highlighted by one of the American Managers:
"It is easy to change the structure but it takes longer 
to change the culture. You may not expect to see any 
change in say two years."
Once the decision has been made in principle to implement 
an organizational management structure based on clinical 
directorates it is appears to be essential to dismantle 
all existing representative and advisory machinery. 
General Manager:
"A bureaucracy is very difficult to dismantle, the 
bureaucrats within it resist. Districts and Regions 
hang on to power."
And a Medical Director commenting similarly on the need 
to dismantle old structures before using new ones added:
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"Without this, old parallel structures with management 
roles tend to subvert the new structure. There 
continues to be a need for a forum for all consultants 
to discuss matters of interest and importance to them, 
reflect views etc., such as a Medical Staff Committee 
but it is important not be part of the managerial 
structure and have no explicit or implicit managerial 
role. It is not possible to run an old Cogwheel 
Divisional system alongside or mixed with a Clinical 
Directorate system."
It is important that the Clinical Directors meet with 
their directorate and all the hospitals within this study 
do this monthly. The staff committees, often known as 
the Medical Staff Committee, are important in an open 
organization, but they have no role in the management 
structure and the managers and consultants in this study 
universally recognise this.
There is one other change, important when considering the 
switch from a divisional system to a clinical directorate 
system. The former was doctor dominated and had no 
involvement with the nurses and other professionals 
except as observers. The clinical directorate system 
works with nurse managers, business managers and heads of 
departments and discusses business matters relating to 
the directorate. Indeed some took the view that the 
change in "business" may require a re-definition of 
clinical freedom. This reintroduced the subject of 
whether doctors should involve themselves in management. 
The Clinical Director of one major hospital felt very 
strongly that the new clinical directorate structures
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would enhance clinical freedom rather than curtail it, a 
view supported by a number of Clinical Directors:
"Because clinical freedom is limited by the laws of 
society, good professional practices and ultimately 
funding, involvement of doctors in management by 
assisting in preventing waste of resources enhances the 
clinical freedom for the use of available resources."
Another Clinical Director:
"Because of the aging population, new scientific 
advances, new technology and limited resources it would 
be unethical for us not to get involved in management, 
at all levels. No one else can make some of the 
difficult decisions. They may need to be shared 
decisions, but they need medical advice. And in so 
doing it ensures our continued clinical freedom."
And another Clinical Director:
"I think we have an ethical duty to make sure that 
resources are used in the most effective way."
It was best summed up by one ex-Clinical Director who had 
experience in the past of management as a UGM:
"Firstly it would be unethical not to be involved.
There is an aging population with chronic degenerative 
disorders. Scientific and technological change tends to 
be led by publicity and funding. Doctors have to be 
involved, it would be unethical not to be. And I think 
it guarantees maximum clinical freedom."
In the next chapter I will consider some of the problems 




CONCEPTS IN CLINICAL MANAGEMENT
16.0. Introduction
Making decisions in a sensible way is a human function; 
however when those decisions involve other people it may 
require management skills. Taking action is also a human 
activity, but when it involves other people it can be 
more efficient and more effective if management skills 
are used. I can find no universally accepted definition 
of a manager, management or the management process. Nor 
it seems am I alone in this. Heirs and Farrell (1989) 
discussing management and managers:
"It seems so often to mean different things to people 
in different professions, or even to different 
organizations within the same profession. 
Unfortunately, there are no satisfactory substitutes."
For them however a manager is
"an individual who has responsibility for making major 
decisions and for determining policy and plans within 
any organization."
According to Drucker (1968:19),
"The first definition of management is therefore that 
it is an economic organ, indeed the specifically 
economic organ of an industrial society. Every act, 
every decision, every deliberation of management has as 
its first dimension an economic dimension."
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Boyatzis (1982) seems more helpful?
"A person in a management job contributes to the 
achievement of organizational goals through planning, 
coordination, supervision, and decision making 
regarding the investment and use of corporate human 
resources."
Appley (1969) agrees that a manager is someone who 
"gets things done through other people."
Handy (1985) in discussing the problem, suggests that if 
it is a problem it is one of roles. Almost any manager 
has an array of roles to choose from. This he feels can 
result in a feeling of role overload and stress, or it 
can be a licence to play all the parts in an ever- 
changing drama. All this is a reference to Mintzberg 
(1973) who describes ten roles for a manager although 
this work was based on the observations of five chief 
executives. Other managerial jobs may not be so wide or 
so complicated, and Stewart (1983) has based work on a 
much wider field at lower and middle levels, the latter 
of which are probably more comparable to the operational 
role of the Clinical Director.
16.1. Managing and Doctors
Interestingly Handy (1985:365) draws a medical analogy 
with the manager as a General Practitioner:
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"The analogy of General Practitioner has been hauled in 
from the medical world to characterize one role that is 
not emphasized by Mintzberg but underlies all the other 
ten roles. The manager, like the GP, is the first 
recipient of problems. However he may deal with them, 
whatever role he may choose to assume, he must first 
(like the doctor) decide whether it is a problem and, 
if so, what sort of problem it is, before he proceeds 
to act. He must in other words: Identify the symptoms 
in any situation? diagnose the disease or cause of the 
trouble; decide how it might be dealt with - a strategy 
for health? start the treatment."
It is therefore not an exact science and for that reason 
often does not appeal to a doctor's basic instincts and 
scientific training. The search for universal principles 
is frustrating. Management is an art with a science 
base. (In the same way that Russell (1958) describes 
history as both a science and an art.) It has generally 
to be learnt by experience. Being complex it is 
interpreted differently by different people. The manager 
is concerned with setting goals and achieving objectives. 
The effective manager is many things, a historian 
learning from past success and failures, a psychologist 
who must understand the way people act in, and react to, 
group situations, and an innovator who can develop new 
ways to achieve desired objectives and apply them in an 
appropriate manner.
Health service organizations are frequently said to be 
unique in a number of ways, so management study and 
practice has to take account of that uniqueness. These 
unique features include: the absolute necessity for high
418
quality of work, the involvement of high technology, the 
use of a wide range of human resources, the co existence 
of automated and manual work methods, many separate 
professional groups etc. some features of which may be 
found in other organizations, but the most unique feature 
is doctors' professional clinical freedom.
16.2. Managing after the Reforms
The idea behind clinical directorates is that everyone 
engaged in an enterprise should be involved with the 
management of it. This concept was the foundation to the 
introduction of general management into the health 
service in 1983 (Griffith, 1983). It has already been 
emphasised that when Griffiths recommended general 
management he claims that he did not intend that a new 
profession of managers should be created within the NHS, 
but rather that all staff, doctors, nurses, 
administrators and others should contribute to the 
management of the service.
Clinical directorates are based on the concept of team 
work between all staff and to be successful depend on 
breaking down the professional barriers. The carrot of 
the 1989 reforms was that with less bureaucracy decisions 
should be made quicker. Significant service developments 
and initiatives should be achievable in a surprisingly 
short time. Long standing minor but persistent
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irritations should be swept aside. Long term conflicts of 
interest are brought to a head and resolved. As two 
managers put it,
"The clinical directorate system is the latest 
organizational response in a line of initiatives 
designed to encourage clinicians to take greater 
responsibility for the delivery of healthcare and the 
use of resources by being involved in the decision 
making process, and which will also speed up those 
decision making processes."
"The recent NHS reforms and the development of the 
market encourages more explicit discussion of choices 
in the allocation of scarce resources and a greater 
linkage between expressed need and provider response as 
well as a more immediate response to needs expressed."
As the final version of the cognitive map shown overleaf 
on page 421 shows, certain characteristics and concepts 
are important.
16.3. Agreement
Several participants stressed that without the agreement 
of all the parties, Clinical Directors, UGM, DGM or CE, 
and the Consultants and others within a clinical 
directorate, the system will not work. UGM:
"Unless there is agreement on the size of the budget 
and the service to be delivered, there cannot be 
responsibility, accountability or authority."
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HOW CHARACTERISTICS AND CONCEPTS ARE IMPORTANT
"Eventually we got agreement on these issues of 
responsibility, authority and accountability. Fights 
still took place, but they were much more sensible 
fights, everyone knows how the system functions and 
they are fights directed at improving the service as a 
whole."
16.4.Responsibility
I was also told that the definition of roles and general 
responsibilities seems to be relatively easy to agree.
The BMA (1990) states that individual consultants still 
have continuing responsibility for their patients, 
although that clinical freedom is subject to the limits 
of law, ethics, contracts, professional standards and 
resources so that Clinical Directors could not commit 
colleagues to workload or resource agreements, discipline 
or sanction colleagues, or override colleagues' clinical 
judgement. The Clinical Director should of course be 
able to negotiate on behalf of consultants agreed 
workloads, and monitor that agreement. He can co­
ordinate medical personnel matters, peer review and 
audit. And none of this precludes any consultant still 
talking directly to management about their own practice. 
And there appears to be no disagreement on these matters. 
All the Clinical Directors I studied were comfortable 
with this and did not admit to experiencing any problem 
with this. However the study did not include any attempt 
at an intra directorate study, an issue I shall return to 
in the chapter on directions for further work.
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As far as the directorate was concerned it seemed
important to identify and agree on what they are
responsible for. Again the BMA/CCSC (1990) view is that 
budgetary authority and responsibility should be for 
staff i.e. medical, nursing, secretarial, administrative 
and other professionals and non staff i.e. medical and 
surgical equipment and drugs, ward supplies etc. But 
this actually depends on the role model chosen and local
decisions and agreements. For instance in one fully
decentralized unit the Clinical Director and Managers 
were agreed that:
"The clinicians would take a dominant responsibility 
for operational management and in return for the 
authority to influence the allocation of resources they 
would accept responsibility and accountability."
"Clinical Directors would be responsible for running 
the directorate on a day to day basis and to deliver 
the agreed services within the budget."
In a hospital not decentralized the managers and 
clinicians did not seem to agree about responsibility. 
The Chief Executive felt that:
"The Clinical Directors are responsible for everything 
within the directorate, the finances, negotiating the 
budget, ensuring it all balances, getting the work 
done, achieving targets but making sure they do not do 
more work than our purchasers buy from us. Quality 
issues, finding Extra Contractual Referrals (ECRs) and 
extra work from Fund Holders."
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Yet of the Clinical Directors in that same hospital 
sixteen felt they had little or no responsibility over 
those issues. A typical comment was:
"Being Clinical Director is little more than having a 
name, I have no more influence than any of the other 
consultants."
Although another did feel it gave him some influence over 
his colleagues:
"I don't have any budget. But I regard myself 
responsible for appointing them [colleagues] and making 
sure there's somebody there [in the department], and 
looking after them and moving up the line and all the 
rest, and for looking after the junior staff not only 
in my department but also in the A & E Dept which I am 
theoretically in charge of, but in practice, because we 
don't have an A & E Consultant."
But responsibility to whom seems to be less clear The 
British Medical Association CCSC (1990) state 
unequivocally:
"Clinical directors should be managerially responsible 
to the management body."
But also to be considered are the Faculty, the Unit, the 
Directorate itself and the Speciality. The Clinical 
Director should be responsible directly to the Chief 
Executive or UGM, but frequently the Clinical Director 
reports to the Medical Director, as representative of the 
Chief Executive. This is because doctors usually feel
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more comfortable reporting to another doctor. (White 
1993).
The question of loyalty and responsibility was also 
raised and whether they are the same or different and 
indeed how different they might be. Responsibility 
implied being accountable. But did loyalty mean adopting 
hospital policy and accepting the constraints of 
management like mindless conformity or should it mean 
doing what one thinks is best for the organization in the 
long term? Ranter (1989) offers a theory that in post 
entrepreneurial organizations there is the prospect of a 
different definition of loyalty:
"there is often no such thing as a "chain" of command, 
and people work under different leadership for
different purposes.......There is encouragement for
people to test limits, challenge traditions and move in
new directions......... Decentralization of decision
making responsibility puts more power in the hands of 
people at lower levels to make decisions and exercise
judgement...... Professionalism......... transcends the
organization.......Post entrepreneurial organizations
produce so much change that they cannot offer the same 
incentive for unquestioning obedience."
16.5. Accountabi1ity.
Together with responsibility and authority comes 
accountability. Accountability means seeking better 
financial information, heightened budgetary awareness, 
and performance more closely monitored. This new 
responsibility requires accountability, accountability
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not only for the level and quality of service but also to 
the production of data which demonstrates and confirms 
this. Clinical audit and quality management suddenly 
become relevant and continuous multi-disciplinary 
activities. Because standards are largely determined by 
doctors themselves, they are understood, owned, relevant 
and achievable. Two Clinical Directors said:
"Suddenly I was accountable for all this, so I had to 
know what was going on, I had to be able to see where I 
was, how we were doing, and 1 also needed to be able to 
show that I was doing it right."
"In the old days most of the information was wrong, now 
we collect it ourselves here in the department, I know 
exactly what the situation is virtually from day to 
day, and I know exactly how we are doing. I tell them 
what is happening, not the other way round."
16.6. Authority.
Many Managers and Chief Executives balked at the thought 
of giving doctors authority. They frequently talked of 
authority only as "hire and fire" and did not see any 
wider context, how Clinical Directors exercised authority 
over and gained acceptance by clinical colleagues, how 
Clinical Directors influenced the behaviour and clinical 
work of colleagues, and how they achieved this.
Talking to doctors about authority I obtained a somewhat 
different view; they mostly thought of authority to 
persuade and encourage their colleagues in a directorate,
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to do what was asked and required of them. But authority 
for a Clinical Director seems to be more than that. They 
do not need what the managers consider authority to be, 
and they should not need to be given authority over their 
colleagues. To some extent those colleagues have already 
put themselves into a quasi submissive role by accepting 
him as their director or agreeing to his acting in that 
role. Consultants:
"He is the Clinical Director, I accept that although I 
didn't appoint him. We are all happy with the 
arrangement however."
"I didn't want him to be Clinical Director but he is, 
and it seems to work, and I'm happy to go along with 
the system."
As a result of some of the feedback sessions from 
Clinical Directors and Managers the one issue which 
seemed to cause most difficulty and confusion, even to 
what it meant in this context, was this question of 
authority. And it was in those hospitals which were 
still centralised that this was a difficult issue to 
resolve. One Chief Executive said:
"I am not sure what is meant by authority. Clinical 
Directors say they need some authority, but authority 
to do what. Do they mean to hire and fire? I mean I 
have no authority."
"I can't give authority to consultants, because I don't 
know what it means. Does it mean that they should be 
able to fire people?"
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And a Chairman of a Trust Board:
"You cannot give people authority, it is something they 
have or they take."
Other UGMs and DGMs in centralized units:
"Authority in a sense is very difficult to define. 
Some have got it, some haven't ."
"Authority are sorts of sanctions, difficult to 
prescribe in a way? the sanctions can be very 
differently used, by different people, as we're all 
human. With different shades and ability you and I 
could be both given the same authority, sanctions 
authority, and you could use them better than I or vice 
versa. And sometimes you use sanctions that you 
wouldn't dare want to write down."
"I would use blackmail. Now that isn't an authority, 
it is abuse if you like of authority, but you would use 
all sorts of things."
"I mean, authority is in a sense discipline of 
dismissal, and is a very last resort."
"But what authority is appropriate authority, for what 
we want doing really. I see the financial incentive of 
saying you can't have your budget or you can't have 
that piece of eguipment. They're some of the things 
I'd try on in terms of use of authority. You'd have to 
negotiate authority, just as you do as in dealing with 
a child where you haven't absolute authority."
To fulfil the duties of Clinical Director I was 
particularly interested to know what degree of authority 
needs to be vested in that individual. I found answers 
to these questions much more clearly stated in 
decentralized units. Some Clinical Directors:
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"For clinical directorates to work responsibility and 
authority must be co-terminous and commensurate."
"The attitude of the District Health Authority and the 
then District General Manager was that he was prepared 
to de-centralize responsibility and authority to the 
doctors."
"What we got was the authority to run the place and to 
actually determine the allocation of resources within 
the hospital."
"Everyone agreed that we had to have the authority to 
run things but with that came responsibility and of 
course accountabi1ity."
And Managers:
"Doctors have to be involved in making those choices, 
and they know that they cannot expect to be involved, 
unless they accept responsibility as well as 
authority."
"So one of the three crucial features that I think have 
to be satisfied when you involve professionals in the 
management of any service is that responsibility and 
authority have to be de-centralized in equal measure 
and accountability has to be clear."
"There has to be clear accountability, but that's also 
got to be clear authority and responsibility."
And there was recognition even in the successfully 
decentralized units that this issue had been a problem. 
Medically qualified ex UGM:
"Managers seemed to be very reluctant to give up 
authority. Now we've had that in this place. I mean 
I had a huge battle in the first year of my time here, 
in persuading the central administration to let us do 
what we wanted to do. I mean it was overt opposition 
to begin with, and then it was covert opposition 
thereafter."
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So although there were some, both doctors and managers, 
in decentralized units with clear ideas on these issues 
many doctors and UGM/CEO's appear to exhibit considerable 
confusion over the authority required by a clinical 
director to undertake the role.
Morgan (1986) exploring the nature of power and how it 
influences who gets what when and how, lists a number of 
sources of power of which formal authority is the first 
and most obvious source. This is what Weber (1947) 
describes as a form of legitimized power. Historically it 
is underpinned by one or more of the three 
characteristics: charisma, tradition and the rule of law.
Charismatic authority occurs when people respect the 
individual and personal influence, especially over 
opinion, comes from that respect. The rational-legal or 
bureaucratic authority arises when the exercise of power 
depends on the application of formal rules and procedures 
and most obviously occurs when the power comes from the 
holding of the formal position or office.
Despite a lack of managerial line authority some 
clinicians have considerable success in managing their 
colleagues. The processes that successful ones use are 
based on representing, involving, consulting, trading, 
using personal power, the skilful use of information and
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often the ability to fit their work into a broader 
picture.
One CE felt that there were three approaches with 
personal influence the most important. He called them the 
good, the bad and the sensible.
The good was the Christian way, dealing with brotherhood, 
love and trust? The bad, the machiavellian, wheeling and 
dealing, scheming, fixing, politicking and the knife in 
the back; And the sensible was the logical way, using 
facts, logic and sensible and rational argument.
”A clinical director will need to have all these cards 
in his hand, and he may well have a natural tendency to 
play one more than another, but what is important is 
knowing when each should be played i.e. savoir-faire."
16.7. Decentralization
Not all the tasks required of a Clinical Director fall 
into one of the above categories and it is here that 
problems arise when management boards expect results 
which Clinical Directors cannot deliver, when the board 
thinks that all is required to produce action and change 
is more accountability, but decentralization has not 
occurred. I was given the following examples, the first 
concerning inpatients:
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A surgeon was asked by the management to arrange for his 
directorate to carry out a contract to perform a number 
of extra elective operations. The members of the 
directorate were willing to do that. But there proved to 
be a number of stumbling blocks. The directorate did not 
have the time within the week, did not have the beds 
available, and did not have theatre time. In addition 
there was no available anaesthetist, because they were 
part of a different directorate.
The Manager could not understand why there was a problem; 
he said that full responsibility had been given to the 
Clinical Directors. The Clinical Director felt that he 
was doing all he could to get the work done, but was not 
allowed to change the existing pattern of the working 
week to accommodate the extra work, use other empty beds, 
or negotiate with another directorate. The hospital 
management board said that there was spare capacity in 
the system, as there were beds closed, but the Clinical 
Director was not able to use them. There was said to be 
spare capacity in the theatres, but the theatres were 
working to a budget and overspent. No one had considered 
the question of the authority to deal with any matter 
which changed existing work either within or outside the 
directorate. Unless a Clinical Director has authority to 
organize these issues, no matter how willing the 
directorate to carry it out, it could not be done; no 
matter how much he is responsible to the Chief Executive
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of Medical Director, and no matter how accountable he 
was, nothing actually happened.
Another example concerned outpatients:
A DGH served some outlying small towns with their own 
outpatient clinics in the cottage hospitals. The cottage 
hospital had an enormous waiting list. But one of the 
other hospitals had so few patients for the number of 
clinics that rarely if ever was the clinic fully booked, 
and everyone was seen at the next clinic after referral. 
At one town there were complaints about the delays, but 
the Clinical Director could not change anything even 
though the Chief Executive said he had given full 
responsibility to the Clinical Director who was 
accountable to the management for the service, because 
the Clinical Director had no authority to change 
anything.
A third example concerned the lack of balance between 
inpatients and outpatients:
The number of outpatients clinics being held within a 
speciality was greater than the number of operating 
sessions that could service the number of patients 
requiring operation. The result was an increasing 
surgical waiting list. There were many complaints about
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this, but the Clinical Director was not able to address 
the underlying problem as he had no authority to do so.
Thus to give a Clinical Director responsibility, no 
matter how accountable that person is, without authority 
"to do the job" little useful is achieved.
16.8. Departmental Tribalism.
Tribalism is a rather fashionable term that refers to 
groups, usually within the same profession, but it can 
also be used in the sense of referring to the strong 
identification with groupings of patients rather than a 
profession. In other words doctors identify with their 
department and speciality. They feel only secondary 
loyalty to the hospital. When I asked consultants what 
they did for a living they would invariably say " I am a 
urologist ," or "I am a general physician," or "I am an 
obstetrician and gynaecologist, " or " I am a general 
surgeon," or "I am an ophthalmologist," etc. They 
never said "I work at St X's Hospital or the Y Royal 
Infirmary". This does not seem to be changing.
Tribalism according to Robinson and Strong (1990:20) 
includes a number of characteristics:
"it is a term used by general managers in the privacy 
of their own conferences - referred to some 
characteristic features of the health service trades? 
to their strikingly different culture, history and
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organization? to their huge fragmentation; to their 
fierce internal loyalties; to their general lack of any 
external vision? and to the consequent difficulty, 
despite their very real commitment to the patient, in 
providing an effective, coordinated overall service."
Medical staff particularly felt more responsible for 
standards of care throughout their own directorate rather 
than exclusively those of their own profession. Typical 
was the view of a Clinical Director:
"So long as my department is working properly I am not 
too concerned about other departments or even the 
hospital really. Just so long as they do not rob us of 
resources to pay for their [other departments] 
inef f iciency."
But some things are changing rapidly since I first 
started, later interviews with Clinical Directors were 
very much more in line with this view:
"I think there is a greater realism than there has been 
before, amongst, I don't know whether to say, most or 
just a lot, I'm not sure what the proportion is, but it 
is coming and it is growing and after a pretty sticky 
first few months while things were shaking down, I 
think there is now an acceptance of what is going on 
and sounds corny, but a corporate identity is beginning 
to return."
So it seems that tribalism is being confronted in the 
face of a more explicit shared responsibility. There is 
in many hospitals a more relevant participation in the 
running and development of the service. There is more 
evidence of commitment to corporate management. This 
entails a consciously managed process which must be seen
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to erode traditional tribalism. As a Clinical Director 
put it,
"It encapsulates the difficult shift from fighting 
one's corner to fighting for someone else's."
A manager was able to recognise medical tribalism when 
she said,
"There can be confusion about the nature of the 
directorate roles and responsibilities and the balance 
of centre directorate loyalties for instance due to 
outbreaks of professional tribalism. This may manifest 
itself in withholding information, lack of support, 
poor communication, and lack of commitment to 
teamworking."
16.9. Some Dilemmas.
Doctors are able to provide long term continuity to the 
running of a hospital which balances the change of 
managers every few years. This tendency appears to lead 
to management thinking shorter term than had been 
previously been supposed. A DGM:
"I've felt very much that administrators or managers 
moving every two years produces lack of continuity in 
management that's an important defect. They don't have 
to think long term, although people think they do, and 
they are accused by doctors sometimes of only thinking 
long term. It's actually not true really I don't know 
why it happened."
An ex UGM:
"Doctors provide long term continuity of management to 
balance the constant change of managers every three or
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four years. For this reason managers I am afraid do not 
necessarily think truly long term."
And a Clinical Director agreed:
"Managers are only here as part of a career move, so 
they only think short term. The only advantage is that 
at least if the person is no good, at least you've only 
got to wait two or three years or so and you'll have 
somebody else."
This it was recognized, might change. Clinical Director:
"Having to work to much closer with the financial 
limits and having to achieve contract targets, and 
being involved much more closely in the financial 
survival, if you like, of the department, could well 
make doctors also think much shorter term. And that 
might be to the detriment of the service as a whole."
The other dilemmas which need to be taken into account as 
Clinical Directors develop their role are the 
professional and organizational tensions. No longer is 
the Clinical Director just a clinician and equal member 
of a peer group, but leading a management team, while at 
the same time engaged in clinical activity. He is a 
respected clinician maybe, but now a complete beginner in 
management skills. Some Managers;
"They need to have the capacity to understand the 
problems that the staff are facing and to be able to 
make judgements about those problems. Management is 
not about having the technology or the technical skills 
to solve medical problems."
"You have to develop skills, other than your direct 
profession."
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"I don't think that doctors appreciate the complexity 
of management. They are just beginners.”
"A range of skills needs to be developed [by doctors] 
which can't always be developed on a part-time basis."
"Doctors are less well equipped than managerial 
professionals, because at the end of the day its about 
how they can, have they got the basic skills, the basic 
personality to withstand the pressures of them."
And doctors recognized their lack of management skills. 
Typical comments were:
"The trouble is I know nothing about managing."
"One of the problems is that we are beginners in 
management, not that the managers seem much better 
informed, but they have more experience at it than us."
Several Clinical Directors not only indicated this but 
wished to be trained. Clinical Director:
"Doctors need preparation for those things? registrars 
and senior registrars in particular are all expected to 
go on management courses. They're a bit half-baked at 
present and a bit short, and I don't believe you can 
train somebody in the sort of management skills that a 
Clinical Director ought to have in the course of three 
weekends. I'm not sure you could train them at the 
under-graduate level, but what you could do is to 
create an awareness of the scope and the need but with 
all the other things, the pressure etc, you couldn't 
do very much about management training."
The Clinical Director is fully responsible for 
performance and accountable for that performance? he is 
involved with day to day decision making, although on a 
part time basis, and therefore maybe the Clinical
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Director is in danger of becoming peripheral to the 
decision making or delegates much of it.
Although the Clinical Director may have an own speciality 
passion, the issue is how to make room for understanding 
and to be concerned about other specialities, to learn to 
represent corporate directorate interests, and to put 
these aside when necessary for unit corporacy. Clinical 
Director for all the surgical specialities:
"I am quite pleased with the progress we've made, we're 
not all the way there, but we became a trust last April 
and I became a Shadow Clinical Director almost two 
years ago and we've created a corporate being of a 
Surgical Directorate within a large trust which didn't 
exist before, so that's a bonus."
The Clinical Director cannot be all things to all people, 
but has to attempt to be informed of all directorate 
business, not necessarily being party to all decisions as 
this is not only unrealistic but intrusive upon others 
and obstructive to their proper functioning.
The Clinical Director also has to do a fair share of 
devolving authority and decision making. All staff need 
to have confidence in their director's common interest in 
all and the holistic approach to the directorate. This 
new, key player must be trusted to sacrifice self 
interest for corporate well being and development. Staff 
motivation and goodwill will be lost if they see any sign
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of their director seeking personal or professional power 
rather than equity and accountability. Medical Director:
"One of the current problems is getting the Clinical 
Directors to give up power to the Associate Clinical 
Directors."
And a Chief Executive:
"A lot of Clinical Directors were unhappy when we 
devolved to cost centres and the ward sisters ran the 
wards."
And a medically qualified ex UGM;
"We then had the devil's own job to persuade even 
Clinical Directors to de-centralize."
A further dilemma is coping with a UGM/CE who appears to 
lack the ability or confidence to devolve. In fact poor 
managers seem to have been supported by the medical 
staff. Neither the manager nor the medical staff may be 
even aware of this fact, such is the loose management 
structure that some hospitals have had. ex DGM:
"It is possible to rehabilitate a UGM or Chief 
Executive. They have to be involved in and understand 
the organization though, but very few have even 
attended an operation. There are hospitals I know where 
the medical staff collude to keep a useless manager in 
post."
And another ex UGM:
"A poor manager can be supported by the medical staff. 
Some hospitals are not really managed at all but have a 
very loose management arrangement although the doctors
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may not realize the fact. There is a need to understand 
the managers' career structure, where they come from, 
where they were before that, their referees and 
mentors. They will probably have a role model and then 
you understand.”
And finally there is difficulty of dismantling old 
bureaucracy. I found a couple of examples of key figures 
in pre reform management structures apparently reluctant 
to devolve. This appeared to manifest itself primarily in 
leaving old structures in place while keeping information 
from the new. Medical Director:
"I think it was Marx who said that parallel structures 
subvert the organization. If you leave the old 
bureaucracy in place and introduce the new structure 
alongside it, you have problems. When we started, we 
started afresh."
And a DGM supported this:
"A bureaucracy is very difficult to dismantle, the 
bureaucrats within it resist. Districts and Regions 
resist, doing everything to hang onto power. However 
Trusts and Fundholders are changing that by pulling the 
power away."
16.10. Conclusions
Having in this chapter considered some of the 
characteristics and concepts of involving clinicians in 
management this concludes the data section. In the next 
chapter I will try to pull together some of the essential 





Jaques (1978), defines a profession in this way:
"At a certain stage of development the possibility of 
managerial control of professional members by non 
members must be excluded. This happens when the latter 
can no longer judge the competence of such 
professionals nor assess the technical problems 
encountered. Only monitoring and co-ordinating role 
relationships are possible in this context."
Much of the work of the NHS is carried out by 
professionals largely working on their own or in very 
small teams. Indeed the essence of professional work is 
that the individual has discretion to adjust the work to 
the situation and to have independence of action when 
required. But this independence may lead to a certain 
degree of isolation and it does not encourage a wider 
team approach within a profession. And this is one of 
the issues being addressed by the changes which are 
occurring in hospitals to create a more team orientated 
approach, as a medically qualified Chief Executive put 
it:
"We are trying to engender a team approach, delegating 
responsibilities and giving for example, ward sisters 
control over everything that goes on, on their wards."
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The consultants are being given the opportunity to 
participate in management, the decision making and the 
changes which are occurring. As a Clinical Director put 
it,
"Clinicians rather than being alienated from decision 
making are being brought to the fore."
They are recognizing that they need certain skills for 
which they have not so far been trained. One Clinical 
Director's comments were typical:
"We will need help, support and training to fulfil 
these roles, but many doctors are willing to do that if 
asked and the involvement is real."
Managers recognize the doctors' need for some new skills, 
as one, talking about the skills required by consultants 
in general and Clinical Directors in particular, 
mentioned the need for
"The learning of management as well as other general 
professional skills."
And many managers support the view that they should be 
involved, a typical comment being:
"Doctors with management flair and leadership skills 
should be encouraged to take their place in the 
management of the health service."
And some consultants do accept also, that they have a 
responsibility in this direction. One said:
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"Clinicians are the people responsible for initiating 
the expenditure. It is therefore important for some 
clinicians to accept responsibility for management and 
to be prepared to play a leading role in managing the 
affairs of the hospital."
And they must have responsible reasons for that 
involvement ?
"Furthermore doctors must be able to manage themselves 
and others and to assess and evaluate the proper use of 
available resources for the best, most effective and 
most efficient delivery of health care."
17.1. Some Dilemmas.
Several discussions brought up the dilemmas which 
consultants had thought might occur or which they faced 
already. This is a subject I shall return to in the last 
chapter on directions for further work. These dilemmas 
are: that doctors were highly motivated but have their 
own objectives? that doctors work very hard but had 
little time to devote to learning new skills. Also put 
as continuing to do what they did best but having to 
develop new skills? safeguarding the doctor patient 
relationship but caring for the organization? the dilemma 
of a restless search for excellence while being prudent 
with resources? a feeling of independence, isolation 
etc., yet now the need to cooperate with others ? that 
doctors were highly motivated but have their own 
objectives. Many of these dilemmas have not been fully
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resolved but since they have been recognized, it means 
consultants are no longer at the beginning of the process 
of change.
For the centre there is a major dilemma over the issue of 
clinical freedom. On the one hand Schon (1983) shows how 
control over clinical work enables the medical profession 
to control the distribution of health care resources and 
that successive governments that provided these resources 
became increasingly frustrated that their priorities, 
such as the care of the chronically sick, were frequently 
ignored. As a result from about the mid 1960's onwards 
governments began the first of a series of attempts to 
reform the NHS, which in retrospect can be seen as 
attempts to curtail the control that the profession had 
over health resource allocation. But Klein (1989:86) 
illustrates the positive political advantages that 
central policy makers can derive from the doctrine of 
clinical autonomy, when clinicians rather than Ministers 
or civil servants decide on priorities.
For the managers there is confusion over clinical 
freedom. Some feel that it exists and will continue to 
do so, and the following are typical comments by 
managers:
"First of all it is essential that clinical freedom is
there and exists and continues."
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"Doctors are and should be the sole arbiter of what 
treatment is given to an individual patient."
"Only career grades like Consultants and General 
Practitioner partners have clinical freedom? trainees 
do not, but it is important and should continue."
On the other hand many managers do not agree and in 
addition, feel that clinical freedom is a myth that never 
really existed:
"I think you have only to look at some of the writings 
previously, does clinical freedom really exist? Did it 
ever exist? Doctors do not really, and have never 
functioned in a free way."
"I think what really has to change is the underlying 
premise that true clinical freedom really does or has 
ever existed."
"I would like to challenge the idea that clinical 
freedom has ever existed."
Other managers were more uncertain about the future of 
clinical freedom:
"Clinical freedom, it may get more and more difficult. 
Everyone will still say clinical freedom exists but the 
exercise of it has constraints already, who knows how 
it will go?"
Some were not even clear about what it really meant:
"I think clinical freedom is about social access.
Social access is all about waiting lists, where doctors 
play the resource game. Social access is really public 
decisions about investment? that is not an issue of 
clinical freedom, although it is an issue that most 
doctors see as their preserve."
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Even some doctors are not clear about clinical freedom 
Shields and Leinster (1993):
"It is debatable whether true clinical freedom in fact 
ever existed."
17.2. Opportunities for Change.
Clearly doctors are the key users of the resources 
available, and they are potentially well equipped to 
understand and communicate with other doctors. But many 
of those appointed to managerial roles, Clinical 
Directors and Medical Directors, are relative amateurs as 
managers, although quick to learn and keen for more 
training in those well decentralized hospitals. The 
following are typical comments by Chief Executives of 
well decentralized hospitals:
"Doctors with management flair can play an important 
role in the efficient running of hospitals."
"I simply could not run the place the way we do without 
these guys' (referring to the consultants') help."
Many have been appointed to the role unwillingly in 
centralized hospitals. In one hospital in this study 
over a quarter of the Clinical Directors were appointed 
because no one else would do it. The most commonly cited 
reasons for this unwillingness were lack of time, lack of 
training, lack of recognition and lack of reward:
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"The one thing we need is time to be Clinical 
Directors."
"I would like to be paid for being Clinical Director or 
be given time to do it, or both."
"We need at least a session of time to do it in and 
space such as an office to work in."
Some are wreckers hoping to fight the changes from within 
until they go away:
"If we keep our heads down and don't cooperate too 
much, nothing will change in the end. Nothing ever 
does, there have been dozens of reforms in the past and 
there will be dozens more. Let the management get on 
with constantly changing things. So long as we just 
keep seeing patients, that's the main thing."
Some are there for reasons other than managing resources, 
such as personal power, personal ambition and personal 
prestige, seizing the new opportunities presented by 
decentralization when it came to their hospital:
"Gives me more influence than many other committees."
"Gives me more influence over my colleagues."
Others were more constructive about the changes and the 
opportunities. One manager felt that
"The directorate structure offers a chance to 
effectively engage a range of staff in discussions 
about how to improve the delivery of care and make 
better use of scarce resources."
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A Clinical Director felt that there had been
"change from a reactive rather than proactive style of 
hospital management."
Another agreed:
"An emphasis on development and change rather than care 
and maintenance. The former includes information 
analysis to assist strategic and business planning, 
external communication, relationships with purchasers 
or General Practitioners, culture change, (including 
quality, patients charter, medical audit),new 
developments, special projects and initiatives etc. 
These require a proactive focus often with a longer 
term framework."
And another manager comparing the old systems with the 
new opportunities said:
"Organizational pressures which encourage fire 
fighting, fix it, reactive management responses rather 
than developing new initiatives or different ways of 
delivering services. Outpatients where piecemeal 
problem solving has been encouraged rather than a 
radical consideration of the changing external demands 
and the impact on the service now required."
17.3. Information Problems
West (1988:146) felt there were too many central 
initiatives which forced managers to spend large amounts 
of time on information collection. Information has 
assumed a much more central role in the operational 
management of a hospital. Unfortunately the computer 
revolution has made possible the production of vast 
quantities of information; the problem is that its very
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abundance can sometimes obscure the essential and the 
relevant. Control of information can provide a means of 
controlling power. As one manger said,
"Management can retain control by controlling the 
supply of information.11
Another manager felt that,
"In an era of rapid cultural change factual information 
is an essential aid to assist and force change to take 
place; without it arguments are conducted in a welter 
of supposition and personal opinion."
What seems to have happened however is that previously 
information gathered peripherally by mainly Medical 
Records departments was forwarded centrally through 
District and Region to the DoH. It was then collated and 
published and many consultants were surprised at the 
inaccuracy of the data.
With the new management arrangements the Clinical 
Directors have a vital need for correct information, and 
the data is gathered peripherally still but within the 
department, by the members of the department and not in a 
mindless paper exercise. The data is being presented 
from the bottom up rather than vice versa, and is proving 
much more accurate. A Chief Executive,
"The Clinical Directors tell the Management Board the 
position on workloads and targets now rather than vice 
versa, where the Finance Officer used to present the 
hospital data, which none believed was ever accurate."
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And a Clinical Director:
"The quality of information coming from the actual 
directorates is much more accurate, and therefore 
useful now."
Another medically qualified UGM said:
"Good information systems are actually one of my four 
criteria that you need to introduce it, but they're not 
the first one."
Interestingly information, information collection and 
information collection systems seemed very high on most 
people's agendas for importance regarding the changes 
that were occurring. Although computerized information 
technology seems far more sophisticated and advanced in 
the United States, the most successfully decentralized 
hospitals in this country felt that such technology was 
not the most vital factor in change. One medically 
qualified UGM from a hospital that has been decentralized 
for several years stressed this, referring to some 
hospitals which he had seen which were having problems:
"They are going the wrong way about it, they are 
introducing information systems and then looking at 
their management structure whereas my argument has 
always been stuff the information systems, get your 
management structure right, then think about what 
information systems you require, because if you do it 
the other way around, you'll get the wrong information 
systems, or you might, or you're wasting your money, 
because nobody will properly use them."
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The essential factor about information was that it 
relates directly to the costs within the directorate. In 
other words changing from functional budgeting to 
management budgeting. A Clinical Director:
"The next thing actually has to do with information 
systems. The first thing you have to do to introduce 
such a system is introduce management budgeting, and 
that means your accounting system has to be changed so 
that you longer account the institution and functional 
groups, doctors, nurses and so forth, you've got to 
have a system for spinning those costs down to the 
clinical teams concerned and that's got to be done 
immediately. But it's not difficult to do. That's the 
key first information step you've got to take, then of 
course you've got to introduce all the other 
information systems, but most of those are actually 
directed to improving patient care, or they should be. 
With a decent PS system and outpatient appointment 
system, transmission of information into labs and x-ray 
departments and clinics, all part of running a hospital 
effectively, not about saving money, but you can tack 
on the saving money, costing systems to them.”
Many hospitals seem to a been carried away with a tide of 
enthusiasm for information technology forgetting that the 
emphasis finally had to be on involvement of the 
professionals in management. A Chief Executive:
"Resource management, instead of emphasizing 
information systems, emphasized in my view the 
involvement of professionals in the management and then 
the information system. So when I see somewhere that's 
not working it begs [i.e. raises] the question, are 
they doing it properly?"
17.4. Future Role of Central Management
Lastly it should not be forgotten that some of the 
dilemmas fall to the managers. Some Clinical Directors
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have been given administrators to guide and brief them, 
or a Business Manager, and this might be a cause of 
resentment to those managers who feel that they could do 
the Clinical Director's job and are indeed doing much of 
it without the pay (some of the participants in my 
feedback sessions asked "what pay?) and responsibility to 
match. Some doctors do carry out their new management 
role for no reward and in addition to their existing 
workload.
The radical change in the way a hospital is managed is 
not just a change which is facing consultants. The more 
senior managers at UGM, DGM and Chief Executive level are 
affected in more ways than they think. Several Clinical 
Directors agreed with this when their attention was drawn 
to this, in line with this a comment from a leading 
academic:
"With the change to clinical directorates the managers 
are in new ground too, they too are not used to 
management either, having been administrators."
The Institute of Health Service Managers are also aware 
that this might be a problem, (Charlwood 1992);
"For managers the future is a lot less distinct than it 
used to be."
There are also problems after being Clinical Director. If 
there is a hierarchy of medical managers, what can the
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non medical lay management do when they have reached a 
certain level if they cannot reach the top? For the 
administrators it remains an unknown, an unanswered 
question.
Decentralization of decision making and the use of the 
directorate structure may leave certain functions in the 
centre. Finance and Personnel and other central support 
departments are not usually completely devolved, and an 
arbitration function will need to be performed by the 
centre. A Chief Executive:
"There remains an enabling rather than a constraining 
role being performed by the centre and central support 
departments.M
17.5. Experience of Clinical Directorates
Many consultants recognized that a central plank of the 
Government's attempts to improve efficiency in the NHS 
over the past few years is an increased involvement of 
consultants in the management process. A medically 
qualified Health Care Academic:
"Particularly it was hoped that clinicians would 
thereby have a greater role in all important decisions 
relating to clinical priorities and the use of 
resources, and this pre-dates even clinical 
directorates with clinical budgeting and resource 
management.”
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Initial experience with Clinical Directorates at 
hospitals like Guy's was encouraging, and although there 
has been no uniform pattern, changes in this direction 
are now in place in most hospitals in the UK. At the 
same time the introduction of the health reforms began to 
be introduced, and then the work of the clinical 
directorates took an extra dimension in many hospitals, 
concerning the content of contracts with purchasing 
authorities and a number of quality issues.
Initially consultants found that they were given 
insufficient administrative and secretarial help, but 
many directorates now have a Business Manager, a Nurse 
Manager and others with specific administrative skills 
within the management team. With budgets properly 
devolved to the directorates, rationalisations within and 
between clinical services becomes a possibility. Some 
felt that
"only the unpleasant tasks have been fully handed over 
by the Chief Executive and hospital board and that 
there is an even tighter bureaucratic control from 
central management. Indeed in some hospitals 
consultants have become disenchanted with the process 
and have been replaced by non medical directors.”
Part of the disenchantment relates to the rapidly 
increasing extent and complexity of the managerial work 
involved. But more important, is the lack of true 
devolvement to clinical directorates in some hospitals.
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And I have already alluded to the desire of some managers 
to devolve responsibility without authority.
And as the health service reforms take effect there is no 
likelihood of managerial tasks for doctors lessening. The 
following statement was echoed by many Clinical 
Directors:
"The 1-2 sessions that were given over to clinical 
directorate work seem to have extended to 3-4 sessions. 
Conflicts with clinical work are an inevitable result 
especially for those in teaching hospitals with the 
additional requirement of academic activity and 
research."
A number of Clinical Directors supported the contention 
that once the work of a Clinical Director extended beyond 
two sessions it was because of too much administration 
rather than management, and this probably indicated 
inadequate managerial support from the Business or Nurse 
Manager, or insufficient trust or delegation to them.
There was a lot of inequality in the way different 
hospitals recognized or rewarded Clinical Directors. And 
there appeared to be a strong correlation between what 
the hospital received from the system and what the 
hospital invested in the system. One Clinical Director 
spoke for many when he said:
"Managers receive their performance bonuses and the 
doctors contribution in the clinical directorate must 
similarly be adequately recompensed. Some way of giving
456
recognition to the importance of such posts in the 
medical staff structure also needs to be found.”
17.6. What Next and The Future
The way consultant work was established in the NHS leads 
to difficulties in setting up a more hierarchical system 
to encompass the wider role and greater responsibilities 
of the Clinical Director because all consultants are 
considered equal and independent. There was a recognition 
however that this might change over the next few years 
with the introduction of more subconsultant specialist 
appointments. One Clinical Director summarised it thus:
"There is however the chance for this to be changed now 
with the almost certain introduction of a new 
specialist grade below that of consultant and over 
which there could be established the final top post of 
clinical director. For each of these categories of 
appointment there would need to be a separate salary 
scale along with allowance for seniority. The 
commitment in return from the doctor appointed to a 
clinical director post is, with respect to the 
acquisition of extra knowledge and skills in health 
service organization, in management, accountancy and 
Information Technology, so that he is as expert and 
informed in these new areas of work, as in clinical 
practice. Attendance at instructional and interactive 
courses is likely to be part of this and will need 
facilitating."
Clinical Directorates as a means of involving doctors in 
managerial roles in hospitals are a recent development in 
this country but what of their future and how important 
are they? Maxwell (1992)
"felt absolutely no doubt about the importance of a 
strong bond between professional activity on the one
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hand and the general management of the institution or 
agency on the other. The bond is necessary in all 
professions that work in a larger organisation for 
example engineering, for example, much of the law, and 
the church but peculiar characteristics in health care 
are, the need for several professions to work together, 
each exercising professional judgement in its own 
field. The tension between the needs of one patient 
and the needs of others; a tension that is not well 
recognised in the Hippocratic tradition. The difficulty 
and pain of some of the decisions that have to be made, 
in conjunction with patients and their families, about 
when to treat and when not to do so. And the tightness 
of resource constraints and the need for choices within 
the resources available, choices that clearly ought to 
be professionally informed, but equally are public 
policy choices for which the institution is publicly 
accountable."
He felt that clinical directorates (on the Johns Hopkins 
model) were a means of achieving such a bond, and that is 
why they are important. They are not an end in 
themselves but a means to an end. They are not 
guaranteed to work? most of all they depend on the 
competencies of the consultants, committed to leadership 
roles, and to a confidence in the arrangements from both 
the professional side and the general management side. 
When they work, the effect can transform the institution, 
but you cannot necessarily assume that the impact is 
permanent. Once they deteriorate, and confidence in them 
weakens on either side (professional or general 
management), they are hard to rebuild.
In the end they are the alternative to professionals 
working in the institution but not as part of it, as in a 
private hospital, or professionals directly managed by 
general management, doing what they are told.
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CHAPTER 18
KEY STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE
18.0. Introduction
Because doctors regard money as not central to the work 
of the NHS in the same way as it is in most commercial
companies, it has been difficult to get medical staff to
face up to financial problems or indeed to admit that 
financial rather than service factors were necessary 
reasons for change.
What then have I discovered of the needs for involving 
doctors more in management, decision making and change in 
hospital? A number of key areas of discussion have
repeatedly come to the fore with both doctors and
managers. They include structures, processes and skills 
required.
18.1. Cultural Change
A change of culture is required to introduce a new 
management idea, and I have seen evidence of this change 
since the beginning of the project. Previously most 
management had been described as fire fighting? there 
were many superficial changes and random initiatives. 
Resource Management, Clinical Budgeting, Awareness
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Training, Technical Needs Analysis, have all been 
referred to, and all are efforts to create a sense of 
progress but they have been only partly effective.
The culture of the hospital needed to be understood and 
dynamically managed so that the powerful and pervasive 
built-in inertias remain as they are and cannot gain 
strength thereby foiling potential change. The time and 
energies of doctors, nurses and managers have in the past 
been diverted into battles rather than establishing 
commonalities, which might make war between the various 
groups unnecessary.
In the past changes have been introduced which on the 
surface have produced change for managers to see, whereas 
below in the body of the organization there has been 
alienation and disaffection. Financial targets and 
activity have been achieved but with the result of low 
morale and minimal participation. The doctors have 
fought the system with a kind of guerilla campaign to 
maintain the status quo. Running the organization below 
peak efficiency has been wasteful and negligent.
Shorten et al (1990) demonstrate that
"When management adopted an interference strategy aimed 
at cost containment and quality assurance, 
confrontations ensued. Strategies which allowqed more 
clinical autonomy and let clinicians shape managerial 
behaviour were necessary to reduce conflict."
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The need for a strategy for cultural change was urgent, 
but the organization needed to be understood, manoeuvred, 
adapted and prepared for the radical shift in management 
style. It was vital that UGM/CEO's addressed issues of 
cultural change and that doctors attempted to understand 
the changes about to unfold.
18.2. The Doctor's Responsibilities
The person in the post of Clinical Director has to have 
the support of the majority of medical staff as the 
organizational head, leader and figurehead of the 
directorate, responsible for the day to day operational 
and the strategic management of the directorate.
18.3. The Opportunities
With clinical staff supported and empowered to make 
operational decisions the hospital at corporate level can 
then be freed to think clearly about strategic issues, 
direction and monitoring. New challenges and 
opportunities are opened up for, and welcomed by, many. 
The full potential of the hospital staff can be realised. 
Cost awareness can be seen and used as creating 
opportunity rather than inhibiting activity. Clinicians 
may then discover enthusiasm for management and an 
inherent ability. The freedom and power this creates 
should replace the authoritarianism of the old managed
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system. A re-evaluation of roles for both doctors and 
managers is necessary. Boundaries and traditional roles 
change; people may feel threatened but the change should 
produce benefits in greater democracy and awareness, with 
considerable benefit to the patient as difficulties are 
confronted and addressed rather than ignored.
Consultant involvement in management has been a 
controversial issue. As I have shown some take the view 
that doctors should only practice medicine, for which 
they have been highly trained, and not dabble in 
management for which they have until recently had no 
training. "I'm here to treat patients" is a familiar 
phrase. An alternative view is that involvement in 
management extends clinical freedom, and it may even be 
considered unethical not to be involved when resources 
are limited and finite, and that a strong clinical input 
and advice is vital, without which inappropriate 
decisions and actions may result.
18.4. Manager as Allies
Few developments take place in health care services which 
do not involve the relationship between clinicians and 
managers. The managerial clinical interface is crucial. 
Pettigrew et al (1992: 282) found:
"a wide variation in the quality of such relations, and
when clinicians had gone into opposition, they could
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exert a powerful block on change. Perhaps more 
surpringly managers also varied in the extent to which 
they saw relationship building and trading with 
clinicians as a core part of their brief.”
The importance of effective managerial clinical relations 
in stimulating strategic change has also been reported in 
studies of the US health care system. Shorten, Morrison 
and Friedman (1990:237) present this as a dominant theme 
in their work:
"emphasizing the significance of looking for common 
ground, involving selected physicians early on in 
planning, carefully identifying the needs and interests 
of key physicians, and working on a daily basis to 
build a climate of trust, honesty and effective 
communications.11
Hocking (1991) identified a similar pattern in the 
university sector,
"where relationships between professionals and 
administrators could be a stimulant or block to major 
change."
Pettigrew et al (1992: 283) feel that:
"Manager clinician relations are easier where negative 
sterotypes had broken down, perhaps as a result of the 
emergence of mixed roles or perspectives. For managers, 
it was important to understand what clinicians valued 
(medical records may be not so important to managers, 
but are of great importance to clinicians), and hence 
what they had to do to engage in effective trading 
relations. Those managers who were best were those semi 
immersed in the world of clinicians."
I have given an example in Chapter 13 section 14 of a 
managers failure to understand the importance clinicians
attach to medical records. Progress must depend on each
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having a mutual understanding and recognition of each 
other's skills and knowledge. It is equally important 
that each group should be prepared to allow the other to 
bring that skill and knowledge into management. There 
are medicine for managers programmes seeking to promote a 
manager's understanding of the problems of clinical 
practice and how that effects managerial issues. Doctors 
are now being allowed more, even encouraged more, into 
managerial involvement and they too need to understand 
managerial practice. An integration of managerial and 
medical values is the sensible way forward, with the 
creation of goals and objectives common to both.
Fitzgerald and Sturt (1992) highlight how doctors' values 
can be a barrier to teamwork and collaboration:
"Doctors often only socialise with other doctors. They 
may only be comfortable with their "peers" and often 
like to "talk shop" using impenetrable jargon. (This is 
also partly true of managers whose jargon is often a 
sore point with doctors.) Because of this social 
barrier, doctors often believe that managers hold 
completely alien values. Their descriptions of managers 
are sometimes a grotesque caricature. This 
"stereotyping" (which works both ways) is a barrier 
that can only be overcome by both sides taking a 
considerable risk in self-disclosure."
The extent of the mistrust and suspicion between doctors 
and managers is also demonstrated by the research of 
Stewart (1986). These relationships being identified as 
a major barrier to the involvement of doctors in the
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management process immediately after the Griffiths (1983) 
reforms.
Enabling clinicians and managers to work together, 
discovering that former enemies are allies under the 
skin, can be disconcerting? finding mutual respect for 
each other's skills and knowledge can be both exciting 
and comforting.
18.5.0. Basis of Successful Clinical Directorates.
There must be a starting commitment from both the 
professional side (nursing as much as medicine) and the 
general management side to make the arrangement work.
And this issue has been addressed in detail in Chapter 
13.4.A. on managers being willing to relinquish 
managerial authority from the centre and 13.4.B. on 
Clinical Directors being willing to take on management 
responsibility. If either commitment weakens then it 
must be re-established or directorates will not do what 
they are there to do. (Maxwell 1992):
"They are not guarantied to work - most of all they 
depend on competent people, committed to leadership 
roles, and to confidence in the arrangements from both 
the professional side and the general management side. 
When they work, the effect can transform the 
institution."
Following on from the issue of managers relinquishing 
control directorates, a Health Care Academic:
465
"Clinical Directors must be given the necessary 
autonomy for expenditure and income, workload and 
quality within strategic parameters agreed by central 
general management. The clinical directorates must of 
course meet their targets. A director who fails to do 
so must be subject to proper discipline and ultimately 
to removal."
Clinical Directors must have authority to deal with 
problems within their directorate and general management 
must provide support. The remedy if a clinical director 
acts irresponsibly is to sack him or her from the post. 
Of course, this is not a sanction to use lightly and a 
wise and responsible clinical director will not in any 
case be likely to spring surprises on general management 
over important issues.
Information on performance and expenditure must be 
accurate and timely. That does not mean it has to be 
over elaborate and this has been discussed in detail in 
Chapter 17 Section 3. Maxwell (1992) feels that,
"Calls for excessively elaborate systems are often a 
diversion and are dangerous because they are only too 
likely to bring disappointment and disillusion. But 
selective, prompt, "accurate enough" information really 
is necessary."
Clinical directors of necessity, to maintain the clinical 
perspective, have to be part time managers with a 
majority clinical commitment and serve for a limited 
period. As one academic put it,
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"Otherwise they will in time lose the professional end 
of the support they need. They are there to lead, not 
to manage. Their roles need to be clear, as do those 
of the other leaders in the directorate, e.g. the nurse 
manager and business manager."
Careful consideration needs to be given to the number of 
clinical directorates to achieve the right balance 
between greater decentralization and effective control. 
Health Care Academic:
"The necessary components of successful clinical 
directorates are that the number of directorates needs 
to be great enough to reflect the real variety of 
clinical activity (i.e. the equivalent of strategic 
business units), but they need to be grouped so that 
the directorates influence strategy and resource 
allocation for the whole institution."
There has to be effective and real decentralization, 
because the advantages are as one Clinical Director saw 
it,
"Decentralised decision making by those closest to 
patients should be faster and more responsive to ever 
changing customer needs. Those who know most about the 
health care business, i.e. the health professionals, 
should be the ideal people to plan the delivery of high 
quality services. More effective budgetary control 
should follow."
How it is done depends on agreement, the delegation of 
authority, the giving of responsibility and methods of 
ensuring accountability, the proper delegation of 
authority from Chief Executive and the involvement in the 
overall affairs of hospital. But responsibility and
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authority must be ”co terminus" as one participant put 
it.
To function, a Clinical Director must receive adequate 
support, and this falls essentially into three areas: 
information, advice and managerial.
18.5.1. Information
Information must be accurate and timely and can often be 
provided by the Nurse Manager and the Business Manager, 
although there may be a need for an external input from 
the Finance and Business and Contracting departments.
This information support is necessary as without it 
reliable and timely information decisions are difficult 
to reach. The Business Manager's role is crucial here, 
firstly as a collecting and sifting point for locally and 
centrally produced figures and statistics, and perhaps 
more important, to condense and simplify the information 
into a user friendly form.
The information required is in the area of budgets, 
identifying areas of under and over spending and 
presenting recommendations for any action which may be 
necessary to the Clinical Service Team (CST), as well as 
the monitoring of all the various contracts, activity
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analysis, coding, case mix and DRG's, manpower and 
general business planning.
Most directorates use the service departments e.g. 
pathology, diagnostic imaging, operating theatres etc, 
and many hospitals are moving towards devolving the 
budgets for such services to the specific directorates on 
a cost/income basis and this may include the remedial 
therapy professions as well. In all instances the pattern 
of service provided and the cost implications do need to 
be agreed.
18.5.2. Advice
The Clinical Director needs advice in unfamiliar areas of 
expertise, not infrequently personnel and financial 
matters from the Business Manager, but in addition he may 
require support from outside the CST from Personnel 
(Human Resource) and Finance departments.
In the final analysis serious disciplinary matters within 
the directorate now fall to the Clinical Director for 
resolution. This is not a field in which many doctors 
have expertise. Several Clinical Directors had found 
themselves involved with disciplinary hearings and 
dismissals for which they admitted no experience or 
training. In such circumstances the advice of the 
Personnel (Human Resource) department is essential, and
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those who had received such support and advice when 
necessary expressed gratitude for this.
18.5.3. Managerial
Managerial assistance in the day to day control of the 
staff in the directorate is again provided by the Nurse 
Manager and the Business Manager.
Managerial support is necessary because it is impossible 
for a Clinical Director to retain continuing clinical 
workload without being able to delegate some managerial 
responsibilities for nursing and clinical staff or in 
some directorates such as laboratory services, radiology 
and otolaryngology etc, for other professionals.
All managerial problems which may arise in any area 
should be discussed in the CST, consisting of the 
Clinical Director, the Business Manager and the Nurse 
Manager, whose meetings may often prove an invaluable 
support mechanism or give the opportunity for fresh and 
innovative suggestions and solutions.
In respect of senior medical colleagues much can be 
achieved just by mutual sharing of budgetary and 
performance information and peer review, without the need 
for any confrontational intervention.
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Few doctors have financial training and if it becomes 
apparent that the budget for whatever reason is not going 
to balance and the matter cannot be resolved by the CST, 
advice from the Finance department on ways of addressing 
the situation can be a vital support factor especially if 
working relationships can be built up. It is also 
necessary at the creation of the clinical directorate to 
establish what your budget is and agree to it, and to 
establish the rules. A UGM:
"Management retains power by not setting out the rules 
of the game."
It is also necessary to see the directorate budget in 
perspective. An Academic:
"The Clinical Director needs to know the total budget 
position not just his own. The directorate budget is 
meaningless in isolation."
Medical Audit may become valuable as a management tool in 
ensuring that alterations, for example in treatment 
protocols, are properly costed and that full cost benefit 
calculations are carried out rather than new approaches 
being introduced on a tide of enthusiasm simply because 
they appear to be a good idea.
In this chapter I have outlined the areas and potential 
for successfully involving doctors in a management role
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in hospitals. In the next chapter I will discuss in more 





This chapter summarising the main work of the thesis is 
divided into two sections:
A. A review of my personal reflections during the three 
years of this study.
B. The conclusions that I have been able to draw, 
Decentralization with agreement on responsibility, 
accountability, authority, and the importance of agreeing 
ground rules. Issues around clinical freedom and a 
collection of ideas around the relationship between 
managers and professionals and the attitudes of doctors 
to management roles.
And at the end of the chapter I will set out a number of 
basic principles for the effective involvement of 
clinicians in management.
19.1. Personal Reflections
This section is an opportunity to reflect on all I have 
learned personally and how I have changed as a result of
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undertaking and carrying out the work. From the outset I 
kept a diary of thoughts and ideas, not only my own but 
those of others that came up in conversations.
It is fair to say that this project has totally dominated 
not only my life for the last three years, but also that 
of my colleagues and my family. It has been researched 
alongside my career as a hospital consultant, part of 
which involved being Clinical Director for my department, 
in addition to having a number of Regional committee 
commitments. For reasons of finance not least being 
father to three teenage sons I have also continued with 
some private practice.
Despite my initial anxiety at the prospect of embarking 
on a non scientific based research project after so many 
years of hospital based clinical work I found I became 
quite addicted to the topic. I began with the 
preconceived notion held by most consultants that health 
service managers are of poor quality and that most 
doctors could do a better job of running hospitals. I 
thought that consultants were rather like entrepreneurs 
with imagination and flair whereas managers were second 
rate administrators, the typical stereotype image so 
beloved of the medical profession. I little realized how 
those views would change over the years, not once but 
many times. I began to think about the values of
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consultants and managers, an issue clarified when I read 
Handy's "The Gods of Management" about a year later.
Changes in the health service seemed to be occurring 
every few years. This seemed to indicate that whatever 
problems there were did not have simple solutions, an 
issue referred to on p 3, although on considering the 
changes I realised that the changes were only in the 
management structure not in the actual service. At that 
early stage I could still not clearly resolve all the 
issues.
As I analyze the data and try to tease out the findings 
and draw some conclusions I am able to identify two main 
strands, personal learning and the substance of the 
thesis, although both are interlinked.
Some of my presumptions when I began this research have 
changed and some have been confirmed by the process. I 
thought in a simplistic way that I would find doctors 
would make better managers and that managers know nothing 
about the problems and dilemmas faced by doctors and 
medicine in general. This was not the case.
I had assumed that professionals could and should only be 
managed by professionals with the same background, which 
from my research experience I now realize is neither 
necessary nor of any advantage to the organization. In
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some hospitals in the United States doctors did try 
running hospitals but according to the Nursing Director 
of a prestigious large hospital things changed because:
"the physicians had not spent a lot of time educating 
themselves in the area of business and management; they 
considered because they had a degree in medicine they 
knew how to run a hospital. Well, they failed 
miserably, both in the area of finance and in managing 
people because in a big organization you need to know 
how to manage people."
I had also hoped to discover some simple explanation or 
underlying mental reasoning for this, but I found no 
simple explanations and whatever the unconscious mental 
processes they were inaccessible.
I did as expected find that doctors and managers have 
different values and attitudes and I confirmed that the 
doctors' view is one of thinking solely about the one 
patient and doing everything possible for that patient 
regardless of cost and I confirmed that the managers 
regard their priority as doing the most for the maximum 
number of patients within the resources available. I 
have concluded that there is a need for partnership and 
collaboration, see page 353. I also intend to discuss 
this further in a later section, although doctors' lack 
of interest in management (page 41) is working against 
hope of cooperation.
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I now know much more than I did about how and why there 
is a suspicion of too much central control, that is 
relevant to the remarks above, and I have drawn the 
concept that in spite of apparent devolution, central 
control has tightened.
I found that managers tend to be driven by contracts and 
feel that the primary role of the hospital is to fulfil 
contracts. Therefore, managers may be regarded as having 
moved from being administrators to becoming 
entrepreneurs. I discovered that whereas doctors see the 
role of the hospital as solely for the purpose of 
treating patients, some doctors are recognizing that 
their environment is altering and they are accepting a 
role change from authoritarian to listening and now to 
participating. See pages 52, 60, 93, 99, 288, 295, 334 
and 435.
There are clinicians who think managerially and 
strategically and successful Clinical Directors are 
increasingly part of such a group. I have already 
referred (page 463) to Pettigrew et al (1992: 284);
"These are clinicians who think across the patch, and 
may even be able to speak for the medical community as 
a whole. Such strategic clinicians are critical people 
for management to identify, foster and encourage and 
under no circumstances should they be driven into 
opposition by trivia. Considerable managerial acumen 
was needed to foster positive alliances."
19.2. The Conclusions
The conclusions focus on three core issues. The most 
important is decentralization of management which has to 
do with the agreement of managers and professionals and 
includes devolvement of responsibility, accountability 
and authority. Next comes the question of the effects on 
clinical freedom and thirdly a collection of issues 
including the relationship between managers and 
professionals and their attitudes to the role of doctors 
in management.
19.3.0. Decentralization
The essence of decentralization is to increase the 
involvement of all staff in the operational management of 
the service. However, it is important that the 
responsibility and authority should be equally devolved 
and commensurate with the task, an issue discussed in 
Chapter 16 in general and section 7 in particular. I 
found a tendency for central management or administration 
to decentralize responsibility, but not to decentralize 
financial or operational authority. On the other hand 
the tendency is for clinicians in the decentralised 
management structure to wish to acquire authority without 
responsibility and accountability. These are issues 
which need to be frankly and openly discussed and worked
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through for a decentralized system of clinical management 
to be effective within the hospital.
In general, greater efforts need to be put into the 
clinical and medical audit and education of staff, 
encouraging commitment to the hospital and devolved 
management to make it happen.
I am satisfied that decentralized units function more 
effectively than centralized units. In the words of 
Musch (1992),
"Decentralized units are always smarter than top 
management."
19.3.1. The Four Vital Requirements for Decentralization
There are four vital requirements for successfully 





Each has been defined and discussed in Chapter 16 
Sections 16.3 to 6. As a Clinical Director put it,
"When you involve the professionals in the management 
of any service, responsibility and authority have to be 
de-centralized in equal measure and accountability has 
to be clear."
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They all need to be fully explored, in particular 
authority, which some managers and consultants seem to 
find the most difficult notion to grasp in the concept of 
management within hospitals, and needs to be clearly 
understood.
These basic principles must be fulfilled for effective 
involvement of clinicians in management. The Clinical 
Directors have to be part of the major decision making 
machinery and have real responsibility and authority and 
for all finances in particular (including contracting). 
There needs to be a single management body where 
decisions are made and it has to have the Clinical 
Directors on that body. I have discussed how there has 
to be a balance between a large numbers directorates but 
with a Management Board small enough to be practical, 
manageable and effective. As I have indicated each 
directorate needs to be as homogeneous as possible with 
comparable specialities, but not too numerous because of 
the resultant size of the Management Board, (see Chapter 
18, p 467). Ideally the Clinical Directors should have a 
majority over the Executive Directors, who would normally 
be about five in number including, the Chief Executive, 
Nursing or Patient Services, Finance, Personnel or 
Estates or Business and Contracting. There should be no 
other managers sitting on the Board. This
480
decentralization is vital, and it has to include, 
finance, information and contracting.
19.3.2. Ground Rules are Important
It is important not to set up a new organizational 
structure without considering who makes the decisions, 
and about what. Frequently too much attention is given 
to structures and very little, or none to the rules by 
which it will work. It is also important to understand 
the new organization being put into place, and establish 
the rules by which it is to work, then if faced with the 
need to change, it is possible to understand how to cope 
with difficulties. The means of approaching problems 
should be clear even if the solution is not. It is also 
important to define the roles, responsibilities and 
relationships of Medical Directors and Clinical 
Directors, to whom they are responsible and for what. 
There are problems in encouraging consultants to achieve 
targets set by the Clinical Director. Doctors are a 
highly motivated group but they have their own 
objectives. It is important that mechanisms for 
maintaining relationships between directorates and of the 
consultant body within the hospital are supported by 
maintaining such bodies as the Medical Staff Committee.
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19.4.0. Clinical Freedom
I have shown how historically hospitals up until fairly 
recently were cottage industries and the craftsmen or the 
technicians were the doctors who ran their workshops 
within them maintaining complete and total authority over 
their areas. According to the CEO of an American 
University Hospital,
"The hospital administrator was relegated to a fairly 
maternal role of clucking around seeing that all these 
artists were happy and the best administrators were 
those that were able to keep their craftsmen the 
happiest. That paradigm is in full change."
Next, with more specialization and the appearance of 
technicians new people were fitted into existing 
departments or new departments were created. They all 
provided a service to patients but no thought was given 
to their function in a unit. The idea of a health care 
team is still beyond the comprehension of many people in 
hospitals. I have discussed on pages 60, 93, 99, 288 and 
295 how doctors have moved from professional independence 
to interdependence, although many do not recognize this. 
And I have discussed (p.94) the resulting stresses in the 
system and (p.100) how the role of the doctor in hospital 
is changing and the way in which the medical hierarchy 
and power has changed (p.105). In addition to the effects 
of change from personal to agency medicine on (p.109-111) 
as well as the importance of personalized medicine to
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clinical freedom (p.146-50) and the implications that 
flow from that. The conclusions around clinical freedom I 
have divided into eight separate sections.
19.4.1. Doctors9 Perspective
I have referred to the idea that at the inception of the 
NHS there was agreement concerning clinical freedom. 
According to Klein (1989:82):
"Implicit in the structure of the NHS was a bargain 
between the State and the medical profession. While 
central government controlled the budget, doctors 
controlled what happened within that budget. Financial 
power was concentrated at the centre? clinical power 
was concentrated at the periphery."
The bargain was to some degree frustrating for the 
doctors as the price of preserving clinical freedom was 
accepting the constraints of working within fixed 
budgetary limits.
I have found that unfortunately this individually they 
could or would not do. Tribalism and rivalry between 
specialities and departments prevented that. Secondly 
doctors fear that general managers are encroaching on 
their professional independence, their freedom to 
determine their working patterns and their clinical 
freedom.
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Thirdly some doctors feel that clinical freedom is under 
threat by the government determined to make doctors more 
accountable for their work (Templeton, 1986) discussed on 
page 256. This phenomenon of control is appearing in 
every Western country (Loveridge and Starkey, 1992).
19.4.2. Managers' Perspective
For managers the bargain referred to earlier was equally 
frustrating. Enthoven (1985:9):
"The consultants have accepted long term contracts with 
the NHS and limits on total expenditure in exchange for 
job security and 'clinical freedom'. Thus NHS 
management has very little leverage to make their 
services responsive to patient needs. To change the 
speciality mix of its medical staff, a Region must wait 
for deaths and retirements."
Managers feel that clinicians constrain managerial 
choices in at least three ways: firstly when they extend 
the range and cost of their activities without taking 
account of the resource implications; secondly they feel 
that a shift in clinical direction may owe more to 
personal interest than to the needs of the hospital; 
thirdly they feel frustration that these actions by 
clinicians can unbalance programmes designed for a 
district as a whole.
Managers therefore face the difficult task of persuading 
doctors to accept that their clinical freedom must be
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counterbalanced by an awareness of and responsibility 
for, the effective management of resources. On page 132 
I have shown how change is occurring with budgetary 
limitations.
Real power may now lie in the hands of purchasers 
(district and health commission managers and GP 
Fundholders), rather the providers (unit managers, chief 
executives and consultants), who can decide what to 
purchase. They will almost certainly take the view of 
the greatest good for the greatest number, rather than 
the clinicians7 traditional view of the best for the 
individual.
On the other hand there may be power in the hands of the 
provider who having met the obligation to provide core 
services can decide what other services to offer, 
services as Hoffenberg (1991:14) says
“which in a market environment will be taken on
economic grounds."
But again this power has left the individual consultant 
in a position where he anticipates it may no longer be 
possible for a surgeon to use his clinical freedom to 
introduce a new operation, nor a physician a new 
diagnostic investigation or drug therapy.
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Finally on pages 130 and 135 I refer to the idea that 
faced with a seemingly impossible managerial problem the 
situation may be resolved if developments result in all 
health care professionals having clinical freedom.
19.4.3. Government Perspective
The government believes a balance has to be struck 
between organization and clinical freedom. The 
government has already successfully imposed the principle 
of a limited list and in doing so has provided further 
evidence of a willingness to take on corporate interest 
groups which could extend to the medical profession.
It has challenged the idea that clinical freedom bestows 
an automatic right to use public resources without 
scrutiny or limits. Decisions by consultants to keep 
patients in hospital longer than necessary has 
implications for the NHS as a whole (Higgins, 1988);
"All such decisions although they had crucial 
implications for the use of NHS resources, belonged to 
the sacred realm of clinical autonomy. Similarly the 
use of ineffective, inefficient or expensive methods of 
clinical intervention."
19.4.4. United States
American doctors have found themselves increasingly 
working to guidelines laid down by corporate bodies and
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government. It has been argued that the medical 
profession in the United States is being de­
professionalised as doctors lose clinical autonomy and 
simply become agents or employees of corporate providers 
of health care, the commercialisation of medicine 
producing its own decline. As Winkenwerder and Ball 
(1988) have written,
"Increasingly, health care is perceived as a commodity 
that is produced, marketed, bought, sold and 
distributed".
Doctors in America now feel they are more controlled, and 
in more ways, than doctors in Britain. There are controls 
on who they can admit to hospital and how long those 
patients may be kept in hospital. There are many 
protocols they have to follow from when the patient is in 
hospital, to their follow up practices. According to one 
CEO,
"There appears to be no doubt that doctors are enjoying 
far less freedom and are far more controlled in their 
daily operations although it requires someone with a 
little bit of perception to see where those controls 
are, and what it really means."
An American Hospital President said:
"It is inarguable that physicians' autonomy has been 
significantly reduced in the last fifteen years as a 
result of external insurance and governmental 
regulations and controls of various sorts."
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And another CEO said:
11 In the past it was unmitigated, unlimited autonomy 
which made medicine a marvellous profession for 
Americans? they now feel they're controlled.”
19.4.5. Lessons from United States
Similar forces are at work in Britain in the NHS. Many 
doctors feel that the most recent proposals for reforming 
the health service contained in the White Paper (1989) 
offer the severest challenge to clinical freedom, in that 
it is proposed to remove many medical decisions from 
doctors and give them to managers who will act according 
to market forces, although power will not be devolved 
solely to managers but to managers and consumers, the 
latter through their general practitioners.
Now that the NHS is being marketed, fears have been 
expressed that the introduction of internal marketing 
with limited budgets for Fund Holding GPs and Health 
Authorities may lead some patients to question the 
motives associated with medical and clinical decisions, 
especially if they should be denied expensive 
investigations or treatment. (Drummond, 1990) comments:
"fundholding may harm the doctor-patient relationship 
if patients become sensitized to the potential 
conflicts doctors face in weighing up options for care 
when some of the options demand expenditure from the 
fund."
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However as Hoffenberg (1991:7) observed,
11 We have an obligation to use public resources
prudently.......the intrusion of cost-consciousness
into clinical judgements cannot be ignored. No society 
is capable of providing the best available care to all 
of its people all of the time. Cost-containment is 
inescapable".
19.4.6. Consequences
Despite the American Medical Association's rejection of 
socialised medicine because of its supposed threat to 
clinical freedom I found the British doctor by and large 
maintains more freedom of action than his American 
counterpart. Hoffenberg (1987) speculated that British 
doctors possessed far greater clinical freedom than their 
counterparts in America where three main forces had 
combined to curtail their clinical freedom. Firstly the 
advances in medical technology had resulted in amongst 
other things, patients resenting the authority of doctors 
and demanding a greater say about themselves; i.e. 
patient power. Pellegrino (1990) describes the
"irreversible shift in the locus of decision-making 
from physician to patient".
Eddy (1990) adds that as a result
"physicians are slowly being stripped of their 
decision-making power".
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Secondly the dominance of the law and litigation forces 
doctors to surrender much of their freedom of action and 
adopt defensive medicine. Thirdly the costs of health 
care are such that payers, whether they be government, 
insurers, industry or individuals determined to regulate 
costs by regulating the doctors who initiate the expense.
The same process that now threatens the profession in 
Britain has already had considerable influence on health 
care provision in the United States and clinical freedom 
has suffered a similar decline over the past two decades. 
There, it has been the funding bodies, whether 
government, insurance companies or employers, who have 
attempted to contain runaway costs by placing more and 
more restrictions on clinical freedom. Such practice and 
demands suggest that there might no longer be grounds for 
justifying unmanaged status other than the provision of 
personal clinical services. Perhaps the move towards 
agency medicine makes doctors easier to manage.
19.4.7. Changes Are Occurring
There are consultants who are amenable to practising to 
suit the organization where no clinical priority can be 
established, and accepting that the hospital has to earn 
its money from somewhere. This is discussed on pages 52, 
60, 93, 99, 288 and 295. One Clinical Director said:
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"Most of us are supported by the institution and we 
want it to work, we don't want it to go down and 
therefore we recognize we have to get money and if the 
way of doing it is to be helpful and it doesn't make a 
big difference clinically.... I have been asked if I 
will do seven more knees very quickly, because if we do 
forty of a particular type of knee that I do, by April 
1st then we get quite a large discount from the company 
that provides the knees? if I've only done thirty 
eight, we don't, therefore, it is please could I do 
knees, rather than hips. It doesn't make any 
difference to me, so I don't mind. If it's an 
advantage to the institution, one does the knees."
And patients are now being referred to as consumers, 
customers and clients. Reiman (1987) wrote:
"The present trend towards market competition is 
clearly weakening the traditional values of our 
profession".
19.4.8. Clinical Freedom and Resource Constraints.
One of the issues that surfaced in a number of interviews 
was the question of the effect or possible effect that 
limited resources would have on clinical freedom. The 
consultant does have the discretion to make decisions 
about patients currently under treatment without those 
decisions being reviewed or overturned by anyone else, 
even someone from the same discipline. What has happened 
can be shared in a peer review context, where it can be 
discussed, but it is voluntary; no one can insist on 
knowing why something was done or overturn or change what 
is being done. That is the basic core of the discretion 
of the consultant. I have already discussed the limits
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to that discretion and as one Director of Public Health 
put it,
"the most obvious limit of that discretion is a 
contract to do certain things, within the law, the 
rules of General Medical Council etc., but the one that 
really matters of course is resources. You can only 
put someone in a Coronary Care Unit if you have a 
Coronary Care Unit with an empty bed, if you have not 
you cannot exercise your clinical discretion.
Resources have increasingly been the major constraint. 
Now we are formalising, the resources that are 
available, they are being determined by some external 
body which is also specifying for the first time that 
they will only give money for you to do certain things, 
to certain people from certain places. That is brand 
new, it still fits my model of clinical autonomy, you 
can't do something unless you have the resources, but 
it brings in a whole new range of constraints on what 
you can do, from an external force, over which you have 
no power. These are people you cannot negotiate with.”
Clinical freedom has to do with the relationship between 
doctor and patient, it does not directly affect managers. 
It is concerned with current patients being treated; you 
do not have clinical freedom to make decisions about 
future patients that you might have under your care. It 
is the issue of resources through contracts which seems 
to be the major threat to clinical freedom. A Director of 
Public Health again:
"A major curtailment of the old clinical freedom to 
provide services you thought you wanted to provide is 
now by money, because you can only provide services for 
which you are funded. A major curtailment of the 
individual's clinical freedom is through contracts, I 
don't think most of our colleagues have realised that 
yet”.
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One manager supported that view:
"I think there aren't enough resources for everything. 
And you can't actually take away the notion of clinical 
freedom and the judgement that implies, from 
resources”.
Yet there are some doctors who believe this is not a bad 
thing. Consultant:
”1 believe the medical profession should lose some of 
its power, because actually the old medical ethic of 
saving lives at all costs, healing the sick whatever 
the costs, finding the cause of the illness whatever 
the cost, is an ethic which is no longer appropriate.”
While a more popular view amongst those consultant 
clinical directors most convinced about the need for 
change can be summarised by the view of Clinical 
Director:
”What a clinician wanted was clinical freedom and that 
required resources because if you didn't have the 
resources, you didn't have the clinical freedom. The 
question was, would we be able to direct more resource 
into clinical work as doctors than if we weren't 
involved? If we could increase the efficiency of our
work we would maximise our clinical freedom......... By
being involved, you can make sure that the money that 
is available is used in ways which make the most 
medical sense to improve clinical freedom.”
As a Clinical Director observed,
"Things change the moment you apply cash limits, the 
responsibility of doctors within the organization 
changes. Because in a cash limited health service, 
striving for equity, everybody has to be accountable 
for what they do. Doctors have to be involved in 
making those choices".
493
Doctors are now becoming aware of finite resources, and 
some of them are prepared to make changes and no longer 
regard this as an infringement of clinical freedom. I 
also feel that to make doctors most cost conscious you 
need to devolve budgets as low as possible, even to 
individuals if necessary, so that they are totally aware 
of how they are committing resources.
19.5.0. Doctors Involvement in Management
I discovered why some of the things that managers do, or 
do not do, result in many of the problems in the doctors' 
rejection of management. These include: making promises 
that are not delivered; showing naivety rather than 
seeking advice? apparently being dishonest with doctors 
about financial limits? some departments spending to 
crisis point always resulting in money being found, which 
devalues the idea of sticking to a budget? a feeling that 
money will always be found from somewhere, District, 
Region or Government, as it would be politically 
unacceptable for a hospital to go broke. This is a large 
barrier to cooperation.
19.5.1 Doctors Neglect of Management
Many doctors admitted that the profession had neglected 
to become involved in management for reasons of lack of
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interest, lack of time, and poor image associated with 
such involvement. In the States similarly as a Clinical 
Director told me,
"Doctors have been very bad managers and what has 
happened in this country in the past few years is a 
direct result of our profession neglecting its 
responsibilities as far as management is concerned. We 
have as a profession neglected responsibility for 
containing costs and neglected responsibility in 
advising on the allocation of priorities as opposed to 
our own particular interest."
A Professor of Surgery put it to me:
"There are several things that have happened in this 
country in the past fifteen or twenty years. The 
doctors have been very bad managers. Our profession 
neglected their responsibilities as far as management 
is concerned, our profession neglected its 
responsibilities in cost containment, neglected its 
responsibilities in allocation of priorities for the 
hospital, as opposed to an individual's interest.... 
that has been the mistake that we have made as a 
profession. As a result, as we are getting the 
crunch, the "Fed's" are cutting back, the State are 
cutting back, the County is cutting back and all the 
support that the medical profession used to get, 
especially teaching institutions, we all are now 
looking at what's what, and we may be a little bit too 
late."
Health management academic:
"..as far as hospital consultants are concerned, there 
is an enormous need for medical leadership, the 
opportunity has been lost so far. The challenge of 
hospital care over the next ten to fifteen years seems 
to be absolutely enormous. The degree of change we 
can expect will be greater in the next ten years than 
it has been in the last ninety; unless doctors are 
leading that change, innovating, being creative, which 
they are as a group, and allowed to be so, and taking 
that on board, the health service is in deep water. 
Doctors can no longer be protectionist in the way they
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do things, they must lead change, innovate, create a 
whole range of things which are important.”
The way doctors choose to react to change in the fields 
of clinical management and resource management will 
substantially influence the type of career available to 
consultants in the 1990's. Perhaps at no time since the 
beginning of the National Health Service when the medical 
profession first joined in, have the choices and 
decisions been so important. If consultants become 
involved in resource management and medical audit both 
their management role and their clinical leadership will 
be enhanced. I have shown how doctors did not grasp the 
opportunity created by the reforms (p.42) and their 
involvement in management will strengthen rather than 
weaken their position (p.77).
19.5.2. Doctors' Support for Management
I found that consultants are divided between those who 
are now active in supporting the new management 
initiatives and keen to play a full participatory role in 
management, and those who are not. I have explained how 
I think there are probably different levels of commitment 
and I have discussed this in some detail in Chapter 14 
Section 14.1.
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19.5.3. Managers7 Support for Doctors7 Role in Management
I found that managers have divided opinions about doctors 
and divided views about the need to involve them in 
management. There is stress in the system between 
managers and professionals (p.94). I found that some are 
genuinely envious of doctors7 apparent freedom and 
jealous of their education, dismissive of the genuineness 
of their values, angry at their arrogance and frightened 
of their own position if the doctors7 role in management 
turns out to be a "sleeping tiger". Equally, many 
managers have genuine feelings of admiration, and a 
willingness to support and help doctors in their work.
19.6. Incentives and Disincentives
Like West (1988:56) already referred to in previous 
chapters (see pages 275, 303, 349, 385, 449) I found that 
incentives need to be introduced into hospitals, so that 
those responsible for inefficiency bear the costs of 
their actions. There are few or no sanctions or 
penalties for lack of interest in bed and theatre usage 
(Chapter 3 Sections 5.1.to 3.) Technical efficiency, the 
elimination of whims and personal agendas need to be 
addressed by clinical budgeting. He concludes:
"To return to the airline analogy, it is clear that 
laymen cannot and should not fly airliners. But the 
financial and planning staff of the airlines can
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legitimately lay down the routes and schedules for 
pilots to follow.”
Fitzgerald et al (1992) also highlight that evidence 
suggests that clinicians need incentives to perform 
management roles, as well as support. There is evidence 
from other professions that underlines the problems 
facing professionals moving into a second career or 
adding to their specialism an additional set of knowledge 
(Perucci, 1973; Scheneller and Weiner, 1985; Earl and 
Skyrrme, undated).
19.7. Suggestions and Recommendations
There is a key role for professional staff and the 
professionals must become more involved in general 
management. Clinical Director:
"The large number of separate decision makers in the 
professions is what separates health care from most 
industrial and service industries."
The old attitude (see p.46 on role models), to doctors' 
involvement in management was summed up by Musch (1992):
"Doctors in hospital management are like eunuchs in a 
harem. They know how it is done. They have seen it 
done. But they cannot do it."
I hope I have shown that this attitude is changing.
The management in hospital appears to be broadly divided 
into two patts, the guidance or strategy management, and
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the delivery or operational management. The task of a 
Clinical Director is mainly concerned with operational 
management but, although not a representative of a 
speciality, is representing the clinicians as a group and 
should have a voice in strategy. In successfully 
decentralized hospitals, the Management Board is chaired 
by the Medical Director and attended by all Clinical and 
Executive Directors.
The Clinical Director must be participating in hospital 
strategy and policy formulation, and contributing to 
effective decision making within the hospital for which 
he should recognise corporate responsibility.
He should be responsible for innovating change and for 
responsiveness to change. Change is never easy. People 
resist it for many reasons, insecurity, social and 
economic loss. Kaluzny and Hernandez (1988) identify 
three types of change as a function of whether ends or 
means or both are involved. The process of change can be 
regarded as a number of separate processes, (Grant and 
Gale, 1990). First there is the recognition of the need 
for change, then the problem needs to be identified, 
together with alternative methods and strategies for its 
management. The selected method and strategy then needs 
to be chosen and the change implemented. And finally an 
evaluation of the success or otherwise of the change 
needs to be made. Though rarely, as the authors admit is
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this a simple step by step process. All this is important 
as the Clinical Director has a responsibility to make the 
best use of resources. It can also prove whether the 
change was wise or whether further change is necessary.
Fitzgerald et al (1992), again referred to in earlier 
chapters (pages 398 and 464), highlight the emergence of 
the clinical manager as a new role.
"It is not a part-time manager performing tasks as any 
other manager might do, Uniquely, a clinician manager 
combines direct and current clinical expertise with 
management expertise to take decisions about the range 
and quality of services offered."
The design of this new clinicians role should reflect 
these considerations, the need to perform certain core 
tasks, such as the development of the strategy for the 
faculty or speciality, and with others for the hospital 
as a whole, financial decision making, resource 
allocation and staffing strategies.
19.8. Characteristics of Managerial Success
There are certain characteristics which seem to 
distinguish the more successful doctors in management. 
Management research has increasingly focused on observing 
what managers do rather than on what they should do. 
Boyatzis (1982), to whom I referred in Chapter 16, see 
page 417, tried to identify the characteristics of
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excellent performance. He concluded that a job is 
performed most effectively when three elements are 
congruent: the job demands, the organisational 
environment and the competence of the job holder. 
Competence for the task involves personality, values, 
motives, attitudes and behaviour, as well as skills and 
knowledge.
Firstly there are technical skills associated with the 
particular profession or speciality. These are basic 
skills and knowledge possessed to achieve success in a 
professional role. Secondly there are basic managerial 
skills appropriate to any managerial situation, for 
example leadership, people management, social skills, 
supervision and working with others. And thirdly there 
are special skills which distinguish the excellent 
manager. Some of these are personality features which 
cannot easily be learned. Others are more amenable to 
change or can be taught and learned. Making these 
distinguishing skills explicit can be an agent for 
change.
Two Clinical Directors:
"Improving the service may mean doing things better, 
either faster with fewer resources to a higher level of 
quality, or achieving improvements in both 
effectiveness of the service and in the efficient use 
of available resources."
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"Looking for and recognizing inefficiencies in current 
practice and generally looking for ways of improving 
how things are done."
Making things happen involves setting goals and achieving 
them. This is setting the direction of the directorate, 
providing a focus for the work of other members of the 
directorate. It may involve setting standards, delegating 
tasks to get work done or organizing resources to achieve 
desired objectives. Clinical Director:
"My job is to identify what the hospital requires of 
the directorate, and that depends on what the 
purchasers require. Then translate that into action 
through all the members of the directorate. Setting the 
targets and standards, organizing the resources to get 
the work done and monitoring the outcomes.”
The Clinical Director needs to be able to think 
conceptually, analytically and strategically, if 
necessary breaking issues into component parts and re­
connecting them into a coherent whole, in other words to 
think about the totality of the problem. He needs to be 
able to identify the key factors in a complex situation, 
and to question the basic premises and assumptions. 
Analytical thinking seems to feature highly amongst 
doctors because of their training, but it is necessary to 
also conceptualize and to relate issues to a broader 
picture and then make connections between different 
parts, to develop and use clear criteria for evaluating 
options, and to anticipate problems and develop 
contingency plans. Clinical Director:
502
"Can you visualize a long term picture of the future of 
the speciality and the directorate based on an analysis 
of its role and the likely future environment in which 
it will be trying to work, and from that develop some 
sort of strategy?"
In other words a Clinical Director must have an ability 
to learn and change behaviour as a result of experience.
The effective Clinical Director needs to be able to 
influence and persuade, trade and negotiate, plan and 
intervene. One method of influencing may of course be 
inadequate; it might be necessary to identify the key 
people who need convincing and to tailor an influencing 
strategy to the concerns of those key individuals or 
groups.
Clinical Directors may need to use networks to gain 
support, or personal relationships to bypass bureaucracy. 
This may be seen by the lobbying of influential people in 
advance of formal meetings, a method adopted by a number 
of participants in this study. It is also beneficial to 
keep key people informed on issues.
It may be necessary to elaborate logical arguments to 
influence people, to present or organise data to 
influence others, to make use of cost benefit arguments 
to influence those who make decisions about investing 
resource in developments, and it is always useful to be
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able to appeal to the greater good of the hospital or 
community.
Turrill et al (1991) in a study of the excellent doctors 
in management referred to these types of characteristics 
as competencies and found that
"These occur with sufficient frequency to suggest that 
they are too important to the role to be ignored. They 
may be termed the threshold variables in that they 
suggest the minimum conditions for fully acceptable 
performance.”
They classified them as follows:
Achieving




Influencing strategically and persuading rationally.
They felt that technical and managerial competencies are 
eminently trainable. These primary behaviours and the 
distinguishing competencies may be improved although only 
within certain limits of the individual's potential.
They feel this results from the underlying 
characteristics of the personality and are the building
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blocks for managerial process competencies such as team 
leadership, negotiation etc.
Some doctors they felt display a somewhat restricted 
range of managerial skills. Some outstanding doctors 
have a very clear view of their own role and the part 
they have to play within the overall process. Their 
common view, typified by Clinical Director,
"is that management is about trying to do more with 
less, pursuing excellence with limited resources”.
Turrill et al (1991:18) feel that
”for many reasons not least of which is the time they 
have available, it may be that they are better placed 
to do this if they act as transforming leaders rather 
than transactional managers. Their choice of role will 
have a significant effect upon the process competencies 
required by them and their immediate team."
The operation of a successful directorate often rests 
heavily upon a team approach and the nurse manager and 
business manager play a significant part. The capability 
of each member of this group of staff is critical.
Typical Clinical Directors' comments:
"A senior clinician who is a "follower" or worse still 
an "opposer" who wishes to take the role to wreck the 
changes that he sees occurring around him is a recipe 
for disaster."
"The most junior consultant was made Clinical Director 
so that the others could ignore him."
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"Unfortunately most of the people involved in 
management and wanting to be involved in management 
have been people who have wanted to build their own 
empires, and they have discovered they can be very 
supportive of their own projects."
"In our own department the most junior of the three of 
us was appointed because they wanted an age range, they 
didn't want them all to be the senior, but they 
appointed the most junior for the wrong reasons. It
created a big problem because my senior colleague
wouldn't accept it and I felt it wasn't the right one
either and in fact he was asked to resign after three
months. Which doesn't go down well in any department, 
and it created a lot of unhappiness."
Similarly a senior nurse or technician who may have been 
successful in different situations will not necessarily 
have the correct distinguishing competencies for this new 
role. Perhaps the key position for the lead clinician 
is primarily leadership, in which case, it appears 
important that the Business Manager and Nurse Manager 
should develop the appropriate managerial process skills 
to support the leader.
19.9. Summary
Based on this study I consider that there are a number of 
basic principles for the successful and effective 
involvement of doctors in management in acute hospitals. 
As discussed in this chapter they revolve around a small 
number of issues such as decentralization, an 
understanding and agreement on explicit rules and clarity 
of roles. For convenience these can be listed
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A. The roles and the relationships between the Trust 
Board and the Management Board of a hospital have to be 
explicit and clearly understood and agreed and the role 
of the Medical Director in relationship to his position 
on those two bodies also clearly understood and agreed.
B. There has to be a single Management Body or Board on 
which all the Clinical Directors sit. If only certain 
Clinical Directors sit on this Board there can be 
alienation within the directorates not accorded this 
role. This Board has to be where all the key decisions 
including financial and budgetary ones are made. The 
Clinical Directors should outnumber the Executive 
Directors. There should be no other managerial members on 
the Board, no other managerial decision making body and 
the CE or CEO must not in any circumstances circumvent 
this machinery.
C. The role of the Medical Director needs to be discussed 
openly and agreed so that everyone within the 
organization is clear, not only about the role, but also 
about the relationship of the Medical Director to the 
Clinical Directors and the consultants in general. The 
Medical Director has to be the link between the Clinical 
Directors and the Trust Board, although he does not 
necessarily need to chair the Management Board.
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D. Similarly the roles and relationships of the Clinical 
Directors need to be discussed, agreed and formalised so 
that there are no confusions. They have to be part of the 
major decision making machinery of the hospital, and the 
link with the other members of the directorate.
E. The processes by which the organization will work have 
to be clearly discussed, thought through and agreed in 
advance so that everyone knows the rules by which they 
are working. Too much attention is often given to the 
managerial structures of the hospital with little thought 
being given to how it will work in practical terms. This 
is detailed in Chapter 14 section 2, see pages 363 - 374.
F. Authority and responsibility have to be equally 
devolved to Clinical Directors. Central management often 
tries to hang on by a variety of means such as holding on 
to information, finances, the contracting processes, too 
many central managerial functions or just by withholding 
support. See Chapter 16 sections 3 - 7 ,  pages 420 - 434.
G. The importance of cross communication should not be 
forgotten to maintain relationships for example between 
directorates. The Medical Staff Committee which is not an 
executive or managerial committee should be encouraged.
In the next and final chapter I shall outline some 
visions of the future, the importance of bridging the
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divide between managers and professionals and indicating 
directions where future work might be helpful in 
progressing the issues raised.
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CHAPTER 20
SOME SUGGESTIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER WORK
20.0. A Vision of the Future
Hospitals staffed with highly trained, specialised 
personnel who cannot contribute their full potential 
means there is a gap between what is and what could be 
given, this represents a loss to hospitals and patients. 
For the individual professional the cost is frustration 
with the system and greatly unfulfilled professional 
expectations. Coordination over the majority of 
activities becomes difficult, and traditional ways of 
working may no longer be appropriate.
Increased resources, money, equipment, personnel are not 
the answer. More effective use needs to be made of 
existing resources through improved organization.
Neither does restructuring hospitals by departments lend 
itself to resolution of these or any other patient 
management or administrative problems which cross two or 
more departments. Paediatrics and Geriatrics are 
examples of two Clinical Care Units or Groups based on 
patient need rather than anatomy. New trends developing 
are Cancer, Diabetics, Gastroenterology. There will be 
an increase of this trend towards patient need groups 
rather than specialities as we now know them. The split
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between medicine and geriatrics has had its day; there 
will be a need to amalgamate directorates and different 
groupings will start to emerge.
We are entering a two dimensional matrix era with 
traditional services such as Finance, Human Resources, 
Hospital Services, Corporate Issues etc., on one plane 
and the Clinical Directorates on the other. But already 
some hospitals are entering the era of the three 
dimensional matrix, with Clinical Care Units in the third 
plane. These are units based on patient care groups such 
as paediatrics, cancer, diabetes, rather than anatomical 
areas such as dermatology, ophthalmology and gynaecology.
If the organization of a hospital is based upon the 
department and it is the Health Care Team that is 
required, the hospital needs a matrix structure, an 
organizational form which places high demands upon 
interpersonal skills. But the balance has moved towards 
requiring organizational change in health care 
institutions. By cutting across departmental lines and 
achieving coordination it is possible to create a unified 
matrix organisation. This may not be easy to implement or 
manage, as a matrix organisation requires management and 
interpersonal skills that may be lacking, but has many 
benefits in improved staff communications.
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Charns (1976) showed how integration and coordination 
were central themes in business management but 
nonexistent in health care. The traditional theory was 
that in a hospital the organization must be based on 
departments.
Several problems facing an organization trying to 
integrate were brought out: communication was too often 
ineffective, as it is as important for information to go 
laterally as well as up and down; also the potential for 
misunderstanding was great, but was lessened in a face to 
face discussion? it was also important to identify 
leadership and educate the leaders.
The problem seemed to be mainly who are the potential 
integrators in the matrix. Doctors say they are more 
concerned about interpersonal relationships in their 
department, but also expressed a view that their main 
need was for more training in managing people. Managers 
might be expected to show creativity, but tend to work 
within formal rules. The high status and prestige of 
doctors suggest they might be likely integrators, but 
their extreme orientations to the hospital may make them 
inappropriate. Managers tend to have a closer 
relationship to the hospital than doctors but lack 
medical training and have lower status. In fact no group 
has all the requirements to be an effective integrator. 
The most logical choice, because he has the respect and
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confidence of other members and a balanced orientation is 
the Clinical Director. Unfortunately, at present most 
consultants have limited management, interpersonal and 
group process skills. But things are changing. Enthoven 
(1985:47):
"A promising trend is for some doctors to attend 
postgraduate courses in management and plan careers 
combining medical practice and management.”
It has been said that "The modern hospital was designed 
in 1920 and has not changed a great deal since" (Drucker 
1992). But change is occurring now, Clinical Directorates 
are operating as autonomous business units with decisions 
made as close to the patient as practical, and the 
directorate managing all its resources either directly or 
via an explicit contract between business and service 
directorates.
20.1. Bridging the Divide.
Stewart (1989) and Maxwell (1992a) and (1992b) and 
(1992c) talk of bridges and bridging this divide, as no 
one really wants a divide. (NHSTA 1989:7):
"a measure of disagreement and conflict between 
managers and doctors over key issues can actually be
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good for the Service, in that it subjects such issues 
to scrutiny from more than one perspective."
It is the suspicion and misunderstanding of others' 
motives that need to be overcome. Managers need to 
convince doctors that they too are committed to patient 
care although it may take a different form, and doctors 
need to show an understanding of the necessity for 
management and what it can offer. This is best done by 
personal contact, keeping each other informed 
particularly about likely changes, by encouraging doctors 
to take on managerial roles, by providing management 
training for doctors, by using appropriate change 
management methods to effect change, by learning what 
matters to doctors, enlisting their support and showing 
others that you, whether doctor or manager, are 
trustworthy.
Consultants are a loose knit peer group, highly 
individual, fiercely independent, hard working, taking 
enormous pride in excellence and passionately championing 
the doctor patient relationship. But there is a shadow 
side: there is little time to learn new skills. In 
situations of scarce resources an energetic consultant 
who puts energy into hospital politics may win at the 
expense of someone else, and energy and enthusiasm put 
into the doctor patient relationship may undermine 
loyalty to the organization. If change is to occur these
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strengths and weaknesses must be recognized. The cultural 
shift has been supported by a clinical directorate 
management system. Slowly, new skills, looking at costs, 
and the need to become part of the organization have been 
recognized. The Americans unlike their UK counterparts 
have taken things slowly and gone to great lengths to win 
the support of their clinicians.
If the hospital was the doctors' workshop, as some 
doctors still think, and the role of other staff, nurses 
and administrators was to implement doctors' orders with 
for example sister coordinated nursing, clerical and 
patient services with other parts of the hospital and if 
necessary taking over those functions to get things done, 
then the need for coordination would be reduced but at a 
cost. The primacy of the individual doctor needs to be 
replaced by multi-disciplinary teams and a breaking out 
of tribal groups.
Bennis (1992) stresses the need to overcome divisions and 
encourage teamwork:
"There is a need to overcome the divisiveness of 
structures and there is a recognition of this in the 
NHS with health authorities attempting to encourage a 
more corporate spirit of teamwork. All of the best 
principles of medicine should work in management."
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He also recognizes how difficult some of the broader 
concepts of management can be for doctors:
"But most doctors have a hard time with management.
I've taught a lot of physicians, and nothing in their 
education has prepared them for the technology of 
cooperation. They are self absorbed and used to 
personal intervention rather than working in teams.
They don't have the literacy of teamwork, 
collaboration, and empowering other people."
"Doctors are socialised in science, to look for the 
correct answer, to dissect and pull apart, and to make 
decisions on empirical evidence. They are not educated 
to be synthetic."
Jarrold (1992) told a forum organised by the Institute of 
Health Service managers that
"Learning to change behaviour - from the chief 
executive through to ward level - is essential if 
health care organizations are to succeed in meeting the 
challenges set by the NHS reforms".
He highlighted the areas of greatest need for attention 
to partnerships including "managers and professionals". 
Hunter (1992) felt that
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"Partnership is about reforming the whole organisation, 
not bolting it on to others."
He went on to offer a warning however:
"Collaboration is not a panacea and health authorities 
must work at effective internal partnerships."
Jarrold (1992) felt that:
"The professional is trained to care for the patient. A 
manager has a wider focus but the two are equal 
partners. There are faults on both sides but we must 
all work as a team and demonstrate commitment to 
patient care, moving from hierarchies to partnerships."
20.2. Directions for Further Work
When I began this project the question I asked seemed 
simple enough. But it has uncovered many issues and led 
to a wide range of supplementary questions which are all 
worthy of investigation in themselves. I have been 
almost exclusively involved in researching consultants 
who are actively involved in management in hospitals, but 
what of the attitudes of those consultants not actively 
concerned in management?
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My work has highlighted the dilemmas that face doctors in 
management roles. These dilemmas are: doctors are highly 
motivated but have their own objectives? working hard on 
patient care but having little time to devote to learning 
new management skills? doing what they were trained to do 
as clincians while having to learn and develop new 
skills? safeguarding the doctor patient relationship at 
the same time caring for the organization, in other words 
doing their best for the individual patient while at the 
same time being aware of the needs of other patients? of 
too much resource going on one patient due to sheer 
technical excellence and the advance of technology 
against the prudent use of resources for the whole 
community? the dilemma of a restless search for 
excellence and terchnical advance while being prudent 
with resources? the feeling of independence, isolation 
etc., yet now needing to cooperate with others? clinical 
freedom against central control? and personal medicine as 
opposed to agency medicine.
Perhaps Hampden-Turner's (1990) methods could be used to 
identify "both-ands” instead of "either-ors”. By 
identifying and charting key dilemmas and using dual axis 
and cross axis charting it might be possible to show how 
to steer a middle course, and to show how far doctors and 
hospitals have moved in dealing with these issues.
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I have mentioned the roles of the Business Manager and 
Nurse Manager within the directorate but this is a new 
concept and there is a need to know what is required of 
their relationship with the Clinical Director.
Clinical freedom is a major issue and is multi faceted. 
What is the effect of the increasing involvement of 
doctors in management on clinical freedom and the 
perception of clinical freedom by patients, managers and 
doctors? How has the perception changed and what is the 
nature of the change? How is any change being handled?
What is it about a hospital that causes it to be 
decentralized or not? Is it the Chief Executive or the 
Consultants? What is the influence of the Chairman of 
the Trust Board? What effect do the other executive 
directors have on the way the hospital is managed?
We have seen how Addison, the first Minister of Health 
under Lloyd George, and Dawson introduced the idea of an 
integrated health service with Primary Health Centres in 
which consultant advice would be available and the 
hospitals would be Secondary Health Centres. We have 
seen how further proposals were made to end this 
separation of the branches of medicine before the 
formation of the National Health Service. Would uniting 
the profession in this way, avoiding communication 
problems, producing a more immediate and coordinated
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response between the two, be worth considering again? It 
is a combination which is being used effectively in some 
American institutions.
Primary care is taking on more and more of those 
functions which were hitherto the sole territory of 
hospitals. Day surgery is increasing but at present is 
only a fraction of what it will be achieving in the 
future. The health service is moving towards a need for a 
more integrated service than ever before. Maybe we are 
witnessing a return to involving consultants more in 
patient care outside the hospital again. Perhaps we are 
seeing the first moves away from the national hospital 
service towards a truly national health service. When the 
opportunity for such a revolutionary plan was lost in 
1920, Cartwright (1977:166) described the "plan as one of 
the more important, although tragic, documents in the 
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